THIRD DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 39989. December 12, 1997.]
VICTORIA CABRAL, petitioners, and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD DEOGRACIAS SEMINIANO, MARCELINO MOLINA, ISAAC ORBE and JUAN ORBE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MABUTAS, JR., J p:
Before Us is a petition (for review and for centered) assailing the resolutions (dated October 30, 1995 and February 13, 1996) of the respondent Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board on DARAB Case No. 3721 (Reg. Case No. No. 239-Bul '91).
The dispositive portion of the assailed resolution (October 30, 1996) is worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Notice of Appellant is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time and the Motion To Quash Writ of Execution is DENIED for lack of merit." (page 566 of the Record).
On the other hand, the assailed resolution (dated February 13 1996) runs thus:
"For resolution are two (2) 'Motion for Reconsideration', dated November 24, 1995 and November 27, 1995 respectively, filed by Petitioner-Appellant on the Resolution of the Board dated October 30, 1995.
"Finding that no new matters are adduced by the Movant in the said Motion which will warrant a reversal of the Board's decision, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit." (page 507, Id).
Tracking down the antecedent facts of the case, We discovered the following substantial data/developments:
The petitioner herein was the owner of a piece of land covered by OCT No. O-1670 (re-numbered OCT No. O-220) of the Register of Deeds of Maycauayan, Bulacan and one of the parcels thereof, described as Lot 5, Psc-104390, is the one in question;
Sometime in 1973, the petition herein filed an application for the conversion of the above mentioned properly from agricultural land to industrial land:
On January 8, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform distributed the above-mentioned properly, through emancipation patents, to the private respondents herein, who were issued (on April 26, 1990) Emancipation Patent TCT in their names;
On April 4, 1991, the petitioner herein filed a petition for the annulment and cancellation of the Emancipation Patent TCTs which had been issued to the private respondents herein (pages 12-14 of the Record).
On May 31, 1991, the respondents filed their answer denying the material allegation in the petition and, at the same time, interposed affirmative defenses (pages 20-21, ld.).
On January 23, 1992, the respondents moved to dismiss the petition, alleging that: "The Court (Board) has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the motion of suit: The court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit." (page 263, ld.)
On January 28, 1992, the Provincial Adjudication dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (page 279, ld.).
Not satisfied with the afore-stated order, the petitioner appealed the Department of Agrarian Reform in Quezon City (page 285, ld.) which appeal was favorably acted upon and the case remanded back to the Provincial Adjudication "for adjudication on the merits" (page 376, ld.).
Subsequently, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision, dated February 23, 1995, the dispositive portion of which was worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the respondents and against the petitioner and Order is hereby issued:
"1. Denying the complaint of petitioner Victoria P. Cabral for cancellation, annulment of Emancipation Patent Title;
2. Declaring the Emancipation Patents/Titles issued in favor of herein respondent has from all liens and encumbrances.
3. Ordering herein petitioner to recognize the right of herein respondents as the absolute owners of the subject properties." (pages 430-429, ld.).
which decision was received by the petition on March 15, 1995 (page 462, ld.).
On April 5, 1995, the petitioner filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" from said decision (page 462, ld), which move was approved by the respondents (page 471, ld.), which opposition decided a reply (page 460-475, ld.).
On May 26, 1995, petitioner's motion for reconsiderations was denied for being "devoid of legal basis" (page 487-486, ld.), which order of denial was received by the petitioner on June 1, 1995 (page 489, ld.).
On June 13, 1995, the respondents filed a motion for the issuance of writ execution of the decision (page 488, ld.), which move was granted (page 499, ld.) and a writ of execution issued directing the (Illegible Portion) to inforce the decision with the assistance of the Philippine National Police (pages 507-508, Id.)
On June 20, 1995, the petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal" (page 510-512, Id.)
On June 26, 1995, the petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" (page 532, ld.), which move was opposed by the respondents (page 542, ld.).
On October 30, 1995, the DARAB issued the (Illegible Portion) questioned resolution (page 570, ld.), the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted
Not satisfied with said resolution, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, dated November 27, 1995 (pages 575-574, ld.), which action was denied in respondent department's second questioned resolution (page 597, ld.).
On March 5, 1996, this court received the instant petition (pages 2-10 of the Rollo), but the same was dismissed for "being insufficient in form and substance" (page 52 of the Rollo).
On April 18, 1996, however, the petitioner filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" (pages 57-60, ld.) and this Court's resolution of dismissed was reconsidered and set aside (page 63, ld.).
In support of her petition, the petitioner alleged that the DARAB erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction:
"IN DISMISSING, AFTER GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WHICH WAS FILED 14 DAYS FROM NOTICE OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 OF THE SUPREME COURT.
"IN NOT COMPLYING WITH THE MANDATE IN SECTION 50 OF R.A. 6657 TO HEAR AND DECIDE ALL CASES DISPUTES OR CONTROVERSIES ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JUSTICE AND EQUITY. WITHOUT BEING BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE EMPLOYING ALL REASONABLE MEANS TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS OF EVERY CASE." (pages 3-4 of the Petition).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Taking note of the undisputed comment of public respondent DARAB (pages 110-115 of the Rollo) to the effect that the petitioner has (Illegible Portion) gone into a forum-shopping spree she allegedly had filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court involving the same subject matter the instant petition deserves an outright dismissal, for forum-shopping is a deplorable practice which much be prescribed and condemned as it (Illegible Portion) and degrades the administration of justice (Ruiz vs. Drilon, 269 SCRA 695; Viotronics Computers, Inc. vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 63, Makati, 217 SCRA 517, Samad vs. Commission on Elections, 224 SCRA 631, Silahis International Hotel, Inc. vs. National labor Relations Commission, 225 SCRA 94). As aptly posited by public respondent DARAB, petitioner's act of seeking relief running along parallel lines from two different tribunal constituted forum-shopping (Samad vs. Commission on Elections, supra, R. Transport Corporation vs. Laguesma, 227 SCRA 826) which, as earlier states, cannot be countenanced.
Taking a close look at the petition, We have observed that the petitioner had branded the same as a "petition for review and for certiorari" which move cannot also be tolerated under existing jurisprudence. The remedy of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive (Federation of Free Workers vs. Inciong, 208 SCRA 167) as a matter of fact, they are entithetical (Municipality of Biñan, Laguna vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 89, Oriental Media, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 647). At this juncture, We wish to state that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings and conclusions it cannot be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law and fact (De Vera vs. Pineda, 213 SCRA 434; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 150). Also, the civil action for certiorari does not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal (Sy vs. Romero, 214 SCRA 187; Salas vs. Castro, 216 SCRA 193; Ruiz, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 490; Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 191, Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88; Fajardo vs. Bautista, 232 SCRA 201; Felizardo vs. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 220, De la Paz vs. Panis, 245 SCRA 242). Further, factual matters are not proper in certiorari proceedings (Insular Bank of Asia and America vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 420). In short, certiorari is limited only to challenges against errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment (Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 582) or simple abuse of discretion (University of the Philippines, vs. Civil Service Commission, 228 SCRA 207; Government Service Insurance System vs. National Food Authority, 249 SCRA 522). Parenthetically, grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of powers (Salas vs. Castro, 216 SCRA 198), which situation appeared wanting in the case at bench. On this point, the petition is also dismissible.
However, We evaded technicality and considered the petition as one for review. Still, as We delved deeper into the record-taking note also of the disputants' arguments relative to the errors interposed by the petitioner (appellant) the petition appeared to have no legal leg to stand on. Tackling jointly the two errors raised by the petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General (for the public respondent) sculled petitioner's argument (relative to the first issue) thus:
"Petitioner argument is misplaced. The records show that petitioner's notice of appeal was filed out of time. Hereunder is the sequence of relevant events that transpired in this case.
"1. On March 15, 1995, petitioner received the decision of Provincial Adjudicator Sapera denying her petition (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Records, p. 462).
2. On March 30, 1995, or fifteen (16) days from receipt of the decision), petitioner moved to reconsider Provincial Adjudicator Sapera decision (Records, pp. 455-402).
3. On May 26, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Sapera denied the motion for reconsideration (Records, pp. 485-487). The order was received by petitioner on June 1, 1996 (Records, p. 489).
4. On June 14, 1995 or thirteen (13) days later, petitioner filed a notice of appeal (Records, pp. 512-513).
"Thus, clearly, 28 days have elapsed since the time petitioner received a copy of the decision of provincial adjudicator until the time notice of appeal was filed.
"Section 1, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
"Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order or decision of the Regional of Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution, order or decision appealed from and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if the appeal is [in] writing."
"In this case, the notice of appeal was filed 28 days after petitioner received a copy of the decision dismissing the notice of appeal, clearly beyond the prescriptive period.
"Administrative Circular 1-95 of the Supreme Court referred to by petitioner does not apply to the case at bar since the same only govern appeals to the Court of Appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi Judicial Agencies. The rule that govern appeals from the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB is the above quoted Sec. 1, Rule XIII if the DARAB rules of procedure
xxx xxx xxx
"Furthermore, it is worthy to point and that petitioner mislead public respondent when she conveniently failed to allege in her notice of appeal that her counsel received a copy of the decision as empty as June 1, 1995 . . .
"That public respondent DARAB initially gave due course to the appeal is of no moment because when the period of appeal had elapsed, it had been automatically divested of its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal filed by petitioner." (pages 6-9 of the Comment by the DARAB).
The Office of the Solicitor General also petitioner's second assigned error, pointing out that her reliance on Section 50 of Republic Act. No. 6657 is similarly "misplaced". After quoting said provision, the public respondent declared:
"The same would apply only if public respondent DARAB still had jurisdiction over the case. However, as previously discussed, public respondent DARAB lost jurisdiction over the case when the period of appeal had lapsed without any appeal being filed by the parties.
"As held in Ceniza v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 388 (1993):
'The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdiction, and failure to perfect an appeal as legally required has the effect of rendering final and executory the judgment of the court below and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. Hence, unless the appeal is perfected on time, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the appealed case, and has power only to dismiss the appeal. . . .' (Ceniza vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 390, 397-398)
"Moreover, it is noteworthy that petitioner did not state any reason for its failure to file its petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner did even allege the existence of circumstances that would amount to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect so as to provide a legal jurisdiction for its appeal.
"Lastly, petitioner's allegation of newly discovered evidence is without merit. Whether or not the properties were sold by private respondents to a 3rd party is a matter which they and the government has to thresh out, petitioner has no personality to question the same." (page 10-11 of the Comment by the DARAB; pages 103-104 of the Rollo).
We agree with the foregoing ratiocination by the Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, the record showed an order, dated June 4, 1996, by the public respondent (page 620 of the Record) granting private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of execution (page 618, ld.), which order remained undisputed. Let it be stated that the petitioner assailed in her petition the resolutions, dated October 30, 1995 and February 13, 1996, of the public respondent, which petition, as earlier stated, was received by this Court on March 5, 1996. However, said petitioner was dismissed (page 52, ld.)-and said dismissal was only reconsidered and set aside on May 20, 1996 (page 63, ld.) on motion by the petitioner (pages 57-61, ld.). The finality of said undisputed order has thereby rendered moot and academic the instant petition. More, this Court cannot take up matters "foreign" to those tackled below. Anyway, this being an appeal of an agrarian case, the only function required of this Court, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Malate vs. Court of Appeals (218 SCRA 572) is to determine whether or not the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Parenthetically, substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial. Where the findings are supported by substantial evidence, such findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court (Bagslom vs. Court of Appeal, 141 SCRA 226; Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. vs. Tolentino 167 SCRA 334; Gonzales, Jr. vs. Alvarez, 182 SCRA 15). An examination of evidence on record shows that the findings of fact of the public respondent are supported by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the petition be DISMISSED, hereby affirming the assailed resolutions (stated October 30, 1996 and February 13, 1996) of the public respondent, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cui and Aquino, JJ., concur.