FIFTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 62736. December 18, 2001.]
VICTOR E. MACAPAGAL, ET. AL., petitioners, vs. CELSO VERDE, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
ABESAMIS, J p:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision, dated October 30, 2000, of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), affirming the February 7, 1996 Decision of the Bulacan Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), dismissing for lack of merit, the complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondent.
The pertinent facts of the instant case are as follows:
Petitioners are owners, pro-indiviso, of a 25-hectare land located at Pala-Pala, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, which they inherited from their deceased parents, Vicente F. Macapagal and Irenea R. Estrella.
Respondent, on the other hand, is an agricultural leasehold tenant, having succeeded his father, Francisco Verde. Petitioners alleged that respondent mortgaged the subject landholding to Aurelio dela Cruz for P15,000.00, on the condition that the latter (Aurelio dela Cruz) will cultivate ½ of the property and enjoy the harvest or fruits thereof. Respondent failed to redeem the mortgage. Instead, respondent borrowed from Aurelio dela Cruz an additional loan of forty (40) cavans of palay. Consequently, Aurelio dela Cruz continued working on the land and enjoying the fruits thereof.
On the basis thereof, petitioners filed the complaint for ejectment on the ground of abandonment in relation to Sec. 8, R.A. 384, as amended.
In his defense, respondent belied petitioners' allegations and interposed that Aurelio dela Cruz is merely a hired helper with the aid of his carabao. Thus, he had never intended to abandon or relinquish his tenancy right to anyone.
After hearing, the Provincial Adjudicator, Erasmo SP. Cruz, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on February 7, 1996.
On appeal, the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform affirmed in a Decision, promulgated on October 30, 2000, the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
Unsatisfied, petitioners came to this Court seeking a reversal of the Decision on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. In connection therewith, petitioners are raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ABANDONMENT BY RESPONDENT OF SUBJECT LANDHOLDING LEGALLY SUFFICIENT AS GROUND FOR HIS EJECTMENT THEREFROM.
II
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT IS PRESENT IN "CULTIVATING AND FIGHTING (FOR)" HIS TENANCY OVER THE SUBJECT LOT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ONLY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS TO BOOST THEIR ALLEGATIONS IS AN AFFIDAVIT (MAGKASANIB NA SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY OF PETRONILO SAYCO AND OSCAR CRUZ).
In support of the issues raised, petitioners maintain that respondent had intentionally abandoned his right to cultivate petitioners' land when he mortgaged his right to cultivate to Aurelio dela Cruz. For petitioners, four disinterested persons executed affidavits to testify on the existence of mortgage. In fact, from the time of mortgage until the filing of the instant case, respondent never returned to work on the land.
We find merit in the petition.
First and foremost, there is no question there initially exists between petitioners and respondent an agricultural tenancy. The essential elements of tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenants; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between parties. 1
However, the issue is whether or not the foregoing elements still exist to say that there is still tenancy relationship.
It is well settled that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional and not binding upon the courts. 2
After a careful perusal and judicious study of the facts alleged in the pleadings submitted before Us, this Court finds that the Adjudication Board overlooked certain facts, which if considered, will affect the outcome of the case.
In the first instance, a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 "as a person, who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system." 3
In the case of Matienzo vs. Servidad 4 the Supreme Court defined a tenant, pursuant to Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Further, the Agricultural Tenancy Act defines "agricultural tenancy" as — "the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." 5
Moreover, Sec. 5(o) of Republic Act No. 1199 provides:
"Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise."
It can be gathered from the above definitions that the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. 6
Hence, the Supreme Court has limited the persons allowed to cultivate the land to people coming from his immediate farm household. In Gagola vs. Court of Agrarian Relations 7, the Court held that a tenant has possession of the land only through personal cultivation. Thus, in the instant case, the key factor in ascertaining the existence of a landowner-tenant relationship is whether or not there is personal cultivation of the land by the respondent. As admitted by the respondent, he availed of the services of Aurelio dela Cruz to till the land for him as hired helper because of Aurelio dela Cruz's ownership of carabao. Taking this into consideration, We are appalled by the fact that respondent, admitting he has no means to own a carabao, can still hire a helper. In fact, there was not enough evidence on record to show the agreement for hire between respondent and Aurelio dela Cruz. To be sure, it was respondent who appears to be dependent on Aurelio dela Cruz.
Clearly, the element of personal cultivation is essential for an agricultural leasehold; that is, that there should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities. 8 The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land 9, and the lessee cannot hire many persons to help him cultivate the land. 10
Thus, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDHOLDERS AND TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS", provides for prohibitions to tenant: —
"(1) . . .
(2) It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of him under this Act, except in cases of illness or any temporary incapacity on his part, in which eventuality the tenant or any member of his immediate farm household is under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the landholder. Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form, for services rendered on the land under this circumstance, shall be for the account of the tenant.
(3) Subject to provisions of the next preceding paragraph, land entrusted for cultivation to a leasehold tenant shall not be sub-let nor shall the lease be assigned by the tenant to another person, except with the written consent of the lessor."
For this reason, Section 50 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of this Act.
Considering the absence of personal cultivation of respondent, coupled with the violation of the above-quoted provision, We agree with petitioners that respondent had divested himself of his right to till the land as tenant thereof.
Finally, respondent transferred his right to till the land to Aurelio dela Cruz without the consent of the landowner. On this score, the tenancy relationship, which existed earlier, shall be deemed terminated on respondent's violation of his obligation as tenant thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE. The Decision, dated October 30, 2000, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent is hereby ordered to VACATE the premises and turn over the same to the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Barcelona and Tria Tirona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Nisnisan vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 173.
2. ibid, citing Cuaño vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 125.
3. Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 168 SCRA 247, 254 (1988); Tiongson vs. CA. 130 SCRA 482,488 (1984).
4. 107 SCRA 276, emphasis ours.
5. Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56.
6. see Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136.
7. 18 SCRA 992 [1966].
8. Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41.
9. Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294.
10. De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559.