NINTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. No. SP-03163-CAR.  April 14, 1977.]

FELIZARDO MAGALONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SIMON YAP, defendant-appellee.

D E C I S I O N

VASQUEZ, J p:

The plaintiff commenced this action before the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lingayen, Pangasinan praying that his alleged tenancy relationship with the defendant be changed to the leasehold system, and that the defendant be ordered to pay him his short-shares, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages. Plaintiff alleges that he has been a tenant on a parcel of land owned by the defendant planted to palay with an area of 1-½ hectares, located in Barrio Taloy, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, since 1966; that they were sharing the produce of the land on a 50-50 basis, with the plaintiff contributing all the items of production and cultivation, with the exception of the land; that the gross harvest of the land for the agricultural years 1969 to 1972 were 72, 76, 80 and 50 cavans, respectively; that he has thus been short-shared by 25 percent of the produce of the land; and that he has indicated to the defendant his desire to shift to the leasehold system, but the defendant has refused his demand.

Answering the complaint, the defendant denied that the plaintiff is his tenant on the landholding in question, the truth of the matter being allegedly that the plaintiff is a full-time employee in his corn mill as machine operator; and that the landholding in question is being cultivated not by any tenant, but by the laborers in his corn mill, including the plaintiff.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, without costs. It ruled that the plaintiff was not able to prove his tenancy status over the landholding in question. Hence, this appeal.

There is no dispute as to these facts: The defendant operates a cono-type corn mill located in Barrio Taloy, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. He also owns a parcel of agricultural land with an area of approximately 1-½ hectares in the same barrio. The plaintiff is one of the twelve laborers in the corn mill, he being the machine operator thereof. He worked in the corn mill from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. everyday, except Sundays and holidays. He was receiving a daily wage of P8.00, and was a member of the Social Security System to which he contributed P0.60 monthly out of his salaries as a machine operator in the defendant's corn mill. The payment of his salaries as a machine operator had been evidenced by payrolls signed by him (Exhibits 1 to 5).

In December 1972, the defendant dismissed the plaintiff from his job as a machine operator in the corn mill. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant for termination pay before the National Labor Relations Commission of the Department of Labor. During the pendency of said case, or on June 28, 1973, the plaintiff instituted the present action before the Court of Agrarian Relations in Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Plaintiff claims that in addition to his employment as a machine operator in the corn mill, he worked as a tenant on the riceland of the defendant. He performed such work from 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and on Sundays and holidays, as well as on other occasions when he was not needed in the corn mill. He presented Genaro Manzon, a tenant on a neighboring parcel of land, to testify that he used to see the plaintiff in the landholding in question in the early mornings and during Sundays and holidays.

The defendant does not deny that he had asked the plaintiff to go to his said riceland. He claims, however, that the land was being cultivated by about six or seven of his laborers in the corn mill, and the plaintiff merely supervised their work in the land; and that the laborers in the corn mill, including the plaintiff, were sent to the land when they are not occupied in the corn mill, and that all of them get paid for doing such work, which compensation is included in their salaries as his employees in the corn mill. Defendant presented one of the laborers in the corn mill, Miguel Layacan, to corroborate his testimony.

In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that he is a tenant on the land in question, the trial court made the following observations, in which We concur:

"The plaintiff miserably failed to prove his tenancy over the landholding in question. Other than his vague declaration that he started tenanting the landholding since 1966, the plaintiff have not shown the important details of his tenancy agreement with the defendant. Thus, none is shown in evidence as to his crop sharing agreement with the defendant; the amount of his past harvests; the amount of seeds he used in the landholding; his contributions to the items of cultivation as well as that of the defendant landowner. The absence of these important facts negate the plaintiff's claim of tenancy over the land in question.

We are overwhelmingly convinced by the defendant's evidence that the land in question is not under tenancy by any person but it is being cultivated by the defendant through his laborers in the corn mill. The plaintiff is usually sent by the defendant to work on the farm during the time that he was not occupied in the corn mill for which he was paid accordingly. The absence of tenancy over the land in question becomes more apparent from the testimony of Miguel Layacan who declared that the harvests were all taken by the defendant every after the threshing thereof. Therefore, the fact that the defendant shares with no one of the produce of the land in question is indicative of the absence of tenancy thereon." (Original Record, pp. 65-66).

We fail to see how a person in the situation of the plaintiff who was employed as a full-time machine operator in a corn mill, working therein from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. everyday excluding Sundays and holidays, could still be a tenant on a parcel of riceland. No matter how industrious he might be, he simply may not devote enough time and attention to the cultivation of the landholding as are called for by the nature of such task.

". . . It is uniformly held that a tenant may not accept full-time employment either in or outside the government service without running the risk of being ejected from his landholding, considering that, by the nature of his two diverse jobs each of which requires his full time and attention, he cannot successfully and efficiently serve two masters at the same time. The tenant cannot altogether shift the burden of his responsibilities to the immediate members of his farm household and claim exemption from complying personally with his obligations, because if he can legally do so, the essence of tenancy relationship — that of trust and confidence will have lost is meaning. Thus it has been held that acceptance of work in the Bureau of Public Works, as a Chief of Police, or as a school teacher, justifies a tenant's ejectment." (The Agricultural Land Reform Code, Santos and Macalino, 1963 Edition, p. 204).

A tenant is even prohibited to work on another landholding if the area of his own is already over 5 hectares, or is sufficient to make him and the members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its cultivation, without the knowledge or consent of his landholder (Sec. 24 (1), Republic Act No. 1199). It is said that the reason behind this limitation is "to protect the landholder who would naturally suffer from the scattered efforts of his tenant and to insure that the tenant will endeavor to attain optimum returns from the land entrusted to him" (Op. cit, pp. 265-266).

In this appeal, the plaintiff has vigorously maintained that this case should be referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316 in relation to DAR Memorandum Circular No. 29. We find no merit in this plea, firstly, because the evidence on record clearly shows the absence of a tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; and secondly, the present action is not filed by a landlord against a tenant with a view to harassing or ejecting the latter from his landholding. It is to be noted from the complaint that the plaintiff does not even allege that he was ejected or threatened to be ejected from his supposed landholding. Neither does he pray for reinstatement to the subject landholding.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Batacan and Jimenez, JJ ., concur.