NINTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 44397. May 21, 1997.]
FLORENCIA LEYNO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DEMETRIO PASCASCIO, defendant-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MABUTAS, JR., J p:
Before Us on appeal is the decision (dated August 11, 1993) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 73) in Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 3114-O (recovery of possession).
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the land subject of this complaint in favor of the plaintiff." (page 324 of the Record).
The antecedent facts of this case, as culled from the record, follow:
On December 21, 1981, the appellee herein filed a complaint (pages 1-3 of the Record) against the appellant herein, which she amended on February 19, 1982 (pages 9-11 of the Record) seeking to recover possession of a public land situated in Barrio San Juan, Municipality of San Antonio, Province of Zambales, which her husband (Jorge Leyno) acquired during the latter's lifetime. In her amended complaint, she averred, inter alia, that:
— Prior to her husband's death in 1972, Jorge Leyno allowed the defendant "to maintain a small fishpond in the Western portion of the land . . . with the understanding that upon demand by the latter the defendant would surrender the same;"
— After the demise of her husband, she "prepared the necessary papers and made a representation with the Bureau of Lands in order to acquire the land . . . by virtue of Lease Agreement;"
—"(O)n June 1981 the Lease Agreement between plaintiff and the Minister of Natural Resources . . . was perfected granting to the plaintiff the right to use and cultivate the land;"
— Aside from maintaining a small fishpond, the defendant also cultivates the southern portion of the subject land "for rice crop . . . without permission from the plaintiff;"
— She demanded that the defendant vacate the land, but the latter "refused and still refuses . . . to the prejudiced (sic) of the plaintiff;"
— She already brought this matter before the barangay "for possible settlement" but to no avail. Consequently, she was compelled to file this case, for which she stands to incur litigation expenses in the amount of P700.00.
The plaintiff then prayer that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor:
"a) Ordering the latter or any of his representative to vacate and restore possession to the plaintiff the land in question;
"b) Ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff litigation expenses (sic) in the amount of P700.00;
"c) To pay the cost of the suit." (pages 10-11 of the Record).
On March 12, 1982, the defendant (appellant herein) moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that "the venue is improperly laid" (pages 14-15 of the Record), which motion the plaintiff (appellee herein) opposed (Pages 17-18 of the Record). On June 16, 1982, the lower court denied the defendant's motion. (page 19 of the Record).
On July 5, 1982, the defendant filed his answer with counterclaim (pages 25-29 of the Record) wherein he denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that "he and the late Dr. Jorge Leyno never had any agreement with respect to said land and he himself (defendant) alone possessed and occupied said land after knowing said land as a public land until now as he (defendant) without the intervention of anybody has constructed a fishpond on a portion thereof and latter to file the corresponding public land application, so he could legally acquire the same from the government." (page 25 of the Record).
In addition, by way of special and affirmative defenses, the defendant contended that:
— This case falls under the original jurisdiction of the Director of Lands since the subject land is "a portion of the public domain;"
— The lower court had "no power, authority and jurisdiction in the disposition, lease or grants any form of concessions of lands of the public domain which is expressly vested by law to the Director of Lands and ultimately the Minister of Natural Resources;"
— The alleged lease contract between the plaintiff and the Minister of Natural Resources is "illegal being in violation of Presidential Decree No. 152 since plaintiff herself does not work and cultivate the land by herself, hence, said contract is null and void ab initio;"
— If there is any contract between plaintiff and the Minister of Natural Resources, the same is "void and inexistent . . . being illegal and expressly declared void by law;"
— He has a "preferential right to the land in question as he himself is the one who is actually working and cultivating the said land pursuant to PD. 152;"
— The plaintiff's "claim of right to succeed deceased Dr. Jorge Leyno does not apply to public land, that is, if ever Dr. Leyno has a perfected right to the land in question;"
—"(U)p to the death of Dr. Leyno he had not acquired any right to the land . . . transmissible to his heirs."
The defendant then prayed that, after hearing, the lower court "declare the Contract of Lease as void and inexistent . . . for being contrary to P.D. No. 152" and "the defendant the lawful possessor of the land in question." He also asked that he (defendant) be awarded: THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), as actual or compensatory damages; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000 00), by way of moral damages; FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), by way of corrective or exemplary damages; FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), for and by way of attorney's fees, ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00), for every appearance of undersigned counsel in Court; and other reliefs consistent with law and equity. He further prayed that the plaintiff be ordered to pay the costs of the suit. (pages 26-29 of the Record).
On July 22, 1982, the plaintiff filed her answer to the defendant's counterclaims. (page 35 of the Record).
On May 12, 1983, after the pre-trial conference, the lower court issued an order which embodied the facts stipulated upon by the parties thus:
"1) That the property in question is the same property as described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
"2) That the land in question has been the subject of a lease contract between plaintiff and the Bureau of Lands;
"3) That portion of the land which is in possession of defendant consists of a fish pond and another portion is a rice land." (pages 79-80 of the Record).
Aside from enumerating therein (pre-trial order) the exhibits submitted by the plaintiff for marking, the lower court likewise summarized the issues "to be ventilated during the trial of this case" in this wise:
"1) Whether or not the lease contract is legal or not;
"2) Whether or not plaintiff has been in possession of the land or in the possession of defendant;
"3) Whether or not all the improvements thereon were introduced by defendant;
"4) Whether or not the fishpond was introduced by defendant at his own expense;
"5) Whether or not defendant cultivated the rice land from 1953 to present;
"6) As to who is entitled to damages, if any." (page 81 of the Record).
On July 13, 1983, the defendant filed a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" (pages 89-91 of the Record), which move the plaintiff opposed (pages 92-96, id.). The defendant filed his reply to the plaintiff's opposition on August 8, 1983 (pages 97-99, id.). On August 31, 1983, the court a quo set the case for preliminary hearing page (page 100, id.)
On April 25, 1984, the defendant filed his second motion to dismiss (pages 125-127 of the Record), this time on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction to try the case and plaintiff has no capacity to enforce alleged contract of lease" Said move was denied by the lower court for being "out of context" on April 26, 1984. (page 130, id.).
On September 3, 1984, the lower court set the continuation of the hearing. (page 139 of the Record). On February 21, 1985, after hearing, it (trial court) issued the following order:
". . . Atty. Luperio Villanueva for the defendant, prayed that considering that the land . . . is devoted to rice, then this case must be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, who has jurisdiction . . .. Atty. Flaviano Aguanta objected to the said motion on the ground that the referral . . . is deemed waived when Atty. Villanueva did not pursue this issue . . . although he intimated that he was going to refer this case to the said Ministry when he took over this case . . ..
"To allow the Court a better appreciation of the position of both parties, Atty. Villanueva is hereby directed to file his manifestation/motion in writing, . . . he is hereby given . . . fifteen (15) days . . . within which to submit the same, furnishing copy thereof upon Atty. Aguanta . . . and Atty. Aguanta is in turn given another period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment/opposition thereto.
". . . let this case be held in abeyance until further assignment." (page 148-A of the Record).
On March 22, 1985, the defendant filed the corresponding motion (page 150 of the Record), to which the plaintiff filed her "Opposition to Motion to Refer Case to Ministry of Agrarian Reform" (pages 151-152, id.) Resultantly, on June 4, 1986 ordered the transfer of the record of this case "to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for proper disposition." (page 153, id.)
On July 13, 1987, however, the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform referred the case back to the trial court (page 155, id.), thereby prompting the latter to set the case for confirmation of hearing. (page 156, id.).
After trial, the lower court issue the now assailed decision, with the following findings:
"The core of the plaintiff's cause of action rests on the Contract of Lease that she and the Minister of Natural Resources entered into concerning the disputed public land. The Contract of Lease (Exhibit 'C') was originally signed by Jose Leido, Jr., the then Minister of Natural Resources and has a duration of 25 years from March 5, 1980 to March 5, 2005. The plaintiff has also paid the taxes assessed on the disputed land.
"With these evidence, was the case of the plaintiff established by preponderance of evidence for this Court to award the disputed public land in her favor?
"This Court answers in the affirmative. Except for the allegations that the Lease Contract between the plaintiff and the Minister of Natural Resources is void, there is really no evidence . . . that indeed the defendant has a better right to the disputed land. The defendant did not present any single document that will prove his case. The sketch plan (Exhibits 1 and 2) does not show anything. The letter complaint or protest, the defendant allegedly filed requesting the cancellation of the Lease Contract was never acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. The defendant never presented any Miscellaneous Sales Application concerning the disputed land as evidence that he indeed applied to the Land Office for the disputed land to be awarded in his favor. His explanation that the people he talked to were no longer working in the Bureau cannot hold water. Miscellaneous Sales Applications are public documents and copies of the same can be found in the Bureau of Lands if the application was indeed filed.
"The argument that the Lease Contract is void on the ground that the defendant was the one who was occupying the disputed public land at the time the plaintiff's Lease Application was filed is without merit. Whether or not he was the one who was occupying the land when the plaintiff's Lease Application was filed is immaterial. The fact remains that a Lease Contract was awarded in favor of the plaintiff by the Minister of Natural Resources and whether that Contract is valid or not is beyond this Court to determine. The Lease Contract which was issued by an Administrative Agency is given much weight and credit by this Court, and unless the contract is revoked by the issuing authority, this Court has no option but to uphold the same.
"On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, this Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction over the case. In Busante vs. CA, G. R. No. 97389, October 30, 1990 (quoting Natural Development Company vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520), the Supreme Court said:
'It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts).' (emphasis supplied).
"This Court is upholding the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources over dispute regarding public land by upholding the Lease Contract that the department awarded to the plaintiff. Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 332, the Supreme Court said:
'The reason then for possessory actions in court, namely, to 'facilitate adjudication' by the Lands Department of a dispute over public land no longer exists. For, defendant's application are no longer pending investigation. Defendant's possession of the lands disputed, for purposes of the free patents has been confirmed in the administrative case. The administrative branch of the government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed into finality. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of possession is lost. Since plaintiff's protest, in reference to possession has already been resolved reversely against them by the Lands Department, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue.'
"The defendant reiterates that he filed his protest with the Bureau of Lands for the annulment of Lease Contract . . .. The filing of the protest does not in anyway give him better right than the plaintiff who was issues a Lease Contract signed by the Minister himself.
"The other argument of the defendant, that the Lease Contract is void because it violates P.D. 152 is again beyond the ambit of this Court to determine. As long as the Lease Contract between plaintiff and Ministry of Natural Resources (DENR) is still effective, this Court has no choice but to award the disputed public land in favor of FLORENCIA LEYNO, the plaintiff. All evidences preponderate in favor of the plaintiff." (pages 322-324 of the Record).
Not satisfied with the decision, the defendant filed his notice of appeal on September 2, 1993. (page 327 of the Record). Subsequently, the lower court ordered the elevation of the records (page 329 of the Record) — and the case found its way to this Court.
In his brief, the appellant faulted the lower court for:
"I. NOT DECLARING THE CONTRACT OF LEASE (EXHS. D & D-1) NULL AND VOID AS IT IS CONTRARY TO PD 152.
"II. ORDERING APPELLANT TO VACATE THE LAND IN QUESTION.
"III. NOT AWARDING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MORAL, EXEMPLARY AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES." (page 1 of the Appellant's Brief).
The appellant, in discussing his first two assigned errors, contended that "(w)hat is being raised is not whether or not the Contract is nullified by P.D. 152. Appellant is NOT questioning the authority of the Ministry of Natural Resources in distributing or awarding the land to the appellee. What is being raised is deeper than that authority. Appellant is directly attacking the validity of the lease contract itself. He asserts that the lease contract did not exist at all. It is void from the very beginning because it is contrary to P.D. 152. The trial court REFUSED to consider this point but it merely concludes that 'as long as the Lease Contract . . . is still effective, this Court has no choice but to award the disputed public land in favor of Florencia Leyno . . ..' It did not determine whether said Lease Contract is still effective. It did not consider P.D. 152 at all inasmuch as it is well under its jurisdiction to act upon its validity." (page 5 of the Appellant's Brief).
According to the appellant, the appellee was disqualified from acquiring the land "because she did not enter and work upon, improve and cultivate the land by HERSELF." (page 8 id.). The appellant stressed that the fact that the appellee was not cultivating the land is "a ground for invalidating the Contract of Lease." (page 9, id.).
The appellant was also careful to point out that:
"The theory of the appellee that Appellant was her overseer of the land does not validate the Contract of Lease in her favor. It is but a ground for the cancellation of the Contract of Lease because Section 2, P.D. 152 prohibits share/tenants in whatever form for the purpose of complying with the requirement of the Public Land Act regarding entry, occupation, improvement and cultivation, and any of such violation constitute a ground for the denial of the application, cancellation of the grant and forfeiture of improvements on the land in favor of the government. Appellee may argue that Appellant is an overseer and therefore not a share tenant. But it is a common practice that an overseer is also a share tenant. And the law stresses that it could be a share tenant in whatever form and this will include the Appellant." (page 9, id.).
He (appellant) also cited Sections 3, 4, and 5 of PD 152 in support of his position.
The appellant explained that "PD 152 precedes the Contract of Lease because said Decree took effect immediately on March 13, 1979 and the Contract of Lease was executed on June 22, 1981 although it became effective on March 5, 1980. The Contract of Lease is not considered to have been executed at all because it is contrary to PD 152 and therefore the lease contract is void from the very beginning, it could not award the land to the Appellee. It could not be a basis of ordering the Appellant to vacate the land in question. What perhaps could be done is to declare the Contract of Lease void from the very beginning and to retain the appellant on the land and let the parties apply with thr (sic) Bureau of Lands which has jurisdiction of determining the qualification of applicants, for the acquisition of the land in question." (page 10, id.)
Anent his third assigned error, the appellant claimed that his rights "are clearly illegally and unjustly invaded by appellee Florencia Leyno," for which reason he is entitled to moral damages based on Articles 2220 and 2217 of the Civil Code. Quoting Articles 2232 and 2234 of the same Code, he averred that he is entitled to exemplary damages. More. After citing Article 2208 of the same Code, he alleged that he is entitled to actual and compensatory damages in the form of attorney's fees. (pages 13-14 of the Appellant's Brief).
The appellee, on the other hand, simultaneously refuted the assigned errors. According to her (appellee), by questioning the contract of lease, the appellant is in effect, also questioning the authority of the Minister of Natural Resources to enter into the said contract. (page 4 of the Appellee's Brief)
The appellee likewise pointed out that while "defendant-appellant cites PD 152 as basis for claiming that the contract is invalid," the appellant "did not present any evidence to show that indeed the defendant has a better right to the disputed land. The defendant did not present any single document that will prove his case. "She (appellee) then postulated that the appellant's contention that they had a better right, "are merely self-serving averments which do not carry weight." (pages 4-5, id.)
Invoking the ruling in Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Abad (206 SCRA 432), the appellee suggested that the appellant should have gone to the proper administrative agency "to lay its claim over the said property," after all, said the appellee, "defendant-appellant had all the time and the right to question the issuance of the contract of lease before the proper administrative body, however he slept on his rights . . .Now in his desperate attempt to retain the possession of the property, he tries to convince the court a quo of his right over the land by claiming that the contract is violative of PD 152." (pages 5-6 of the Appellee's Brief).
The appellee also pointed out the inconsistency in the positions taken by the appellant thus:
". . . while he alleged in his Answer as one of his Affirmative defenses that the Trial Court does not have the authority and jurisdiction in the disposition, lease or grants of any form or concession over lands belonging to the State as this authority is expressly vested by law under the Director of Lands and ultimately to the then Minister of Natural Resources, he nevertheless prayed . . . that the contract of lease entered into between the plaintiff and the then Minister, now Secretary, of Natural Resources be declared by the trial court as void and inexistent. While in his affirmative defense, he acknowledges the conclusiveness of the power of the administrative agency concerned, in his prayer, however, he asks that the trial court interfere with the administrative agency . . in the dispensation of the latter's exclusive authority over public lands." (pages 6-7 of the Appellee's Brief).
The appellee stressed that the trial court correctly upheld the lease agreement as "the courts are without authority to interfere with the administration of the lands of the public domain by the Bureau of Lands as approved by the Ministry, now Department of Natural Resources." (page 7 of the Appellee's Brief).
The appellee concluded by saying that clearly, there is "no room to award the defendant-appellant the right to possess the property and to the damages prayed for." (page 8 of the Appellee's Brief)
In the reply brief filed by him, the appellant reiterated his arguments and said that pursuant to PD 152 the appellee should have been in possession of the land subject of the contract of lease to entitle her to become a lessee of the land in question. "Appellee admits that she had not been in possession of the land (p. 39, tsn, hearing on February 21, 1985). By her admission, she losses (sic) her right to lease the property . . . Inasmuch as appellant is the actual possessor of the land and is actually tilling the land . . . said appellant should not be dispossessed from the land . . . he is entitled to the land as the actual tiller thereof. The matter of his being qualified to apply for the said land will be a proper issue before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources under the Public Land Law. But in this case, the Contract of Lease must perforce be declared a nullity as it is violative of PD 152 . . .." (pages 2-3 of the Reply Brief).
He (appellant) averred that considering appellee's own Admission (that she was not in possession of the subject land), the former's allegation that "he has sufficient evidence to prove that he has better right over the land . . . is not self-serving. . . there is no need to present any documentary evidence to support the right of the appellant to the land." (pages 3-4, id.).
The appellant further alleged that under the circumstances, he "could not have gone to the Bureau of Lands to contest the Contract of Lease and then exhaust administrative remedy while this case continues its course in this Court. As appellant is drawn against the wall . . he has to take the first opportunity to contest the contract of lease in this case. But the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedy could not really come into play. There was no on-going legal proceeding between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendant appellant before the appellee instituted this case in the lower court — not in the Bureau of Lands, particularly about the contract of lease in question. While appellant had indeed submitted his application with the Bureau of Lands for the acquisition of the land in question . . . it was just for that purpose, not for . . . contesting the contract of lease made in favor of the appellee. . . ." (page 4, id.).
The appellant then restated his contention that "since appellee had purposely sought the Contract of Lease as a vehicle to dispossess the appellant from the land . . . which clearly shows bad faith on her part, appellant should be awarded prayed for by him." (page 5, id.).
After perusing the record of this case, We find no merit in this appeal.
While doing over the ponencia of the case at bench, We have noted that the appellant herein had, on two (2) occasions, moved for the dismissal of the complaint. In the appellant's first motion to dismiss (pages 14-15 of the Record), he (appellant) contended that "the venue is improperly laid" He claimed therein that the appellee's complaint should have been filed with the "C.F.I. of Zambales, Branch II since the property as alleged in Paragraph 2 of the complaint is situated in San Antonio, Zambales and not this Honorable Court." His (appellant's) motion was, however, denied.
In contrast, in his (appellant's) second motion to dismiss (pages 125-127 of the Record), he averred that "the court has no jurisdiction to try the case and plaintiff has no capacity to enforce alleged contract of lease." According to him (appellant), because the issues in this case "delve more principally on the right to possess the land in question. . . and that defendant is in actual possession of said land. The matter, then, refers to the very issue of disposition of land, which is vested in the Bureau of Lands . . ." He expressed the view that ". . . a conflict over the land exists. This conflict should, by law, be resolved by the Director of Lands — not by the court, unless the land has ceased to be a part of the public domain with the issuance of a patent title in favor of any person. But since there is no final disposition of the land, it remains to be within the jurisdiction of the Lands Department."
"Yet, during the hearing on February 21, 1985, appellant's counsel sought the referral of this case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (page 148-A of the Record), invoking for this purpose PD 316. The corresponding motion therefor was filed on March 22, 1985 (page 150 of the Record). This move, although favorably acted upon by the court a quo (page 153 of the Record), proved futile because the records were returned by the Department of Agrarian Reform to the court of origin on November 24, 1987. (page 154 of the Record).
The appellant's tendency to adopt varying postures is also evident from the fact that in his brief he tried to make it appear that he was a share tenant in the subject parcel, for which reason PD No. 152 should be made to apply, although in the answer with counterclaim which he (appellant) filed with the court a quo, he specifically denied that he had any agreement with Dr. Jorge Leyno (deceased husband of the appellee). According to him, "he himself (defendant) alone possessed and occupied said land after knowing said land as a public land . . ." (page 25 of the Record).
This Court also finds it ironic that although in his answer, the appellant questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court over the case at bench allegedly because the "power, authority and jurisdiction in the disposition, lease or grants any form of concessions of lands of the public domain" falls within the domain of the "Director of Lands and ultimately the Minister of Natural Resources," still, in his (appellant's) prayer he asked that the lower court "declare the Contract of Lease as void and inexistent contract for being contrary to P.D. No. 152." (pages 26-28 of the Record).
Obviously, therefore, the appellant took different positions at different stages of this case (including this appeal). This kind of demeanor will not be countenanced by this Court. It is well-settled that a change of theory on appeal cannot be allowed as it would be unfair to the other party and would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 301).
It is clear from the lease contract itself (pages 214-222 of the Record) that the transaction entered into on June 22, 1981 between the then Minister of Natural Resources (Jose Leido) and the appellee was executed under Chapter IX, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. To Our mind, the law (P.D. 152 entitled "Prohibiting the employment or use of share tenants in complying with requirements of law regarding entry, occupation, improvement and cultivation of public lands, amending for the purpose certain provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act") being invoked by the appellant does not come into play under the circumstances.
We took note of the evidence presented by the appellee which showed that the latter applied to lease the subject parcel "under the provisions of Chapter VI, IX of Commonwealth Act No. 141" as early as December 1976. (page 213 of the Record). The right to lease the same parcel was awarded the appellee on March 6, 1980, so that on June 22, 1981, the agreement of lease was entered into by the appellee and the Minister of Natural Resources. (page 214 of the Record). The law being invoked by the appellant, on the other hand, took effect as far back as March 13, 1973. A fortiori, even assuming por arguendo, that PD 152 is applicable, it could reasonably be presumed that the same was taken into consideration by the Minister of Natural Resources before entering into the questioned contract of lease. (Sec 5[m], [q], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the law (PD 152), which the appellant insists should be applied to this case, was intended to apply to applications for homestead.
We carefully pored over the contract of lease as well as the pertinent provisions of Chapters VI and IX of Commonwealth Act No. 141, but found nothing therein to buttress appellant's averment that the fact that the appellee was not cultivating the land is a ground for invalidating the contract.
The record shows that the complaint was filed by the appellee on December 21, 1981 — shortly after the contract of lease was executed — precisely because she wanted to work upon and introduce improvements on the land.
Neither the Contract of Lease nor the provisions of Chapters VI and IX of Commonwealth Act No. 141 require that the applicant should have been in possession of or have been cultivating or have introduced improvements on the parcel of land applied for prior to filing his application therefor, unlike other provisions in the same legislation, i.e., on sale, on free patents.
We are quoting hereunder the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which, We feel, are relevant to the issue in this case:
"Sec 39. It shall be an inherent and essential condition of the lease that the lessee shall have not less than one-third of the land broken and cultivated within five years after the date of the approval of the lease: . . ..
"Sec. 40. The lessee shall not assign, encumber, or sublet his rights without the consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the violation of this condition shall avoid the contract: Provided, That assignment, encumbrance, or subletting for purposes of speculation shall not be permitted in any case: . . .
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales or agricultural public land, that the Government will lease or sell, as the case may be, the lots or blocks specified in the advertisement, for the purpose stated in the notice and subject to the conditions specified in this chapter.
"Sec. 64. The leases executed under this chapter by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall, among other conditions, contain the following:
". . .
"(d) The lessee shall construct permanent improvements . . . commence the construction thereof within six months from the date of the award of the right to lease the land, and shall complete the said construction within eighteen months from said date.
". . .
"The violation of one or any of the conditions specified in the contract shall give rise to the rescission of said contract. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may, however, subject to such conditions as he may prescribe, waive the rescission arising from a violation of the conditions of subsection (d), or extend the time within which the construction of the improvements shall be commenced and completed." (Commonwealth Act No. 141, emphasis ours).
The contract of lease, on the other hand, contained, among others, the following stipulations:
"FOURTH. — The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART hereby agrees to begin the occupation and cultivation of the land within six (6) months from the date of the award, and shall so continuously occupy and cultivate the same until the expiration of the term of this contract. It shall be inherent and essential condition of the lease that the lessee shall have not less than one third of the land broken and cultivated within five (5) years from the date of the award; . . .Moreover, should the lessee, without previously obtaining permission from the Director of Lands abandons the land or stops cultivation thereof for more than one (1) year at any time while this lease is in force, this lease shall be terminated as provided for in the next paragraph.
". . ..
"TENTH. It is further covenanted and agreed that for a breach of any covenants herein by the said PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, save these covenants for breach of which special provision is made, the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART may elect to declare this agreement rescinded and void and, after having given thirty (30) day's notice, in writing, to the said PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, may enter and take possession of the said premises and all improvements actually existing thereon, and the said PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, hereby covenants and agrees to give up the possession thereof.
". . ..
"FIFTEENTH. It is also agreed that the lease application filed and on which the granting of this lease is predicated, shall be considered as part of this contract and any omission and misrepresentation in, or violation of the statements in the said lease application shall give the right to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART to rescind this contract, to recover the land and to forfeit all amounts already paid and the improvements made or existing thereon." (pages 215-217 of the Record, emphasis ours).
It is luce clarius, therefore, that the right to enter into contracts, like the one subject of this controversy, and to have the same rescinded devolves upon the Minister (now Secretary) of Natural Resources. The law on this matter is explicit:
"Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
"Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." (Commonwealth Act No. 141).
For the satisfaction of the appellant, this Court would like to stress that:
". . . the essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; and (4) there is consideration. It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvest. And with respect to the landowner, We have ruled that tenancy relationship can be created only with the consent of the true and lawful landowner." (Ocier vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 510, citing Qua vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 236, 242, which in turn cited Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573; De la Cruz vs. Bautista, 186 SCRA 517 and Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 168 SCRA 247; also, Greza vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 39, 51).
Applying the foregoing requisites to the facts of this case, it becomes clear that no tenancy relationship exists between the appellant and the appellee. Hence, it is beyond peradventure that PD No. 152 does not apply.
In view of the foregoing discussion, and considering that the proper procedure prior to the award of the right to lease, i. e., requirement of publication, seems to have been observed, We are inclined to uphold the ruling of the trial court thus:
"The argument that the Lease Contract is void on the ground that the defendant was the one who was occupying the disputed public land at the time the plaintiff's Lease Application was filed is without merit. Whether or not he was the one who was occupying the land when the plaintiff's Lease Application was filed is immaterial. The fact remains that a Lease Contract was awarded in favor of the plaintiff by the Minister of Natural Resources and whether that Contract is valid or not is beyond this Court to determine. The Lease Contract which was issued by an Administrative Agency is given much weight and credit by this Court, and unless the contract is revoked by the issuing authority, this Court has no option but to uphold the same. . . .
"This Court is upholding the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources over dispute regarding public land by upholding the Lease Contract that the department awarded to the plaintiff. . . ." (page 323 of the Record).
It is axiomatic, that factual conclusion and findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reason. (Castañeda vs. Sandiganbayan, 171 SCRA 263; Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 620; Asong vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA 299; National Onion Growers Cooperative Marketing Associations, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 35; De Alino vs. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 499; Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 599; Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 651; Casis vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 732; Donato vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 196; Gaschem Schookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115; Ferrer vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 302; Lee Eng Hong vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 392; Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 376).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated August 11, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 73) in Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 3314-O is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Imperial and Aliño-Hormachuelos, JJ., concur.