EIGHTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 39024. May 31, 1996.]
ROSITA JARDENICO, ADELINA JARDENICO, LETICIA JARDENICO, BIENVENIDA JARDENICO, ANGELINA JARDENICO, and FELIX JARDENICO, JR., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SPOUSES ELEUTERIO SIOSAN and ADELAIDA JARDENICO, defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
LANTIN, J p:
Before us is an appeal by defendants-spouses Eleuterio Siosan and Adelaida Jardenico from the decision, dated February 15, 1992, of the RTC-Iloilo City, Branch 24, in Civil Case No. 14731, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the latter —
(1) To return or deliver to plaintiffs the possession of the lots belonging to the latter and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title in their names (Exhibits O, P, Q, R, S and T):
(2) To pay plaintiffs actual damages corresponding to the equitably reduced estimated value of the palay harvest from May 1982 to the present in the amount of P102,374.00 and P10,500.00 a year from this date, until fully paid:
(3) To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and expenses of litigation in the sum of P5,000.00 and
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
On November 22, 1982, plaintiffs Rosita Jardenico, Adelina Jardenico, Leticia Jardenico, Bienvenida Jardenico, Angelina Jardenico, and Felix Jardenico, Jr. filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against defendants-spouses Eleuterio Siosan and Adelaida Jardenico before the RTC-Iloilo City, Branch 24. The complaint stemmed from the refusal of the defendants-spouses to turn over the possession of the shares of the plaintiffs in the four (4) parcels of land, known as Lot Nos. 1013, 1421, 1422, and 1607-B, which the plaintiffs and defendant Adelaida Jardenico inherited from their deceased parents, Felix Jardenico and Genoveva Jamandre. The plaintiffs claimed that the said parcels of land were entrusted without consideration to the defendants-spouses in order for them to use the income thereof in defraying the educational expenses of their children provided that the possession of the lands would be returned to the plaintiffs upon their demand. The failure of the defendants-spouses to return the possession of the lands pertaining to the plaintiffs despite demand therefor constrained the latter to seek from the lower court the following reliefs:
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court:
(a) Ordering the defendants to return or deliver immediately to the plaintiffs the possession of the above-mentioned lots respectively belonging to the latter and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title in their names;
(b) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages corresponding to the value of 210 cavans per hectare for 6.8493 hectares per year from May, 1982 until the possession of the said lots belonging to the plaintiffs is delivered or returned to them respectively, at P50.00 per cavan; moral damages and exemplary damages in such amounts as this Honorable Court may determine to be reasonable under the circumstances; attorney's fees of P10,000 plus an appearance fee of P300.00 per appearance and a contingent fee equivalent to 20% of any and all sums that may be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiffs; and expenses of litigation of at least P2,000.00;
(c) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this action; and
(d) Granting to the plaintiffs such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises."
In their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion for Referral to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), now Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), dated December 28, 1982, the defendants-spouses Eleuterio Siosan and Adelaida Jardenico alleged that they were in possession of the six (6) parcels of land, not four (4) as what the plaintiffs claimed, because they were tenants of the late Felix Jardenico, Sr., father of the plaintiffs and defendant Adelaida Jardenico, and that there was no stipulation that they would return the parcels of land upon demand of the plaintiffs. Thus, the defendants-spouses prayed for the following reliefs:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed;
1. That before trial, an Order be issued referring the instant case to the MAR, Region VI, Iloilo City, pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 316, as implemented by MAR Memorandum Circular No. 29, Series of 1973, for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties, and for a certification as to whether or not this case is proper for trial;
2. That after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action, with costs against the plaintiffs;
3. That plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants moral damages in an amount left to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court;
4. That plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants the sum of not less than P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
5. That plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants exemplary damages in an amount left to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
Defendants further pray for such other reliefs which are just and proper in the premises."
On January 28, 1983, the lower court granted the motion of the defendants-spouses to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
On August 17, 1983, the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Iloilo City, through its Regional Director Frank Dinsay, certified that the case was proper for trial or hearing by the court.
On January 9, 1984, the lower court issued an Order, terminating the pre-trial conference and setting the case for hearing on its merits.
On June 21, 1984, the defendants-spouses filed another motion to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which was opposed by the plaintiffs on June 26, 1984. However, the motion was granted by the lower court on August 15, 1984.
On July 12, 1984, the defendants-spouses filed a motion to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, to which motion to dismiss the plaintiffs filed a motion, dated July 11, 1984, seeking to impugn the same from the records of the case for failure to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On March 29, 1985, the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Iloilo City, certified that the case was indeed proper for trial or hearing, which certification was affirmed in an Order dated December 24, 1986 by the then Minister of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The subsequent motion for reconsideration, dated January 28, 1987, filed by the defendants-spouses was denied on June 22, 1987.
Thereafter, the defendants-spouses filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 79709. The Supreme Court in a Resolution, dated May 9, 1988, dismissed the petition for failure of defendant Eleuterio Siosan to sufficiently show that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, formerly the Minister had committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned order.
On June 29, 1988, the Supreme Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. The Resolution of May 9, 1988 of the Supreme Court became final and executory on July 28, 1988.
On July 4, 1991, the defendants-spouses filed another motion to dismiss, claiming that the lower court had no jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiffs on July 19, 1991.
On July 15, 1991, the lower court denied the motion to dismiss, as follows:
"Before this Court for resolution is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Atty. Leodegario A. Conlu, Jr. anchored on counsel's perception that agricultural tenancy is in issue in this case so that under Republic Act 6657 'whenever an issue of agricultural tenancy is being raised in a case, the competent jurisdiction is within the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.'
Apart from the fact that basic is the principle that a Court cannot be automatically divested of its jurisdiction on the basis merely of the issues raised by defendant in his answer (designed purposely to deprive the Court from exercising that jurisdiction) there is no provision in Republic Act No. 6657 which supports, or lends credence to, the allegations of defendants' counsel in his Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss that `whenever an issue of agricultural tenancy is being raised in a case, the competent jurisdiction is within the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.'
What is provided under Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 is that `the DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform . . ..'
It bears emphasis that the term `agrarian reform matters' has a limited meaning. What is contemplated in the term is clearly spelled out in Section 3, paragraph (a) of the cited law. It provides —
Section 3 paragraph (a) `Agrarian reform means the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced to farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, irrespective of terminal arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands such as production or profit sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.'
Definitely, the issues raised in this case are not among those covered or even contemplated in the aforequoted definition of what `agrarian reform matters' mean, controversies over which, the DAR has primary jurisdiction pursuant to Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657.
Besides, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the forerunner of the Department of Agrarian Reform, had already declared that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties in this case and this pronouncement has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. Considering this, does movant counsel want to suggest that with the creation of the Department Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), to which primary jurisdiction is vested in resolving controversies involving agrarian reform matters, the aforenoted declaration of the MAR as confirmed/affirmed by the Supreme Court is now altered, considering that the situation of the parties in relation to the issues raised in the case has remained the same?
Moreover, one of the issues for resolution in this case as suggested by counsels and embodied in the Pre-Trial Order is `whether or not the defendants are agricultural lessees of the plaintiffs.' It is the perception of the Court that this is a justiciable issue cognizable by the Court and beyond the competence of the DARAB to inquire into, taking into consideration Section 50 in relation to Section 3, par (a) of Rep. Act. No. 6657.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied. As prayed for, let this case be set for the continuation of hearing on September 16, 1991 at 8:30 A.M.
SO ORDERED."
Thereafter, the trial of the case before the lower court proceeded and the lower court rendered the assailed decision on February 25, 1992.
Hence, the defendants-spouses filed the present appeal, raising the following assignment of errors:
"I THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
II THAT THE COURT ERRED IN RELYING ITS DECISION ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT DATED MAY 9, 1989.
III THAT THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING DECISION NOT BASED ON THE FACTS AND LAW
IV THAT THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES."
It appears that the spouses Felix Jardenico, Sr. and Genoveva Jamandre, who died on November 12, 1970 and July 23, 1979, respectively, were owners of four (4) parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1013, 1421, 1422 and 1607-B, all situated in Barangay San Jose, San Miguel, Iloilo and covered by TCT Nos. T-14444, T-11745, T-14759 and T-95628, respectively. The parcels of land were being cultivated and possessed by defendant Eleuterio Siosan as tenant. On October 31, 1979, the plaintiffs and defendant Adelaida Jardenico (spouse of defendant Eleuterio Siosan), who are the surviving children of the deceased spouses, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and adjudication of the estate of their parents which included the subject parcels of land (Exhibit A). On July 3, 1980, defendant Eleuterio Siosan executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal, stating that he was waiving his claim as tenant of the parcels of land (Exhibit FF). On December 11, 1981, the plaintiffs and defendant Adelaida Jardenico agreed that the four (4) parcels of land be consolidated and thereafter subdivided into seven equal parts (Exhibit F). After the parcels of land were subdivided and their respective shares ascertained, the plaintiffs and defendant Adelaida Jardenico executed a deed of partition on December 29, 1981 (Exhibit H). Subsequently, the plaintiffs and defendant Adelaida Jardenico were able to secure individual title over their respective shares (Exhibits O, P, Q, R, S, and T). The plaintiffs also declared the same for taxation purposes (Exhibits U, V, W, X, Y, and Z). In a letter, dated May 19, 1982, the plaintiffs demanded from defendant Adelaida Jardenico to turn over the possession of their shares in the four (4) parcels of land (Exhibit K). Another letter of demand, dated September 1, 1982, was sent to defendants Eleuterio Siosan and Adelaida Jardenico by the counsel of the plaintiffs (Exhibit N). Despite the repeated demands of the plaintiff, the defendants-spouses refused to turn over the possession of the shares of the plaintiffs, depriving them of the income thereof. The plaintiffs were thus constrained to file the present suit, thereby incurring litigation expenses.
A. It is the contention of defendants-spouses Eleuterio Siosan and Adelaida Jardenico that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which required prior barangay conciliation before any action can be filed in court, and because of such failure the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
The contention of the defendants-spouses is not tenable.
The defendants-spouses did not specifically allege in their answer that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the barangay conciliation procedure outlined in Presidential Decree No. 1508, now embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. In fact, the defendants-spouses even admitted in their answer the allegation of the plaintiffs that they sought the intervention and assistance of the Barangay Captain of San Jose, San Miguel, Iloilo, in order to settle their differences amicably, to wit:
"11. That they specifically deny the first portion of the allegation in paragraph 13 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to its truth or falsity, and as to the remainder, they admit it, with a qualification that if the intervention of the Barangay Captain of San Jose, San Miguel proved futile, it was because one of the defendants only exercised his rights as such lawful tenant-lessee, whose tenurial security is protected for by law:"
If indeed there was no compliance with the condition prescribed by P.D. No. 1508 before the plaintiffs filed the present suit, their complaint may be dismissed on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. However, the failure to raise it as a defense in the answer or in a timely motion to dismiss is deemed waiver of such defense (Fernandez vs. Militante, 161 SCRA 695). Furthermore, after the defendants-spouses had invoked the jurisdiction of the lower court by filing their answer and seeking affirmative reliefs from it, they cannot now assail that jurisdiction to which they have submitted themselves voluntarily (Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470).
Also, it must be emphasized that the Hon. Supreme Court has held that the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court has acquired over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant (Diu vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115213, December 19, 1995; Felizardo vs. Court of Appeals; 233 SCRA 220).
B. The defendants-spouses argue that the lower court cannot rely on the Resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court, dated May 9, 1988, which dismissed their petition for certiorari and which in effect affirmed the Order of the then Minister Heherson Alvarez of the Ministry of the Agrarian Reform (MAR), now Department of Agrarian Reform, who upheld the certification of the Regional Director of the MAR in Iloilo City that the case was proper for trial. They contended that Presidential Decree No. 316 upon which the certification of the Regional Director was based, did not authorize the Regional Director or the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform to resolve the issue of the existence of tenancy relationship between the parties, but only the issue of whether or not the ordinary courts can acquire jurisdiction over the case.
The argument of the defendants-spouses is not meritorious.
A careful reading of Presidential Decree No. 316 belies the position taken by the defendants-spouses.
"SEC. 2. Unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Court of First Instance, municipal or city court, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and if any such cases are filed, these cases shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy." (Emphasis Ours)
The authority of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative to make a preliminary determination of the relationship of the contending parties was made explicit in the subsequent Presidential Decree Nos. 946 and 1038, though such determination is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the case is certified as a proper case for trial. It is worth mentioning that in the determination of whether the case is proper for trial, the issue of the tenancy relationship between the contending parties must necessarily be resolved by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative.
Defendants-spouses are estopped from questioning the authority of the Secretary or the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine whether or not they were tenants. In their answer to the complaint of the plaintiffs, defendants-spouses specifically asked the lower court to refer the case to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform for preliminary determination of their relationship with the plaintiffs and for a certification as to whether or not the case was proper for trial. Defendants-spouses cannot now repudiate the authority of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform to which they had voluntarily sought to refer their case.
C. With respect to the third assigned error, the defendants-spouses claimed that the lower court disregarded the fact that they were tenants. Furthermore, they contended that the execution by defendant Eleuterio Siosan of the Affidavit of Withdrawal (Exhibit FF) is of no moment invoking the exception in Article 6 of the New Civil Code, which states that "Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law," and the decision of this Court in two cases.
We find no reversible error when the lower court disregarded the contention of the defendants-spouses that they were tenants. In fact, We agree with the conclusion of the then Minister of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform that by virtue of the execution of the Affidavit of Withdrawal, defendants-spouses ceased to be tenants of the subject parcels of land, which finding the Hon. Supreme Court in effect sustained in its Resolution of May 9, 1988 in Eleuterio Siosan vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 79709, by ruling that defendant Eleuterio Siosan, the petitioner therein, failed to sufficiently show that the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the public respondent therein, had committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned order. The then Minister of Agrarian Reform aptly stated in his Order the following:
"It is an established fact that Eleuterio Siosan had been cultivating the 6.8493-hectare landholdings even during the lifetime of the parents of the plaintiffs. It is also a fact that after the death of said parents, an agricultural leasehold contract has been entered into by and between the plaintiffs through their administrator and Eleuterio Siosan. There can be no doubt that at that time defendants (Eleuterio Siosan and his wife as a member of his immediate farm household) were tenants in subject landholding. However, when Eleuterio Siosan executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal on July 3, 1980, he in effect renounced his tenancy rights over subject landholdings. Whatever reason he may have advanced for waiving his tenancy rights, the fact remains that he did so voluntarily and he cannot now claim otherwise if it suits his purpose.
In the case of Iluminada Alejandro Vs. Atty. Pablo Flores, et al. CA-G.R. No. CAR-07312, June 1, 1978, the court held:
`Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission be permitted to falsify it. This is the doctrine of estoppel. Rules 131, Sec. 3 (a) of the Rules of Court.'
Defendant Eleuterio Siosan under the doctrine of estoppel cannot now claim that his affidavit of withdrawal did not state the true intention of the agreement between him and the plaintiffs. Furthermore the document speaks for itself. He has been a tenant in subject landholdings but he renounced his rights thereto. In the case of Domingo Pagalan et al. vs. Abelardo Mantua, CA-G.R. No. 09029-SP, July 24, 1979, it was stated:
`It has been ruled that Courts should adopt the posture that unless there is strong, positive and convincing evidence to impugn the veracity of the document, the document should be given force and meaning. For unlike the human tongue, a document only speaks of what it can show by silence'"
The affidavit of withdrawal being cited in the foregoing disquisition is hereby reproduced for the proper understanding thereof.
"AFFIDAVIT OF WITHDRAWAL
I, ELEUTERIO SIOSAN, Filipino, of legal age, married and resident of the Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say;
1. That I am the legal spouse of Adelaida Jardenico who is one of the co-owners of Lot Nos. 1202, 1422, 1013, 1421, 1607-B and 1420 all located at Bgy. San Jose, San Miguel, Iloilo under Title Nos. 18990, 14759, 14444, 11743, 95628 and 004123, respectively, with a total area of 7.4533 hectares, more or less, which I have been tilling;
2. That, as per records of the MAR, I have been identified and registered as tenant on said parcels of land for which reason the said parcels have been certified by the MAR Office to be tenanted and covered by Operation Land Transfer;
3. That, my wife being one of the co-owners of the said parcels of land in undivided interest. I hereby waive my claim as tenant on said parcels for the purpose of deleting from the files of the MAR office any record to show that I am a tenant on said lands;
4. That the issuance of a certification to the effect that the above-stated parcels of land are not tenanted is in order in lieu of the MAR Certification dated February 4, 1980 previously issued which should be withdrawn and/or cancelled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 3rd day of July, 1980 in Iloilo City, Philippines.
(SGD.) ELEUTERIO SIOSAN
Affiant"
The existence, much less the authenticity and due execution of the quoted affidavit was never denied by the defendants-spouses. Thus, they are bound by it and they cannot take inconsistent postures to the detriment of the plaintiffs who have interests in the subject parcels of land which We are bound to protect. We must add that there is no justifiable reason why We should consider the waiver of the tenancy rights of defendant Eleuterio Siosan as contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs.
The plaintiffs as lawful owners of the subject subdivided parcels of land are entitled to the possession and the fruits thereof, the deprivation of which by the defendants-spouses entitled them to a reasonable amount of damages. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, it is just and equitable that attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in addition to judicial costs, be awarded to the plaintiffs (Article 2208, New Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 25, 1992, of the RTC-Iloilo City, Branch 24, in Civil Case No. 14731, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants-spouses Eleuterio Siosan and Adelaida Jardenico.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Tayao-Jaguros and Adefuin-dela Cruz, JJ., concur.