SIXTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 47059. September 17, 1998.]
MAXIMINA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ADJUDICATION BOARD — Diliman, Quezon City, HON. TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR., — Provincial Adjudicator, Malolos, Bulacan, DARAB SHERIFF, Malolos, Bulacan, and DRA. ANTONIETA M. LUCINDO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LUNA, J p:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed on March 12, 1998.
Petitioner assails the decision dated February 27, 1996, of the Adjudication Board, Region III, Malolos Bulacan, in DARAB Case 775-Bul'95, also the decision dated April 22, 1997, of the Adjudication Board, Department of Agrarian Reform, in the DARAB Case 5071, and the Writ of Execution dated November 12, 1997 of the April 22nd decision.
Petitioner contends that the DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying her motion to quash the writ of execution, because those decisions were rendered "for want of jurisdiction"; that no notice was sent to her counsel concerning the resolution dated October 17, 1997, denying her motion for reconsideration of the April 22nd decision; and that for lack of notice, the DARAB's April 22nd decision has not become final and executory.
In her comment, private respondent prayed for dismissal of the petition, maintaining that petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the DARAB; that petitioner was served with a copy of the DARAB's resolution dated October 17, 1997, denying her motion for reconsideration of the April 22nd decision; that this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, is not the proper remedy, because, from the DARAB's decision, the appropriate remedy is appeal by certiorari; and that the respondent Board did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution since the decision is immediately executory even pending appeal.
This is the decision of the Adjudication Board, Region III, Malolos, Bulacan:
"This is in effect a referral case originating from the Municipal Trial Court Branch 001, Norzagaray, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 663 for Ejectment, entitled Dra. Antonietta Merced-Lucindo, Plaintiff, vs. Maximina (Maxima) Cruz, Defendant. The basis of the referral could be gleaned from the portion of the ORDER dated May 16, 1994, issued by aforesaid court quoted as follows:
'After scanning over the evidences adduced by both parties as well as the allegations in the Complaint and in the Answer, the Court is of the opinion there is a question of whether or not the defendant is really the plaintiff's tenant over which issue this Court has no jurisdiction. Consequently, let the above-entitled case be first referred to the Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) where the matter of tenancy should first be fully litigated and ventilated.'
Plaintiff, Dra. Lucindo, alleged among others that sometime in August of 1969, Atty. Guillermina M. Gener, Erlinda M. Perez, Jose M. Perez and she (Antonieta-Merced Lucindo), Original Certificate of Title No. 4518 was issued in their names; that on December 24, 1994, the co-owners entered a Contract of Lease with Luzon Aggregates, Inc., under the lease contract, the lessee will extract gravel and sand on the 175,000 sq. meters of land, a part of parcel of which is the subject landholding; that on November, 1990, herein plaintiff purchased a parcel of land which originally was covered by OCT No. 4518 and the divided share of Atty. Guillermina M. Gener and after the purchase, it was transferred in the name of the plaintiff and now covered under TCT No. T-126093 (M); that subject landholding is located in Matiktik, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of 8,477 sq. meters more or less; that on April 3, 1995, Regional Director Eugenio B. Bernardo, DAR Region III, issued on ORDER granting the application for the exemption/exclusion from the coverage of the CARP of the plaintiff's land with an aggregate area of 4.3234 hectares, located at Padling, Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan; that under the Tax Declaration, the description of the land is non-agricultural and the whole area was declared gravel and sand, or mineral land; that said defendant is neither a tenant of plaintiff nor was there a tenant-landlord relationship as the said parcel of land, it being considered a mineral land; if only to avoid further litigation, the plaintiff had given the defendant the chance to vacate the premises by sending demand letter, however, the defendant filed and continuously fails to vacate the premises; that on January 27, 1995, the Municipal Trial Court Judge Romulo C. Basa rendered a decision favorable to plaintiff Dr. Antonieta Lucindo quoted as follows:
'(1) The defendant or any person/s claiming rights under her to vacate the premises;
(2) The dismissal of all other plaintiff's claims for moral and exemplary damages;
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of the suit;'
That on appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, the decision of the Municipal Trial Court was affirmed; that on May 16, 1994, Hon. Romulo Basa issued an Order referring the case to the DARAB; that on April 10, 1995, plaintiff re-filed the case with this Honorable Board to determine whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Likewise, defendant averred among others that plaintiff is the registered owner of a parcel of land subject matter of this case; that she bought it from her sister Atty. Guillermina Merced-Gener sometime on November, 1990 whose ownership is evidenced by OCT No. 0-4518; that as a result of the sale, TCT No. T-126693(M) was issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan; that thereafter plaintiff declared the aforesaid land for taxation purposes as gravel and sand and paid the taxes due thereon; that plaintiff at the time she bought the land from her sister knew that defendant's house was already there and because of this, she sent several demand letters to the defendant to vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the land thus, compelling the plaintiff to file the present action.
As required by this Forum, both parties had submitted their respective Position Paper which form part of the records of the case.
As distilled and crystallized by this Forum, the only issue to be resolved is whether or not defendant is a bonafide tenant of subject landholding.
As borne by the records of the case an application for Exemption/Exclusion from the coverage of the CARP was approved and granted by Regional director Eugenio Bernardo in an ORDER dated April 3, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, an ORDER is hereby issued GRANTING the application for Exemption/Exclusion from the coverage of the CARP of Antonieta Merced-Lucindo of her lands with an aggregate area of 4.3234 hectares located at Padling, Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan, and DIRECTING the landowner-applicant or any person claiming rights under to respect the security of tenure of the tenant(s) enjoyed prior to June 15, 1988, of there is any.'
Further appearing on record is the Decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan in a Civil Case No. 663 entitled Dr. Antonieta M. Lucindo, Plaintiff vs. Maximina Cruz, Defendant, the dispositive portion of which is quoted as follows:
'WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering:
1. The defendant or any person/s claiming rights under her to vacate the premises;
2. The dismissal of all other plaintiff's claims for moral and exemplary damages; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit.'
On Appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, said Court affirmed the lower court's decision, a portion of the decision reads as follows:
'After carefully going over the entire record of this case, it is the considered opinion of the court that the judgment appealed from is just and correct. There is no cogent reason to alter the same. Defendant's claim for indemnification or reimbursement of the value of her house cannot be restrained, although her right to remove said improvement from plaintiff's land is not prejudiced or diminished.
WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against defendant.'
It is significant to mention pertinent findings of the Regional Trial court regarding the case, to quote same:
'The Court a quo has found the stay of defendant/appellant on plaintiff's land merely upon the tolerance of the latter because of her promise to vacate the same and transfer her house to her own land just near to that of plaintiff-appellee. Said Trial Court did not believe the claim of said defendant that the portion of plaintiff's land she is occupying is the homelot allegedly given by plaintiff's late mother with whom her (defendant's) deceased husband had landlord-tenant relationship since prewar time. According to said court of origin, that lease allegation of defendant has remained unsubstantiated by any concrete evidence, what with the fact that the land in dispute is not agricultural but declared an "gravel and sand" or mineral land. In other words, the defendant or her late husband could not be an agricultural tenant of that land as contemplated by law. As defined by Sec. 3 of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, "Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." And, the same law defines agricultural activity under said section, as cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestocks, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and parties, performed by a farmer, in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical." The land occupied by defendant apparently is not a farm by a gravel and sand land.'
In the light of the foregoing, it is highly inconceivable to think that subject landholding is an agricultural land. The very essential elements missing to establish tenancy relationship are: that the land is agricultural and that its purpose is agricultural production and there is consent by the landlord (Vda. de Donato vs. Court of Appeal 61094, Sept. 18, 1987, 154 SCRA 119; Qua vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 236; Gonzales vs. Alvarez 182 SCRA 15; Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 3834). If at all defendant was staying at subject landholding, it was merely an act of tolerance by plaintiff. This fact was never been controverted by substantial evidence.
The land, being mineral, was classified by the Municipal Assessor's Office, as such, which landholding became the subject of sand and gravel business without any controverting evidence to disprove the same by the defendant."
On appeal by defendant, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, in its April 22nd decision dismissed the appeal, and affirmed in toto the February 27th decision of the Adjudication Board, pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
"Apparently, the issues raised on appeal by defendant-appellant Cruz is whether or not this Board has jurisdiction to hear and try the subject matter of the complaint.
This issue, however, is rendered moot and academic by her admission, in effect agreeing with plaintiff's claim ever since the filing of this complaint in the court of origin, that the land underdisputely (sic) is a mineral land. 'Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceeding in the same case are conclusive' (Phil. American Gen. Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines Inc. 212 SCRA 194, 5 August 1992). Nonetheless, we do not subscribe to the view that by her admission, this Board has lost its jurisdiction.
A case in point is the case Salen vs. Dinglasan, 189 SCRA 623, 28 June 1991 which held:
'It may not be amiss to state at this point that during one of the hearings (March 27, 1978), where parties failed to settle the case amicably, it was agreed that in the presentation of their evidence, the parties would avail of the provisions of PD 946 by filing the affidavit/s and counter/affidavit/s of their witnesses, and in the course of the proceedings, there was instance when the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised or even hinted at by petitioner Salen. It has been consistently held by the Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will stop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.' (Emphasis ours)
It will be observed that defendant has rejected the jurisdiction of the civil court by insisting that the land is agricultural and so outside its competence, who then submitted to the authority of this Board to which the case was referred to by the court, but later on repudiated such authority when defendant received an adversed decision. We find such 'flip-flopping' attitude, to borrow the words of plaintiff, untenable and certainly not sustainable.
As aptly held in Gemenez vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 1; the Supreme Court held:
'When a party invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure an affirmative relief against his opponents, such party may not be allowed to repudiate or question the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain such relief . While jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, should public policy bars such party from so doing after having procured that jurisdiction himself, speculating on the fortunes of litigations.' (Emphasis ours)
At any rate, we must not lost sight of the more important fact that this is an action referred to us by the court to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties, which is well within the Board's competence. Thus:
'After scanning over the evidence adduced by both parties as well as the allegations in the Complaint and in the Answer, the Court is of the opinion that there is a question of whether or not the defendant is really the plaintiff's tenant over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Consequently, let the above-entitled case be first referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform Board (DARAB) where the matter of tenancy should first be fully litigated and ventilated.' (Order, MTC, Br. 001, Norzagaray, Bulacan)
A thorough examination of the evidence on record would readily show that the finding of the lower Board on the non-existence of tenancy relationship between the parties is supported by substantial evidence.
In the first place, the essential element that the subject landholding must be agricultural is obviously lacking. This is clearly established by the admission of defendant that the land is mineral. As defined by Republic Act No. 6657, 'an agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land' (Section 3 (c). On this score, the Supreme Court has this to say:
'The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirms this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are those lands which are 'arable' and 'suitable agricultural land' and 'do not include mineral, forest, residential or industrial land.' (Luz Farms vs. DAR Secretary, 192 SCRA 51, 7 August 1986).
Not only that. The Supreme Court has ruled that an agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 398). The same principle applies to mineral lands as it belongs to the same category as provided in Section 3(c) of RA 6657.
Being a mineral land, it follows that its primary purpose is not for agricultural production, notwithstanding the submitted photos which do not even show the kind of crops planted; or more importantly, whether the crops harvested including the area planted are of such quantity sufficient to support the defendant's family as mandated by Section 166 (21) of RA 3844. Indeed, defendant did not offer any proof to show the kind of crops planted.
And so we come to the element of sharing. 'Sharing is the essence of tenancy relationship' (Reyes vs. Vda de Katigbak, CA-GR No. 39285-R, 22 April 1969). The record is bereft of any evidence to show that defendant has shared with any harvested crops with plaintiff. The fact that defendant alleges a 50%-50% sharing is a mere allegation not substantiated by evidence. 'He who alleges fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence". (Tod Weld Manufacturing Inc. vs. ECED, S.A.; 138 SCRA 118 (1985). Accordingly, no tenancy can be formed" where the alleged tenant does not pay any rental' (Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573).
As pointed out in the case of Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 247, 5 December 1988:
'All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant, of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, de jure tenant. This is because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing laws.'
The foregoing discussion lead us to conclude that no tenancy relationship exists between plaintiff and defendant and so defendant is not entitled to security of tenure nor avail of benefit of the land reform program of the government. This means that 'she may not be allowed the use of a homelot, a privilege granted by Section 24 of RA 3844 as amended, in relation to Section 22 (3) of RA 1199 as amended, only to persons satisfying the qualifications of agricultural tenants' (Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236, 11 June 1991).
If at all, defendant's stay on the premises is merely tolerated by plaintiff. 'A person who occupied the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is based on an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him (Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 464).
In fine, this Board subscribe to the pronouncement of the High Court:
'In carrying out its social requirements policies, the government would not simply lay aside moral standard and aim to favor usurpers, squatters and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin of their occupancy. Such policy would perpetuate conflict instead of attaining their fast solution.' (Bernardo vs. Bernardo 6 Phil. 292)."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 22, 1997 decision (Annex P of Petition), contending that the DARAB erred in not dismissing her case "for lack of jurisdiction since jurisdiction over the case properly pertains to the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the case for ejectment was first filed." The motion was denied on October 17, 1997, and she received a copy of the denial order on "10/31/97" (Annex 1 of comment, p. 119 of rollo).
This petition for certiorari should be dismissed as it is not a proper mode of appeal. The correct mode of appeal from a decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is a petition for review. (Sec. 1, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A wrong or inappropriate mode to this Court "shall be dismissed" (Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90). The reason and philosophy being the rule, is that a petition, for certiorari under Rule 65, does not necessarily include an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence but is confined merely to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of error of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
But let Us look at the question of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through or enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties, or fixed by their will. (Bacalso, et al. vs. Ramolete, et al., 21 SCRA 519). The choice where to bring an action is a matter of procedure. The moment such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional (Alimajon vs. Valera, et al., 107 Phil. 244). The defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction. The court has the authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction (Evangelista vs. Court of Agrarian Relations of Iloilo, 109 Phil. 957).
These are the facts. Private respondent filed the complaint for petitioner's ejectment before the MTC of Norzagaray, Bulacan (Civil Case 663). There, petitioner questioned the court's jurisdiction. She likewise assailed the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case 183-M-93, where she appealed the decision of the MTC. After the RTC affirmed the MTC's decision, she filed a motion for reconsideration, and the RTC set aside its judgment and remanded the same to the MTC for further proceedings. And so the MTC referred the case to the DARAB, where private respondent re-filed her complaint for ejectment. While the case was pending before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner filed her answer, averred affirmative and special defenses, interposed a compulsory counterclaim, prayed for affirmative reliefs, and actively participated in the proceedings. It was only after the provincial adjudicator rendered the February 27th decision, finding that the land in dispute is "mineral land", and not "agricultural"; that there is no land-tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent; and that she should vacate the premises, that petitioner, in a motion for reconsideration of the decision, contended that the board has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case, and the decision should be declared null and void for want of jurisdiction.
The question of whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has jurisdiction over the case, is discernible in private respondent's complaint, and in petitioner's answer thereto. Thus, private respondent alleged:
"2). That sometime in November of 1990, plaintiff herein purchased a parcel of land which originally was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-4518, then registered in the name of her sister. Atty. Guillermina Merced-Gener and after the purchased, it was transferred in the name of the plaintiff and now covered and described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-126693(M) of the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan Branch, Meycauayan, Bulacan, copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title is attached as Annex A;
(3) That after the said title and ownership of the said parcel of land described in the preceding paragraph is registered in the name of the plaintiff, the latter declared the same for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1376 as evidenced by the attached Tax Declaration marked as Annex B and that the corresponding taxes due to the government was paid as evidenced by the attached realty tax marked as Annex C;
(4) That when the plaintiff purchased the said parcel of land, defendant's house was already erected within the premises, however, the said defendant undertook to vacate the premises by transferring and/or removing the said house to the land belonging to the defendant which is only a stone away from the land belonging to the plaintiff;
(5) That the said defendant is not a tenant of the herein plaintiff neither was there a tenant-landlord relationship as the said parcel of land belonging to the plaintiff is considered as mineral land as it is covered by sand and gravel and declared as such and as a matter of fact the land was the subject of a contract with the Luzon Aggregates, Inc., as evidenced by the attached document marked as Annex D wherein excavation and extraction was undertaken."
Petitioner's answer is:
"F. That defendant through her husband Lorenzo Cruz is the tenant and actual tiller of the subject land since the pre-war of Felicitas Merced (plaintiff's mother). She succeeded in the possession of the landholding as tenant beneficiaries when her husband died on July 6, 1990;
G. That because of the long relationship between the plaintiff's mother and the defendant as tenant-farmer (Kasama), in 1971 defendant surrendered the three hectares more or less of the landholding to the plaintiff's mother and as a gesture of gratitude she (Felicitas Merced) gave the land occupied by their house as their homelot and the remaining one (1) hectare for them to cultivate as tenant tiller under a 50/50 sharing in the harvest after deducting all the necessary expenses incurred in the production thereof;
H. Defendant being a builder in good faith of the residential house prior to the acquisition of the property in question, assuming that plaintiff has acquired it through legitimate means, she is under obligation under the law to respect the tenurial rights of the defendant and to indemnify the defendant of the fair market value of the improvements which is estimated at P130,000.00"
Observedly, it was after an adverse judgment has been rendered by the provincial adjudicator that petitioner raised for the first time the question of jurisdiction of the said body. On this score, while question of jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, because such question is determinable by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action, petitioner is estopped from impugning such jurisdiction after all has been said and done with. For, sound reasons of public policy dictates that she, speculating on the fortunes of the litigation, should not be allowed to repudiate such jurisdiction which is so prejudicial to the administration of justice, resulting in endless litigations.
The principle of jurisdiction by estoppel, is well explained in Tijan vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36;
"It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rules, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbunjones, etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty."
The Sibonghanoy ruling finds reiteration in Crisostomo vs. C.A., 37 SCRA 54; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Capilitan vs. De la Cruz, 55 SCRA 706; PNB vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 299; and Salen vs. Hingelman, 198 SCRA 689)
The case is within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In the exercise of its quasi-judicial power, it has the power to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and all other matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 50, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In appeals involving agrarian cases, the function of this Court is to determine whether the findings of fact of the DARAB are supported by substantial evidence (Malate vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 572 [1993]). The DAR is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes being the administrative agency possessed with the necessary expertise on the matter (Machete vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 176 [1995]). Its findings should be accorded respect, and even finality (PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 201 SCRA 487 [1991]).
Observedly, in this petition for certiorari, petitioner has not questioned the findings and conclusions of the DARAB that there is no landlord-tenancy relationship between the parties, no proof has been shown what kind of crop is planted on the land, and no evidence has been offered of petitioner having shared any harvest with private respondent.
Petitioner's contention that there was lack of notice of the DARAB's resolution dated October 17, 1997 denying her motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 27, 1997, lacks basis as she was served a copy of the denial order, and she personally received the same on October 31, 1997. On November 12, 1997, the April 27th decision has become final and executory, since "no appeal" has been undertaken by petitioner, and filed this petition only on November 12, 1998.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision and the writ of execution are UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.
Vidallon-Magtolis and Cosico, JJ., concur.