SEVENTEENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 52748. June 27, 2000.]
RITA UBANAN and the HEIRS OF TEOFILO UBANAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. HEIRS OF NICOLAS CAPISTRANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
D E C I S I O N
SALAS, B., J p:
What We have is an appeal from the Order by the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, which directed the dismissal of the appeal; and the dismissal of the Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Case No. 96-073; for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance; Annulment of Title; Damages . . .).
The appellants faulted the Court below with the following Assignment of Errors:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ATTY. V. J. CABANLET WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE DEFENDANTS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 'JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS' FILED BY NEW COUNSELS.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF IS RESORTING TO TECHNICALITY.
IV. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES HAS ALREADY SET IN AS AGAINST THE IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' TITLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN BERGADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' ACTION TO QUIET TITLE HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED."
(Rollo, p. 15).
Res judicata and prescription, to Us, are the only relevant issues.
We affirm.
The plaintiffs/appellants said that they are filing the case as heirs of the late husband, Teofilo Ubanan; or as the children of Teofilo and Rita Ubanan.
The defendants/appellees, heirs of Nicolas Capistrano and Cecilia Castañeda, are the persons in whose names OCT No. O-596, covering the property in Kamakawan, Guza, Cagayan de Oro, was issued. Capistrano Mountainview Corporation, on the other hand, is a family corporation by the heirs of Nicolas and Cecilia, which corporation now manages the contested property.
Fil-estate Development, Inc. (FEDI) is the developer of the property, site of the Mountain Meadows Residential Estates and Golf Club.
Fil-Estate Property, Inc. is the assignee of a portion of the property, and a co-developer.
Appellants added that they are the owners and natural possessors of Lot No. 2536-C-3, measuring an area of 20,000 square meters, still owned in common and originally a public land occupied and possessed under a bonafide claim of ownership since 1960 by Felicidad Yekyek, or a portion of the land covered by OCT No. O-596.
In 1965, Teofilo and Rita Ubanan purchased from Felicidad said portion, as a matter of fact, evidenced by an Absolute Sale on September 22, 1965.
After the purchase, they took possession thereof, cultivated the property and introduced improvements; had the property tax declared in their names; and paid the taxes. From 1965 or for a period of thirty (30) years, they had been in continuous possession of the property under a bonafide claim of ownership.
They were shocked in October, 1994, when the heirs of Nicolas Capistrano claimed ownership of the property, supposedly by virtue of OCT No. O-596, said title having been issued by the Commission of Land Registration on April 3, 1974, in the names of the defendants, heirs of Nicolas and Cecilia. It also appeared that OCT No. O-596 covered the whole sitio of Kamakawan and included Lot No. 2536-C-3 (part), being owned by them (appellants).
In January, 1996, Fil-Estate Development and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. brought bulldozers to the area, closed the entry points, installed check points, started conducting surveys, prevented the free ingress and egress; and stopped them from bringing in building and planting materials. As a matter of fact, the appellees are now in the initial stage of developing the sitio into a proposed residential estate and golf club.
"Worst", as of February 3 and 4, 1996, the property was bulldozed and half levelled, totally destroying their plants, trees and improvements.
Appellants further said that OCT No. O-596 in the name of the heirs of the Capistranos is null and void insofar as it covers the contested property, Lot No. 2536 C-3 (Part). Aside from that, the procurement of OCT No. O-596 by the defendants was malicious, in bad faith and with fraud.
They precisely asked the Court that they be declared as true and absolute owners of the property — Lot No. 2536 C-3 (Part); and for the Register of Deeds to cancel the title of the appellees.
It was, on the other hand, the allegation of the appellees in their Motion to Dismiss that the Complaint did not specify which of the ten lots the appellants are claiming ownership.
The Capistrano lots were covered by CARP, Compulsory Acquisition for Land distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law that was protested against as being exempt because the property is residential and not agricultural. The protest, as a matter of fact, was granted by the DAR Secretary who issued an Order of Exemption in 1995. There was a Motion for Reconsideration by the occupants but this was denied.
Pursuant to the DAR Secretary's Order, the only obligation of the appellees was to do payment of the disturbance compensation; or the only right of the appellants was to be paid.
Since 1974, when the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court dismissed the adverse claims, the occupants did not do anything to perfect their claim of ownership, except to rely on the tax declarations.
The appellants argued that the Decision in Cad. Case No. 19 cannot be considered as evidence since this was not established; there is no proof either that the Decision has already become final and executory. Courts are not authorized to take judicial knowledge of the contents of the records of other cases, notwithstanding that both cases may have been heard before the same judge, although in the absence of an objection, the Court may treat all or any part of the original record, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it or when the original record of the case or any part of it has been admitted as part of the records of the case then pending. They even have consistently insisted that the appellees present as evidence the alleged Decision in Cad. Case No. 19.
Res judicata, they continued, presupposes the following elements, a) a former judgment that is final, b) rendered by the Court of competent jurisdiction, c) a judgment on the merits, d) identity between the first and the second actions, of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.
In the case at bar, they said, the causes of action are different; one is a Decision on a cadastral case while the case at bar is for injunction and damages, Appellees' ownership does not constitute res judicata because the cause of action is not dependent on ownership. If at all the case was filed, it was because the appellees bulldozed the property and harassed them in the exercise of their right of ownership. Their possession now covers a total of thirty-two (32) years, exclusive of possession by the predecessors. They even have a house and had planted several trees and plants. Even assuming arguendo that the appellees are owners of the property, they (appellants), on the other hand, should be looked upon as builders/planters in good faith; the appellees are not supposed, to take the law into their own hands.
On imprescriptibility of the appellees' title:
vThe pronouncement by the Court that no title in derogation of the title of the registered owner, can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, does not apply, since the case, in court, is one for quieting of title and reconveyance. Notwithstanding irrevocability of the Torrens Title, a person can still be compelled to do reconveyance of the property to the rightful owner, since the property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner. Also in appropriate cases, this legal guaranty against prescription should yield to laches, citing the case of Miguel vs. Catalino, (26 SCRA 234).
Moreover, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible, they (appellees) being in possession of the property. Also, the cause of action was for injunction because of the illegal bulldozing of the property, which cause of action does not prescribe.
We disagree.
On res judicata:
The appellees, heirs of the Capistranos, have an indefeasible title to the property as evidenced by OCT No. O-596, while the appellants claim, on the other hand, is not titled. The title was issued by the same Court (RTC), that was then sitting as a land registration court in Cadastral Case No. 19, on April 3, 1974, pursuant to Decree No. N-150423.
It is said (Director of Lands vs. Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120) that all land registration proceedings, including cadastral cases, are proceedings in rem, that is binding to the whole world, including even those who did not participate therein. The 1974 Decision has already become final, as evidenced by the issuance of OCT No. O-596.
The appellants even admitted (Appellants' Brief) that they are claiming the property, precisely because they are heirs of the late Teofilo Ubanan. The latter incidentally participated actively in the proceedings. They certainly cannot now pretend ignorance of the binding effect of the cadastral proceeding; necessarily, the pretension that the title was acquired by the Capistranos through fraud, cannot be validated. Teofilo Ubanan had the actual opportunity to express his objection to the claim of the Capistranos while the case was then on trial.
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription (Sec. 47, PD No. 1529, as amended).
There was a pretension that the parties and the causes of action are different in both cases. What is only needed is the identity of interest. (Valencia vs. Regional Trial Court, 184 SCRA 80). It is therefore not a case of strict identity of parties, in applying the doctrine of res judicata, but merely substantial identity. Naturally, the test is identity of interest. In the case now before Us, the appellants are claiming ownership interests supposedly because of their deceased parents, the latter having actively and directly participated in the cadastral proceeding.
The appellvees, in turn, claimed ownership interests, in their capacity as the declared owners in Cadastral Case No. 19. Considering the Court's pronouncement, necessarily, the appellants' predecessors had no right whatsoever to the property; therefore, there was nothing for the appellants to inherit.
Another point.
The appellants said that, at least, they are possessors in good faith. We do not agree. All parties are deemed to have constructive notice of public documents being registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, when dealing with the property that is registered under the Torrens System (De Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 295).
It is also of presumptive knowledge the existence of a Torrens Title that has been issued; the buyer therefore cannot "in good conscience" now say that she believed her vendor to have rights of ownership over the property that was purchased (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Munar, 25 SCRA 405 citing the case of J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Lumanlan, L-23497, April 26, 1968).
The appellants certainly cannot now claim that they are possessors of the property in good faith considering that the Capistranos' ownership is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, or the presumed knowledge of its issuance in 1974.
One more point.
he Court below correctly ruled in taking cognizance of Cadastral Case No. 19, considering that the same Court decided both the cadastral case in 1974 and the case now before Us on appeal. Facts which are ascertainable from the record of a court proceeding are among the matters which judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial functions.
We agree with the appellants, thus:
"In Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat, a case very much in point, the Supreme Court might as well have been talking about this case when it held that —
'[t]he specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of a definite ruling, is whether or not, on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.'
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. . . . Thus: Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.' [emphasis supplied].
xxx xxx xxx
To further support their inherently baseless claim that the existence of the Decision in Cadastral Case No. 19 has not been adequately shown, appellants attempted to make a mountain out of a molehill by stating that 'the Decision does not state a 'Teofilo Ubanan' but a 'Teofilo UbaNON'. Appellants go on to conclude, in their typical non-sequitur fashion, that this typographical error 'serves to emphasize the necessity of proving the existence and finality of the decision'. Appellants seem to have overlooked the very basic principle that Cadastral Case No. 19 was in rem proceeding. As such, one need not even be specifically named or be made a party to the cadastral case in order to be bound by a judgment rendered therein. How, then, can the mere typographical error as to Teofilo Ubanan's name serve as a basis for the contention that the existence of Cadastral Case No. 19 has not been shown?
xxx xxx xxx.
During the hearing of 19 February 1996, the original of the certified true copy of the Decision in Cadastral Case No. 19 was shown to Presiding Judge Francisco G. Rojas, Sr. of the lower court, who even made the remark that the Clerk of Court who signed the certified true copy of the Decision (Charito A. Akut) was now a councilor of Cagayan de Oro City. This took place in the presence of plaintiffs-appellants' counsel. Clearly, then, the contention of the plaintiffs now that the said Decision 'cannot be ascertained as genuine' and hence, 'not capable of judicial knowledge', is nothing but a brazen attempt to mislead this Honorable Court on the basis of a deliberate and convenient case of amnesia."
(Ibid, pp. 93-95).
There is also prescription:
Principally sought by the appellants is the nullification of OCT No. O-596 which was issued in the names of the Capistranos as early as 1974 or already more than twenty-two (22) years (case was filed in 1966). The appellants supposed remedies are either an action to review the decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529; or reconveyance based either on fraud or implied trust.
The period to review the decrees on registration (Section 32) is only one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Since the decree was issued as early as 1974, the title is already indefeasible. Also, an action for reconveyance, based on fraud should only be brought within a period of four (4) years from the discovery, or supposedly from 1974 when the title was issued, because then registration presupposes constructive knowledge of the whole world. There is already prescription since the appellants have been late by about eighteen (18) years (counting from 1974 including the four-year period).
Similarly, under Art. 1456, NCC, reconveyance can only be allowed, in cases involving an implied trust, within a period of ten (10) years. Even if implied trust is the basis, then the action already prescribed.
One last point.
The ruling in the case of Rita Ubanan and the Heirs of Teofilo Ubanan vs. the Heirs of Nicolas Capistrano, et al. (CA-G.R. No. 52478), is to Us, crucial. Said case and this case, substantially have the same factual background and issues. As a matter of fact, the "centerfold" is OCT No. O-596, that was issued in 1974, pursuant to a decree, the latter as the consequence of the Decision in Cadastral Case No. 19.
Also raised were the issues on res judicata, prescription, and that the cadastral case was supposedly not capable of judicial notice.
The Court of Appeals said:
"'Be that as it may, the cadastral judgment is a judicial confirmation Capistranos' (sic) title and ownership over several lots involved in Cad. Case No. 19 including Lot 2536, C-8 (part) as far back as 2974. Concomitantly, the decision as well foreclosed the pretended claim of ownership of Perla Ubay-Ubay who was one of those who opposed but failed Capistrano's application for confirmation of title insofar as the subject lot is concerned. Verily, it is the same Perla Ubay-Ubay from whom respondents Kwongs allegedly acquired their rights over the litigated lot in 1989 and from whom they are tacking their possession.
It follows, therefore, that when the Kwongs purchased Perla Ubay-Ubay's rights and interests on the lot on December 31, 1989, the judgment in Cad. Case No. 19 dated 5 July 1972 had already long become final and OCT No. O-596 had long been issued on April 4, 1974. In simple language, the Kwongs made an empty purchase in 1989. Basic in all contracts of sales is that the buyer acquires only the extent of what the seller owns; acquiring neither hide nor hair if vendor had none to sell. Thus, the lower court's reliance on Article 476 of the Civil Code will totally fall to pieces as Article 476 of the same codes requires that before the remedy of quieting of title is had, plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title to the property in litigation, which the Kwongs lack.
Viewed from the above, two important legal conclusions necessarily came to play: (a) Respondents Kwongs have no cause of action in the case and, (b) the case is already barred by a prior judgment of by Res Judicata.
Inasmuch as the Kwongs acquired nothing from Perla Ubay-Ubay then they have no justification to file the complaint in Civil Case No. 96-067. They have no title to quiet nor possession to tack from. Indubitably, they possess no cause of action.
Quintessentially, Kwongs' lack of legal title over the disputed lot is brought about by a prior final judgment on the merits in Cad Case No. 19, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, in a case involving the same parties subject matter and causes of action. Succinctly, all the essential requisites of Res Judicata are thus present (Diwa v. Donato, 234 SCRA 600; Caina vs. CA, 239 SCRA 252 [1994]). Well-entrenched is that even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issues over again (Allied Banking Corp. vs. CA, 229 SCRA 252 [1994]).
More importantly, all the abovementioned ingredients of res judicata are extant and visibly available from the allegations of the private respondents complaint and the pleadings offered during the hearing of the motion to dismiss and affirmative defenses. Legally speaking, Perla Ubay-Ubay and the Kwongs, as her successors in interests are bound by the cadastral decision especially so, when proceedings in such as land registration cases constitutes notice to the whole world. (Calalang vs. Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 225 [1992]).' [emphasis supplied]."
(Ibid, pp. 105-106).
On prescription, the ruling was:
"'Prescinding further from the above ratiocination to allow Civil Case No. 96-067 to proceed will not only amount to the reopening of an already long judicially settled dispute concerning the ownership of Lot 2536, C-3 (part). It too will contravene and smash against into (sic) a deeply rooted jurisprudential doctrine that a torrens title becomes incontrovertible or indefeasible after one year from its final Decree (Calalang vs. Register of Deeds, supra, Sec. 32, P.D. 1529). It is no longer open to review or attack but the aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance if title has not passed to an innocent purchase and for value (James vs. CA, 231 SCRA 496 [1994]). Moreover, an action to invalidate a Certificate of Title on the grounds of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from entry of decree of registration. (Bishop vs. CA, 208 SCRA 636 [1992]; Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418 [1995]). Once, a decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being controverted by an adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned. (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. vs. CA, 254 SCRA 220 [1996]).
Again, the pertinent data needed to compute the prescriptive period, are all clearly and plainly seen by merely locking at the date of the filing of the complaint in 1996 and the issuance of OCT No. O-596 on April 4, 1974, or a gap of 22 years.' [emphasis supplied])."
(Ibid, p. 106).
On the issue that the ruling in Cadastral Case No. 19 is not capable of judicial knowledge, the court finally said:
"'Appropriately, a certified true copy of the decision in Cad. Case No. 19 was properly presented during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss and of the Affirmative Defenses. Being a public document, the certified true copy submitted suffices as a proof thereof (Sec. 4, Rule 132, Rules of Court); Garido vs. CA, 236 SCRA 450 [1994]), and carries with it the presumption of regularly needing clear, convincing proof more than merely preponderance, to contradict it (Calabat vs. CA, 241 SCRA 356 [1995]). And records show that respondent Kwong's preferred no proof to contradict the genuineness of the said cadastral decision not its finality. Anyway, on its face. OCT No. 9-596 confirmed that it was issued by virtue of Decree No. N-150423, as a result of the finality of the judgment in Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad Record No. 1569. OCT No. O-596 as Annex 'A' of the complaint in Civil Case No. 96-067, such that the lower court cannot ignore taking judicial notice of said decision.'"
(Ibid, p. 107),
We also agree with the Court, thus:
"1. The principle of res judicata is fully and squarely applicable against the plaintiffs. The decision of this Court (then the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch I, presided over by Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe) dated July 5, 1972, in Cadastral Case No. 19, entitled Director of Lands vs. Justina Abanado, et al., Annex 'A' of the Joint Motion to Dismiss dated March 15, 1996, shows at the bottom of page 4 thereof that Teofilo Ubanan, the now deceased husband of plaintiff Rita Ubanan and father of the other plaintiffs, participated as oppositor in that cadastral case. He even filed a motion to lift order of default. Page 7 of the said decision shows that except for Juan Liera and Narciso Gadia as well as the heirs of Nicolas Capistrano, all the other opppositors, Teofilo Ubanan included, joined the stand of the Director of Lands that the lots, subject matter of that cadastral case, were public land. Parenthetically, this pronouncement of this Court belies the allegation of paragraph 11 of the complaint in this case that the plaintiffs are the 'true owners' of the land, subject matter of this case. This is because if, as said Teofilo Ubanan maintained, the said land is public land, then it necessarily follows that, at the most, he can only be considered an applicant for a free patent or a sales patent. Hence, he himself certainly did not consider his own self as the owner thereof;2. Under the provisions of Section 49, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, a final judgment rendered by a court is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in interest, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity, regardless of how erroneous it may be (see Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, pages 348-349; Santos vs. Mojica, 26 SCRA 703, 706; Lanuza vs. Gonzales, 17 Phil. 216; Fernandez vs. Fuentabella, 43 Phil. 216; Fernandez vs. de Castro, 48 Phil. 123; Edwards vs. Arce, 98 Phil. 688; Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 522). Since what is being litigated in this case is part of the subject matter of the said cadastral case, the plaintiffs in this case, as successors in interest of said Teofilo Ubanan, are undoubtedly covered by the rule of res judicata;
3. The contention of the plaintiffs at page 8 of their comments of April 8, 1996, that the (photo copy of the) decision in Cadastral Case No, 19 cannot be considered as evidence since it has not been proven by evidence or by admissions is squarely refuted by the aforecited case of Baguio vs. Vda. de Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337, where it was ruled that a court may take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and decided by it, and that such judicial notice supplants the evidence on motion that Rule 133, Section 7, of the Rules of Court authorizes a trial court to receive when a motion is based on facts not appearing on record. In fact, a court is duty bound to take judicial notice of its record and of the facts which the record establishes (De Los Angeles vs. Hon. Sotero Cabahug, et al., 106 Phil. 839). Verily, if the plaintiffs have any doubt regarding the genuineness of the photocopy of the decision in that Cadastral Case No. 19 or the accuracy of its contents, it is rather up to them, in view of the above-cited rulings on the subject of judicial notice, to show any lack of faithfulness of reproduction by this photo-copy. After all, the record of Cadastral Case No. 19 exists as part of the record of this Court. It is therefore very easy for them to make the necessary verification;
4. The contention of the plaintiffs that the decision in the said Cadastral Case No. 19 is not applicable to their complaint in this case since the causes of action are different — one being a decision in a cadastral case and their complaint in this case is for injunction and damages — does not even deserve scant consideration from this Court. On the contrary, a cadastral case is a proceeding in rem falling under subdivision (a) of Section 49 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the decision therein is binding on the whole world (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 11, pp. 347-348). It should be noted that the caption of their complaint states that it is, among others, for annulment of title. Even paragraph No. 2 of the prayer of their complaint seeks a declaration of OCT No. O-596 of the heirs of Nicolas Capistrano and Cecilia Castaneda as null and void, and the succeeding paragraph No. 3 prays for judgment ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the title of the impleaded defendants-heirs insofar as it includes the alleged land of the plaintiffs.
xxx xxx xxx.
7. Coming now to the issue of prescription, well-settled is the rule that registration under the Torrens system of registration constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. OCT No. O-596 of the heirs of Nicolas Capistrano was issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration on April 25, 1974. It was subsequently transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City in the Registration Book of his office on June 13, 1974. Even assuming, therefore, that the remedy of reconveyance, which is based on an injury to the rights of the plaintiff and which is confined as basis thereof to discovery of fraud, was available to the plaintiffs, this right to pursue that remedy is limited to only four (4) years from that date of transcription (Article 1146, No. 1, Civil Code; Balbin vs. Medalla, 108 SCRA 666). This is because discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place when the claimants-heirs of Nicolas Capistrano in the cadastral case were issued their original certificates of title, inasmuch as registration of the patents (decree in this instance) under the Torrens system of registration constituted constructive notice to the whole world (Balbin vs. Medalla, supra). Besides, oppositor therein Teofilo Ubanan, under whom the plaintiffs claim, was a participant in that cadastral case. Hence, the decree in the said Cadastral Case No. 19 became incontrovertible as to him after one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) and constitutes res judicata to his successors in interest, the plaintiffs herein."
(Ibid, pp. 42-44, 46-47).
We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested decision.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. and Cruz, JJ., concur.