SPECIAL NINTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 48348.  July 23, 1999.]

ROSENDO GAOAT, ORLANDO RAMOS and ISABELO RAMOS, petitioners, vs. HON. WILFREDO TUMALIUAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Isabela, and PETRA C. RAMOS vda. de CARPIO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DACUDO, J p:

            Impugned in the instant petition for certiorari as allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction, are the Orders dated February 10, 1998 and March 24, 1998 of the respondent Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela in Civil Case No. Br. 23-561-97, entitled "Petra C. Ramos vda. de Carpio v. Rosendo Gaoat, Orlando Ramos and Isabelo Ramos" denying the therein defendants', now the petitioners', motion to dismiss, and motion for consideration of the therein private respondent's complaint for revival of judgment, ejectment and damages.

            The antecedent facts are as follows:

            On January 16, 1985, petitioners entered into separate contracts of lease with the late Roman Carpio, husband of the private respondent Petra Ramos Vda. de Carpio, for the cultivation and use of Carpio's agricultural land located at San Rafael, Roxas, Isabela. In said contracts, it was stipulated, among others, that as lease rentals for the cultivation and use of the said agricultural land, petitioners Rosendo Gaoat, Isabelo Ramos and Orlando Ramos shall pay 2,962, 1,246 and 1,700 kilos, respectively, of clean and dry palay every agricultural year. For failure of the petitioners to pay the agreed lease rentals, the private respondent filed against the former three complaints for "Breach of Contract, Ejectment and Damages," which were raffled off to Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court at Roxas, Isabela, whereat these were docketed as Civil Case Nos. Br-23-142, Br-23-143 and Br-23-144.

            In November of 1989, the parties agreed to put an end to the ongoing cases, and, for this purpose executed an Amicable Settlement, the salient terms and conditions of which are as follows:

1.      That DEFENDANTS Isabelo Ramos and Orlando Ramos hereby agree to collaborate and assist the plaintiff Petra Ramos vda. de Carpio in prosecuting the pending administrative case relative to Lot No. 5054, Pls-62 in the Bureau of Lands against the absentee claimant VIVENCIO BUENO;

2.      That pending the issuance of the Certificate of Title to the said land, the defendants ROSENDO GAOAT, ISABELO RAMOS and ORLANDO RAMOS shall give and deliver to plaintiff the agreed consideration of palay every cropping season and shall undertake to satisfy their unpaid and accrued obligations of palay in staggered amounts;

3.         That upon the issuance of title to said Lot No. 5054, PLs-62 in the name of plaintiff, the defendants ISABELO RAMOS and ORLANDO RAMOS shall be given portions thereof by plaintiff, Provided, however, that the share of the plaintiff PETRA RAMOS VDA. DE CARPIO in Lot NO. 5053, Pls-62 as the preterited heir in the Estate of GREGORIO A. RAMOS in an already executed EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE shall be determined and deeded to her in addition to the area where her house now stands in said lot NO. 5053, Pls-62, In exchange of the areas to be given to the said defendants;

4.      That plaintiff will undertake to extend help and assistance to her other brother ANTHONY G. RAMOS or to any of them, of her share of the harvests of Lot No. 5054, Pls-62 every cropping season for the education of their children; and after conveying a portion of Lot NO. 5054, Pls-62 to her son, ROY CARPIO, the remaining area shall, by agreement, be conveyed to her brothers and sisters who would exchange portions of Lot No. 5053, Pls-62 with her;

5.      That the parties hereto have agreed, as they hereby agree, that the above-entitled cases be now dismissed and they, likewise, forego their claims and counterclaims against each other;

6.      That, henceforth, the parties shall maintain their close family relations, considering that plaintiff PETRA RAMOS VDA. DE CARPIO is a sister of the full blood of defendants ISABELO RAMOS and ORLANDO RAMOS; and

7.      That the parties have hereto agreed, as they hereby agree, to abide faithfully and comply with the terms and conditions above set forth which is the law by and among themselves, subjecting any one of them violating the same to be liable for damages to the party that would be aggrieved thereby." 1

            In November 22, 1989, on the basis of the foregoing compromise settlement, the respondent Court rendered Judgment, dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, let judgment be entered in accordance with the tenor of the aforesaid amicable settlement and the herein parties are hereby ordered to comply strictly with their corresponding obligations appurtenant thereto." 2 

            Apparently, after the palay harvest of October 1986, the petitioners failed to deliver to herein private respondent the lease rentals agreed upon. So, on November 11, 1997, private respondent filled a Complaint 3 for Revival of Decision, Ejectment and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela against the herein petitioners, praying thus:

"WHEREFORE, It is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due hearing, judgment shall issue:

1.         Reviving the Decision in Civil Cases Nos. Br.23-142; Br.23-143 and Br. 23-144 of this Court;

2.         Ordering the ejectment of the defendants from the landholdings owned by the plaintiff, and on which they failed to give the agreed lease rentals and subject matter of the Amicable Settlement in said Civil Cases to be revived;

3.         Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as damages in violating the terms and conditions of the Amicable Settlement in said civil cases to be revived;

4.         Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00 representing moral damages suffered by the latter on account of the actuations of the defendants;

5.         Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P15,000.00 representing reasonable attorney's fee plus P1,000.00 per appearance of her lawyer as trial honoraria;

6.         Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000 representing litigation expenses incurred by her;

7.         Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P25,000 as exemplary damages;

8.         Ordering defendants to pay the costs of the suit; and

Such further and other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable in the premises be afforded the herein plaintiff as fact and circumstances may warrant."

            On January 22, 1998, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the action, and arguing that the action involved the enforcement of an agricultural leasehold contract, jurisdiction over which belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The private respondent opposed 5 said motion, alleging that the subject action was one for revival of judgment, with the collection of rentals and ejectment as mere incidents thereto; and that the motion filed by the defendants (petitioners herein) was merely intended for delay.

            The respondent Court in an Order 6 dated February 10, 1998, denied the aforementioned motion to dismiss in the following manner:

"After carefully going over the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto, and after hearing the arguments pro and con, the Court resolves to deny the motion to dismiss. The Court believes that justice would be better served by giving due course to the complaint for the decision sought to be revived was rendered by this Court and therefore this is the only Court that can revive the same. The case was previously filed here, decided here, and must be revived here. In short, the controversy started here. It must end here.

"The Rules of Court is very explicit. Any decision not executed within the five year period after its promulgation can only be revived by another action. (Sec.6, Rule 39, Rules of Court). It must be filed before the Court that previously rendered it.

"The defendants argue that the Rules of Court is impliedly amended by the Rules of the DAR. This is not so. The DAR did not start this case, did not previously render the decision sought to be revived, therefore, the DAR is not in a position to continue what it has not started. It is only this Court that can continue what it began."

            The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 7 of the abovecited Order, but this was denied by the respondent Court in an Order 8 dated March 24, 1998, thusly —

"Defendants argue that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case for the issues are collection of lease rentals and ejectment, matters which are agrarian in character. The Court does not agree. The main Issue is the revival of the judgment rendered by it in a civil case. Implicitly, revival of judgment must be filed with the same court that previously rendered the decision."

            Dissatisfied with both orders, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari, contending in the main that private respondents causes of action, i.e. for the collection of lease rentals from the petitioners, and the latter's ejectment from their agricultural landholdings, and damages, made out an agrarian dispute, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In her Comments thereon, dated August 14, 1998, the private respondent countered that the subject action involved a purely judicial question which was beyond the jurisdiction of an administrative body like the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board; that the collection of rentals prayed for in the private respondents complaint did not make her action agrarian in character, as there was no necessity of establishing and proving the same in the hearing of her action for revival of judgement; and, that finally, there was no showing that the Court a quo committed a grave use of discretion in issuing the challenged orders. 9 

            We vote to deny the petition at bench.

            The petitioners have, with much show of reason, endeavored to demonstrate that the present case falls without and beyond the competence of the Regional Trial Court, and that it instead comes in the jurisdiction of the DAR and the DARAB, given the sweep and compass of Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 667, as well as the other related and complementary statutes, presidential decrees and other issuances. We quote from the petitioners' very vigorous dissertation, to wit:

"22.   An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agricultural, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms of or conditions of such tenurial arrangements (Sec. 3[d], Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 6657 cited in Isidro vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503 [1993]; Machete vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 176 [1995]).

"23.   In this connection, it must be remembered that Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, vested in the DAR exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform (Sec.17). Thereafter, Executive Order No. 129-A, while In the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases Sec.13).

"24.   On 15 June 1988, Republic Act No. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evinced and supported the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. Section 50 thereof substantially reiterates Sec.17 of E.O. 229 thus:

Sec.50.         Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) (Machete vs. Court of Appeals, supra).

"25.   Pursuant to the foregoing executive orders and republic act, the DARAB Rules of Procedure was promulgated on December 20, 1988, Sec.1, Rule 2 of said Rules enumerate the cases on which the DARAB has jurisdiction, to wit:

SECTION 1.            Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 223 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No.6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not limited to the following:

"a)     Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;

"b)     Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank; . . .

"26.   In view of the foregoing, jurisdiction over agrarian disputes or controversies, as in the case at bench, has been effectively transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the Department of Agrarian Reform. As held in Vda. de Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 885 (1990):

"The Jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.: . . . is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in the broader jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)" 10 

            As to the collection of back rentals, the petitioners advert to the ruling in of the Supreme Court in Machete v. Court of Appeals (250 R.A. 176), to wit:

"Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary Jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence" 11

An action for revival of judgment, upon the other hand, is provided for under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court, to wit:

"SEC. 6. — Execution by motion or by independent action. — a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations."

            Expounding on this provision, the Supreme Court in Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 S.C.R.A. 728, declared:

"The only action contemplated in the above-quoted provision of law is one for revival of judgment and not a new action based on the original controversy decided upon with finality. The action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action wherein the cause of action is the judgment itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. It purpose is not to re-examine and re-try the issues already decided but only to revive the judgment (Azotes v. Blanco, 85 Phil. 90).

"We held in the case of Compania General de Tobacos v. Martinez, 29 Phil. 515, and reiterated in the later case of Estonine v. Southern Marketing Corporation, etc., et al., G.R. No. 61375, November 23, 1988, the following rule:

After the lapse of five years, however, the judgment creditor can no longer enforce the judgment by process issuing as his request from the court which rendered it. It is then beyond the power of that court to issue execution upon its judgment. The judgment is, after that period of time, reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors which must be enforced, as are all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Being a final judgment of a court, it is of course, conclusive as to the controversy between the parties up to the time of its rendition.

By the mere pleading of the judgment and its introduction in evidence, the plaintiff effectually blocks all investigation into the merits of the original controversy. But, being a mere right of action, it is subject to defenses and counterclaims which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective, as, for instance, prescription, which bars an action upon a judgment after ten years (Sec. 43; par. 1, Code Civ. Proc.) or payment; or counterclaims arising out of transactions not connected with the former controversy. In other words, the judgment creditor finds himself in the position of any other litigant and is under an equal necessity of proving his case, although his trouble in doing so may be less due to the conclusiveness of the evidence which he has to offer, that is, his judgment. . . . ' " 12 

            Speaking of jurisdiction, the first and fundamental postulate is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action, not the law when the cause action accrues. 13 The corollary and complementary postulate is at jurisdiction once acquired is retained until the case is finally terminated, or until complete remedy is granted, including the execution of the judgment 14 With particular reference to courts of limited or special jurisdiction, such courts can only take cognizance of those cases and exercise those powers expressly conferred upon them by their enabling law or the statute which created them. 15 While to be sure Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, specifically vested in the DAR exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters involving agrarian reform, and while Republic Act No. 6657 substantially reiterated and reincorporated into its Section 50 (which, significantly, provides for Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR") the aforesaid Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229, still and all, a closer scrutiny of both provisions fails to reveal that either or both had vested jurisdiction on the DAR, or the DARAB (which was created by Executive Order No. 129-A) over actions involving compromise agreements or settlements concerning tenants or tenurial arrangements, as well as execution of judgments relative to such compromise agreements or settlements. (Of course, this discussion must stem from the basic assumption that the petitioners herein have always regarded themselves as tenants in the disputed landholding. Or that the cases which had split or divided the petitioners and the private respondent into warring camps, inclusive of the present cases, were/are agrarian and/or tenancy in nature — an assumption that may not necessarily or seasonably be indulged in — given the private respondent's claim 16 that the herein petitioners Orlando Ramos and Isabelo Ramos, in their answer as defendants in DARAB Case No. 533, Isa. 96, had questioned the jurisdiction of that Board upon the grounds that they were never allegedly instituted by the private respondent as tenants in her landholdings, and that the case filed by the private respondent before said Board was not agrarian or tenancy in nature, for which reason, therefore, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the case for collection rentals and ejectment).

            Upon the other hand, Article 2037 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise." This provision, we believe, contemplates nothing else but an execution issued pursuant to a judicial compromise, rendered in the first instance by a regular court of justice, like the Regional Trial Courts, in accordance with, and on the basis of, a compromise submitted to the court by the parties therein. Parenthetically, it may not be amiss to state, that because a compromise once perfected has the effect and authority of res judicata, especially so if it was judicially approved, 17 the parties thereto are bound to abide by it, unless there has been error, deceit, violence or forgery in the Compromise. 18 And, this is true, although the agreement later proved unsatisfactory. 19 Indeed, a judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise is unappealable, and is immediately executory, as a matter of right, with the judgment debtor not even given any advance notice of the application for execution, nor so much as afforded a prior hearing thereon. 20 

            There are two other equally cogent reasons that strongly militate against the petitioners' invocation of jurisdiction by the DAR or the DARAB over the action for revival of judgments: and these are public policy and estoppel. For, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, then repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In such a case, the party is barred from repudiating or questioning the jurisdiction of the court, as such a course of action cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy. 21 

            Stated a bit differently, if a party has once invoked the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot thereafter challenge the jurisdiction of that court in the same case. 22 The reason therefor, as stressed the Supreme Court, is that:

"A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result in a brazen deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned over that the first has committed error in yielding to his plea." 23 

            Under the same parity of reasoning, splitting the jurisdiction of the court is not favored. 24 

            It should be added that all matters growing out of the controversy must be finally determined in one and the same suit. The object is to prevent a multiplicity of action and to prevent the possibility of one part of the cause being tried before one judge and the other part before a different judge, which would unnecessarily harass the parties and produce needless litigation and accumulate cost. 25 In fact, the jurisdiction continues until the case is finally determined or until complete remedy is granted, including the execution of judgment. 26 

            To deprive a court of the power to execute its judgments is to impair its jurisdiction, and the general rule is that every court having jurisdiction to render a particular judgment has also the inherent power or authority to enforce it, and to exercise equitable control over such enforcement. 27 

            Held up against these unrelenting and formidable jurisprudential precepts and tenets, the petition at bench must literally flounder and fail.

            WHEREFORE, the petition at bench is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

            SO ORDERED.

            Valdez, Jr. and Reyes Jr. JJ., concur.

Footnotes

  *        As Per Office Order No. 120-99-E dated June 29, 1999.

  1.       Annex "C"; Rollo, pp. 26-28

  2.       Annex "D"; Rollo, pp. 29-31

  3.       Annex "E"; Rollo, pp. 32-39

  4.       Annex "F"; Rollo, pp. 40-43

  5.       Annex "G"; Rollo, pp. 44-47

  6.       Annex "A"; Rollo, pp. 23-24

  7.       Annex "H"; Rollo, pp. 48-52

  8.       Annex "B"; Rollo, p. 25

  9.       Rollo, pp.61-65

10.       Petition, pp. 10-13; Rollo, pp. 13-16.

11.       Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 16-17.

10.       Petition, pp. 10-13; Rollo, pp. 13-16.

11.       Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 16-17.

12.       At 738-739.

13.       Ferrer v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172; Encarnacion v. Baltazar, 111 Phil. 459, Paringit v. Masakayan, Phil. 112 Phil. 561; Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 21 S.C.R.A. 717; People v. Fontanilla, 23 S.C.R.A. 1227; Laperal v. Cruz, 63 S.C.R.A. 329; People v. Mariano, 71 S.C.R.A. 600.

14.       Vda. de Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1; People v. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715; Alejandro v. Judge 70 Phil. 613; Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234; PLASLU v. CIR, 93 Phil. 747; Lumpay v. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 968; Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 S.C.R.A. 422; Tuvera v. Guzman, 13 S.C.R.A. 729; People v. Paderna, 22 S.C.R.A. 273; Uypangco v. Leuterio, 27 S.C.R.A. 716; Abut v. Abut, 45 S.C.R.A. Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 51 S.C.R.A. 13; Amango v. Court of Appeals, 53 S.C.R.A. 64; Denila v. Bellosillo, 64 S.C.R.A. 63; People v. Nazareno, 70 S.C.R.A. 531.

15.       Tuazon v. Crossfield, 30 Phil. 543; Africa v. Gronke, 34 Phil. 50; Yu Lay v. Calmes, 40 Phil. 651; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 198; Lopez v. Roxas, 17 S.C.R.A 750; Ker & Co., Ltd., v. Court of Tax Appeals, 4 S.C.R.A 160; Toledo v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 8 S.C.R.A 499; Paterno v. Paterno, 20 S.C.R.A. 585; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Villa, 22 S.C.R.A. 3; Devesa v. Monticillo, 27 S.C.R.A. 822; People v. Maceren, 79 S.C.R.A. 450; Philex Mining Corporation v. Reyes, 118 S.C. R.A. 602; Union Glass and Container Corporation v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 126 S.C.R.A. 31; DMRC Enterprises v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 132 S.C.R.A. 293; Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, 153 S.C.R.A 399; Malayan Integrated Industries Corp. v. Mendoza, 154 S.C.R.A. 548; Miller v. Mardo and Gonzales, 112 Phil. 792; Globe Wireless Ltd., v. Public Service Commission, 147 S.C.R.A. 269; Philippine Ports Authority v. Fuentes, 195 S.C.R.A. 790.

16.       See; Annex G, p. 3; Rollo, p. 46.

17.       Cf.: Mayuga v. Court of Appeals, 154 S.C.R.A. 309.

18.       Article 2038, Civil Code; Municipality of San Joaquin v. Bishop of Jaro, 36 Phil. 577; Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148 S.C.R.A. 677

19.       Castro v. Castro, G.R. L-4400, June 13 1952, 91 Phil. 922.

20.       Pamintuan v. Muñoz, 131 Phil. 213.

21.       Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 S.C.R.A. 29; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 29 S.C.R.A. 419; Vera v. people, 31 S.C.R.A. 17; Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. De la Cruz, 45 S.C.R.A. 190; Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 46 S.C.R.A. 139; Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 51 S.C.R.A. 13; People v. Munar, 53 S.C.R.A. 278.

22.       Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277; People v. Casiano, 1 S.C.R.A. 478; Pindangan v. Dans, 6 S.C.R.A. 14; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 S.C.R.A. 628; Republic v. Car and Co., Ltd., 21 S.C.R.A. 279; Carillo v. Allied Workers Asso., 24 S.C.R.A. 566; Tolentino v. Escalona, 26 S.C.R.A. 285, Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 29 S.C.R.A. 419; Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 S.C.R.A. 54; Sarmiento v. Salud, 46 S.C.R.A. 365; Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 S.C.R.A. 1; People v. Casuga, 53 S.C.R.A. 278.

23.       People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541-542.

24.       Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 S.C.R.A. 628; Bay view Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers' Union, 18 S.C.R.A. 946; Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer, 19 S.C.R.A. 304; Pacarna v. Cebu Autobus Co., 32 S.C.R.A. 442; Progressive Labor Association v. Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp., 33 S.C.R.A. 349; Alhambra Industries Inc. v. CIR, 35 S.C.R.A. 550; Leoquinco v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 37 S.C.R.A. 535; Gonzales v. Province of Iloilo, 38 S.C.R.A. 209; Associated Labor Union v. Cruz, 41 S.C.R.A. 12; Ramos v. Central Bank of the Phil., 41 S.C.R.A. 565; Rilipro Inc. v. CIR, 46 S.C.R.A. 621; Associated Labor Union v. Central Azucarera, 64 S.C.R.A. 236; Goodrich Employees Association v. Flores, 73 S.C.R.A, 297; Holganza v. Apostol, 76 S.C.R.A. 190; Maria Cristina Fertilizar Plant Employees Asso. v. Tandayag, 83 S.C.R.A. 56; Bengzon v. Inciong, 91 S.C.R.A. 249.

25.       Pascua v. Sideco, 24 Phil. 26.

26.       Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234; States Marine Corp. v. Cebu Seamen's Assn., 7 S.C.R.A. 294; Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 S.C.R.A. 422; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Celerio, 24 S.C.R.A. 521; Uypangco v. Leuterio, 27 S.C.R.A. 776; Abut v. Abut, 45 S.C.R.A. 326; Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 51 S.C.R.A. 13; Amargo v. Court of Appeals, 53 S.C.R.A. 64; Fuentes v. Bautista, 53 S.C.R.A. 420; Denila v. Bellosillo, 64 S.C.R.A. 63; People v. Nazareno, 70 S.C.R.A. 531.

27.       Manila Railroad Co. v. Yatco, 23 S.C.R.A. 735.