EIGHTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 45758.   October 28, 1998.]

EMELIE P. PEREGRIN AND PABLO PANGANIBAN, petitioner, vs. PEDRO DEL ROSARIO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VASQUEZ JR., J p:

On appeal before Us is the Decision dated October 8, 1997 rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB, for short) which reversed and set aside an earlier Resolution dated May 12, 1993, reinstating the more earlier judgment of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Malolos, Bulacan in DARAB Case No. 1527 (Reg. Case No. 093-BUL-89), entitled, "Pedro del Rosario vs. Emilie Peregrin and Panganiban."

The facts of the case are briefly stated by the respondent DARAB in the assailed Decision and which We quote with approval:

"In a verified complaint dated August 14, 1989, plaintiff-appellant claims that he is the duly constituted tenant over two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of one and one-half (1½) hectares, more or less, devoted to rice production, situated at Barangay Santa Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and owned by a certain Simplicio Reyes; that long before the effectivity of P.D. No. 27, or as early as 1951, plaintiff-appellant has been in the actual continuous and peaceful possession of the aforesaid parcels of land and has been religiously paying the landowner's share due under a 50-50 sharing system; that defendants-appellants have been harassing and molesting herein plaintiff-appellant in his peaceful possession of the subject land designated as Parcels No. 2, and even forcibly took possession thereof; and that there is an urgent and paramount need to issue a restraining order/preliminary injunction to restrain herein defendants-appellees from further disturbing, molesting and/or doing illegal acts tending to oust and eject plaintiff-appellant herein from his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject land.

Defendants-appellees filed their Answer dated September 8, 1989, and while admitting the allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff is the actual tiller of the land designated as Parcel No. 1 and the former tiller of Parcel No. 2, they denied the rest of the allegations for lack of knowledge or information relative thereto. They alleged that the original tenant of the land was Teoderico del Rosario who is already dead, such that his tenancy rights were transferred to his surviving spouse and/or to his eldest child as successor-in-interest; and that these two (2) parcels of land are presently owned by Larry Reyes and that land parcel No. 2 is no longer classified as a riceland since the same has been converted into a fishpond.

By way of special affirmative defenses, defendants-appellees argued that on December 7, 1988, the present owner Larry Reyes leased said properties to defendants-appellees herein as evidenced by a "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" and that due to the inexperience and incompetence of herein plaintiff-appellant, the fishpond business venture suffered tremendous losses." (pp. 1-2, DARAB 10-08-97 Decision; pp. 29-30, Rollo)

After due proceeding, on October 27, 1992, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan rendered its Decision, the decretal portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds herein plaintiff Pedro del Rosario a bonafide tenant of the subject landholding (Parcels 1 & 2) entitled to a security of tenure. Consequently, defendant Emilie Peregrin and Pablo Panganiban and all other person acting in their behalves are hereby ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST PERMANENTLY from committing any acts tending to disturb or eject the plaintiff from the disputed farmholding and for plaintiff Pedro del Rosario, to pay landowner Larry Reyes the amount of five thousand pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Malolos, Bulacan, October 27, 1992." (p. 7, DARAB Decision, p. 31, Rollo)

Not satisfied, defendants-appellants, Emilie Peregrin and Pablo Panganiban, submitted a timely Motion for Reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated may 12, 1993, the October 27, 1992 judgment was reconsidered and reversed. The Provincial Adjudicator this time ruled:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds plaintiff Pedro del Rosario NOT a bonafide tenant of the subject landholding parcel 1 and 2 and all other persons acting in their behalves are hereby Ordered to cease and desist permanently from committing any acts tending to eject or disturb defendant (sic) Emilie Peregrin and Pablo Panganiban from their peaceful possession of the subject landholding.

SO ORDERED." (p. 2, Annex J; p. 52, Rollo)

Pedro del Rosario elevated the matter to the DARAB. On October 8, 1997, the DARAB reversed and set aside the May 12, 1993 Decision and reinstated the original October 27, 1992 verdict in the case.

Hence, this petition for review on the following listed errors, to wit:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1.      THE HONORABLE BOARD ERRED IN FINDING RESPONDENT A TENANT OF THE SUBJECT LAND;

2.      THE HONORABLE BOARD ERRED IN NOT RESPONDENT AND/OR HIS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO HAVE ABANDONED WHATEVER TENANCY RIGHTS THEY MAY HAD OVER THE SUBJECT LAND." (p. 4, Petition; p. 23, Rollo)

Both imputed errors will be jointly discussed since they dwell on the main issue of whether or not herein private respondent, Pedro del Rosario, is a tenant-tiller of the subject parcels of land.

We find for the respondent.

Agricultural tenancy is the possession of a person of land devoted to agricultural belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a certain price, or ascertainable, whether in produce or in money, or both [Section 3, R.A. No. 1199; Miguel Carag vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 44 (1987); Zamoras vs. Su, Jr., 184 SCRA 248 (1990)].

Essentially, for an agrarian tenancy relation to exist, the following must concur: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvest between the parties [Isidro vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503 (1993)].

In the present case, there is no denying, and petitioners admit, that Pedro del Rosario is the actual tenant-tiller of Parcel No. 1 of the two (2) controversial lots in this suit. But as to Parcel No. 2, petitioners can only admit that same private respondent was a former tenant-tiller thereof. At a certain point, though, petitioners claim that they are in actual possession not only of Parcel No. 2 but, likewise of parcel No. 1 or the whole one and one-half (1-½)-hectare total area of the land, which was eventually converted to a fishpond, by virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" dated December 7, 1998 between the landowner Larry Reyes and the petitioners bearing the express conformity of respondent Pedro del Rosario. In effect, petitioners proceed to say that Pedro del Rosario had already abandoned and/or relinquished his tenancy rights on the subject properties.

We find proposition unsustainable.

At the outset, petitioners' portion in this case seems to be unstable and wavering. At one point, they acknowledged that Pedro del Rosario is the tenant-tiller of Parcel No. 1, then later claim they possess the whole of the property. Fittingly, public respondent correctly ruled that petitioners could no longer backtrack on their judicial admissions and subsequently take a stand contradictory or inconsistent therewith.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the public respondent in the assailed Decision are simply persuasive and corroborated by sufficient evidence that Pedro del Rosario has been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the controversial Parcels Nos. 1 and 2 having inherited his agricultural tenancy rights thereon from the former tenant, Teoderico del Rosario, his father. The fact that the private respondent signed his conformity to the "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" is a clear indication that Pedro del Rosario is still being recognized by no less than the landowner, Larry Reyes, and the intended lessees thereof, petitioners Emilie Peregrin and Pablo Panganiban, as an agricultural tenant of the land. For if not, what would be the need to secure private respondent's conformity to purportedly lease the agricultural land in issue? The intent is obvious. Recognition of Pedro del Rosario's tenancy rights is inescapable. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and the written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important [Isidro vs. Court of Appeals, supra]. It must be restated here that agricultural tenancy laws are intended to preserve such relationship in order to ensure the well-being of the tenant and from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. This is the concept of the social justice which oftentimes lead to the axiom in land tenure that once a tenant, always a tenant [De Guzman vs. Feliciano, 21 SCRA 450 (1967)].

Petitioners' other pretension is that respondent's father, from whom he claims to have inherited the tenancy rights over the subject land, had abandoned the lots during his lifetime due unproductivity and lack capital. And, for six (6) years thereafter, nobody among his heirs showed interest in further cultivation of the land.

Notably, this stand taken by the petitioners is again inconsistent with the idea of their judicial admission that respondent, Pedro del Rosario, is the tenant-tiller of at least one of the parcels. Yet, petitioners failed to submit enough credible proof to establish the supposed abandoned or voluntary surrender of agricultural tenancy rights. Suffice it to say, voluntary surrender must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant to security of tenure becomes an illusory one [Talavera vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 778 (1990)]. This is the very essence of our agricultural land reform laws, to protect the security of tenure of farmer or agricultural lessees.

By and large, We only agree with what DARAB had said in its Decision. We re-echo:

"It cannot be gainsaid therefore that the herein plaintiff-appellant, being a tenant-tiller of the parcels of land in question, is entitled to the protective mantle of security of tenure as guaranteed by law. This tenurial security of plaintiff-appellant includes the right to have the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the parcels of land in question free from any molestation and harassment and/or any illegal act repugnant to law. The basic intent and purpose of the law is the preservation of tenancy relationship between the landholder and the tenant-tiller to ensure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Thus, our existing agrarian laws were established in the light of the social justice precept of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the state to promote the common welfare." (pp. 6-7, DARAB, 10-08-97 Decision; pp. 34-35, Rollo).

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FORGOING, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED, there being no reversible error in the challenged Decision. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Garcia and Regino JJ., concur.