FIFTEENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 40423. June 18, 1996.]
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD — JUSTINA A. VELASQUEZ, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
ASUNCION, M.C., J p:
The subject of petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction dated 22 May 1996 is DARAB's writ of execution issued on 17 May 1996 implementing its Decision dated 1 February 1996 in DARAB Case No. 2288 (Reg. Case no. 0054-93), the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Declaring plaintiff-appellant's appeal to have been validly perfected;
2. Declaring plaintiff-appellant a bona fide agricultural lessee and as such entitled to her security of tenure and, by reason thereof, Defendant-Appellee is hereby ordered to reinstate and maintain said Plaintiff-Appellant to her peaceful possession and cultivation on the subject farmholding;
3. Declaring Plaintiff-Appellant to have validly exercised her right to redemption and the Register of Deeds of Parañaque is hereby ordered to cancel the titles issued to Defendant-Appellee and in lieu thereof, the corresponding certificate of title be issued to said Plaintiff-Appellant after acceptance of the redemption price by Defendant-Appellee who is hereby ordered to accept the same. EcDTIH
4. Declaring that there was no valid conversion of the subject farmholding into residential purposes pursuant to and in compliance with the existing applicable laws and implementing guidelines therefor.
At the hearing held on June 7, 1996 on petitioner's application for issuance of injunction, the parties through their respective counsel argued their position on the incident. The oral argument ran along the same lines taken in their respective written position in the various pleadings filed by the parties. The record shows that private respondent submitted an Opposition to the application and a Rejoinder to petitioner's Reply to private respondent's Opposition.
Petitioner maintains that it is entitled to the injunction because, first, it would render nugatory any judgment in this appeal that may be rendered in its favor and, second, public respondent DARAB was without jurisdiction when it assumed appellate jurisdiction over a final and executory order of PARAD that dismissed private respondent's petition for redemption on the ground that property in question had ceased to be agricultural in nature upon its reclassification under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance adopted by Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in 1980 as a low-density residential area and petitioner was subsequently granted Development Permit in 1986 and License to Sell in 1987 by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The claim of finality of the PARAD order is anchored on the basis of PARAD's own treatment of private respondent's second motion for reconsideration as a notice of appeal. The second motion for reconsideration not being allowed under DARAB rules of procedure, the same did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal and order lapsed into finality. Being final and executory, the PARAD order ordaining that the property involved is residential in nature takes the subject matter of the litigation beyond the competence of the DARAB. This is the basis of petitioner's petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner seeking review under the petition also maintains the position that the assailed decision of DARAB is not in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court in Natalia Realty vs. DAR, G.R. NO. 103302, August 12, 1993 which decreed that conversion of government agencies before June 15, 1988 did not need any clearance from DAR.
On the other side, counsel of DARAB and private respondent argued that the petition was filed out of time, and that it was improper because review of the DARAB decision cannot be had under either Rule 45 and 65 since review under the former rule is one taken against decision of this Court to the Supreme Court while the latter remedy is available where there is no appeal, there being one under the provisions of Supreme Court Administrative Circular 1-95.
Respondents, responding to petitioner's issue assailing DARAB's alleged improvident exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the PARAD order, contend that DARAB rules of procedure permit the liberal treatment of pleadings when PARAD deemed the second motion for reconsideration as a notice of appeal sufficient to confer upon DARAB jurisdiction over private respondent's appeal of the PARAD order and was acquired upon private respondent's payment of proper fees. They also contend that the case of Natalia Realty Inc. vs. DAR is not applicable, the facts therein not being four-square with those in this case.IT
The merits and the lack of it in the case were extensively discussed by the parties, petitioner urging that it is entitled to the relief demanded while respondents argued the contrary view. Culled from the discussion, it is evident that the dispute between the parties lies chiefly in legal conclusions arrived at without any serious doubt as to the facts in the case, namely, the correctness of PARAD's treatment of private respondent's second motion for reconsideration as an appeal and DARAB's position that there was no valid conversion of the property in question from agricultural into residential. The issues are jurisdictional in nature, attacking the very authority of the DARAB to assume appellate jurisdiction over private respondent's appeal from the PARAD decision and to render judgment thereon, which can and will be resolved after the parties have fully ventilated and articulated their respective contentions thereon.
Peripheral matters urged by the parties such as the contentious actions taken by the parties in various forums only tended to confuse rather than assist the Court in resolving the injunctive question at bench. Except for the decision in G.R. No. 64284, on which private respondent bases her petition for redemption, all the other actions appear, at least in the meantime, to be extraneous in the resolution of this incident.
On the incident at bench, the Court inquired from the parties as to the effects of the non-issuance of writ of injunction. The petitioner revealed that the property in question is registered in the name of the petitioner although the same has been developed and subdivided into small lots and sold to 600 buyers. If the DARAB decision were executed, the titles of petitioner will be canceled and new ones will be issued in the name of private respondent as ordered therein. Eventually, it will result in chaos among 600 subdivision lot buyers. It appears also that petitioner would be compelled to accept the redemption price of P2,319,210.00 for which it paid P11,868,000.00. Private respondent hastened to add that notices of lis pendens have been annotated in the titles of petitioner.
It is axiomatic that the issuance of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, its office being one to preserve the rights of the parties until the merits in the case are finally decided.
Weighing the comparative effects of the issuance of the writ of injunction on the rights of the contending parties, it appears to the Court that under the facts and circumstances obtaining petitioner will be prejudiced by the immediate implementation of the writ of execution issued by DARAB if its titles were canceled in favor of private respondent and forced to accept a redemption price way below the cost f acquisition of the property before the final decision is made in this case. The immediate execution of the decision will drastically take away from the petitioner the ownership and possession of the property and the difference between the redemption price and the cost of acquisition of the property before the decision reached the stage of finality.
It also appears that the rights of private respondent are adequately protected by the notice of lis pendens inscribed in the titles of petitioner since the property shall be subject to the final result of this case. No practical advantage can be achieved from the immediate execution since the titles, whether in the name of petitioner or private respondent, are under the restrictive function of the notice of lis pendens. Verily, there is no perceptible imperative and urgent need to execute the assailed DARAB decision pending consideration of the appeal.
The Court rejects the private respondent's proposition that DARAB decisions cannot be enjoined because of their executory nature. It would deprive courts of the inherent power to issue auxiliary writs and other means to carry their jurisdiction into effect (Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court) and to protect and preserve the rights of parties during the pendency of appeals (Knecht vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 1; Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285). More than that, the power of this Court to stay execution is expressly and specifically granted under Section 12, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of the Supreme Court.
In view thereof, the Court resolved, pending consideration of the petition, to ISSUE the writ of preliminary injunction without bond as the preservation of the rights of the parties during the appeal is strongly indicated by the prevailing factual situation while at the same time no actual prejudice upon the rights of private respondent can be anticipated by the stay of execution by writ of this Court. DSHcTC
To obviate any question as to the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court resolved to ADMIT the petition under petitioner's Manifestation and Motion filed on 7 May 1996.
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court further resolved the REQUIRE respondents to file their respective comment on, not a motion to dismiss, the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution, which comment shall serve as the answer in the event that the same is given due course.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue without bond directing respondents, including the Register of Deeds of Parañaque, to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the writ of execution issued in DARAB Case No. 2288 until further orders from the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Montoya and Jacinto, JJ ., concur.