SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 43440. December 5, 1995.]
JOSE VARGAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CELEDONIO OBANE, defendant-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R. T., J p:
THIS is an appeal in an action 1 for recovery of possession of a portion of a parcel of land with damages.
Plaintiff adduced evidence tending to show that he is the owner and possessor of five-hectare parcel of land situated at Barangay Maoyon, Puerto Princesa City. The property was designated, after cadastral survey, as Lot No. 17922, Cad. 800-D.
In 1976, defendant, brother-in-law of plaintiff, arrived in Puerto Princesa City. At that time, defendant was financially hard-up, without visible means of livelihood. Plaintiff benevolently allowed defendant to gather, produce and enjoy the fruits of the coconuts, coffee and citrus trees as well as the banana plants in a one-hectare portion of plaintiff's property.
Plaintiff and defendant agreed on the following:
"(a) The defendant will take care of the trees and/or the plants aforementioned and will gather and enjoy the fruits or products thereof for his own benefit and without any obligation on his part to give or share with the herein plaintiff any part or portion of the fruits or products of said plants or trees;
(b) The defendant will plant on the land (portion adverted to) additional coffee trees and plaintiff will pay him P2.00 per tree planted when he will desist from further taking care of the trees/plants and gathering the fruits thereof either on his own volition or upon demand by the plaintiff;
(c) That defendant will immediately stop taking care of the trees/plants on the land (portion adverted) and desist from further (sic) gathering or enjoying the fruits or products thereon upon demand by the plaintiff and after payment by the plaintiff of the coffee trees planted by the defendant at the rate of P2.00 per tree;"
In 1982, plaintiff demanded from defendant to return and vacate the one-hectare portion. Defendant, however, refused to heed the demand despite plaintiff's offer to compensate defendant P2.00 for every coffee tree he planted.
Defendant denied plaintiff's claim of benevolence. Defendant averred that his agreement with plaintiff is as follows:
"a) defendant will take care of the existing agricultural improvements on the land so that the fruits gathered will be divided between them in the manner where 1/3 go to plaintiff , while 2/3 will go to defendant.
b) defendant will plant coffee which when already fruit bearing, the fruits will be divided between them in the same sharing percentage aforementioned.
c) if when defendant should decide to vacate the land, plaintiff will pay him the reasonable value of each coffee planted but not necessarily at the rate of P2.00/tree.
d) defendant has the option to vacate the land but plaintiff will never demand, or compel defendant that he vacate the land." (Emphasis supplied)
Defendant also claimed having planted all the new coffee trees for which he is entitled to payment of their reasonable value before he can be ejected2 .
At the pre-trial conference, the parties defined the issues as follows:
"1. Whether or not the defendant is a tenant of the plaintiff;
2. Whether or not the plaintiff has any legal claim over the land occupied by the defendant; and
3. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to collect damages from the defendant under the premises." 3
On July 22, 1993, the trial Court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that —
"It is now beyond question that plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the portion of land designated as Lot No. 17922 situated in Barangay Maoyon, Puerto Princesa City, his ownership over the entire lot is now an undisputed fact. It was likewise indubitably established that said lot is being applied for homestead by the son of plaintiff identified as Tomas Vargas.
"Definitely, defendant was neither a claimant nor a tenant. Despite pretensions he assumed earlier claiming the relation of tenant and landlord with plaintiff, which he later abandoned unilaterally and claiming ownership of his portion only to drop it when he found he could not successfully maintain this position, he held on to the portion simply on the pretext that the P2.00 per coffee tree to be reimbursed to him as previously agreed was too small in relation to the valuation fixed by the City Assessor. The Court is left without option than to declare his possession in evident bad faith. Since defendant is neither a claimant nor a tenant and refused to let go of the premises without just cause despite demand from the plaintiff whose ownership and possession over the said property was never disputed, there can be no doubt plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from said defendant.
"In 1976, when out of sheer generosity of the plaintiff the defendant was allowed to develop the land and to enjoy its fruits without an obligation to give anything to the former, he was, at least at that time considered under the law as one who was a 'possessor in good faith.' Such possession was however converted to possession in bad faith when he unreasonable refused to vacate the subject premises upon a lawful demand made by the plaintiff. Thus, it appeared clear that in 1982, despite demand for him to vacate the premises defendant held on his possession on the flimsy ground that he was not yet reimbursed of the improvements he made on the land. Regardless of the offer of plaintiff to pay P2.00 for every coffee tree defendant had planted as they have previously agreed, the latter persisted in his possession without categorically naming his price for the improvements. he simply refused to vacate and continued his possession to the prejudice of the plaintiff who was the true owner and possessor of the property. In the mind of the Court, defendant's actuation could only be construed as desperate bid to hold on to his possession regardless of the consequences. In life, there are circumstances that require a prudent man to verify and if he does not do so, he will be in bad faith as provided under Art. 528 of the Civil Code which provides, to wit:
'Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.'
"Since then, defendant had been possessing the premises in bad faith, hence, he neither had the right of retention nor for reimbursement for all the improvements he made starting in 1982 up to the present time. In view thereof, plaintiff is perforce entitled to payment of damages he suffered as a consequence of defendant's unlawful acts. From the actual assessment made by the Barangay Captain of Maoyon, Puerto Princesa City, it appeared that there were as of January 1984 263 coffee bearing trees and 136 non-bearing. Of this number, it may be safely assumed that around 249 coffee trees were planted by the defendant. If at all, plaintiff was obligated only to pay the sum of P500.00 for defendant's efforts." 4
The decretal portion of the decision states:
"WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and orders the following:
1. Defendant must vacate and relinquish possession immediately to the portion of Lot No. 17922 he occupies;
2. Defendant pay plaintiff the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as reasonable value for the fruits of coffee trees since 1982 up to the present;
3. Defendant pay the litigation expenses and attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS to plaintiff; and
4. By way of moral damages defendant pay the additional sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS;
5. Defendant pay the cost." 5
Feeling aggrieved, defendant appealed the decision, ascribing three (3) errors to the trial court, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PARCEL.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT IS NOT A TENANT OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT IS A POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH WHO HAS NO RIGHT OF RETENTION AND NO RIGHT OF A REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS HE INTRODUCED TO THE LAND IN QUESTION. 6
Defendant-appellant contends that:
First. Plaintiff-appellee has no legal right to institute the present action for lack of a valid title. The lot in question being a public land, the right to evict occupants thereof belongs to the State.
Second. There is tenancy relationship between him and appellee. There being a tenancy relationship, the lower Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
Third. Since he is a tenant, appellant claims a security of tenure. The demand to vacate by appellee in 1982 was not for a valid cause. Thus, appellant's refusal to vacate the land was justified and was not done in bad faith.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant's stance is glaringly inconsistent. On one hand, he denies appellee's ownership of the land. On the other hand, he claims to have tenancy relationship with appellee over the land with him as the tenant.
For a tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is consideration; (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land; and (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvest. 7
If appellee is not a landowner as claimed by appellant, then there can be no tenancy relationship because for a tenancy relationship to exist, the parties must be a landowner and a tenant.
If, however, appellant is a tenant, then he cannot deny the title of appellee as landlord, in the light of Sec. 2 (b), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence which provides for a conclusive presumption, thus:
"(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them."
Otherwise stated, the ownership of the landlord at the start of the tenancy relation is conclusively presumed as against the tenant and the latter is not permitted to dispute that fact.
Notwithstanding appellant's claim that the land in dispute is a public land, appellee as actual possessor can commence an action for recovery of possession because ownership is not in issue. It is undisputed that at the time appellant entered the disputed land, appellee was already in possession thereof. Appellee's possession was manifested by the fact that several fruit-bearing trees and coffee trees were already planted by him prior to appellant's entry. Appellant's entry into the land was only due to appellee's benevolent and gratuitous act, i.e., to help appellant cope up with the financial distress he was facing at that time.
In allowing appellant to work on the disputed land, appellee imposed no obligation on the part of appellant to give a share of the fruits to plaintiff. In short, appellant was not a tenant of appellee and, therefore, not entitled to security of tenure.
We, however, do not agree with the order of the trial Court for appellant to pay appellee P10,000.00 as reasonable value of the fruits of the coffee trees, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, attorney's fees and P110,000.00 moral damages. We find no adequate basis for these awards. One is entitled for an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. 8 There is no such proof. And it is now settled that where the reason for the award of attorney's fees was not stated in the trial Court's decision but only in its dispositive portion, the same ought to be deleted. 9
Moreover, the record shows that from the time appellant entered the land in 1976, he introduced improvements and planted coffee trees which were already fruit-bearing at the time appellee demanded for the return of the land in 1982. Appellee himself offered to pay P2.00 for every coffee tree planted by appellee and the Court made a finding that around 249 such trees were planted by appellant. It should be appellant who deserves a reimbursement in the aforesaid amount offered by appellee.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that the order for defendant-appellant to pay the reasonable value of the fruits of the coffee trees, moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees are hereby DELETED and in lieu thereof, plaintiff-appellee is hereby ordered to reimburse appellant the sum of P498.00. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
Buena and Vasquez, Jr., * JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2240 of RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa City, Original Records (OR), pp. 1-5.
2. OR, pp. 9-12.
3. OR, p. 70.
4. OR, pp. 139-141; Rollo, pp. 44-46. Emphasis Ours.
5. OR, p. 141; Rollo, p. 46, penned by Judge Angel R. Miclat.
6. Rollo, pp. 20-21.
7. Qua v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 236 (1991).
8. Art. 2199, New Civil Code.
9. RCPI vs. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899 (1990); Agustin vs. CA, 186 SCRA 375 (1990).
* Acting Third Member vice J. C. Y. Santiago, on leave, per Office Order No. ____.