SIXTEENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 63139. May 30, 2001.]
Spouses NARCISO BARNACHEA and JULITA BARNACHEA, petitioners, vs. Hon. OSCAR C. HERRERA, Jr., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 20, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 20, Hon. HORACIO T. VIOLA, Jr., Presiding Judge, MTC Pulilan, Bulacan and Spouses AVELINO & PRISCILLA IGNACIO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SALAZAR-FERNANDO, J p:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking relief from the Order 1 dated October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 468-M-2000 entitled, "Spouses Avelino Ignacio and Priscilla Ignacio, Plaintiffs/Appellees, versus, Spouses Narciso Barnachea and Julita Barnachea, Defendants/Appellants." the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, appellants' "Urgent Motion (for Suspension of Proceedings)" dated October 6, 2000 is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED."
The facts are:
Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest owned a piece of land, a homelot, located at Cutcot, Pulilan, Bulacan covered by an emancipation patent (TCT No. T-188-EP) issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), on which a residential house was built. Private respondents are owners of the adjoining lot which was also awarded by the government. They claimed that the petitioners are illegally occupying a portion of their lot.
The lot in question was previously owned by Luis Santos under TCT No. 0-339. The lot was then transferred to Purificacion Santos Imperial through succession. It was later placed under the coverage of PD 27, otherwise known as Emancipation of Tenants Act of 1972. Under PD 27, the entirety of the tenanted rice land was caused to be surveyed/parceled by DAR for distribution to farmer-tenants pursuant to operation land transfer (OLT) of said decree.
Among those awarded lots were Santiago Isidro (Isidro, for brevity) and Procopio de Guzman (De Guzman for brevity). Isidro was awarded Lot 2-K while De Guzman, Lot 2-B, an adjacent lot. Accordingly, Emancipation Patent (EP) No. 079916 with an area of 2,600 square meters was issued to Isidro. 2 On the other hand, De Guzman was issued EP No. 445440 (TCT No. T-185-EP) containing an area of 19,360 square meters. 3
Isidro's lot was reduced by about 450 square meters when a service road along the irrigation canal was constructed on the northwest border of his lot. Thus, EP No. A-050545 (TCT No. T-188-EP) was issued on November 3, 1980 based on subdivision plan Psd 000829 (OLT) as approved by the Regional Director, Bureau of Lands of the Ministry of Natural Resources. 4
On May 4, 1995, De Guzman sold his land to private respondent Avelino Ignacio without any DAR clearance. 5 As a result EP No. 445440 (TCT No. T-185-EP) was cancelled and TCT No. 82343 was issued in private respondent Avelino Ignacio's name. 6
Thereafter private respondent Avelino Ignacio's lot was subdivided into sixty-nine (69) lots under subdivision survey Psd-03-0789020. Separate TCTs were issued all in the name of private respondent Avelino Ignacio and inclusive of TCT No. 86823, covering Subdivision Lot 18; TCT No. 86824, covering Subdivision Lot 19; TCT no. 86821, covering Subdivision Lot 16; and TCT No. 86822, covering Subdivision Lot 17, which were adjacent on the eastern side to the property owned, occupied and possessed by petitioners.
On July 12, 1999, the former owner, Purificacion Santos Imperial, filed an administrative charge 7 against Atty. Sampana, the Register of Deeds of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for grave misconduct for anomalously canceling EP No. 445440 in the name of Procopio de Guzman, predecessor of herein private respondents, and in issuing TCT No. 82343, including the corresponding derivative titles (TCT Nos. 86821, 86822, 86823, and 86824) all registered in the name of private respondent Avelino Ignacio. As a result of the unauthorized sale of Lot 2-B, DAR filed, on July 21, 1999, a petition for cancellation of award. 8
On October 20, 1998, private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment 9 with the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan against herein petitioners. The case was dismissed on December 8, 1999. 10 However, the case was revived on April 5, 2000. 11 Petitioners received summons on April 13, 2000. Due to the lapse of their counsel brought about by the Holy Week activities, petitioners filed on April 18, 2000 a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, instead of a new Answer. Thereafter, on May 3, 2000, a Manifestation 12 was filed praying that an order be issued directing the private respondents to furnish them copies of the alleged Annexes "A", "A-1" and "B" stated in the April 5, 2000 revived complaint which were not attached thereto.
On May 5, 2000, the MTC of Pulilan issued an Order denying the Motion for Extension of Time. 13 On May 23, 2000, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed. 14 However, petitioners received the May 5, 2000 order on May 26, 2000, three (3) days after they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Also, on May 26, 2000, petitioners received a copy of a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated May 24, 2000. 15 To avert the implementation of the Writ of Execution, petitioners filed on May 30, 2000 a Notice of Appeal. A subpoena 16 dated June 5, 2000 was issued setting the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution on June 19, 2000 but private respondents and their counsel failed to attend although their counsel was allowed to submit a comment on the incidents. A Compliance 17 dated June 28, 2000 was submitted praying, among others, that the pending resolution on the incident and the Notice of Appeal, earlier filed, be deemed as having been filed ex abundanti cautela.
On July 6, 2000, a copy of a Manifestation and Motion dated June 19, 2000 of private respondents was received praying, inter alia, that the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 5, 2000 Order be denied on the ground of being moot and academic. On July 21, 2000, the MTC issued an order declaring the Motion for Reconsideration as abandoned on the sole basis of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. 18 Thereafter, the entire record of Civil Case No. 818 was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a quo.
On August 24, 2000, petitioners submitted their Appeal Memorandum. On September 20, 2000, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. 19
In a related development, on October 5, 2000, petitioner's sister Leticia Isidro Garcia, part-owner of subject property, filed a petition for Quieting of Title with the RTC of Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 694-M-2000. 20 On October 9, 2000, petitioners, prior to the receipt of the September 20, 2000 decision, filed an Urgent Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 21 in Civil Case No. 694-M-2000 principally on the ground that petitioners claim ownership over the land. They likewise prayed for a hearing set on October 13, 2000. Despite being personally served a copy of the Urgent Motion, private respondents and their counsel did not submit an opposition nor appeared on the scheduled hearing.
On October 17, 2000 the court rendered the assailed order. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 22 Hence, this petition raising the lone issue of: 23
I.
WHETHER THE PENDENCY OF AN ACTION INVOLVING THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR SUSPENSION OF AN EJECTMENT PROCEEDING BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES AND RELATING TO THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER
The petition is without merit.
An ejectment suit under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action to recover mere physical possession of real property or possession de facto. The main issue is possession de facto separate and distinct from any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. On the other hand, accion reinvindicatoria is an ordinary action to recover the real right where ownership or title is involved.
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale does not divest the Municipal Trial Court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases before it. 24
Petitioner relies on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Amagan vs. Marayag, 25 where the Supreme Court allowed the suspension of the ejectment proceedings after a subsequent case for ownership was filed by one of the parties. In said case however, the Supreme Court made it clear that the ejectment suit must be one for unlawful detainer and not forcible entry, to wit:
"Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of lawful detainer and not of forcible entry."
A perusal of the ejectment suit filed shows that it is in the nature of forcible entry. For while there was initial tolerance on the part of the private respondents, the same did not convert the nature of their ejectment suit from forcible entry into unlawful detainer. In Munoz vs. CA, 26 the Supreme Court held that:
"The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the premises illegal. . . .
. . . The respondent appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that — "a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them" — because, as we have said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, hence, there was no tolerance."
As such, the doctrine enunciated in the Amagan case will not apply. The ejectment suit filed by private respondents against petitioners is in the nature of forcible entry. An action for forcible entry contemplates of a situation where the respondent used force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth in ousting another person. Hence, petitioners cannot merely defeat the enforcement of a writ of execution by conveniently filing an action for declaration of ownership, for as previously discussed, the nature of the two cases are inherently different.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Brawner and De Guia-Salvador, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, Order, pp. 22-23.
2. Rollo, Annex E, p. 35.
3. Rollo, Annex F, pp. 36-37.
4. Rollo, Annex G, pp. 38-39.
5. Rollo, Annex H, p. 40.
6. Rollo, Annex I, pp. 41-42.
7. Rollo, Annex J, pp. 43-47.
8. Rollo, Annex L, pp. 49-70.
9. Rollo, Annex N, pp. 92-95.
10. Rollo, Annex O, pp. 96-106.
11. Rollo, Annex Q, 110-113.
12. Rollo, Annex P, pp. 107-109.
13. Rollo, Annex S, pp. 160-161.
14. Rollo, Annex R, pp. 114-159.
15. Rollo, Annex T, pp. 162-163.
16. Rollo, Annex U, p. 164.
17. Rollo, Annex V, pp. 165-179.
18. Rollo, Annex Y, p. 186.
19. Rollo, Annex AA, pp. 188-198.
20. Rollo, Annex BB, pp. 199-213.
21. Rollo, Annex CC, pp. 214-218.
22. Rollo, Annex B, p. 24.
23. Rollo, Petition, pp. 2-21.
24. De la Cruz vs. CA, 133 SCRA 520 (1984); Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 (1987); Ang Ping vs. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77 (1987); Sen Po Marketing Corp. vs. CA, 212 SCRA 154 (1992).
25. G.R. No. 138377, February 28, 2000.
26. 214 SCRA 216 (1992).