DIVISION OF FIVE OF THE FORMER FIFTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 47502. November 29, 2000.]
GEORGE LIZARES, petitioner, vs. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, GONZALO DIZON, CENON GUINTU, CARMELITA VDA. DE DAVID, RICARDO GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, CELESTINO DIZON, ROBERTO DIZON, FLORENTINO LAPUZ, EDILBERTO CATU, FORTUNATO TIMBANG, OSCAR SANTIAGO, HERMINIGILDO FLORES, CELESTINO DIZON, GONZALO DIZON, ROBERTO DIZON, CIPRIANO DIZON, ANTONIO DIZON, TEODULO DIZON, JUANARIO MANIAGO, CELESTINO ESGUERRA, FLORENTINO LAPUZ, GORGONIO CANLAS, ANTONIO LISING, CARLOS PINEDA, RENATO GOZUN, ALFREDO MERCADO, ROMEO PANGILINAN, JOSE SERRANO, WENCESLAO PANGILINAN, GUILLERMO DEL ROSARIO, CANDIDO TIMBANG, BIENVENIDO MACHADA, ARSENIO LEGASPI, AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION III, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
A M E N D E D D E C I S I O N 1
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J p:
From Our original Decision rendered in this case 2 REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the assailed decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in favor of herein petitioner, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
In their motion, respondents raised matters of import and significance which constrained Us to take a second hard look at the records.
The background circumstances are:
Encarnacion Vda. De Panililio (hereinafter referred to as Panlilio) is the owner of a vast tract of land with an area of 115.41 hectares located at Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga covered by TCT Nos. 3510, 3513, 3514, 3515, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3528, 3530, 3531, 3532, 3533, 9191, 11670-R, all of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Pampanga.
On April 19, 1961, Panlilio entered into a contract of lease over the subject landholdings with Paulina Mercado. Paulina is the wife of Panlilio's nephew. The contract covered agricultural years starting from 1961 up to 1979.
Sometime in 1973, pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27, 3 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued thirty eight (38) Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to the tenants of Panlilio.
Among the awardees are the following: Hermenegildo Flores, Juanario Maniago, Renato Gozun, Teodulo Dizon, Celestino Esguerra, Cipriano Dizon, Guillermo del Rosario, Celestino Dizon, Eliseo Guintu and Wenceslao Pangilinan, some of the respondents herein.
On November 26, 1973, Paulina Mercado, lessee, filed a letter-complaint with the DAR questioning the issuance of CLTs to those tenants. She alleged, among others, that the DAR should not have issued those CLTs since the land involved being planted to sugar is outside the coverage of PD No. 27. She claimed that the respondents surreptitiously planted palay instead of sugar in order to bring the land within the purview of the law. After proper investigation, the DAR concluded that the CLTs were "properly and regularly issued." 4
Pualina Mercado likewise filed a similar complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed therein as CAR Case No. 1649-P'74.
On December 4, 1976, the tenants of the portion planted to sugar cane petitioned the DAR to cause the reversion of their sugarland to riceland so that it may be covered by the Agrarian Reform Law. The petition was with the conformity of Panlilio.
On January 12, 1977, Panlilio executed an affidavit, partly quoted as follows:
"1. That I am the owner of an agricultural landholding situated at Mexico, Pampanga, with an area of 115.4 hectares, more or less, dedicated at present to the production of palay and sugarcane crops;
2. That I have been informed that 50.22 hectares comprising the portion dedicated to palay crop have been placed under the provisions and coverage of P.D. No. 27 and that Certificates of Land Transfer have been issued to the tenant-farmers thereon;
3. That as owner of the above-mentioned property, I interpose no objection to the action taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform in placing the aforesaid portion dedicated to palay crop within the coverage of PD No. 27;
4. That lately, all the tenants of my said property including those in the sugarcane portions, have filed a petition dated December 4, 1976 with the Honorable Secretary Conrado R. Estrella, Secretary of Agrarian Reform, requesting for the reversion of the sugarcane portion of my property adverted to above to palay land which is the original classification of the entire subject property;
5. That the aforesaid petition dated December 4, 1976 of the tenants of my property which was filed with the DAR carries my written conformity;
6. That it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as hacienda masamat be placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter the same be sold to tenant-petitioners;
xxx xxx xxx."
On January 20, 1977, by virtue of the said affidavit, the DAR Secretary, through Director Gaudencio Besa, directed Director Severino Santiago, Regional Director of Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga "to distribute all land transfer certificates, in view of the desire of Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio to place her property under the Land Transfer Program of the government."
On the basis of the action of the DAR Secretary, the CAR, on March 17, 1978, issued an order dismissing the complaint of Paulina Mercado (lessee) in CAR Case No. 1649-P'74, thus:
"There is now on record, submitted by defendants, the pertinent exhibits of the outcome of the letter-protest of plaintiff, which are official records, as follows:
1. Letter dated January 20, 1977 of Director Gaudencio Besa, signing for the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, informing plaintiff Paulina Mercado of the decision of the owner of the property in question, Mrs. Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, to place the same under the land transfer program of the government, for which reason the resolution of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of the DAR Secretary on the distribution of land transfer certificates to defendants pursuant to PD 27 has become moot and academic;
2. Letter dated January 20, 1977 of Director Besa, also signing for the DAR Secretary, to Director Severino Santiago of Region III, DAR, San Fernando, Pampanga, directing him to distribute all the certificates of land transfer over the landholdings in question to be tenants thereof;
3 Ist indorsement dated February 3, 1977 of the Asst. Regional Director of Region III, DAR instructing the Officer-in-Charge, DAR Agrarian Team Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, to distribute the certificates of land transfer pursuant to DAR Memorandum dated May 3, 1976;
4. 2nd Indorsement dated March 3, 1977 of the Officer-in-Charge to the Team Leader of the same Office anent the distribution of the land transfer certificates among the tenants of the land of Mrs. Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio situated at Mexico, Pampanga.
With this development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has become moot and academic, it being already settled in the DAR proceedings the placement of the land in question under the land transfer program of the government. Therefore, the instant case should be dismissed. Necessarily, all pending incidents should be deemed disposed of . . . ."
On December 29, 1986, Encarnacion Panlilio died.
After seven (7) years of sometime in 1993, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the following tenants of Panlilio, also respondents herein:
EP Nos.
Hermenegildo Flores 690774
143627
Celestino Dizon 690960
683355
45390
Gonzalo Dizon 680524
Roberto Dizon 690758
Cipriano Dizon 45260
45256
Antonio Dizon 681072
Teodulo Dizon 45326
Juanario Manago 143207
Celestino Esguerra 45265
45219
Florentino Lapuz 690759
45259
Gorgonio Cantas 143508
Carlos Pineda 197097
45254
Renato Gozun 143208
Romeo Pangilinan 475341
Jose Serrano 475340
Wenceslao Pangilinan 476572
Guillermo del Rosario 475339
Candido Timbang 143931
45262
45257
Arsenio Legaspi 45266
Meanwhile, on June 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Bacolod City appointed petitioner George Lizares as executor of the estate of Panlilio. Records show that he is the son of the late Jesus Lizares, Panlilio's administrator of Hacienda Masamat during her lifetime.
On February 28, 1994, petitioner Lizares filed his first complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as DARAB Case No. 638 P'94 for annulment of coverage of landholdings under PD No. 27 and ejectment against Reynaldo Villanueva, Gonzalo Dizon, Cenon Guintu, Carmelita Vda. De David, Ricardo Guintu, Orlando Guintu, Rolando Guintu, Rogelio Munoz, Eliseo Guintu, Celestino Dizon, Roberto Dizon, Florentino Lapuz, Edilberto Catu, Fortunato Timbang and Oscar Santiago, also respondents herein. On April 12, 1994, they filed their answer with counterclaim.
On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for cancellation of emancipation patents, docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 933 P'95, 934 P'95 and 935 P'95, against the rest of the respondents. They then filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action and lack jurisdiction. On July 13, 1995, the PARAD denied the motion. Forthwith, respondents filed their answer.
Upon petitioner's motion, all the cases were consolidated. The PARAD then directed the parties to submit their respective position papers, and thereafter, considered the cases submitted for decision.
On November 14, 1995, the PARAD rendered a joint decision dismissing petitioner's complaints for lack of merit, holding that the subject landholding is under the coverage of PD No. 27 on the bases of the following:
(1) the affidavit of Panlilio dated January 12, 1977 placing her entire property within the coverage of PD 27;
(2) her omission to state in her last will and testament her desire to revoke the said affidavit dated January 12, 1977 in order to exclude her landholdings from the coverage of P.D. 27;
(3) Her failure during her lifetime to bring to the attention of the DAR and the CAR her affidavit dated February 3, 1977 revoking her first affidavit dated January 12, 1977; and
(4) the report of the DAR and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the property is devoted to palay.
The PARAD likewise ruled that since respondent tenants deposited cavans of palay every year at Tombo Rice Mill as Panlilio's share, they cannot be evicted from their landholdings.
Upon appeal by the petitioner, the DARAB affirmed the PARAD decision, holding that:
"This Board has diligently examined the records of the four (4) cases and scrutinized the evidences presented in each case, including the assailed decision, and is fully convinced that Plaintiff-Appellant failed to establish the errors in the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the Honorable Adjudicator a quo that would warrant the reversal thereof.
In the first place, it is a well-settled rule that findings of trial courts (the Honorable Board a quo in this case) are accorded great respect in the absence of any showing that they ignored, overlooked or failed to property appreciate matters of substance which would affect the results (Pineda vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 602, citing Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 436).
'No less that the DAR personnel together with the Bureau of Lands' people reported that the subject property is devoted to palay production . . . ' (Page 10, Decision dated November 14, 1995).
In the second place, We have ruled time and again that as regards relations between litigants in land cases and in the determination of facts in Agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence (Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 529, January 27, 1992; Hernandez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 758 [1990]; emphasis supplied).
The affidavit executed by the late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio on January 12, 1977 unequivocally expressed her desire to subject the controversial Hacienda Masamat under the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 and that thereafter, the same property be sold to herein Defendants-Appellees. It was the Landowner's intent, as manifested in said affidavit, which triggered the hierarchy of events which conduced the following undertakings:
1. Letter, dated January 20, 1977, of Director Gaudencio Besa, signing in behalf of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, informing the then civil law lessee, Paulina Mercado, of the decision of the landowner, Encarnacion vda. de Panlilio, to place the subject property under the Operation Land Transfer program of the government;
2. Letter, dated January 20, 1977, of Director Besa, also signing for the DAR Secretary, to Director Severino Santiago, Regional Director of Region III, DAR, instructing the Officer-in-Charge, DAR Agrarian Team Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, to distribute the certificates of land transfer pursuant to DAR Memorandum dated May 3, 1976; and
3. Second Indorsement, dated May 3, 1977, of the Officer-in-Charge to the Team Leader of the same office anent the distribution of the land transfer certificates among the tenants of the land of Mrs. Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio (all quoted and presented as official records in the order issued by the District Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I, San Fernando, Pampanga dated March 17, 1978, Rollo, pages 245-248; Second Folder).
These public documents are entitled to full faith and credit on their face in the absence of any competent evidence that their execution was tainted by defects or irregularities that would warrant a declaration of nullity (Anchuelo, et al vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 147 SCRA 434; Roman vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 542).
In addition there is a presumption that the official duty of the Department of Agrarian Reform personnel in the issuance of the controversial Emancipation Patents has been regularly performed, and this presumption is founded on fundamental reasons. Indeed, Plaintiff-Appellant in the instant appeal failed to allege or invoke any of the grounds laid by Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994 for the cancellation of the assailed titles. In such a case, there is nothing on records that would warrant the reversal the reversal of the decision of the Board a quo.
More importantly, the late landowner Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio failed to pursue with zealous determination the revocation of her Affidavit, dated January 12, 1977. Almost twenty (20) years thereafter, Plaintiff-Appellant cannot now assert a right which the deceased herself, in her lifetime, had abandoned or declined to assert the same."
On September 9, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the DARAB in an order dated March 30, 1998.
Hence the instant petition for review by George Lizares.
Petitioner claimed that the DARAB erred in affirming the decision of the PARAD finding that the land is primarily devoted to palay despite evidence to the contrary, declaring as valid respondents' sales of their landholdings covered by Emancipation Patents to third persons and dismissing the complaints.
In their comment, respondents stated that petitioner's allegations are just a rehash of those contained in his motion for reconsideration dated September 9, 1997 of the DARAB decision; that there being no new matters adduced in his petition, the same should not be given due course; and that in the remote possibility that the petition is given due course; they are adopting their brief dated February 8, 1996 filed with the DARAB.
As earlier mentioned in Our Decision dated April 11, 2-000,We granted the petition and reversed the decision of the DARAB. We held that the instant petition is impressed with merit because of the following reasons:
1. While it is true that Panlilio, in her affidavit dated January 12, 1977, placed her entire property (Hacienda Masamat) under the coverage of PD 27 and allowed the same to be sold to her tenants, however, less than a month thereafter, or on February 3, 1977, she executed another affidavit revoking the first, thus:
"That in an affidavit I executed and signed about the 1st week of January, 1977, prepared by DAR lawyer Atty. Pepito Sanchez who came to see me at my son's residence at 16 Canopos St., Bel Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, it was stated in paragraph 6 thereof which I quote: 'That it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda Masamat be placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter, the same be sold to the tenants-petitioners;'
That the said 'affidavit' was prepared by the DAR lawyer aforementioned and that inasmuch as it was not explained very well to me by the said lawyer and that what I understood about the 'affidavit' was the fact that I had intended only to place the portion of my land at Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga, which is dedicated to the cultivation of palay and containing about thirty (30) hectares under the purview of Presidential Decree No. 27 and to be sold to the tenant-petitioners, I signed the said 'affidavit;'
That the price stated therein for the sale of thirty(30) hectares to the tenants is Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (7,500.00) per hectare;
That it was not my least intention to agree and subject my entire property in Hacienda Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga, especially the larger portion dedicated to the to cultivation of sugarcane, placed under the coverage of the Presidential Decree No. 27;
That another reason for my desire not to place my entire property referred to as Hacienda Masamat in Mexico, Pampanga, under P.D. 27 is the fact that the said Hacienda Masamat is leased to my nephew's wife, Mrs. Paulina Y. Mercado, and the lease contract I executed in her favor covering my said Hacienda Masamat is still subsisting and in force and will expire only after the agricultural crop Year 1978-1979;
That I have not appeared before any notary to subscribe and swear to said 'affidavit', although I came to know later on that the same was notarized on January 12, 1977 as Doc. No. 491, Page No. 100, Book No. 4, series, of 1977 of the notarial registry of Notary Public Dionilo D. Marfil of Quezon City;
That in view of the above, I am canceling and revoking, as I hereby cancel and revoke, through this affidavit, the said affidavit I executed on January 12, 1977, notarized by said Notary Public Dionilo D. Marfil, especially paragraph 6 thereof, and the said cancellation and revocation becomes effective on the date of the execution hereof."
We concluded that both PARAD and DARAB seriously erred in ignoring the second affidavit.
2. The sugar land is to sugar cane and, therefore, should not be placed under the coverage of PD 27. This finding is based on the letter-complaint of Paulina Mercado to the DAR Secretary and the CAR resolution in CAR Case No. 1649-P'74 dated April 24, 1974, thus:
"The records of this case show that Certificates of Land Transfer were issued in favor of the defendants on the strength of the recommendation made by the investigating team of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga wherein Atty. Pepito Sanchez, counsel for the defendants, is one of the members; that upon the representation made by the plaintiffs, the certificates of land transfer were recalled and that another team coming from the Central Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform headed by Atty. Gregorio Sapera, Legal Officer III, was authorized to make re-investigation of the landholdings in question; that upon making the re-investigation, Atty. Sapera found out that the landholdings in question are principally devoted to the production of sugarcane. Thus, he recommended that the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of the awardees be cancelled.
The Court has carefully read the records of this case and as between the investigation of Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Sanpera, the Court is duty bound to consider favorably the facts found in the investigation conducted by Mr. Sapera. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case as related above there is no need of referring the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as authorized under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 27 because the landholding in question is not principally devoted to palay but to sugarcane."
In the instant motion for reconsideration of Our, Decision, respondents contend:
1. Petitioner's complaints should have been dismissed for his failure to implead therein indispensable parties, namely the Land Bank of the Philippines which paid Panlilio the amortizations on the land and the third persons who purchased the landholdings from the tenants;
2. This Court disturbed and reversed the findings of fact by the PARAD and the DARAB supported by substantial evidence. The PARAD and the DARAB correctly refused to give credence to the second affidavit of revocation, it appearing that the same was not presented during the proceedings in the DAR and the CAR. In fact, the tenants' petition dated December 4, 1976 for the coverage of the subject land by the Operation Land Transfer under PD No. 27 with the written conformity of Panlilio was even specified in her first affidavit. The petitioner failed to rebut or deny this fact leading to the conclusion that she consented to said coverage.
3. It is not the job of the appellate court to sieve through the evidence considered by the administrative agency in adjudicating the case before it, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Respondents point to the fact that Paulina Mercado (lessee), in her efforts to recover the landholdings from the tenants, never mentioned any revocation made by Panlilio. There can be no other conclusion, therefore, than that no such affidavit was ever executed by Panlilio during her lifetime and that such was procured only after her death or before petitioner Lizares filed the instant actions in 1994 and 1995.
4. This Court violated the principle of res judicata in reversing the CAR resolution dismissing the complaint in Case Case No. 1649-'74 rendered twenty-two years ago. Likewise, estoppel and laches bar the instant actions. Seventeen years have elapsed from the time the second affidavit as executed in 1977 up to the filing of the complaints in 1994 and 1995. Besides, this Court's Decision canceling the CLTs and EPs is impossible to execute since the entire area has been reclassified into a residential/commercial zone. More importantly, Panlilio had been paid in full by the Land Bank for her landholdings. These supervening events will render this Cout's Decision nugatory. Also, there are no more EPs since they had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCTs were already issued. To cancel the EPs in effects is to cancel the TCTs. Such cancellation would amount to a collateral attack against the Torrens System of registration which is not allowed by law.
5. Lastly, the petition should be dismissed in favor of Romeo Pangilinan, Wenceslao Pangilinan, Jose Serrano and Guillermo del Rosario in view of the compromise agreement in DARAB Case No. 4561 between them and petitioner herein. They submitted, as proof, their joint motion to dismiss the complaint executed on February 10, 1997 and petitioner Lizares' receipt from them of P1,356,619.00 as consideration for the dismissal of his complaints against them.
After assessing the grounds raised by respondents in their motion for reconsideration and a meticulous review of the records, We are now in serious doubts as to the correctness of Our Decision, Our reasons are:
First, according to petitioner Lizares, Panlilio's second affidavit (revoking her first affidavit) upon which this Court achors its assailed Decision, was executed as early as February 3, 1997. If it were, true Panlilio's natural reaction was to submit her second affidavit or affidavit of revocation to the DAR in order to exclude her landholdings from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27. Significantly, Panlilio died on December 29, 1986. She had, therefore, nine (9) years from the date of execution of her second affidavit, within which to have her land excluded by the DAR from such coverage considering that it was principally planted to sugar and that she was misled by DAR lawyer, Atty. Pepito Sanchez, into signing her first affidavit. But she dit nod. Petitioner's father, Jesus Lizares, was her administrator. Yet he did not also take any action for apparently he was not aware of such affidavit of revocation.
Moreover, in her second affidavit, Panlilio specifically stated:
"That another reason for my desire not to place my entire property referred to as Hacienda Masamat in Mexico, Pampanga, under P.D. 27 is the fact that the said Hacienda Masamat is leased to may nephew's wife, Mrs. Paulina Y. Mercado, and the lease contract I executed in her favor covering my said Hacienda Masamat is still subsisting and in force and will expire only after the agricultural crop year 1978-1979;
xxx xxx xxx."
If Panlilio indeed signed her affidavit of revocation, why did she not inform her niece Paulina about it in order to protect her right as a lessess? It must be remembered that at that time, the latter's complaints (for cancellation of CLTs) against the tenants of Panlilio were still pending in the DAR and the CAR. Had Panlilio givin Paulina a copy of such second affidavit, she could have brought it to the attention of the CAR and the DAR. Certainly, the subject landholdings could not have been placed intirely under Operation Land Transfer, we need not emphasize here that being a lessee, Paulina would not want to part with her Aunt's landholdings.
Out of the blue, the second affidavit surfaced only in 1994 and 1995 when petitioner Lizares brought the instant actions against Panlilio's tenants or after eighteen (18) years from the date of its alleged execution. At this juncture, We can only conclude without hesitation that Panlilio did not execute the second affidavit.
Petitioner alleged in his position paper that the same affidavit of revocation was submitted to the DAR and the CAR, but they were not acted upon because of the dismissal of the cases for cancellation of CLTs filed by Paulina Mercado. Petitioner's claim is a mere allegation. It has not been substantiated. Again, if it were true, why did Panlilio and Paulina fail to pursue any further action?
Aside from the questionable second affidavit, there was no indication of Panlilio's intention to recover her landholdings. In fact, she and her successors-in-interest allowed the government to proceed with the process of transferring the said landholdings to her tenants. Clearly, they sat on their rights for almost twenty (20) years and let their tenants believe that they were entitled to own the landholdings after payment of just compensation.
We find Panlillo and her successors-in-interest guilty of laches. Laches is the failure for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which in exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or has declined to assert it. 5
Even in her Last Will and Testament there was no indication that Panlilio revoked her first affidavit and authorized petitioner to recover her land to be included as part of her estate. Petitioner has been silent on this point.
Second, Petitioner failed to refute the due execution of the January 12, 1977 affidavit (first affidavit). No less than four government agencies tasked to implement PD No. 27 accorded validity to it: first, the DAR when it ordered the distribution of the CLTs; second, the CAR when it adopted the action of the DAR and dismissed Paulina's complaint in CAR Case No. 1649-P'74; third, the PARAD when it declared the subject landholdings within the coverage of PD No. 27; and last, the DARAB when it affirmed the PARAD decision. Parenthetically, no convincing evidence was presented before the PARAD that Panlilio was forced or compelled by Atty. Pepito Sanchez to execute and sign such affidavit.
Let it be emphasized at this point that courts should accord respect, and even finality, to finding of facts of quasi-judicial bodies, as long as it is supported by substantial evidence, 6 as in these cases.
Third, petitioner's allegation of fraud and collusion on the part of the DAR personnel must fail. It is a basic rule in evidence that the party making an allegation has the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence. 7 Here, petitioner miserably failed to do so. His only basis in the fact that Atty. Pepito Sanchez, the DAR lawyer during the time CLTs were issued to the respondents, is their counsel of record. No convincing evidence was presented before the PARAD that Panlilio was forced or misled by Atty. Sanchez to sign her first affidavit. Clearly, no fraud or collusion can be attributed to the DAR personnel.
Fourth, while the proceedings in the CAR tend to establish the land as principally sugarland, hence outside the coverage of P.D. 27, still, Panlilio's consent to have the entire land covered by the said law as alleged in her first affidavit, cannot be construed as a violation of its provisions. In fact, in executing the said affidavit, she did not defeat, nor contravene the express intent of the law to emancipate her tenants from the bandage of soil. In doing so, she even supported its implementation.
In Our challenged Decision We found that the subject land was principally planted to sugar and therefore outside the pale of P.D. 27. But We overlooked the fact that Panlilio in her first affidavit, which was not validly revoked, expressed her desire to have her entire landholdings placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. To be sure, the fact that Panlilio's land is sugarland has become inconsequential in the light of her first affidavit.
Fifth, the sales made by some of the herein respondents to third persons could be held valid since they are allowed by no less than EO 228, 8 thus:
"Sec. 6. . . . Ownership of lands acquired by the farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment of amortizations."
EO 228 was enacted after PD No. 27. It is basic that is case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. 9 Hence, EO 228 prevails over PD 27. Although it is expressed in PD No. 27 that lands acquired by virtue thereof shall not be transferred except by hereditary succession or to the government, ownership may now be transferred by virtue of the express provisions of EO No. 288.
Sixth, in Our challenged Decision We held that the forcible coverage of Hacienda Masamat under P.D. 27 works a grave injustice against Panlilio and herein petitioner. However, We failed to realize that to cancel the CLTs and EPs involved will result to graver injustice to respondents herein. Indeed, sustaining the validity of the EPs and CLTs will be more in accord with the mandate of P.D. 27. Furthermore, Panlilio had been paid by the Land Bank P7,500.00 per hectare and had accepted her shares of the harvest without being heard to complain or protest during her lifetime.
Finally and more importantly, to deny the instant motion for reconsideration of Our Decision will have the effect of overturning the CAR decision rendered twenty-two (22) years ago. The resolution of the said court placing the entire land in question under the coverage of PD 27 has long become final and executory. To disregard such ruling is to disturb judicial stability.
Petitioner can no longer assail the propriety of the final resolution of the CAR rendered way back on March 17, 1978. The Supreme Court held that the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case whether or not the decision is erroneous 10 and the issues raised therein should be laid to rest. 11
The Supreme Court also ruled:
"Administrative decisions must end sometime as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies." 12
"The orderly administration requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court of quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by law, rules and regulations. A resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void." 13
Indeed, We should not have decided the cases at bench in favor of petitioner solely on the basis of an alleged second affidavit of revocation executed almost twenty (20) years ago prior to the filing of the instant complaints.
Panlilio had been dead for many years when her second affidavit suddenly appeared. Thus, she could no longer be called to the witness stand in order to affirm or deny the same. To Our minds, it is spurious, a concoction and afterthought. We are after the truth. But the pursuit of such truth must be made to depend on credible evidence, not on a highly questionable one-sided statement.
If We do not reversed Our challenged Decision, it will set a dangerous precedent. For henceforth, a successor-in-interest or an executor or administrator can easily recover the landholdings placed voluntarily by the landowner under the coverage of P.D. 27 by merely presenting in evidence the latter's affidavit of revocation allegedly executed by him during his lifetime but which surfaced only after almost twenty years after his death.
WHEREFORE, respondent's motion for reconsideration of Our Decision is hereby GRANTED. The petition is ordered DISMISSED and the challenged DARAB decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., Tria Tirona and Valdez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SALAZAR-FERNANDO, J p:
This treats of a Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 2, 2000 by private respondents, seeking to set aside this Court's Decision dated April 11, 2000 and dismiss the appeal, or in the alternative, to remand the case for new trial.
It appears however that while the undersigned and Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. Senior Member of the Former Fifth Division, voted to deny the instant Motion for Reconsideration, the Chairman, Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez adopted a contrary view and voted to grant said Motion. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 4(a) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), two more Justices were designated to compose a division of five (5) Justices of said Division, namely Justice Martin S. Villarama and Justice Perlita Tria-Tirona. However, the latter two Justices concurred with the opinion of Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez. Hence, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's position becomes the majority opinion, and she (Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez) is the new ponente, pursuant to said Section 4 of the RIRCA.
Accordingly, the undersigned expresses her dissenting opinion to the new majority opinion and votes to deny the instant motion for reconsideration.
The Honorable Chairman raises the question why the second affidavit of Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio dated February 3, 1977 repudiating her first affidavit dated January 12, 1977 was not brought by the lessee, Mrs. Paulina Mercado, to the attention of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as well as the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), considering that CAR Case No. 1649 P'74 was dismissed on March 17, 1978 when the second affidavit was already existing as early as February 3, 1977. The reason why the second affidavit was not brought to the attention of the CAR was because Mrs. Panlilio was not the complainant but Mrs. Mercado, the agricultural lessee in the CAR case. Petitioner Lizares even alleges in his position paper before the PARAB that:
"However, in dismissing the protest and complaint, the Honorable Department and the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations failed to recognize and acknowledge the presence of another affidavit, executed less than a month later, revoking the former affidavit (Exhibit G). The said affidavit was submitted before the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Honorable Court, but the same remained enacted because of the dismissal of the case." (Emphasis supplied)
This allegation of Lizares was not refuted.
While it may be true that after the case with the CAR was dismissed, Mrs. Mercado did not pursue the case any further, there is, likewise, no showing that she was still the agricultural lessee after crop year 1978-79, about the time the CAR order dismissing the case came out. Not being a lessee, she was not in a position to keep protesting the forcible inclusion of Hacienda Masamat under P.D. 27, or to appeal the CAR order. In any event, any laches on the part of Mrs. Mercado does not lie to defeat the substantial rights of the registered landowner, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio.
In Satiago vs. Court of Appeals, 2 the Supreme Court said:
"As for laches, its essence is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. But there is, to be sure, no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. . . . It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result."
Granting arguendo that petitioner's action is already barred by laches, such will not make the patently illegal acts of the DAR as well as the issuance of the CLTs and the emancipation patents to respondents valid and legal. In Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court noted:
"Unlike estoppel, laches as an equitable defense usually bar only the equitable enforcement of a right but not the right itself. It is an affirmative defense and the burden of proving it rests on the defendant."
It is true that the Last Will and Testament of Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio was silent on the second affidavit. However, this Last Will and Testament did not also mention the first affidavit. Said will of Encarnacion L. Panlilio did not express her desire to have her land in Hacienda Masamat covered by P.D. 27., as was allegedly expressed in the first affidavit. Thus, the issue of whether or not Encarnacion L. Panlilio expressed her revocation of her first affidavit in her last will and testament is immaterial.
On the issue that petitioner failed to refute the due execution of the first affidavit dated January 12, 1977, as no less than four government agencies accorded validity to it, there is no question as to the due execution of the test affidavit. However, as mentioned earlier, it is clear that the four government agencies concerned ignored the second affidavit. In fact, the PARAB admitted the existence of the second affidavit when it ruled:
"The presence on the record the affidavit of the late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, executed a month after the first affidavit, cancelling the latter is of no moment. The first affidavit was executed by the affiant voluntarily and the contents thereof are clear. She knew the meaning and import of all its contents. She was at that time of sound mind just like the time she prepared her last will and testament which was admitted to be probated by the court. " 4 (Emphasis supplied)
However, the PARAB, or the other three government agencies concerned for that matter, had not proven that Encarnacion L. Panlilio's execution of the second affidavit was involuntary; that the same is less clear than the first one; that she did not know the meaning and import of all its contents; that she was not of sound mind; or that the affidavit executed in Makati is better than the one executed in Bacolod. In fact, Encarnacion L. Panlilio, in her second affidavit dated February 3, 1977, declared that she did not know the import of the first affidavit she executed before Atty. Pepito Sanchez, now counsel for private respondents. She declared:
"That in an 'affidavit' I executed tend signed about the 1st week. of January, 1977, prepared by DAR lawyer Atty. Pepito Sanchez who came to see me at my son's residence at 16 Canopos St., Bel Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, it was stated in paragraph 6 thereof which I quote: 'that it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda Masamat be placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter the same be sold to the tenant-petitioners;
That the said 'affidavit' was prepared by the DAR lawyer aforementioned and that inasmuch as it was not explained very well to me by the said DAR lawyer and that what I understood about that 'affidavit' was the fact that I had intended only to place the portion of my land at Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga which is dedicated to the cultivation of palay and containing about thirty (30) hectares under the purview of Presidential Decree No. 27 and to be sold to the tenant-petitioners, I signed the said 'affidavit';
That the price stated therein for the sale of thirty (30) hectares to the tenants is Seven thousand Five Hundred pesos (P7,500.00) per hectare;
That it was not my least intention to agree and subject my entire property in Hacienda Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga, especially the larger portion dedicated to the cultivation of sugarcane, placed under the coverage of the Presidential Decree No. 27;
That another reason for my desire not to place my entire property referred to as Hacienda Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga, under P.D. 27 is the fact that the said Hacienda Masamat is leased to my nephew's wife, Mrs. Paulina Y. Mercado, and the lease contract I executed in her favor covering my said Hacienda Masamat is still subsisting and in force and will expire only after the agricultural crop year 1978-1979;
That I have not appeared before any notary to subscribe and swear to said 'affidavit', although I came to know later on that the same was notarized on January 12, 1977, as Doc. No. 491, Page No. 100, Book No. 4, Series of 1977 of the notarial registry of Notary Public Dionilo D. Marfil of Quezon City;
That in view of the above, I am cancelling and revoking, as I hereby cancel and revoke, through this affidavit, the said affidavit I executed dated January 12, 1977, notarized by said Notary Public Dionilo D. Marfil, especially paragraph 6 thereof, and the said cancellation and revocation becomes (sic) effective on the date of the execution hereof.'' 5
On the other hand, it is clear that the DAR knew of the existence of the second affidavit. While the then DAR Secretary ordered the inclusion of Hacienda Masamat under P.D. 27 and the DAR, through Director Gaudencio Besa, was very fast (over a week after the 1st affidavit was executed) in issuing an order 6 dated January 20, 1977 directing the issuance of the certificates of land transfer, it was, as petitioner alleges, 7 "fairly recently" that the CLTs in favor of respondents were issued. This was despite the dismissal of Mrs. Mercado's case on Larch 17, 1978. It is noteworthy that CAR found that Atty. Gregorio Sapera of the DAR Central Office did in fact recommend the CLTs awarded to respondents cancelled, as in fact the certificates of land transfer were recalled before Atty. Sapera made his re-investigation and CAR stated that:
"The records of this case show that Certificates of Land Transfer were issued in favor of defendants on the strength of the recommendation made by the investigating team of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga wherein Atty. Pepito (sic) Sanchez, counsel for the defendants, is one of the members; that upon the representation made by the plaintiffs, the certificates of land transfer were recalled and that another team coming from the Central Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform headed by Atty. Gregorio D. Sapera, Legal Officer III, was authorized to make re-investigation of the landholdings in question; that upon making the re-investigation, Atty. Sapera found out that the landholdings in question are principally devoted to the production of sugarcane. Thus, he recommended that the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of the awardees be cancelled."' (Emphasis supplied)
The conclusion is inescapable that the DAR did not move precisely because of the existence of the second affidavit.
It is ruled that decisions of administrative bodies, or any body exercising quasi-judicial or judicial functions for that matter, must base their decisions on substantial evidence. It cannot be said that both the PARAB and the DARAB based their decisions on substantial evidence when they ignored the existence of the second affidavit on the bare reason that no steps were taken to pursue the revocation of the first affidavit. Nor did the PARAB base its decision on substantial evidence when it insisted that the land in question was covered by PD 27. The PARAB ruled:
"On the first question of the coverage or not under Operation Land Transfer of the landholding pursuant to PD 27, it is folly to pretend that the property is not within the ambit of the law. This large tract of land consisting of 115.41 hectares comprises the riceland and sugarland with an area of 90 hectares, productive land, the rest being intended for residential purposes. The letter of complaint of the civil law lessee, Mrs. Paulina Mercado, confirms the classification of land. The riceland is 50 hectares while the remaining is planted to sugarcane. However, when long drought visited the sugarland, the tenants planted palay and other crops i.e. mongo, corn, vegetables, etc.
No less than the DAR personnel together with the Bureau of Lands' people reported that the subject property is devoted to palay production. It cannot be said even by the most charitable standards that the public defendant, Department of Agrarian Reform, evinced unmistakable bias to the then civil law lessee who was given warranted benefits when she allowed the tenant-defendants to plant palay in lieu of sugarcane in the 1970s.
The original owner, the late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, even conceded in 1977 that the property was dedicated to production of palay and sugarcane crops. She was even informed that 50.22 hectares comprising the portions dedicated to palay crop had been placed under the purview and coverage of PD 27' and as owner of the abovementioned property she interposed no objection to the action taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform in placing the aforesaid portion dedicated to palay crop within the coverage of PD 27. (Annex '7', Plaintiffs Position Paper).
The desire of the said landowner to have her entire subject (sic) be placed under the coverage of PD 27 without exemption is clear and unequivocal ground to concede legality in the act of DAR. The Department of Agrarian Reform and the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations wrote finis to the claim of the then protestant, Mrs. Paulina Mercado. In the language of the said court, in the aforementioned case, with this development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has become moot and academic, it being already settled in the DAR proceedings the placement of the landholdings in question under the land transfer program of the government'." 9
The above-quoted findings of the PARAB are not supported by substantial evidence. Consider the following circumstances:
1. The PARAB ruled that the DAR personnel and that of the Bureau of Lands found that the lands in question were devoted to palay production. Perhaps it was due to oversight when the PARAB failed to consider the CAR order 10 dated April 25, 1974 where it noted that Atty. Sapera's team found the lands in question to be planted with sugarcane. Thus, it recommended that the CLTs be cancelled. Atty. Sapera and his team were from the DAR Central Office.
2. The PARAB ruled that Mrs. Mercado allowed the respondents to plant palay in lieu of sugarcane. How did PARAB conclude that Mrs. Mercado allowed this? Obviously it failed to read the portion of the letter of Mrs. Mercado to the DAR Secretary dated November 26, 1973 which stated as follows:
"Mr. Felixberto Gomez, representative of the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular inspection on July 27, 1973 on the area that are planted with sugar cane but due to the long drought the newly planted cane died so that I instructed them to plant peanuts or mongo (see attached letter dated July 10, 1973) but they insisted to the planting of palay although it is against my wish and consent inasmuch as you get more proceeds from sugar, but these very tenants agreed to plant sugarcane this agricultural year 1973-74.
Now I have conclusive evidence that inspite of the agreement with CAR representative the person concerned will no longer plant sugar cane because of the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfers in their favor." 11 (Emphasis supplied)
No stretch of imagination is required to conclude that the planting of the palay was against the wishes, and without the consent, of Mrs. Mercado. It is difficult to understand how the PARAB came to conclude that Mrs. Mercado allowed the planting of palay, instead of sugarcane. The PARAB also glossed over the fact that the CAR had to order respondents to plant sugarcane which would not have been the case if Mrs. Mercado allowed the planting of palay. 12
3. The PARAB insisted on the declarations of Encarnacion L. Panlilio in her first affidavit to the effect that she consented to the placing of her land under P.D. 27. Obviously, the PARAB never gave the second affidavit any consideration, for if it did, it would have been obvious that Encarnacion L. Panlilio expressly revoked her first affidavit when she specifically declared:
"That it was not my least intention to agree and subject my entire property in Hacienda Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga especially the larger portion dedicated to the cultivation of sugarcane, placed under the coverage of the Presidential Decree No. 27." 13
In Malonzo vs. Commission on Elections, 14 the Supreme Court noted:
"In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.'
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred."
In the instant case, the PARAB's decision could not be said to be based on substantial evidence, considering that it ignored other evidence which might have led it to a different conclusion.
On petitioner Lizares' allegation of fraud, this is amply supported by substantial evidence. Atty. Pepito Sanchez, then DAR, lawyer and counsel for respondents, who recently withdraw as such, as well as other DAR personnel, were accused by Mrs. Mercado, the agricultural lessee, of bias and even engaging in machinations to get the land in question covered by P.D. 27. Mrs. Mercado alleged in her letter complaint to then Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora dated March 20, 1974 as follows:
"Atty. Sanchez and Mr. Teodulo Guarin, of Pamp. Art. II-36 were reported to me by reliable sources that they went to the extent of instigating eight (8) persons who were issued CLTs to broadcast (sic) mongoes, corn and other vegetables on the sugar landholdings so that I could not have these areas planted with sugarcane.
xxx xxx xxx
As a matter of fact I was not even consulted by the local DAR personnel when the awardees applied for Certificates of Land Transfer. I was totally ignored by the team in their investigation in the matter of issuance of CLTs as many landowners have experienced that more often than not, total strangers were issued CLTs over their land. I am aware of the fact that there are standing instructions from your office that landowners and/or civil law lessees are to be notified when workers apply for certificates of land transfer. Mr. Guarin, Teodulo, Team Leader of Pam. ART II-36 told me that landowners were not to be notified.
Due to my complaint that I could not rely on the impartiality of Atty. Sanchez, Mr. Teodulo Guarin et. al., in the matter of reinvestigation, for the documentary evidences that I presented were totally ignored I made representations that an impartial investigator be sent to make proper reports on the actuality of the situation pertaining to the land in question." 15
Acting on the alleged bias of Atty. Sanchez and other DAR personnel, the CAR found that the DAR had to order the recall of the CLTs issued on the strength of the investigation team's recommendation of the DAR Regional Office of which Atty. Sanchez was a member, and to have another team from the DAR Central Officer headed by Atty. Sapera do a reinvestigation. In time, Atty. Sapera's team made findings completely contrary to that Atty. Sanchez's team and recommended that the CLTs issued to respondents be cancelled. 16
It is thus clear that Atty. Sanchez and others, were moving heaven and earth, so to speak, to get the land in question covered by P.D. 27, even succeeding in having CLTs issued to the alleged tenants. However, they were overruled by Atty. Sapera's team from the DAR Central Office, who found that the land was planted with sugarcane. Thus Atty. Sanches resorted to another method, that of convincing Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio to have the land voluntarily covered by P.D. 27. This resulted in the January 12, 1977 affidavit, 17 which Atty. Sanchez himself prepared, and the issuance of Director Besa's order dated January 20, 1977, 18 prompting the CAR dismiss Mrs. Mercado's case. 19 However, Encarnacion L. Panlilio, in her February 3, 1977 affidavit, repudiated her first affidavit, alleging that Atty. Sanchez did not explain to her the full import of the same. She stated as follows:
"That the said 'affidavit' was prepared by the DAR lawyer aforementioned and that inasmuch as it was not explained very well to me by the said DAR lawyer and that what I understood about the 'affidavit' was the fact that I had intended only to place the portion of my land at Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga, which is dedicated to the cultivation of palay and containing about thirty (30) hectares under the purview of Presidential Decree No. 27 and to be sold to the tenant-petitioners, I signed the said 'affidavit'.
xxx xxx xxx
That I have not appeared before any notary to subscribe and swear to sued 'affidavit', although I came to know later on that the same was notarized on January 12, 1977, as Doc. No. 491, page No. 100, Book No. 4, Series of 1977 of the notarial registry of Notary Public Dionilo D. Marfil of Quezon City." 20
The above circumstances point to no other conclusion than that there was a scheme on the part of the DAR personnel to forcibly include Hacienda Masamat within the coverage of P.D. 27, even though a large portion of this is sugarcane land.
The CAR expressly found the land in question to be sugarland. In fact, it had to order the respondents in this case to plant sugarcane instead of palay which they insisted on planting. In its April 25, 1974 order, the CAR ruled:
"The Court is of the belief and hereby holds that there is no need of referring the matter under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, it being cleared (sic) that the landholdings in question situated at Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga is a sugarcane landholding."(Emphasis supplied)
In its order dated May 30, 1974, the CAR ruled:
"There was issued an Order dated April 30, 1974, the dispositive portion of which follows:
'WHEREFORE, in view of the findings of this Court that the landholdings involved in this case are sugarlands and not palay lands and in order not to make the landholdings idle, the herein defendants are hereby ordered to plant sugar cane in their respective landholdings on or before May 7, 1974. Failure on their part to do so within said period, the herein plaintiffs are hereby authorized to plant sugarcanes on their respective landholdings, the expenses of said planting to be charged to the defendants out of their shares to be realized during this coming harvest season.'
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the defendants-tenants are hereby enjoined to cultivate the sugarcane presently standing on the landholdings in question and to continue taking care thereof until ready for cutting the same by following the proven farm practice of sugarcane. It is hereby ordered likewise that the moment the said defendants will not cultivate and show defiance in taking care of the said sugarcane, the plaintiff-landowner is hereby authorized to take care of the same and cultivate it likewise by following the proven farm practices of sugarcane. Before the plaintiff will assume the management in taking care of and cultivation of the sugarcane, said plaintiff shall inform in writing the herein defendants individually about the failure of each defendant and the proper cultivation and taking care of the sugarcane and said plaintiff shall inform the court about this defiance. In case the court will find that the information given by the plaintiff were true, the court will issue an order to this effect and the interest of the parties will be given due consideration.
SO ORDERED." 22 (Emphasis supplied)
As the land is sugar land, it could not fall within the purview of P.D. 27, the provisions of which are very clear that the lands included are only those planted to rice and corn. The pertinent provision of P.D. 27 states as follows:
"This shall apply to tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed-estate or not." (Emphasis supplied)
The argument that Encarnacion L. Panlilio expressed her desire to have Hacienda Masamat included in the coverage of P.D. 27 as shown in her first affidavit does not automatically make the land covered by said law. The DAR and respondents had not shown any provision, and indeed there is none, authorizing such action by the DAR in including Hacienda Masamat under the coverage of P.D. 27 solely on the basis of an expression of no objection on the part of Encarnacion L. Panlilio to the actions of the DAR. In any event, there is the second affidavit expressly repudiating the first.
On the other hand, the proper mechanism for the voluntary inclusion of land not included in the coverage of P.D. 27 is found in section 51 of R.A. 3844, dated August 8, 1963, which pre-dated P.D. 27 and provides for the acquisition of private agriculture lands by the DAR through negotiated purchase. This provision states as follows:
"Sec. 51. Powers and functions. — It shall be the responsibility of the Department:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) To acquire private agricultural lands regardless of area through negotiated purchase subject to approval of the court as to price for distribution and sale at cost to their actual occupants who are tillers of the land in lots of not more than six hectares; Provided, That where there are several groups or individuals or such tillers petitioning for the acquisition of their respective occupancy, priority shall be given to the group with a greater number of tillers, and the latter over individual tillers: Provided, further, that the group or individual who has continuously tilled the land longest shall have first priority."
The above provision should have been the proper mode of acquisition of lands not included in the coverage of P.D. 27. However, such option was not availed of nor was there any intention to do so. Series of acts designed to railroad the coverage of the entire Hacienda Masamat under P.D. 27 were very evident although PD 27 is explicit in stating that the lands covered are only rice and corn lands.
The undersigned fails to see how cancelling the Emancipation Patents or the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to respondents would work a graver injustice to them. It is clear from the above disquisition that the awarding of the same to private respondents was the fruit of an insidious scheme to deprive a legitimate landowner of her land. To grant the instant motion for reconsideration would confer legitimacy to this scheme. Thus, the alleged rights of private respondents over the land in question cannot prevail over that of the legitimate landowner. It is worth noting that in our own Constitution's Bill of Rights, it has been made clear that:
"No person shall be depraved of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." 23
It may be true that the CAR order dismissing the case has long become final and executory. However, such order does not amount to res judicata, as not all of the requirements for res judicata have been complied with. In Linzag vs. Court of Appeals, 24 the Supreme Court said:
"The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation —republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause — nor debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
The requisites of res judicata are (1.) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of pasties, subject matter and cause of action."
There can be no res judicata in this case, as the CAR order dated March 17, 1978 was not a judgment on the merits. This order merely recognized the alleged fact that the land in question was placed under the purview of P.D. 27, and that thus, the case had allegedly become moot and academic. It ruled as follows:
"There is now on record, submitted by defendants, the pertinent exhibits of the outcome of the letter-protest of plaintiff, which are official records, as follows:
1. Letter dated January 20, 1977 of Director Gaudencio Besa, signing for the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, informing plaintiff Paulina Mercado of the decision of the owner of the property in question, Mrs. Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, to place the same under the land transfer program of the government, for which reason the resolution of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of the DAR Secretary on the distribution of land transfer certificates to defendants pursuant to PD 27 has become moot and academic;
2. Letter dated January 20, 1977 of Director Besa, also signing for the DAR, Secretary, to Director Severino Santiago of Region III, DAR, San Fernando, Pampanga, directing him to distribute all the certificates of land transfer over the landholdings in question to the tenants thereof;
3. Ist Indorsement dated February 3, 1977 of the Asst. Regional Director of Region III, DAR, instructing the Officer-In-Charge, DAR Agrarian Team Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, to distribute the certificates of land transfer pursuant to DAR Memorandum dated May 3, 1976;
4. 2nd Indorsement dated Match 3, 1977 of the Officer-In-Charge to the Team Leader of the same Office anent the tenants of the land of Mrs. Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio situated at Mexico, Pampanga.
With this development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has become moot and academic, it being already settled in the DAR proceedings the placement of the landholdings in question under the land transfer program of the government. Therefore, the instant case should be dismissed. Necessarily, all pending incidents should be deemed disposed of. The interlocutory order dated May 30, 1974 requiring the defendants to plant sugarcane in the landholdings in question should be set aside. Also, per Order dated April 30, 1974, plaintiffs were ordered to deposit the amount of Pl,000.00 as condition for their planting of sugarcane in the landholding in question in May, 1974, to answer for whatever damages defendants might suffer as a consequence thereof. The release of the deposit is in order." 25
It is clear that the above-mentioned order did not dispose the case on the merits. It merely ruled that Mrs. Mercado's case had already become moot and academic due to the orders of the DAR. As earlier mentioned, the DAR's actuations were very flawed as it jumped on the existence of Encarnacion L. Panlilio's first affidavit to justify placing Hacienda Masamat under the coverage of PD 27, without stopping to consider that this affidavit was only an expression of intent, such intent being later clarified in the second affidavit. Thus, there can be no res judicata.
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), authorizes awardees to sell their respective landholdings to third persons after full payment of amortization. P.D. 27 provides that landholdings can only be disposed of to the government or transferred by hereditary succession. However, herein private respondents are not covered by this provision. It was noted earlier that the transfer of the landholdings to them was patently illegal. Therefore, they hold no rights over the sugar lands in question, nor do they have any right to dispose of them.
Noteworthy is the fact that private respondents had been less than candid with this Court, even to the extent of displaying a very cavalier attitude, when they did not file a comment when required to do so on the pretext that they were adopting their comments in the case below to serve as their comment in the instant petition, 26 only to become very loquacious, offering "newly discovered evidence", when they found out that the case went against them. This circumstance does not do well for a full determination of the issues before us and indeed makes this Court's process of adjudication doubly harder. Private respondents should not complain of a situation which is largely of their own making.
While the DAR may be commended for its zeal in the execution of the land reform program of the government, it should likewise be reminded that the end never justifies the means.
The cry "land to the tiller" rings very hollow when the tiller, at the first opportunity, sells the land awarded to him to other persons who are not tillers themselves, who promptly put the land to purposes other than agriculture, which was not the intention of the framers of the land reform laws.
WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS, the undersigned hereby DISSENTS from the majority opinion, and votes to DENY the motion for reconsideration.
Footnotes
1. Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of this Court, as amended, providing that if the Decision is reconsidered, the subsequent disposition should be embodied in an Amended Decision.
2. Penned by Honorable Remedios Salazar-Fernando and promulgated on April, 11, 2000.
3. Partly quoted as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1018, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended do hereby decree and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of this day October 21, 1972.
This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not;
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more that seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it;
xxx xxx xxx
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws.
4. Records, p. 210.
5. Premiere Development Bank, et al. vs. NLRC, et al. G.R. No. 114625 July 23, 1998, citing Cormero vs. CA. 247 SCRA 291, August 14, 1995 citing Marcelino vs. CA, 210 SCRA 444 (1992); Solomon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 352 (1990); Jimenez vs. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190, April 6, 1990; Palmera vs. Civil Service Commission, 235 SCRA 87, August 4, 1994, Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, 25 SCRA 1; Fuentes vs. NLRC, 167 SCRA 767, November 24, 1988
6. Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corp. vs. Macaraig, Jr., 299 SCRA 491 (1998).
7. Catapusan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 109262 November 21, 1996, citing Sec. 1, Rule 131, Sec. 1, Rule 133, Misa vs. CA, 212 SCRA 217.
8. Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, enacted July 17, 197.
9. Alex L. David vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 127116 & 128039, April 8, 1997.
10. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC and Procopio Evangelista, 306 SCRA 151 (1999); Ventura O. Ducat vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119652, January 20, 2000.
11. Salandanan vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 671 (1998).
12. Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Torres, 286 SCRA 666 (1998);
13. Fortich vs. Corona 299 SCRA 624 (1998).
SALAZAR-FERNANDO, J:
1. Rollo, pp. 185-186
2. GR No. 103959, 278 SCRA 98 [1997]
3. GR No. 109803, 289 SCRA 178 [1998]
4. PARAD Decision, p. 12, Rollo, p. 337
5. Petition, Annex M-7, Rollo, p. 226
8. Petition, Annex M-8, Rollo, 226
7. Petition, pp. 20-21, Rollo, pp. 31-32
8. Petition, Annex M-3, Rollo, pp. 213-214
9. Petition, Annex P, Rollo, pp. 335-336
10. Petition, Annex M-3, Rollo, pp. 213-214
11. Petition, Annex M-2, Rollo, p. 203
12. Petition, Annex M-4, Rollo, pp. 216-218
13. Petition, Annex M-7, Rollo, p. 226
14. GR No. 127066, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)
15. Petition, Annex M-2-B, Rollo, p. 207
16. Petition, Annex M-3, Rollo, pp. 213-214
17. Petition, Annex M-6, Rollo, p. 225
18. Petition, Annex M-6, Rollo, p. 228
19. Petition, Annex M-9, Rollo, p. 229
20. Petition, Annex M-7, Rollo, p. 226
21. Petition, Annex M-3, Rollo, p. 215
22. Petition, Annex M-4, Rollo, pp. 216-218
23. Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution
24. GR No. 122181, 291 SCRA 304 [1998]
25. Petition, Annex M-9, Rollo, pp. 231-232
26. Rollo, p. 351
27. Rollo, p. 377