NINTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 46021. March 9, 1999.]
NIEVES RIGOR-ALIPAO, LADISLAO ALIPAO and AVELINO RIGOR, represented by BONIFACIO RIGOR, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, QUEZON CITY AND AURELIO GANNOD, URSULA GANOD-VELASCO AND ROGELIO RIGOR, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRAWNER, J p:
Petition for Review of the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (hereinafter referred to as "DARAB", for brevity) dated 01 September 1997, which reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudication Board, Region III, Diwa ng Tarlac, Tarlac, Tarlac (hereinafter referred to as "PARAB for brevity") dated 02 February 1993. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from dated February 2, 1993, is hereby REVERSED and a new judgment entered:
"1. Ordering the tenants to stay in peaceful possession of their respective landholdings; and
"2. Enjoining Petitioners-Appellees from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of Respondents-Appellants in their subject landholding.
"3. Counterclaim is denied for lack or merit." 1
The present petition originated from DARAB Case No. 1236, Reg. Case Nos. 188-T-91, 189-T-91 and 190-T-91, all of the Provincial Adjudication Board Tarlac, Tarlac.
The facts preceding the filing of the initiatory cases as found by the respondent DARAB, are as follows:
"DARAB Case No. 188-T-91, arose from a complaint filed by Nieves Alipao et al., sometime in March 5, 1991, contending, inter alia, that; Plaintiff-Appellees Nieves Rigor Alipan and Ladislao Alipao are conjugal owners in fee simple of a parcel of agricultural land situated at Batang-batang, Victoria, Tarlac, with an area of eighty one thousand four hundred nine (81,409) square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14372 of the land record of the Province of Tarlac (Annex B); Respondents-Appellants Aurelio Gannod and Artemio Velasco are the duly instituted tenants over their agricultural land for quite a number of years; that by virtue of this institution, Respondents-Appellants agreed to deliver the amount equivalent to one-half (½) of the net production which includes auxiliary crops; Respondents-Appellants delivered only a very insignificant amount of sugar or palay for the principal crop which, if computed accordingly, taking into consideration the area and fertility of the soil of the land, does not even represent ten (10) percent of the average production of the landholding; Respondents-Appellants never delivered any share of the landowner with respect to the auxiliary crops; the average production of the land in area adjacent to the landholding ranges from 70-80 piculs per hectare, that from the year 1980 to the present, Respondents-Appellants, in utter disregard of the said agreement, failed, refused and continued to fail to deliver the rightful share of the landowner for the auxiliary crops and those of the principal crops; sometime in the 1980 and prior thereto, Plaintiffs-Appellees and their representatives confronted the Defendants-Appellants on the issue of the low production; in this confrontation, Plaintiffs-Appellees suggested that Respondents-Appellants should not only adopt modern farm practices as a method of farming but also improve productivity of the land by selecting the proper variety to be planted, applying the correct number of bags of fertilizers, taking care of the growing plants, clearing the landholding of tall grasses and other essential activities required of him as tenant; Respondents-Appellants agreed to abide by these proposals; Respondents-Appellants failed to comply with the terms and condition of the verbal agreement; Respondent Aurelio Gannod, without authority from the landowners, converted a portion of his landholding of about two thousand (2,000) square meters into palay land and subleased the same to Respondent-Appellant Ursula Gannod without the consent of the landowners and without the consent of the landowners and without paying any share of the landowner; and that this incident has already passed the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and for lack of settlement, a certification was issued, copy of which is attached and marked as Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof.
"Respondents-Appellants filed their Answer with Counterclaim, Aurelio Gannod and Artemio Velasco admitting that portion of the allegations as it relates to the sharing basis of the sugarcane production but denies the material allegations of the complaint, claiming that: Defendants-Appellants have no say or hold in the milling of the produce as the same is, for all years, milled in the name of the Plaintiffs-Appellees at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, San Miguel, Tarlac, which in turn is being liquidated by a certain Antonio Pacheco, overseer of the Plaintiff-Appellees, the latter is the giving the shares of the Respondent-Appellants after the number of piculs has been realized, deducting for that matter the equivalent shares of the Respondents-Appellants in the cost of productions; Defendant-Appellant Aurelio Gannod only utilizes about one hundred fifty (150) square meters, more or less, to cassava plants, with a minimal harvest while Defendant-Appellant Aurelio Velasco, only cultivates about four thousand (4,000) square meters, more or less and said area is purely devoted to the production of sugarcane crops; Defendant-Appellant Aurelio Gannod only utilizes about one hundred fifty (150) square meters, more or less, as a backyard garden and the other Defendant-Appellant Artemio Velasco has no auxiliary crops whatsoever, and, they have always been religious in their obligations to the plaintiffs-appellees, the truth being that, as already discussed, Defendants-Appellants have no control in the milling of their sugarcane produce as it was milled in the name of the Plaintiffs-Appellees at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, San Miguel, Tarlac.
"It is noted that DARAB Cases Nos. 189-T-91 and 190-T-91 contained similar allegations except paragraph three (3) of the aforecited cases, which read, as follows:
'DARAB Case No. 189-T-91 paragraph 3 — That Plaintiff Avelino Rigor is an owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated at Batang-Batang Victoria, Tarlac, with an area of eleven thousand five hundred fifty three (11,553) square meters, more or less Plaintiff's evidence of ownership is shown in a xeroxed copy of TCT No. 29417.
'DARAB Case No. 190-T-91 paragraph 3 — That plaintiff Nieves Rigor is an owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated at Batang-Batang Victoria Tarlac with an area of fifteen thousand five hundred fifty seven (15,557) square meters, more or less plaintiffs evidence of ownership is shown in a xeroxed copy of TCT No. 29418." 2
After hearing, the PARAB rendered a Decision finding for petitioner (as plaintiff) and against private respondents (as defendants) —
"1. Directing the defendant and all other persons acting in their behalves to vacate their respective landholdings pursuant to Section 36, paragraph 3 of Republic Act No. 5844;
"2. All other claims and counter-claims are hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence." 3
The petitioner now comes to Us seeking a reinstatement of the aforequoted Decision, based on the following Assignment of Errors:
"THAT THE DARAB COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN UNDULY DEPARTING FROM THE RULE UNDER OUR JURISPRUDENCE IN AGRARIAN CASES WHERE THE FINDINGS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE.
"THAT THE DARAB COMMITTED GRIEVIOUS ERROR IN REVERSING THE SUBSTANTIAL FINDINGS OF THE PARAB WHICH HAD THE FIRST HAND INFORMATION ON THE EVIDENCE AND THE POSITION TO RULE UPON ITS THEIR WORTH (sic) BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN JUDGMENT OVER THAT OF THE PARAB;
"THAT THE ACTUATIONS OF THE DARAB AMOUNTED TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CORRECTIBLE BY THIS REMEDY." (sic) 4
Petitioner's arguments fail to persuade Us. We thus deny the Petition.
True it is, as pointed out by petitioner, that the rule is, and has always been that the findings of fact made by an administrative tribunal, if based on substantial evidence, is final and is generally not distributed on appeal. 5 Substantial evidence has been defined as that "which is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 6 But, as aptly stated by petitioner in her Petition, this rule is not cast in stone, and will admit of certain exceptions, such that when a conclusion or findings is grounded entirely on speculation, surmise or conjecture, when the interference is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible, or when there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, or when the findings went beyond the issues of the case, or when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, among others, then the review and reversal of such findings is justified. 7 This necessarily stems from the power of the DARAB, as the administrative superior of the PARAB, to review the judgment of the latter. 8 This, in turn is implicit from the configuration of the Department of Agrarian Reform wherein the DARAB, headed by the Secretary of Agrarian Reforms, has the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. 9 By virtue of the broad powers given the reviewing office to the fact that he who heads it is the alter ego of the President, the courts are not supposed to interfere except in case of clear abuse. 10 To borrow the words of Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Lim, Sr., v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 11 "(i)t would be to cast an undeserved reflection on a coordinate branch of government to impute a decision reached by it after careful of the facts of the vice of unfairness or arbitrariness. Due regard for the principle of separation of powers would caution against such a hasty condemnation."
In the case at bench, We find to be in order the respondent DARAB's reversal of the judgment made by the PARAB. By the records of the case, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the petitioner has indeed failed to establish the causes of action on which she has founded her Complaints, and that the DARAB has correctly applied the doctrine of Ei cumbenti probation qui decit, non qui negat. The possession by private respondents of the subject agricultural lands, following the spirit of our Fundamental Law, cannot be lightly taken from them, specially not in the face of such scanty evidence as those adduced by petitioner during the trial.
A reading of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as 'AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE AND TO INSTITUTE LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF TENANCY AND THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL INTO INDUSTRY, PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" 12 will yield no other conclusion than that it was passed for the benefit of small farmers. Part of its Declaration of Policy states that its purpose is "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices", and "(t)o make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society." And Section 36 thereof, which is invoked by petitioner to bolster her case, emphasizes that the general rule is that a leaseholder shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of the land, and ejectment and dispossession the exception. Perforce, it would be at war with the declared intent of the Legislature, and render the intendment of the law illusory, if the courts are to facilely rule in favor of eviction on tottering grounds. Rather, it would be to advance the liberal intent of existing legislation, as well as our Constitution, which exhibit a latitudinarian attitude towards the small farmers, and We would exposit fealty to the bedrock principles on which our republican system of governance is based, if We defer to the Decision under review, there being an absence of gross or evident abuse of discretion which would warrant judicial interference.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the impugned Decision UPHELD and AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 26.
2. Decision, pp. 2-5, Rollo, pp. 20-23.
3. Rollo, pp. 37-38.
4. Rollo, p. 6.
5. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49.
6. Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635.
7. Chua Tiong Tiay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112130, 31 March 1995, 243 SCRA 183.
8. Family Planning Organizations of the Philippines v. NLRC, 204 SCRA 415, at 421.
9. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., v. Pano, L-27811, 17 November 1967, 21 SCRA 895.
10. Estate of Florentino Buan v. Pampanga Bus Company, et al., 99 Phil. 373.
11. 34 SCRA 751.
12. Passed August 8, 1963.