ELEVENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 43855. August 31, 1999.]
BIENVENIDO ARBOLEDA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD and ANGELES OLIVEROS, ET AL., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SALAZAR-FERNANDO, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review and/or Certiorari filed by petitioners which seeks the reversal and nullification of the decision of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Diliman, Quezon City, dated November 27, 1996 in DARAB Case No. 1341, affirming in toto the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Kalibo, Aklan in DARAB Case No. 528 entitled "Spouses Angeles Oliveros and Ana Oliveros versus Bienvenido Arboleda, et al."
The Facts
Jose Layson owned a parcel of agricultural riceland situated in Puis, New Washington, Aklan, with an area of one point eleven hundred eighty four (1.1184) hectares. Since 1947, private respondents were agricultural tenant-lessees of the subject riceland. CIDaTc
In 1980, the subject land was sold by Jose Layson to petitioner Beneverth Arboleda. Herein private respondents did not cease to personally cultivate the subject riceland as agricultural lessees paying its rentals in the quantity of 25 cavans of palay every agricultural year.
On April 2, 1980, "Agricultural Leasehold Contract" 1 was executed between Bienvenido Arboleda and private respondents. On February 18, 1981, a "Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold" 2 was issued to Angeles Oliveros.
On May 2, 1990, the property was mortgaged by Bienvenido Arboleda, as administrator and Attorney-in-fact of his son Beneverth Arboleda to Rogelio Fernandez, for Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
On May 5, 1990, petitioner Bienvenido through his hired men and in the presence of two armed men Boy Rasco and Rogelio Fernandez, harvested the mongo beans of private respondents by means of force and threats. On the first week of June 1990, petitioners successfully ejected private respondents. Due to petitioners' acts, private respondents lost about one hundred forty (140) cavans of palay yearly starting from agricultural year 1990 up to the present.
On May 14, 1990, private respondents filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Kalibo, Aklan against petitioners, with prayer for reinstatement and payment of damages, litigation expenses and shares of the palay produced by the land representing unrealized income. In their answer, petitioners admitted that the land was owned by Beneverth Arboleda and administered by his father, Bienvenido Arboleda and later mortgaged to Rogelio Fernandez but traversed all other material allegations in the complaint alleging that private respondents were never tenants of the owner, Beneverth, but were civil law lessees as per their contract of lease which expired on April 12, 1990; that private respondents voluntarily surrendered the landholding after the expiration of said contract of lease; that Bienvenido Arboleda never signed any agricultural leasehold contract and if he signed the same, his signature was secured by fraud and deceit; and that the computation of private respondents' share in the net produce as the alleged damage they suffered was purely speculative. EDATSC
After the parties had submitted their pleadings and documentary evidence, series of hearings were conducted and on February 12, 1993, a decision was rendered ruling in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring complainant Angeles Oliveros to be the agricultural lessee of subject landholding;
2. Ordering defendants to vacate and restore the possession and cultivation of subject landholding to complainants-spouses;
3. Ordering defendants to maintain complainants in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof;
4. Ordering defendants Beneverth Arboleda and Bienvenido Arboleda to pay to the complainants the quantity of 140 cavans of palay per annum since the start of their dispossession in 1990 until they shall have been restored to the possession of the land, or its money value in accordance with the prevailing market price; and
5. Dismissing the claims and counterclaims.
SO ORDERED." 3
On May 7, 1993, petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal with the Adjudication Board, Department of Agrarian Reform, Diliman, Quezon City. On November 27, 1996, DARAB rendered a decision affirming in toto, the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Erlinda Vasquez.
Not satisfied with said decision, petitioners are now before us on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
Issues
I
"WHETHER OR NOT THE ADJUDICATION BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY, COMMITTED ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW THAT WOULD WARRANT REVERSAL OR MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE THE AGRICULTURAL LESSEES INSTEAD OF CIVIL LAW LESSEES OF THE LANDHOLDING IN QUESTION
II
"WHETHER THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ILLEGALLY EJECTED OR THEY VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED THE LANDHOLDING IN QUESTION AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE ON APRIL 12, 1990, AND
III
"WHETHER OR NOT THE ADJUDICATION BOARD COMMITTED ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THE PETITIONERS ARBOLEDAS TO PAY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THE QUANTITY OF ONE HUNDRED FORTY (140) CAVANS OF PALAY PER ANNUM SINCE 1990, UNTIL THEY SHALL HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE SAME LANDHOLDING."
The Court's Ruling
First. Petitioners' argument that public respondent erred in ruling that private respondents were agricultural lessees instead of civil law lessees of the landholding in question and that they were only hired workers of the former owner, Jose Layson when the latter sold the subject land in favor of Beneverth Arboleda, is devoid of merit.
The records of the case clearly established the fact that the private respondents were agricultural tenant lessees as early as 1947 when the subject riceland was still owned by Jose Layson. When petitioner Beneverth Arboleda purchased the property, herein private respondents did not cease to personally cultivate the subject riceland as agricultural lessees. The status of private respondents as agricultural lessees was further bolstered when petitioners and private respondents executed an "Agricultural Leasehold Contract," as well as the subsequent issuance of a "Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold". The change of ownership or management of the rice land did not in any way affect the status of the private respondents as agricultural lessees of the land. The tenant is entitled to the security of tenure which is not extinguished by the sale of the land worked by him. 4 When the previous owner, Jose Layson sold the subject riceland to the petitioner, Beneverth Arboleda, the latter, being the purchaser or transferee thereof, had been subrogated to the rights and obligations of the former as the landlord of private respondents. Section 10 of R.A. 3844 as amended provides:
"The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor." (Emphasis ours)
In Ancheta vs. Court of Appeals, 5 the Supreme Court held: More than that, on both justifiable and equitable grounds, this Court as arbiter of agrarian justice, has generally upheld the tenants' security of tenure 6 or the right of the tenant to the enjoyment and possession of his farmholding which has been created, conferred, protected and guaranteed by the police power of the state in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution expressed in Article II, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution (as well as in 1973 and 1987 Constitution). In pursuance thereof, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to help small farmers and to uplift their economic status by providing them a modest standard of living. The law further protects them by conferring upon them security of tenure over the landholding they work on. Thus, it has been held that the leasehold relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the team or period in a leasehold contract or by the sale, alienation, transfer or conveyance of the legal possession of the landholding. The tenant can only be ejected by the court for cause, 7 and such cause for dispossession must be proven and justified.
Petitioners' contention that the private respondents were civil law lessees and not agricultural lessees has no legal basis. Bienvenido Arboleda further contended that his signature was forged in the execution of the subsequent agricultural tenancy contract. The foregoing stance assumed by petitioners is patently untenable, in the face of the principal features and stipulations of the contract in controversy and the pertinent provisions of existing law on leasehold tenancy. It bears emphasis that the title, label or rubric given to a contract cannot be used to camouflage the real import of an agreement as evidence by its main provisions. Moreover, it is basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting parties. 8
As viewed from the four corners of Exhibit "C," 9 there is no doubt that the contract entered into between petitioner (Arboleda) and Angeles Oliveros was pure and simple leasehold tenancy contract as the term is understood under our tenancy law.
In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 10 the Supreme Court enumerated the principal elements of a leasehold contract or relation:
1. The object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land which is leased or rented for the purpose of agricultural production;
2. The size of the landholding must be such that it is susceptible of personal cultivation by a single person with assistance from the members of his immediate farm household;
3. The tenant-lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or operate said land, solely or with the aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and
4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owners or the legal possessor of the land, leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce. (Emphasis supplied)
The "Agricultural Leasehold Contract", indubitably contains the foregoing essential elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement.
The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. Furthermore, the farmland is used for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "rental of twenty five (25) cavans of palay for the first crop year and twenty five (25) cavans of palay for the second crop year.
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it has of an area of only one point thirteen (1.13) hectares. In a long line of cases, 11 the Supreme Court held that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members of his immediate farm household. AcICHD
Beneverth Arboleda is the registered owner of the disputed landholding, which was administered by his father Bienvenido Arboleda, who delivered the possession thereof to Oliveros in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. There are important differences between a leasehold contract and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work on the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits.
As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas the leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 12
The contention of the petitioners that the Civil Law on Lease Contract was applicable as it was only for a period of ten (10) years and the same had already expired on April 12, 1990 holds no water. The mere fact that the parties fixed and limited the duration of their lease contract to only ten (10) years, does not remove the relationship which they created from the purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the general import of their agreement which irreversibly leads to and clearly justifies tenancy coverage. It is fundamental that the tenants-lessees security of tenure subsists notwithstanding the termination of the contract, which initially established the tenancy relation.
In the language of the law, the "agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract, nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding . . ." 13 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Section 36 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code provides that:
"Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The above provision does not permit the parties to stipulate at what future time the tenant shall leave or surrender the land. DSAICa
The existence of agricultural leasehold relationship between the private respondent, Angeles Oliveros, and Beneverth Arboleda, represented by Bienvenido Arboleda, was best evidenced by the Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Exhibit "C") entered into between the private respondent Angeles Oliveros and Bienvenido Arboleda and the issuance of Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold (CAL) in favor of the former. This was corroborated by the testimony of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, Gelly Suganob during the trial to wit:
"Cross Examination
Atty. Resurrection:
Q. . . . but you are sure that it was spouses Angeles Oliveros and Ana Oliveros who furnished you the date in the Agricultural leasehold contract?
A. No, sir. The landowner presented me the leasehold contract notarized by a certain lawyer.
Q. You mean to say that you just copy that contract of lease between Beneverth Arboleda and Angeles Oliveros?
A. Both agreed that they will enter into a leasehold contract.
Q. What I am asking you is they give the data entered within the leasehold contract was copied by them from the old contract?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the leasehold contract was personally signed by Bienvenido Arboleda?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you explain to him the provision or agreement in the contract?
A. Yes, sir. I verbally translated in Aklanon before I let him sign. 14
(TSN, pp. 8-9, July 1, 1992)
The testimony of Gelly Suganob, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Madalag, Aklan, confirming and affirming the genuineness and due execution of the Agricultural Leasehold corroborating the testimony of private respondent, Angeles Oliveros and the admission of petitioner Bienvenido Arboleda of his signature as reflected in the agricultural leasehold contract when confronted during the cross-examination, belied the contention of the petitioner that Bienvenido Arboleda did not sign any Agricultural Leasehold Contract. As a landholder, he had full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. Once a land owner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with help of labor coming from the immediate household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the land gentry.
Second. Petitioner alleged that private respondents were not illegally ejected but they voluntarily surrendered the landholding in question after the expiration of the contract of lease on April 12, 1980. This is bereft of merit. Private respondents never voluntarily surrendered the said subject riceland. HCacTI
The evidence on record and petitioners' arguments are not enough to overcome the rights of private respondents as provided for in the constitution and agrarian statutes. The very essence of agricultural tenancy lies in the cardinal rule that an agricultural tenant enjoys security of tenurial statutes. The Code of Agrarian Reform of the Philippines (RA. 3844, ass amended) specifically enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relations. Section 8 of the said Code provides:
"Sec. 8. Extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation. — The agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners invoked voluntary surrender under Paragraph 2 of Section 8, RA 3844 as the reason for the termination of the tenancy relationship. Section 8, Paragraph 2 of R.A. 3844 as amended, requires that, surrender of the landholding in order to terminate tenancy relations, written notice thereof must be served by the tenant or agricultural lessee to the landholder or agricultural lessor three months in advance. 15 The intention to surrender the land cannot be presumed nor can it be established by implication. Being a waiver of tenurial rights, public policy requires that the case be clearly and convincingly established by competent and sufficient evidence, otherwise security of tenurial status, which is the essence of our agrarian laws would be jeopardized to the detriment of tenant-farmers. 16
In the case at bar, petitioners employed force and intimidation to eventually eject private respondents from the rice land in question and due to the alleged acts of harassment of their landlord, private respondents were compelled to seek the assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of New Washington, Aklan and the DAR, Legal Division of Kalibo, Aklan. The filing of the complaint for reinstatement and damages adequately belied the contention of petitioners (landowner) that private respondents voluntarily surrendered the landholding in question, it likewise sufficiently indicated private respondents' continued interest to uphold their rights as tenants of the petitioners. Furthermore, no written notice was served by the agricultural lessees to the agricultural lessors that they would surrender the leased agricultural land.
What negated private respondents voluntary return of the landholding to the petitioners was the fact that farming was the only source of their livelihood. 17 Voluntary surrender by an agricultural tenant of his landholding, in order to be valid must be due to "circumstances more advantageous to him and his family." This is provided for in Section 28 (5) of R.A. 3844, as amended.
Considering finally, in the light of the decision of this Court in CA-G.R. Nos. 03445-46-CAR, dated January 8, 1976, which says . . . Pursuant to PD 27, effective October 21, 1972, tenant-farmers whether in land classified as landed estate or not, are deemed owners thereof and as such cannot be removed nor ejected from their respective landholdings (PD 316 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 2-A, as amended). The existing provision on voluntary surrender as provided for in Section 8, paragraph 2 of R.A. 3844, as amended, is deemed modified protanto by the Presidential Decree abovementioned. 18
Third. Finally, petitioners' last contention is bereft of merit. The Adjudication Board, Diliman, Quezon City did not commit errors of fact and law when it ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents the quantity of one hundred fifty (150) cavans of palay per annum since 1990 until they shall have been restored to the possession of the land. The record shows that private respondents are paying rental to the petitioners. The landowner shall be liable to the tenants (private respondents herein) for the damages to the extent of the tenants participation in harvest. The rental given to the petitioners as the landowner represents 25% of the harvest of the subject land so that when 25% goes to the landowner (petitioners), 75% goes to the tenants (private respondents). Hence, when the 25 cavans represent 25% then 75 cavans will also represent 75%. Considering that there are two (2) crop seasons in a year, the tenants therefore who are the private respondents in this case were entitled to one hundred fifty (150) cavans of palay a year as their share.
In the light of the foregoing, it is this Court's duty to protect the poor tenants/agricultural lessees against the harassment and vindictiveness of their landlord, thus giving substance to the security of tenure provisions of our law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the judgment appealed from to be in accordance with the law and evidence on record for which reason, it is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Guerrero and Aliño-Hormachuelos, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Annex "B", p. 80, Rollo.
2. Annex "C", p. 81, Rollo.
3. Decision of Hon. Erlinda S. Vasquez, Rollo, page 8.
4. Davao Steel Corp. vs. Cabatuando, 10 SCRA 705.
5. Ancheta vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 408, August 1991.
6. Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations and Sinforoso Quion, 101 Phil. 675 [1975]; Pineda vs. De Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 [1967]; Quilantang v. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294 [1972]
7. Code of Agrarian Reform of the Philippines with Notes and Comments, Verando L. Agustin, pp. 26-45, 1981 edition; De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 175 SCRA 559 [1989].
8. Quiroga vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 38 Phil. 501.
9. Annex "B", Rollo, p. 80.
10. 27 SCRA 7.
11. Agustin vs. De Guzman, etc., and Guerrero, 104 Phil. 260; Buencamino vs. Reyes, etc. and Pallasique, 104 Phil. 906; Somera, et al. vs. Galman and the Court of Agrarian Relations, 105 Phil. 431.
12. Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590.
13. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844.
14. TSN, July 1, 1992, pages 8 & 9.
15. Bengson & Bengson vs. Lambino, CA-G.R. No. SP-07129-R, February 1, 1978.
16. Dela Cruz vs. Castro, CA-G.R. No. 470039-R, January 5, 1972; Gultiano vs. Oraez, CA-GR 02514-SP, February 10, 1975; Sumayo vs. Poblacion, CA-GR No. 02269-R, November 11, 1974; Dela Cruz vs. Crispin, CA-G.R. No. 07473-SP, April 18, 1978; cited in Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines with Notes and Cases by Venerando L. Agustin First Edition, 1981.
17. TSN — M.A. Luces, March 4, 1992.
18. Cruz vs. Santos, CA-G.R. No. SP-05514, January 31, 1977.