SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 46829.  February 26, 1998.]

ESPERANZA VDA. DE FRIAS, petitioner, vs. DRA. ANTONIETA M. LUCINDO, ET AL., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

GALVEZ, J p:

Petition for the annulment of a decision of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) dated May 22, 1997, filed by Esperanza vda. de Frias who, four years earlier, or specifically, on May 1, 1993, lodged a complaint with the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform, in Malolos, Bulacan, against private respondent Dr. Antonieta M. Lucindo, that said Esperanza Vda. de Frias be maintained, in her capacity as a leasehold tenant, in the peaceful possession of a landholding owned by private respondent.

The antecedents:

1)     On February 1, 1993, Esperanza Vda. de Frias (hereinafter, petitioner), filed a complaint with the Region III DARAB against Antonieta N. Lucindo (hereinafter, private respondent), averring, inter alia, that she and her husband are leasehold tenants of a 3.4757 hectares landholding owned by private respondent located at Sitio Padling, Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan, and covered by TCT No. T-174593 in the name of private respondent; that on June 17, 1992, petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement whereby petitioner agreed to give up her tillage of the property concerned, in consideration of which private respondent agreed to give petitioner 1,250 square meters of the landholding; that private respondent shall thereafter cause the resurvey of the property and titling of the 1,250 square meters in the name of petitioner at the expense of private respondent; that the area to be segregated and thereafter delivered to petitioner shall be that portion where petitioner's house already stands and that petitioner should be given a right-of-way; that contrary to their agreement, private respondent decided to wall-in in private respondent by constructing a concrete fence on the area.

Petitioner's complaint was docketed as DARAB Case No. 460-Bul '93.

(2)    On November 7, 1994, then Provincial Adjudicator Jose V. Reyes rendered decision in said case the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, (1) Ordering respondent Dr. Antonieta Lucindo to seggregate (sic) the 1,750 sq. meters as well as the Deed of Conveyances and the title over the subject land at her own expense and deliver the same to herein Petitioner with (sic) 3 months from receipt of the Order; (2) Ordering the Petitioner to cease and desists (sic) from interfering to (sic) herein respondent after Petitioner had received his (sic) title to the 1,750 sq. meters."

3)     Private respondent moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, arguing that (1) the subject property had already been declared mineral land and therefore beyond the coverage of CARP; (2) the subject land is less than five (5) hectares.

4)     On October 26, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz, rendered judgment on the same case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

"(1)   Declaring the defendant Dra. Antonieta M. Lucindo to the maintained in peaceful possession, use and enjoyment of subject landholding;

"(2)   Concurring that subject landholding is a mineral land, not agricultural;

"(3)   Directing the plaintiff to respect the peaceful possession and enjoyment by the defendant of her property.

"Case dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED."

(5)    Petitioner thereafter appealed to the DARAB where the case was re-docketed as DARAB Case No. 4691.

(6)    On May 22, 1997, DARAB dismissed the appeal, stating that the preponderance of evidence shows that (a) the subject land has already been classified mineral; (b) that tenancy status arises only if the land subject of case is primarily devoted to agricultural production but petitioner was not able to prove that 1.9 hectares thereof is devoted to corn and other crops; (c) that there was no mutual consent between petitioner and private respondent to establish a tenancy relationship because the records show that petitioner's stay in the premises was merely tolerated; and lastly, (d) the element of sharing has not been established by petitioner as there was no proof that she has given rentals to private respondent out of the harvested coconuts and other auxiliary crops.

(7)    The petition and its annexes do not show whether petitioner had timely filed with this Court either a petition for review or a petition for certiorari consistent with R.A. 7902, but on January 27, 1998, the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, stationed at Malolos, Bulacan, issued a writ of possession in DARAB Case No. 460-Bul. '93 (DARAB Case No. 4891) to implement the affirmed decision in said case.

Petitioner now comes to this Court for the annulment of the October 6, 1995 decision in DARAB Case No. 460-Bul. '93, duly affirmed by the DARAB on May 22, 1997, on the following ground:

"THAT THE DECISIONS RENDERED ON OCTOBER 26, 1995 AND ON MAY 22, 1997, ARE NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE LANDHOLDING IN QUESTION WAS DECLARED AND CLASSIFIED AS SAND AND GRAVEL AND/OR MINERAL LAND AND THEREFORE BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE DARAB, TO ADJUDICATE."

This Court finds no substantial merit in the petition.

FIRST, there is nothing either in B.P. Blg. 129 nor in R.A. 7902 which authorizes this Court to annul judgments of quasi-judicial agencies, such jurisdiction given to this Court being limited solely to annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 9[2], B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Sec. 1, R.A. 7902; Rule 47, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure). Petitioner could have timely raised the issue of jurisdiction by seasonably filing a petition for certiorari with this Court against the DARAB within three months (now only within 60 days under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) from her receipt of the adverse decision of the latter. This, she failed to do.

SECONDLY, even assuming arguendo, that this Court is empowered to entertain this present petition, considering however the facts and circumstances hereof, petitioner is now barred by laches from assailing DARAB'S jurisdiction in this case, after petitioner initiated and had actively participated in the proceeding. It should be stressed that said Case No. 460-Bul. '93 was filed by petitioner herself with the Regional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, for the purpose of seeking relief from said quasi-judicial agency. As held in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction. Petitioner, after seeking relief from the DARAB, and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, should not now be allowed to eventually impugn its jurisdiction.

True it is, that in La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 (1994), it was held that where a court has clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and that barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, neither estoppel nor waiver of jurisdiction shall apply. This Court however believes that highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances exist in this case to justify its application of the principle of waiver of jurisdiction by estoppel.

THIRDLY, a reading of DARAB's decision of May 22, 1997, shows that not only did it rule that the property subject of litigation is classified as mineral land, but that assuming that it is agricultural land, petitioner was not able to establish her status as a tenant thereof, except her own self-serving assertions, and neither was there any proof that she had delivered rentals to private respondent out of the harvested coconuts and other auxiliary crops obtained from the litigated landholding. This adverse finding of DARAB should have been timely appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, but petitioner however admitted that she did not avail of other remedies such as new trial, appeal or petition for relief, "through no fault of her own", without explaining to or enlightening this Court, by way of recital of specific facts, why she could not be faulted to failing to take such remedies.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for annulment in this case is DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino and Buzon, JJ., concur.