ELEVENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 48291. February 23, 1999.]
MA. ROSARIO L. BATONGBACAL, petitioner, vs. SIMEON ZAFRA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AGCAOILI, J p:
This is a petition for review to set aside the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator declaring respondent Simeon Zafra to be a bona fide tenant of the landholding in question and ordering petition Ma. Rosario L. Batongbacal (and her alleged co-owner) to cease and desist from outstanding the former therefrom.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Simeon Zafra (as plaintiff) filed a complaint against petitioner Ma. Rosario L. Batongbacal, and her alleged co-owner, including the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan (as defendants), for maintenance of peaceful possession over the subject landholding situated in Caingin, Bocaue, Bulacan. Respondent claimed that he is the rightful tenant of the land as previously declared by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in its order dated August 27, 1987 in Administrative Case NO. III-62-87. As such, he is entitled to be maintained in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof. Respondent filed the complaint because, according to him, petitioner and her co-defendants had dumped filling materials on said landholding which prevented him from cultivating it.
On April 14, 1994, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant (sic) as follows:
1. Finding the plaintiff to be a bona-fide tenant of the landholding in question;
2. Ordering defendants, Mun. of Bocaue, Bulacan, Ma. Rosario Batongbacal, Celso S. Lasaro, Consorsia Santiago, Rodolfo Lazaro and all other persons acting in their behalves are hereby ordered (sic) to cease and desist from committing any acts tending to eject, oust or disturb the plaintiff in his landholding;
3. Making the Preliminary Injunction issued pertinent.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner (and her co-defendant Francisco Santiago, Jr.) appealed. On February 16, 1988, the DARAB promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal and ordering petitioner (and her co-defendant) to vacate the premises and to respect respondent's peaceful possession and cultivation thereof.
Petitioner, who alone filed the instant petition for review, seeks reversal of the DARAB decision, alleging that she was denied due process for not having been given the opportunity to present her evidence. Moreover, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case since the land in question is a "commercial or institutional land" covered by the comprehensive development plan of the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan.
For his part, respondent avers that the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was handed down on the basis of the evidence appearing on record and that petitioner was afforded full opportunity to ventilate her position through her pleadings which included a motion for reconsideration.
The petition is without merit.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was arrived at on the basis of the investigation conducted by a representative of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) and that evidence forming part of the record of the case. The Provincial Adjudicator, upon a collation of the entire gamut of the evidence, came to the conclusion that "there is more than substantial evidence to declare (the) plaintiff as a bona fide tenant of the landholding in question." Elucidating on the matter, he held as follows:
"On the first issue, the Board is convinced to resolve the same in the affirmative. Plaintiff has been found by the DAR Team Office and by the investigation conducted by Atty. Rufino Antonio, Trial Attorney II DAR-BALA, Malolos, Bulacan. This finding is supported by the Affidavit of Mr. Gil Del Rosario, an adjacent (kahangga) landholder of the plaintiff, certifying plaintiff is indeed a tenant of the landholding he is claiming since the 1940's, exhibit 'A'. The landowners ledger, EP Form 1 also revealed that plaintiff is a bona-fide tenant of Pedro Lazaro, Exhibit 'B'. The tenancy status of the plaintiff is fortified by receipts, exhibit D, D-1, D-2, D-3 all pointing that the former has been paying his lease rentals. Although there is no written contract to prove plaintiff's tenancy status, his long period of cultivating and performing all the phases of agriculture in his landholding coupled with his act of sharing his harvest through the payment of lease rental established his status as a bonafide tenant." 1
The DARAB not only affirmed the status of respondent as a bona fide tenant but also debunked the claim of petitioner that she was deprived of her right to due process. DARAB held:
"Appellants' allegation that they were deprived of the opportunity to present their evidence is not as shown by the fact that their exhibits attached to Adm. Case No. 111-62-97 already form part of the records of the instant case which includes as well as the case folder of CA-GR SP No. 26354 — petition for certiorari and injunction filed by respondents to restrain the DAR Secretary from reopening Adm. Case No. 111-62-87), Not only that. The documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 91-1939 also forms part of the present proceeding. Their insistence, therefore, that the appealed decision was rendered without a trial on the merits is not well taken . . ." 2
The requirements of the process are obeyed as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard. There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered on the evidence presented of the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. 3 In fact, a hearing does not necessarily mean verbal arguments in open court; one may be heard also through pleadings. 4 In this case, petitioner (and her co-defendants) filed their answer to the complaint and pleaded affirmative defenses therein. They were likewise heard on their appeal to DARAB and, again, on their motion for reconsideration of the decision adverse to them. 5 Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the issue of alleged denial of due process. 6
In agrarian cases, all that is required is mere "substantial evidence." 7 Accordingly, if the findings of fact of the agrarian court or agency are supported substantial evidence, they are conclusive and binding on the appellate court. 8 Moreover, administrative proceedings are not bound by the rigid requirements of the Rules of Court. 9
In the case at bench, the factual finding that respondent is a bona fide tenant is based on the record of the case, and is presumed to be correct. 10 The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding which will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons. 11
Petitioner disputes the jurisdiction of the DARAB in the case, contending that the subject landholding is included within the institutional and commercial zone of the Proposed General Land Use Plan of Bocaue, Bulacan.
The contention does not impress.
Jurisdiction is determined from the allegations in the complaint. Where the complaint sets forth a cause of action for dispossession of a tenant by the landholder of an agricultural land, such an action falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the agrarian court. 12 Section 17, EO No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, now vests in the DAR quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988, contains provisions which evidence and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matter. 13
There is no dispute that respondent's complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession was basically premised on his allegation that he is the instituted tenant of the land in question. This important allegation inevitably brings the case within the jurisdiction of the DAR. Indeed, that respondent is a bona fide tenant is bolstered by the fact that he is himself a recipient of a certificate of land transfer (CLT). This fact reaffirms the conclusion of tenancy reached in this case. 14 Petitioner's allegation that respondent is not a tenant of the landholding in question did not operate to divest or terminate DAR's jurisdiction over the case. 15 Such defense is not determinative of the issue of jurisdiction, otherwise the question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the petitioner. 16
Besides, as oppositely remarked by the DARAB in its assailed decision, there are lot of factors to be considered before land can qualify as an institutional or commercial land — factors which, however, have not been inputed in the record of the record of the instant case. Thus:
"Other factors, to mention a few, must be taken into consideration before the subject landholding can qualify as an institutional or commercial land, such as: 1) Zoning Certification from HLURB Regional Officer when the subject land is within a municipality with a Land Use Plan Ordinance approved and certified by the HLURB; 2) Certificate of the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator that the proposed use conforms with the approved Land Use Plan when the subject land is within a municipality with a Land Use Plan/Zoning Ordinance approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; 3) Certification from the area is not covered by A.O. No. 20, Series of 1992 of the Office of the President; 4) Certification from the DENR Regional Director that the proposed use is ecologically sound; 5) Certification from the DA Regional Director that the land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purpose; and 6) Municipal resolution favorably indorsing the land was of the land use of the land in question." 17
In any event, whether or not the subject landholding is a commercial or institutional land is an issue to be determined in a separate and proper complaint, especially so that the validity of the CLT issued in the name of respondent would necessarily be involved. The integrity of the CLT can be questioned only in a case directly attacking it but never collaterally. 18
Considering the finding of the DARAB that respondent is a bona fide tenant, he is entitled to security of tenure. 19
Paraphrasing De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 20 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, like the Agrarian Reform Code, 21 is a social legislation enacted by Congress to institute land reform in the country — to establish owner-cultivatorship and the family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints and practices; and to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and the source of a genuine strength in our democratic society. The law was enacted to uplift their economic status by providing them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet a farm family's need for food, clothing, shelter, education and other basic necessities. The law further protects them by conferring upon them security of tenure overt the landholdings they are working on. They can only be ejected foe cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 71.
2. Rollo, 40.
3. Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. Commission on Elections, 122 SCRA 123 (1983).
4. Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 43 (1990).
5. Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 (1988).
6. Sampang v. Inciong, 137 SCRA 56 (1985).
7. Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226 (1986); Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 18 SCRA 992 (1966).
8. Malate v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 572 (1993); Heirs of E. B. Roxas, Inc. v. Tolentino, 167 SCRA 334 (1988); Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commissions 154 SCRA 368 (1987).
9. Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237 (1987).
10. Esquig v. Civil Service Commission, 188 SCRA 166 (1990).
11. Sintos v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 (1995).
12. Tuvera v. De Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 (1965).
13. See. Sec. 50, RA No. 6657; Quismundo v. Court of Appeals; 201 SCRA 609 (1991).
14. Don Pepe Henson Enterprises v. Pangilinan, 161 SCRA 687 (1988).
15. Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, supra; Casaria v. Rosales, 14 SCRA 368 (1965).
16. Abrin v. Compos, 203 SCRA 420 (1991).
17. Rollo, 41-42.
18. Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 302 (1986).
19. Don Pepe Henson Enterprises v. Pangilinan, supra.
20. 175 SCRA 559 (1989).
21. RA No. 3844.