SIXTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. No. 07164-SP.  April 18, 1978.]

PEDRO BARRAMEDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELOMINA OCA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

D E C I S I O N

PASCUAL, J p:

Before this Court is an appeal from the decision of Branch I of the Court of Agrarian Relations in Cebu City ordering the plaintiff to surrender and deliver the farmholding in question to the defendants Carlos and Vicenta Lopez, and subsequently dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

The issues are simply whether the court below had jurisdiction over the case, and whether the appellant was illegally ejected from his farmholding on the alleged ground of abandonment.

Contrary to the opinion of the courts below we hold that it has jurisdiction over the present action.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint (Magay vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456, 458; Tumulad vs. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143, 151; Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137, 140; Union Obrera de Tabaco, Inc. vs. Quicho, 40 SCRA 589, 594). And in his complaint, the plaintiff-appellant alleged that he is the agricultural tenant of the defendants Carlos and Vicenta Lopez (Complaint, paragraphs 2 and 3, CAR Record, pp. 1 and 2). Indeed, the court below found that there was a tenancy relationship between the parties (Supplemental Decision, CAR Record, p. 304). Furthermore, the complaint sets forth allegations of dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant by the landowners (Paragraphs 11 and 12, CAR Record, pp. 2-3). The allegations of tenancy relations between the contending parties and dispossession of the appellant are sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court below (Casaria vs. Rosales, 14 SCRA 368, 370; Tuvera vs. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 729, 732; Cabio vs. Alcantara, CA-G.R. No. 02741-SP, February 5, 1975). The fact that the defendants-landowners denied the allegations of the plaintiff-appellant and averred that the latter had abandoned his farmholding did not divest the court below of its jurisdiction for a very obvious reason.

But the court below insists that since the plaintiff-appellant abandoned his farmholding, then the disposition of the case properly belongs to the Department of Agrarian Reforms pursuant to "Section 12(b), number (11) of Republic Act 946." (See Supplemental Decision, CAR Record, p. 304).

We do not agree. The facts do not show that the appellant abandoned his farmholding as we will presently consider. In the second place, Republic Act No. 946 cited by the court below has no reference to tenancy relations. It refers to prohibition of work on Sundays and legal holidays. If the court below meant to refer to Presidential Decree No. 946, then we still do not agree. The allegation of the landowners that the appellant abandoned his farmholding is a question of fact requiring judicial intervention. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 946 took effect only on June 17, 1976. Even assuming arguendo, that this Decree covers the present case, Section 12(b) thereof is not applicable because this provision refers only to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reforms over matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27. And Section 12(b)(11) of the said Decree refers in particular to the administrative implementation of the transfer of a farmholding which has been actually abandoned by a tenant-farmer either before or after receiving his certificate of land transfer. In this event, the administrative implementation involved in the transfer of land calls for the Department of Agrarian Reforms to cancel the certificate of land transfer and to allocate the farmholding in question to the actual tiller thereof, if any there be. Otherwise, the farmholding shall be reallocated to a deserving tenant-farmer recommended by the Samahang Nayon within whose jurisdiction the farmholding in question is located (Handbook on Presidential Decree No. 946, S. Ct. Publ., p. 49). In different words, the question of whether a particular farmholding has been abandoned or not by a tenant-farmer is still a factual question within the jurisdictional competence of the Courts of Agrarian Relations.

This brings us to the next issue of whether the plaintiff-appellant had abandoned his farmholding. If he did not, then there is no question that he was unlawfully ejected and must be reinstated with damages. If he did, then the tenancy relationship existing between the parties was severed and he had no right to reinstatement. Our judgment is that he did not.

The material facts show that plaintiff-appellant was the tenant of the defendants-appellees Carlos and Vicenta Lopez over a small parcel of corn land situated in Bolinawan, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime in October of 1973, plaintiff-appellant left for Surigao to secure some financial help from a nephew living there (t.s.n., February 19, 1975, p. 19; September 4, 1975, pp. 6, 24, 26; April 22, 1976, p. 52). But before leaving his farmholding, the plaintiff-appellant entrusted it to the care of another nephew, Salvador Alfafara (t.s.n., February 19, 1975, p. 20; September 4, 1975, pp. 6, 10, 24, 26, 28, 32; April 22, 1976, p. 19). What is more, the plaintiff-appellant advised Francisco Oca, the landowner's overseer, of his impending departure for Surigao and informed the overseer that he was going to leave the cultivation of his farmholding to his nephew until his return (t.s.n., May 4, 1974, p. 12). Salvador Alfafara worked on the farmholding of his uncle from the time the latter left in October of 1973 until December of 1973 (t.s.n., February 19, 1975, p. 27) when the appellees took possession of their landholding (t.s.n., September 4, 1975, pp. 10, 40, 46, 55; April 19, 1976, pp. 34, 40) and turned it over to their overseer Francisco Oca, the other defendant in this case (t.s.n., September 4, 1975, pp. 33, 56). When the plaintiff-appellant returned to Carcar, Cebu on January 6, 1974 (t.s.n., February 19, 1975, p. 19), he demanded the return of his farmholding but the defendant landowners refused.

The landowners admit that the plaintiff-appellant was their agricultural tenant on the landholding in question since 1969 (t.s.n., February 19, 1975, pp. 7, 18). We also take judicial notice of the decision of the court below in CAR Case No. 960 (Exhibit B-1, found in Exhibit B, at p. 115) holding that the plaintiff-appellant was the tenant of the defendants-appellees. This is reiterated by the same court in the present case (Supplemental Decision, CAR Record, p. 304). But the landowners claim that the defendant-appellant had abandoned his farmholding when he left for Surigao in October of 1973. There is no merit to this contention. To constitute "abandonment" there must be an intention to do so manifested by the absolute relinquishment of the farmholding by the tenant (Asoy vs. Gonzaga, CA-G.R. No. 02683-SP, October 31, 1974). In the case at bar, the facts show that the appellant had no such intention and neither did he relinquish absolutely the farmholding to the appellees or to their overseer. On the contrary, the plaintiff-appellant has shown his determination to recover his farmholding when he learned that the landowners had taken it from his nephew. Besides, plaintiff-appellant was not remiss as a tenant-lessee during his short absence from the farm for two months. The defendant landowners themselves admitted that appellant's nephew, Salvador Alfafara, cultivated the farmholding up to December, 1973 when they took the farmholding away from him (t.s.n., February 19, 1975, p. 27; April 19, 1976, pp. 24, 26, 28, 39). In fact, when the defendant landowners took over the farmholding, there was a standing crop which they later harvested in January of 1974 (t.s.n., September 4, 1975, pp. 58, 59; April 19, 1976, p. 13). While it is a fact that they paid appellant's nephew for the production expenses (t.s.n., April 19, 1976, p. 11), the decisive fact is that Salvador Alfafara cultivated the farmholding for the appellant while the latter was temporarily away.

The infirmity of defendants-appellees' theory of abandonment is also evident from the fact that the plaintiff-appellant has no other farmholding and that his only source of livelihood is the disputed farmholding (t.s.n., April 19, 1976, p. 19). Unless he is out of his mind, and there is no evidence that he is, the appellant is not likely to abandon his only means of livelihood. There was no reason for him to do so and our attention has not been called to any. Indeed, the fact that the plaintiff-appellant was already deemed the owner of the disputed farmholding which he has actually tilled under Presidential decree No. 27 and Presidential Decree No. 316 (Villavicencio vs. Navarro, CA-G.R. No. 01174-SP, September 30, 1974), coupled by the fact that he has a certificate of Land Transfer (Exhibit X; t.s.n., December 11, 1975, pp. 6-8) are compelling reasons why the plaintiff-appellant would not abandon his only farmholding.

While defendants-appellees tried to prove that plaintiff-appellant's nephew, Salvador Alfafara, had voluntarily surrendered the disputed farmholding to them upon reimbursement of his production expenses (Exhibits 1, 1-A), Alfafara had really nothing to surrender because he was not the actual tenant. He could not surrender it because he was not authorized to do so by his uncle. There was also no voluntary surrender of the farmholding in contemplation of law because the appellant has not evinced such intention by notice in writing, as required by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Asoy vs. Gonzaga, CA-G.R. No. 02683-SP, October 31, 1974). There is no such a thing as presumptive voluntary surrender or abandonment anyway. Neither is there abandonment or voluntary surrender by implication, and most certainly not from vague and doubtful evidence. If there should ever be a waiver of right, public policy demands that the same be clearly and convincingly established by competent and sufficient evidence. There is none in this case. (See Gultiano vs. Oraez, CA-G.R. No. 02514-SP, February 10, 1975; Sumayo vs. Poblacion, CA-G.R. No. 02269-R, November 11, 1974; Gavino de la Cruz vs. Antonio J. Castro, CA-G.R. No. 47039-R, January 5, 1972.)

Coming now to the issue of damages claimed by the appellant, the rule is that a tenant-farmer who is unlawfully ejected is entitled to damages. Section 27(1) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, expressly provides that in case of unlawful ejectment, the landholder shall be liable to the tenant for damages to the extent of the landholder's participation in the harvest. But this is not a matter of course. It is settled that recovery of damages by an unlawfully dispossessed tenant must be proved by competent evidence (Delfin vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 19 SCRA 593-594). As stated above, the measure of damages is to the extent of the landholder's participation in the harvest. For this purpose, the net produce must be ascertained and this requires the deduction of production expenses from the gross produce. In the present case, the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove by clear and sufficient evidence the actual damages allegedly suffered by him. This Court can not award him any.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court below dismissing the case is hereby set aside because it is not supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions therein being clearly against the law and jurisprudence. A new one is hereby entered ordering defendants-appellees Carlos and Vicenta Lopez to return and reinstate the plaintiff-appellant Pedro Barrameda on the farmholding in question posthaste and that he be maintained in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof. Costs against the appellee spouses.

SO ORDERED.

Juliano Agrava and Climaco, JJ ., concur.