THIRD DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 36299. April 2, 1996.]
ROXAS AND CO., INC., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, and MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J p:
This is a petition for review, with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, of the decision dated July 13, 1994 of the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform which denied the petitioner's request for the cancellation of the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued by the same respondent in favor of agrarian reform beneficiaries over three (3) parcels of land with a combined area of about 103.436 hectares belonging to the petitioner, and the order dated December 20, 1994 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the first order.
The antecedent facts of the case as gleaned from the petition, its annexes and the comment thereon of the respondents are as follows:
Petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc. is the owner of a vast track of land, locally known as the "Hacienda Palico" (hereinafter referred to as "Hacienda" for brevity) consisting of about 1,024 hectares at Nasugbu, Batangas and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 985.
Involved in this controversy are three (3) parcels of land forming part of the Hacienda with an aggregate area of 103.436 hectares situated in the adjoining barangays of Bgy. Biliran and Bgy. Lumbangan both in the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. These three (3) parcels of land were originally embraced in petitioners TCT No. 985 but were subsequently segregated therefrom and are now covered by three (3) separate titles, to wit:
1. TCT No. 60028 — with an area of 27.4140 hectares located at Bgy. Bilaran:
2. TCT No. 60032 — with an area of 37.8648 hectares located at Sitio Sagbat, Bgy. Lumbangan;
3. TCT No. 60033 — with the same area of 37.8648 hectares located at Sitio Lumang Bayan, also in Bgy. Lumbangan.
On April 18, 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas passed Resolution No. 28 which eventually became Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, providing for the classification of lands within the municipality. Under the Ordinance, settlement cluster/areas in the different barangays outside the Poblacion, more specifically those at Bgy. Lumbangan and Bilaran, were classified as "residential" while other areas in Bgy. Lumbangan were classified as "medium and heavy industrial zone" (Annex "E", Petition; pp. 57-60, Rollo).
On May 4, 1983, the town plan of Nasugbu, Batangas, as embodied in the aforementioned Municipal Zoning Ordinance, along with the town plans of other municipalities in the province, was approved by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), per its Resolution No. R-123 (Annex "F", Petition; p. 62, Rollo).
Consonant with the foregoing, the corresponding real property tax declarations for the three (3) parcels of land in question classified the lands covered thereby as "residential" (Annexes "G", "J" & "K", Petition; pp. 64, 71 & 74, Rollo). Likewise, on September 21, 1987, petitioner was issued by the HLURB a Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance for its residential projects in sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan at Bgy. Lumbangan (Annexes "H" & "I", Petition; pp. 67 & 69, Rollo).
On June 15, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), went into effect under which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was mandated to acquire and distribute agricultural lands to landless farmers and farm workers. As defined in the statute, "agricultural land" refers to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land" (Sec. 3 [c]).
On October 15, 1993, the respondent DAR Secretary, evidently in pursuit of the DAR's mandate under the CARL, issued Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654 in the collective names of 153 farmer-beneficiaries covering the area of 513.9863 hectares of Hacienda Palico (Annex "L", Petition; p. 77, Rollo). Among the areas embraced in the said CLOA are the three (3) parcels of land subject of the present case, namely, the 27.414 hectares located at Bgy. Bilaran under TCT No. 60028, the 37.8648 hectares at Sitio Sagbat under TCT No. 60032 and the other 37.8648 hectares at Sitio Lumang Bayan under TCT No. 60033, both at Bgy. Lumbangan, which parcels of land, as aforesaid, were already previously classified as "residential" under Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 of Nasugbu, Batangas and duly approved by the HLURB.
Petitioner alleges that it came to know of the issuance of the aforementioned CLOA No. 6654 only when the purported farmer-beneficiaries thereof tried to enter the parcels of land at Bgys. Bilaran and Lumbangan.
Forthwith, in separate letters dated January 4, 1994 and January 14, 1994 addressed to the respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), petitioner protested the inclusion of the three (3) parcels of land in dispute under the coverage of the CARL and accordingly demanded the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 insofar as the same parcels are concerned (Annexes "M" & "N", Petition; pp. 128 & 131, Rollo).
Significantly, on May 19, 1994, the respondent DAR Regional Director for Region IV (RARO), in his "Paalaala" addressed to the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform in effect admitted the erroneous inclusion into CLOA No. 6654 of the three (3) parcels of land subject hereof. We quote the pertinent portions of said "Pa-alaala":
"Ang tatlong loteng binanggit sa itaas ay bahagi ng Hacienda Palico na tumatayong iisang lote lamang sa ilalim ng TCT Blg. T-985 na naging batayan naman natin sa pagpapalabas ng kolektibong CLOA para sa mga manggagawangbukid-benepisyaryo na nabibilang sa samahan ng DAMBA-NFSW o kaya ay mula sa kooperatiba ng mga manggagawa sa Hacienda. Nakakalungkot na hindi naihiwalay at nailabas sa kolektibong CLOA ang tatlong parcelang nabanggit dahil nakabatay nga sa iisang plano at titulo ang ating dokumentasyon at paghahanda ng CLOA. Sa liham-aplikasyon lamang ng Roxas & Company natin natuklasan at natiyak na ipinahiwalay at ipinarehistro ng kompanya sa bagong mga titulo ang nasabing lote as ROD noong 23 Agosto 1991.
"Magkagayunman, binigyan pansin at aming pinag-aralan ang aplikasyon alinsunod sa itinatadhana ng DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. Sa aming ginawang pagsisiyasat ay aming napatunayan na dalawa (2) sa tatlong lote ay naklasipika na mga bilang residensyal sa pamamagitan ng Town Plan at Zoning Ordinance ng Nasugbu noong 1982 na naaprubahan naman ng HSRC (HLURB) noong 1983. Ang dalawang loteng ito ay yaong nasa Sagbat (T-60032) at sa Lumang Bayan (T-60033). Kaya lamang, sa aming aktwal na pag-usisa sa loteng nasa Lumang Bayan ay Natuklasan namin na sa kabuuan nitong lawak na 36.00 ektarya, mahigit kumulang sa 12 ay may patubig na palayan (na hindi saklaw ng OLT dahil sa hindi tenanted). Dahil dito at alinsunod sa Presidential Administrative Order No. 20, series of 1992, naniniwala kami na bagamat na di-saklaw ng CARP ang nabanggit na 12 ektarya pinagbabawal naman at hindi maaaring baguhin tungo sa residensyal ang kasalukuyang gamit nito bilang may patubig na palayan.
"Sa kabilang banda, ang lote naman sa Bilaran ay hindi maaring ibilang sa mga lupaing di-saklaw ng CARP alinsunod sa DOJ Opinion No. 44 sapagkat ang klasifikasyon nito mula sa agrikultural tungo sa residensyal ay isinagawa lamang noong 1992 o makalipas na magkabisa ang RA 6657 noong 15 Hunyo 1988.
"Batay sa mga nabanggit na pagsisiyasat at pagsusuri, ang MARO, PARO at ang tanggapang ito ay nagkakaisa na irekomenda sa inyo na aprubahan ang exsempsyon sa CARP ng lote lamang sa Lumang Bayan at sa Sagbat ngunit sa kundisyong hindi gagalawin ang kasalukuyang gamit ng 12 ektaryang may patubig na palayan habang ang lote naman sa Bilaran, sa kabilang banda, ay idisapruba ang aplikasyon at ipagutos ang pamamahagi nito sa mga kwalipikadong benepisyaryo." (Annex "O", Petition; pp. 133-134, Rollo).
In a letter dated May 27, 1994 addressed to the respondent Secretary Of Agrarian Reform, petitioner once again reiterated its protest against the inclusion into the agrarian reform program of the three (3) parcels of land in question. In said letter, the petitioner stated:
"We vehemently protest the manner in which the Regional Director attempts to curtail or deprive us our rights as owner of lands classified as residential. In an apparent attempt to mislead as shown by his deliberate failure to furnish us a copy of his memorandum, the Regional director has cited findings which are not supposed by adequate proof. Unnecessary conflicts, not to mention expenses incurred, have arisen in Nasugbu, Batangas as a result of your subordinate's sloppy investigation and faulty interpretation of the comprehensive agrarian reform law. The haphazard preparation of the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Awards, which were made without even considering the classification of areas covered by the mother title and the notices of coverage issued by your department, is made evident by your Regional Director's admission that even residential lands have been included therein. With the submission of these documents, we trust that our rights as owner of residential lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform will be finally respected". (Annex "P", Petition, pp. 136-138, Rollo).
On July 4, 1994, respondent DAR Regional Director, obviously stung by the petitioner's strong language, in another memorandum to the respondent DAR Secretary, clarified his earlier recommendation to exempt the petitioner's parcels of land in Sitios Sagbat and Lumand Bayan in Bgy. Lumbangan and Bilaran as referring only to areas's thereof which are actually residential, thus:
"Based on the aforementioned, we would now like to revise our recommendation to read as follows:
'a. We would like to recommend for exemption from CARP coverage the residential clusters or areas in Brgys. Lumbangan (Sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan) and Biliran.
'b. We would like to recommend, further, that the portions of both barangays outside of the neighborhood residential units (settlement clusters/areas) be covered by CARP or that the application for exemption for these areas be disapproved or be denied for lack of merit.
'c. That immediately after the aforementioned decisions are made, an actual survey on the ground be made to establish the boundaries of the present settlement clusters/areas in order to segregate it from the CARP covered by agricultural areas". (Annex "Q", Petition; pp. 1410-141, Rollo).
In effect, the respondent Regional Director reversed his earlier recommendation by reducing the area of exemption to the areas actually used as residential.
On July 13, 1994, the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform came out with the herein first assailed issuance denying petitioner's earlier request for the exemption from the coverage of CARL of the three (3) parcels of land herein involved and the recall and cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 covering the same parcels. In said questioned issuance, the respondent Secretary informed the petitioner that "only those residential clusters/areas, AFP Camp. Administration building and motor pool, church, schools and cemetery in Bgy. Lumbangan (Sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan) and Biliran are exempt from CARP coverage", adding that "[A]ctual survey should be done to establish the boundaries of the areas that are deemed exempted from CARP vis-a-vis areas that are not". (Annex "R", Petition; pp. 143-144, Rollo). Copy of the issuance was received by the petitioner on July 19, 1994.
In a letter dated August 3, 1994, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the aforementioned issuance on the ground of denial of due process, petitioner alleging that CLOA No. 6654 was issued in utter disregard of petitioners proprietary right and in gross violation of the procedures prescribed therefor under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In the same letter, petitioner stressed the fact that its lands in Bgys. Biliran and Lumbangan were already classified as non-agricultural long before the effectivity of said law, hence could not be covered thereby. (Annex "S", Petition; pp. 146-154, Rollo).
On December 20, 1994, the respondent Secretary issued the second assailed order denying the petitioner's aforesaid request for reconsideration. The order of denial dispositively reads, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued:
1. Denying the motion to exempt the triangular lands in Sagbat and Lumang Bayan;
2. Recognizing the urban expansion areas of Brgy. Cogonan as the relevant zoning classification affecting Hda. Palico in the vicinity of Martinez St.;
3. Delineating the 'neighborhood residential units' by drawing a circle with a radius of 250-300 meters from each barangay center pursuant to HLURB Clarificatory Statement. Areas of Hda. Palico found inside the circle will be exempted from CARP coverage; and
4. Directing the DAR Regional Director, Region IV to effect the continuation of the segregation survey to establish the boundaries or areas deemed exempted from CARP and portions that are not". (Annex "T", Petition; pp. 159-163, Rollo).
Copy of the aforementioned order was received by the petitioner on January 13, 1995.
Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on January 27, 1995, petitioner came to this Court via the instant petition for review, it being its submission that —
"I
PETITIONER'S PROPERTIES ARE CLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL AND, THEREFORE, ARE NOT COVERED BY THE CARL.
"II
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING THE CLOAS CONSIDERING THAT:
1. RESPONDENTS ISSUED THE CLOAS WITHOUT STRICTLY COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 16, 17 AND 18 OF THE CARL.
2. RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNFAIRLY DECIDED PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF LACK OF DUE PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF UNDISCLOSED AGENCY FILES.
3. RESPONDENT SECRETARY IMPROPERLY RELIED ON OCULAR INSPECTIONS AND NEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE UNDISCLOSED TO PETITIONER IN DETERMINING THE PROPER CLASSIFICATION OF PETITIONER'S LANDS."
On February 15, 1995, while the instant petition was already pending with this court, the respondent Secretary of Agrarian reform issued an order directing the respondent DAR Regional Director for Region IV to implement the challenged issuances of July 13, 1994 and December 20, 1994. Upon an urgent motion of the petitioner, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the herein respondents from implementing the assailed issuances until further orders from this Court.
In their Comment, the respondents raised the preliminary issue of timeliness of the instant petition, contending that the instant recourse was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for appeal, as provided for under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. It is alleged that the questioned decision dated July 13, 1994 was actually received by the petitioner on July 19, 1994 and the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof only on August 3, 1994, or on the fifteenth or last day to perfect an appeal. On the other hand, the order of December 20, 1994 which denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on January 13, 1995 hence petitioner had only until the following day — January 14, 1995 — to perfect its appeal to this Court. Since the present petition was filed only on January 27, 1995, respondents argue that the same was filed out of time and therefore ought to be dismissed outright.
Petitioner disagrees, claiming that its petition was filed on time counting the 15-day period from January 13, 1995 when it received the December 20, 1995 order of the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It is argued that since the CARL of 1988, contrary to the claim of the respondents, does not provide for the computation of the reglementary period, the same should be computed in the manner construed by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner cites the recent amendment to Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 1-19 which originally reads, thus:
"4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity. One (1) motion for reconsideration of said ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment may be allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant may appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from notice of the resolution of denial."
As amended and revised by circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 30, 1995, the same provision of Circular No. 1-91 now reads, as follows:
"4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration for new trial or reconsideration fully filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period fifteen (15) days". (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner contends that although the petition in this case was filed before the aforementioned amendment to the circular took effect, said amendment may be applied retroactively.
We sustain the petitioner. As ruled by the Supreme Court in a litany of cases (Enrile vs. CFI, 36 Phil. 574; Hosana vs. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741; Guevarra vs. Laico, 64 Phil. 144; Sevilla vs. Tolentino, 66 Phil. 196: Camacho vs. CIR, 80 Phil. 848; People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702; Ongkiko vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50; Salcedo vs. Carpio, 89 Phil. 254; Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208; Tolentino vs. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309; Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229; Yakult vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990], to cite a few), procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. We see no reason why the present case should be treated differently. Besides, strict compliance with technical rules is not an inflexible norm. So it is that in Soriano vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 545 [1993], the High court Said:
"We are not unmindful of the line of decisions handed down by this Court, some of which are invoked by petitioner, wherein the hand of equity reached out to stay the dismissal of an appeal on mere technicalities or by the inflexible application of the rules, especially when the non-compliance with said rules was neither intended for delay nor resulted in prejudice to the adverse party".
Given the amendment introduced to Section 4 of Supreme court Circular No. 1-19, supra, which amendment, being procedural in character, may be given retroactive effect consistent with the doctrine enunciated by the Highest Tribunal in the cases herein cited, there can be no question at all that the instant petition was filed very much within the time frame fixed in Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-19, as amended.
Having disposed of the procedural issue raised by the respondents. We shall now proceed to the substantive aspects of the present recourse.
From our appreciation of the records before us, it appears clear to this Court that the lands in dispute have been classified as residential long before the Comprehensive Agrarian reform Law of 1988 went into effect on June 15, 1988. In fact, they have been so classified about five (5) years before CARL came into being. Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 of the town of Nasugbu, Batangas where under the lands in dispute were declared as "residential" was enacted way back in 1982 and the town plan itself of the municipality based on said zoning ordinance was approved by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) as early as 1983. Verily, the corresponding tax declarations covering the said parcels beginning the year 1987 already declared the lands therein as "residential" pursuant to said classification. What is more, petitioner's application to convert its lands at Sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan at Bgy. Lumbangan into a housing subdivision was given locational clearance by the HLURB itself. Indeed, no less than the respondent DAR Regional Director for Region IV admitted the non-agricultural character of the lands in question when, in his "Pa-alaala" of May 19, 1994 to the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform, he wrote;
xxx xxx xxx
Sa aming ginawang pagsisiyasat ay aming napatunayan na dalawa (2) sa tatlong lote ang naklasipika na mga bilang residensyal sa pamamagitan ng Town Plan at Zoning Ordinance ng Nasugbu noong 1982 na naaprubahan naman ng HSRC (HLURB) noong 1983. Ang dalawang loteng ito ay yaong nasa Sagbat (T-60032) at sa Lumang Bayan (T-60033)."
We may even add that the very same lands in Sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan at Bgy. Lumbangan were also designated in the same Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 of Nasugbu, Batangas as "Medium and Heavy Industrial Zone", which is definitely non-agricultural.
In the landmark case of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR, 225 SCRA 278 [1993], the Supreme Court, addressing the issue of whether lands "already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies prior to 15 June 1988, (are) covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988", ruled:
". . .. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall 'cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands'. As to what constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is referred to as 'land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.' The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only those lands which are 'arable and suitable agricultural lands' and 'do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
xxx xxx xxx
"Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined 'agricultural land' thus —
'. . . agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."
"Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL." (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, however, the respondents would dilute the applicability to the Natalia ruling to this case by pointing out that certain portions of the properties in question are still devoted to agricultural uses. Thus, the respondent DAR Regional Director for Region IV in his same "Pa-alaala" of May 19, 1994, pertinently states:
xxx xxx xxx
Kaya lamang, sa aming aktwal na pag-usisa sa loteng nasa Lumang Bayan ay natuklasan namin na sa kabuuan nitong lawak na 36.00 ektarya, mahigit kumulang sa 12 ay may patubig na palayan (na hindi saklaw ng OLT dahil sa hindi tenanted). Dahil dito at alinsunod sa Presidential Administrative Order No. 20, series of 1992, naniniwala kami na bagamat na di-saklaw ng CARP ang nabanggit na 12 ektarya pinagbabawal naman at hindi maaaring baguhin tungo sa residensyal ang kasalukuyang gamit nito bilang may patubig na palayan".
which observation was reiterated by the same respondent in his memorandum of July 4, 1994, to wit:
"It may also be noted that the portion of Bgy. Lumbangan inside Hda. Palico contains not only residential (but also) areas under rice and sugar cane cultivation. By no stretch of the imagination can they be included in the category of neighborhood residential units. They can only (be) perceived to be included in what is referred to in the zoning resolution as 'all other areas are agricultural".
A similar observation was made by the same respondents as regards the petitioner's land at Bgy. Bilaran. Thus, in the same memorandum of July 4, 1994, he writes:
"A look at the portion of Bgy. Bilaran, which is inside Hda. Palico, will reveal that the residential clusters/areas are only the portions bordering the road. After the residential clusters (1-2 houses deep), one will easily see wide areas under sugar cane cultivation, which is classified in the zoning resolution as agricultural".
Undoubtedly, the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform shared the foregoing observations of his subordinates such that in his letter-decision of July 13, 1994, the said respondent concludes:
"It is noteworthy to mention that a good portion of Bgy. Lumbangan inside Hacienda Palico is not residential but agricultural. Section 3, Zone D of the 1983 HLURB Resolution states, '. . . all others not specifically zoned are agricultural.' This is the large portion of Lumbangan at the back of the neighborhood residential units which are planted to sugar cane and rice.
xxx xxx xxx
"The same HLURB resolution classified a portion of Bgy. Bilaran as belonging also to the urban core zone more specifically the neighborhood residential units. Said resolution states that part of the urban core zone are residential units or clusters of settlements. These are the portions alongside the road. Like Bgy. Lumbangan, a large portion was not specifically zoned and is therefore, agricultural".
The foregoing was reiterated by the same respondent in his assailed order of December 20, 1994, thus:
"Further scrutiny of the concerned ordinance will also reveal that all areas not specifically zoned are agricultural (Sec. 3, Zone VII D). Since the settlement cluster and areas in Hda. Palico then (1983) and now (1994) are observed only to be those along the national road linking Manila and Nasugbu, most of the property which are planted to sugar and rice are therefore, agricultural and not anything else."
In short, it is the respondent's posture that only those areas of the lands herein involved which are being actually devoted to residential purposes are exempt from the CARL, excluding therefrom those areas classified as residential but not so actually used and devoted for such purpose.
We are not persuaded.
An analysis of the Natalia ruling immediately reveals that the mere reclassification of a parcel of land to other purposes, albeit the land itself is still underdeveloped and not yet devoted to non-agricultural uses, operates to exempt said land from the coverage of the CARL. The Supreme Court ruled thus:
"Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which have already been developed. Of course, this is contrary to its earlier position that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the developed and underdeveloped portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated. Consequently, both did not need prior DAR approval.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as 'agricultural lands'. These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon prior approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. . . . The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL." (225 SCRA 278; 282-283; Emphasis supplied).
It matters not, therefore, that portions of the lands herein involved are not yet devoted to non-agricultural uses. What really matters is that said lands have already been classified as residential or non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL. This is as it should be, for municipalities and cities have to allocate in advance sufficient lands for the expansion of its residential areas. Prudence no less demands such a vision, what with the rapid rate in our population growth.
Moreover, it bears stressing that under Section 3 [c] of the CARL, "agricultural lands" is defined as "land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." It is therefore clear from this definition that lands which are still devoted to agricultural activity but has already been classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial do not fall under the coverage of CARL. Evidently, this jibes with what has been said in Natalia that what really determines the applicability of CARL to a certain parcel of land is its previous classification and not the actual use or purpose to which it is being devoted.
Independently of the foregoing is the flaw in the procedure undertaken by the respondent agrarian officials in placing the subject lands of the petitioner under the CARL and the issuance of the questioned collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654 in favor of alleged farmer-beneficiaries. This brings us to petitioner's complaint of denial of due process.
Section 16 of the CARL which deals with the procedure to be observed in the acquisition of private lands, provides:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 17, 18 and other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of title and other monuments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation."
We find merit in petitioner's contention that the foregoing procedures were not properly observed in this case. Firstly, it is evident that all the respondents herein failed to identify with certainty the land subject of the acquisition, thereby preventing the petitioner from disputing the issuance of the challenged CLOA No. 6654 and from determining the correct valuation thereof. This is manifest from the very admission of the respondent DAR Regional Director for Region IV contained in his same "Pa-alaala" of May 19, 1994 wherein he expressed regret over the inclusion of the three (3) parcels of land herein involved in the collective CLOA issued on October 15, 1993 despite their prior classification as residential lands. Undoubtedly, such a controversial incident would not have happened had a prior and proper identification of the lands preceded the issuance of the said CLOA. The deficiency in this respect is confirmed by the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform himself when, in his first assailed issuance of July 13, 1994, he excluded from the subject CLOA the "AFP Camp, Administration building and motor pool, church, schools and cemetery in Bgy. Lumbangan (Sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan) and Bilaran" which were originally included therein. The lack of such prior identification is even accentuated by the fact that it was only in the same issuance of July 13, 1994 where the respondent Secretary ordered, for the first time, the conduct of an actual survey "to establish the boundaries of the areas that are deemed exempted from CARP vis-a-vis areas that are not".
Secondly, the issuance of the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform of Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654 in the collective names of 153 farmer-beneficiaries covering 513.9863 of Hacienda Palico exacerbates respondents violation of the procedural guidelines for the acquisition of petitioners land which under the aforementioned Section 16 (e) of the CARL, respondent may redistribute to qualified beneficiaries only after the landowner receives payment of the just compensation for his land.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was instituted to address one of the perceived deep-seated social problems in our country. Admittedly, resistance to its implementation by the landed population somehow derails its full realization. It is a rule of democracy, however, that the justness of a cause is no excuse to brush aside legal rules and norms. The statute has set forth specific procedures precisely to protect all citizens, be they rich or poor, landed or landless. Here, it is regrettable to state that obedience to such procedures is evidently lacking from the respondents. Such disregard of the rule laid down by the statute has thereby impaired, if not altogether ignored, the petitioner's constitutional right to due process.
"One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
"That right covers the person's life, liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-375).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the challenged letter-decision dated July 13, 1994, and the order dated December 20, 1994, of the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654 issued by the same respondent on October 15, 1993 over the three (3) parcels of land herein involved, are hereby NULLIFIED, VACATED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez and Vasquez, Jr., JJ., concur.