NINTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. December 11, 2001.]
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE L. MADRID and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse and set aside the Order 1 dated January 29, 2001 issued by public respondent Jose L. Madrid, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51 in Civil Case No. 2001-6801 entitled "Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Severino Listana, Sr." and his subsequent Order 2 dated April 2, 2001 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner voluntarily offered to sell his property located in Inlagadlan, Casiguran, Sorsogon with an area of 246.0561 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193 to the Government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Of the said parcel of land, 240.9066 hectares were adjudged by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and private respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) as acquirable area and valued the same at P5,871,689.03.
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid valuation, petitioner rejected the same and raised the issue with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Region V for summary administrative determination of just compensation docketed as VOCF Case No. 043 '97. Private respondent LBP, despite notices failed to appear during the scheduled hearings. The proceedings being summary in nature, the PARAD directed the parties to file their respective position papers and documentary evidence in support thereof. Not long after, or on October 14, 1998, PARAD Manuel M. Capellan rendered a Decision 3, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Lank Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner provided for by law.
"SO ORDERED."
On November 11, 1998, private respondent LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision which was denied by PARAD Capellan in an Order dated May 7, 1999. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Despite the opposition by private respondent LBP, the PARAD granted petitioner's motion and issued a Writ of Execution 4 on June 18, 1999 ordering Mr. Alex Lorayes, Manager of private respondent LBP, Legaspi City Branch to pay petitioner in the manner provided for by law.
On June 23, 1999, a Request to Pay 5 was sent to private respondent LBP by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Rogelio Rondon. However, two (2) months after the writ was issued and served upon private respondent LBP, Legaspi City Branch, the same remained unsatisfied. Thus, on September 2, 1999 petitioner filed a Motion for Contempt 6 against the Department Manager of the LandBank Valuation Office, Legaspi City, that is Mr. Lorayes. PARAD Capellan issued an order directing private respondent LBP to show cause as to why it should not be cited for contempt for not complying with its Writ of Execution thru Mr. Lorayes.
On September 6, 1999, private respondent LBP flied a petition 7 for judicial determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52 of Sorsogon, Sorsogon acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC) in the area docketed as Civil Case No. 99-6639. Thereafter, it filed an Opposition to Motion for Contempt 8 alleging that it already filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the SAC of Sorsogon, Sorsogon pursuant to Sections 16 (f) and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 and that since the same is an original action and not an appeal from the decision of the PARAD, the latter is deemed vacated upon institution of the case before the SAC.
On August 20, 2000, PARAD Capellan issued an Order 9 granting petitioner's motion for contempt, the decretal part of which reads: ESTDcC
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LANDBANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998.
"SO ORDERED."
On September 6, 2000, private respondent LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 of the Contempt Order of PARAD Capellan alleging therein that on August 25, 2000, it received a copy of the same; that since the basis of the contempt is Rule XI of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure which provides that "(T)he Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court", the proper indirect contempt charge should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court against Mr. Lorayes and due process must be observed which means that he must be served notice and be heard to enable him to defend himself; that in indirect contempt, there must be a showing that there is willful disobedience to a lawful order of the court or quasi-judicial agency; that such is not the situation in the instant case as it is not within the authority of Mr. Lorayes to approve the release of the amount mentioned in the Decision dated October 14, 1998, the same belonging to the higher management of LBP.
Apparently not convinced, PARAD Capellan issued an Order 11 dated September 20, 2000 denying private respondent LBP's motion for reconsideration. On September 29, 2000, private respondent LBP filed a Notice of Appeal 12 alleging therein that it will appeal the Order of PARAD Capellan dated August 20, 2000 with the DARAB Central Office, a copy of which it received on August 25, 2000 which was the subject of its motion for reconsideration filed on September 6, 2000, and thereafter denied in an Order dated September 20, 2000, a copy of which it received on September 27, 2000.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal (on contempt) with Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution alleging that the appeal was filed out of time considering that private respondent LBP received a copy of the Order dated August 20, 2000 on August 25, 2000 and it belatedly filed its Motion for Reconsideration only on September 6, 2000, which is beyond the five (5)-day period allowed by the DARAB New Rules of Procedure (Section 3, Rule XI). Thus, petitioner averred that the Order dated August 20, 2000 was already final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days and by September 6, 2000, there was nothing more for private respondent LBP to reconsider. In its Comment to the aforesaid motion, private respondent LBP contended that the filing of the Notice of Appeal is within five (5) days from notice of the Order dated September 20, 2000, stating further that the Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration was received by it on September 27, 2000. Thus, it had until October 2, 2000 within which to file its Notice of Appeal as the final order referred to in Section 3, Rule XI of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure is the order denying its motion for reconsideration. 13
In a Resolution 14 dated November 27, 2000, the controversy was resolved by PARAD Capellan in favor of herein petitioner, ruling that his Order dated August 20, 2000 was already final and executory for failure of private respondent LBP to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Consequently, private respondent LBP's appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time and the motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution was granted.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve praying therein for the issuance of an arrest order against Mr. Lorayes. Private respondent LBP opposed the same stating that the issuance of an order of arrest is not within the authority of the DARAB, its Members or Adjudicators. Finding private respondent LBP's contention bereft of merit, PARAD Capellan issued an Order 15 on January 3, 2001 granting petitioner's motion for issuance of an order of arrest against Mr. Lorayes.
On January 8, 2001, private respondent LBP filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order 16 against petitioner and PARAD Capellan with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Jose L. Madrid. It alleged that in its opposition to the issuance of an order of arrest, it stated that the amount of P5,312,190.23 has already been paid to petitioner and that there is a pending case for judicial determination of just compensation involving the same parties and property before the SAC of Sorsogon (RTC Branch 52). Private respondent LBP further maintained that Mr. Lorayes could not grant and facilitate the release of the amount of P10,956,963.25 in favor of petitioner as mandated in the Writ of Execution as he is not authorized by LBP to approve for release such amount. Hence, private respondent LBP prayed that an order be issued enjoining PARAD Capellan from issuing an order of arrest and from implementing the same because it is not within his authority to issue the same in addition to the fact that there is a pending case before the SAC involving the question of just compensation of the subject property.
Thereafter, a 72-hour temporary restraining order was immediately issued by public respondent Judge Madrid, which was thereafter extended to twenty (20) days. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and an Opposition to issuance of Preliminary Injunction which private respondent LBP opposed.
On January 29, 2001, public respondent Judge Madrid issued the assailed Order enjoining PARAD Capellan from enforcing the Arrest Order dated January 3, 2001. Public respondent Madrid held that PARAD Capellan "failed to observe the procedure expressly spelled in Sections 4 and 12 of Rule 71" of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, insofar as contempt proceedings are concerned, adding that the proper contempt charge should have been filed by petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, public respondent Judge Madrid bewailed the issuance of an arrest order against Mr. Lorayes, declaring that the DARAB or its Adjudicators have no power to issue the same. Thus, the dispositive portion of the Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in his stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final determination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the LandBank.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 thereof which was denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The central issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not public respondent Judge Madrid gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued a writ of injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the January 3, 2001 Order of PARAD Capellan.
Before resolving the above issue, We deem it appropriate to first discuss the authority of the PARAD to issue contempt orders as this question was aptly raised before the contempt proceedings, although already in the motion for reconsideration stage, and in the injunction suit.
Chapter XII, Section 50 and Chapter XIII, Section 54 of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) provide:
"SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). CTHaSD
"It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding before it.
"It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
"Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory."
"SECTION 54. Certiorari. — Any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy thereof. (emphasis supplied)
From the above provision of law, it is clearly evident that the DAR, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator has jurisdiction to cite parties before him for contempt, direct or indirect. The same holds true insofar as the power to issue arrest orders based on his power to cite for contempt, imprisonment and/or fine being the penalties provided for under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 18
The argument therefore that the PARAD has no authority to issue arrest orders is misplaced considering the express grant of such authority under the CARL. As correctly asserted by petitioner, taking the case of Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa 19 as a case in point, a quasi-judicial agency such as the DARAB thru its PARAD may issue an arrest order in the same manner that the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation (CID) may issue such orders, that is, as a result of executing his final orders or judgments. The argument by private respondent LBP that the PARAD does not have jurisdiction to issue arrest orders is true only if an arrest order was issued in the course of an investigation to determine probable cause, as this is unconstitutional.
Having settled the issue of jurisdiction of the PARAD vis-à-vis the contempt proceedings and the execution of its consequent penalties, We are now tasked to rule on the propriety of bringing an independent action for injunction in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the contested arrest order. Petitioner maintains that the proper remedy is either to appeal to the Board or to file a special civil action for certiorari with this Court with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and not a mere petition for injunction since the contempt order became final and executory after private respondent LBP failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration thereof.
We agree with petitioner.
The procedure insofar as just compensation cases before the DARAB is found in the provisions of the CARL and the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Thus, Chapter V, Section 16, Chapter XII, Section 51 and Chapter XIII, Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL read:
"SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation." (emphasis supplied)
"SECTION 51. Finality of Determination. — Any case or controversy before it shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for resolution. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Any order, ruling or decision shall be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
"SECTION 56. Special Agrarian Court. — The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court. ISCcAT
The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall given preference to the Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall have the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging in the Regional Trial Courts.
"SECTION 57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision." (emphasis supplied)
In relation thereto, Rule XII, Section 1 and Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, provide:
"SECTION 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision. — Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
The Board or Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order or decision has been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu propio, issue a writ of execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
"SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration." (emphasis supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the following procedures should be complied with with respect to the determination of just compensation under the CARL after rejection by the landowner of the valuation set by the DAR and the LBP and up to the filing a case for judicial determination of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court, to wit:
1. The DAR, through the PARAD shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The PARAD shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to challenge the decision of the PARAD.
2. If any of the parties does not agree with the decision of the PARAD, an independent action for judicial determination of just compensation should be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision of the PARAD before the Special Agrarian Court. (SAC) in the province or city or municipality where the land is located. Appeal is not allowed from the decision of the PARAD to the Board.
3. If no independent action for judicial determination of just compensation is brought before a SAC within the reglementary period, the decision of the PARAD then becomes final and executory. 20
In all other matters, the decision, final order or resolution of the PARAD is appealable to the Board within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same in accordance with Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. If the losing party chooses not to appeal, fails to file a timely appeal therefrom or fails to file a motion for reconsideration thereof within five (5) days from receipt of the decision, final order or resolution, execution should issue as a matter of course.
As to whether or not the decision of the PARAD with respect to the just compensation of the subject land was already final and executory before private respondent LBP filed an action for judicial determination of just compensation with the SAC, We cannot make a categorical determination herein as the case is now on appeal before this Court after the SAC ruled against private respondent LBP. Be that as it may, insofar as the contempt order is concerned, We hereby rule that the same became final and executory fifteen (15) days from private respondent LBP's receipt of a copy of the same as the records reveal that it failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Perforce, the PARAD cannot just order the transmittal of the records to the Board, as private respondent LBP wants him to do.
Private respondent LBP, as upheld by public respondent Judge Madrid, asseverated that the contempt proceedings before PARAD Capellan was not in accord with the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, specifically Rule 71 thereof as the same was initiated by petitioner through a motion to cite for contempt and not by the filing of a verified petition, and that the same was incorrectly filed with the PARAD instead of with the Regional Trial Court.
As to the last argument, the discussion above vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of the PARAD to hear contempt proceedings hopefully clarifies the matter. Anent the assertion that the contempt proceedings was not in accord with Rule 71, initiated as it was by the mere filing of a motion, We hereby likewise find it unnecessary to discuss the repercussions of the filing of a mere motion to cite for contempt as the contempt order should have been assailed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 if private respondent LBP is of the opinion that the PARAD rendered his order in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Private respondent LBP not having done so, the consequence of the contempt order cannot be enjoined as it would in effect reverse and set aside the contempt order itself through the mere expedient of filing a petition for injunction, thus, opening a different avenue to contest a decision which has long become final and executory.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the PARAD having jurisdiction over contempt proceedings (having the authority to conduct the same and after affording the parties due process of law) and considering that the contempt order was already final and executory for failure of private respondent LBP to appeal therefrom, the proper remedy was to directly assail the contempt order through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order or to file a motion to quash warrant of arrest issued as a result of the contempt ruling of PARAD Capellan. It bears to note that a final and executory judgment rendered by a court or quasi-judicial agency with competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked, as in this case, by filing a simple petition for injunction without praying for the reversal of the judgment. SaHIEA
When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. 21 Moreover, the Supreme Court in the case of Salva vs. Court of Appeals 22, held that "(A) judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes."
Having said that, We hereby rule that public respondent Judge Madrid committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he assumed jurisdiction and issued a writ of injunction to enjoin the execution of the warrant of arrest against Mr. Lorayes referred to by private respondent LBP as an "incident" of the contempt proceedings, when the real issue therein can no longer be reviewed as the same attained finality through its own fault and negligence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 issued by public respondent Judge Jose L. Madrid, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51 in Civil Case No. 2001-6801 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the petition for lack of merit.
With costs against private respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Morales and Pestaño, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 57.
2. Rollo, p. 61.
3. Rollo, p. 112.
4. Rollo, p. 115.
5. Rollo, p. 117.
6. Rollo, p. 118.
7. Rollo, p. 120.
8. Rollo, p. 24.
9. Rollo, p. 125.
10. Rollo, p. 131.
11. Rollo, p. 136.
12. Rollo, p. 139.
13. See Resolution of PARAD Capellan dated November 27, 2000, Rollo, p. 140.
14. Ibid.
15. Rollo, p. 143.
16. Rollo, p. 145.
17. Rollo, p. 111.
18. See also DARAB New Rules of Procedure, Rule XI, Sections 1 to 3.
19. 197 SCRA 854.
20. See Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629.
21. Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523.
22. 304 SCRA 638.