SEVENTEENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 58078. March 23, 2001.]
SPS. ANTONIO B. JACINTO and HENRIETTA ADAZA-JACINTO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), and SPS. FELIPE YOUNG and FLORCEPIDA YOUNG, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AGNIR, JR., J p:
This is an appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from the decision dated 14 February 2000 rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 6331 which affirmed the decision dated 16 June 1997 rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator for Zamboanga del Norte in DARAB Case No. IX-ZN-1118.
As borne by the record, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioners-spouses, residents of Dapitan City, were the owners of a big parcel of land located in Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, containing an area of 10.6 hectares, more or less. After they transferred their title to their eight children, petitioner Henrietta Adaza-Jacinto continued to be the administrator-caretaker of the land.
Respondents-spouses, on the other hand, are residents of Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent Felipe Young is a Filipino-Chinese businessman who is also a cockfighting aficionado while his wife and co-respondent Florcepida is a registered nurse. Felipe Young is the son of deceased spouses Mariano Young and Flaviana Uy who during their lifetime owned vast tracts of lands in Zamboanga del Norte.
On 26 April 1989, petitioner Henrietta Adaza-Jacinto and respondents-spouses Young entered into an agreement denominated as "Kasabutan", pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"That Mrs. Henrietta Adaza-Jacinto and Sps. Felipe (Bomping) Young and Mrs. Flor Young have agreed that the spouses will fence a portion of land of Mrs. Henrietta Adaza-Jacinto to be placed with chicken and cording area of fighting cocks.
That the conditions are as follows:
1. That the spouses will not pay rentals for the land they will use.
2. That the spouses may also plant corn. They will share Mrs. Jacinto. The sharing will be agreed verbally.
3. That the payment of realty taxes shall likewise be agreed verbally whether or not the spouses will contribute.
4. That Mrs. Jacinto may plant coconuts within the premises to be fenced by the spouses.
5. That the spouses will not violate any law or ordinance regarding sanitation.
That this agreement is executed in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the future, and the use of the land by the spouses has no term. BUT, if the owner will use the land, then this contract will be rescinded. Before the rescission of this agreement, the spouses will be given time to relocate. It is agreed here that the spouses will be informed two (2) months in advance before they will be asked to transfer."
On 03 September 1993, the same parties entered into another "Kasabutan", pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"That we Felipe Young and Flor Young will plant corn in the land of Antonio and Henrietta Adaza-Jacinto in Dohinob, Roxas, ZN;
And we have agreed that the owner of the land will not ask for a share in the planted corn on condition that that (sic) we Felipe and Flor will plant coconuts in the entire land with an area of nine (9) hectares. In addition to this we have agreed that the owner of the land will not pay the coconuts planted."
In a letter dated 05 June 1996, petitioners informed respondents that they will now use the property subject of the "Kasabutan" and that effective 20 June 1996, the two Kasabutans were considered rescinded. Thereafter, petitioners resumed possession of the subject property. CacTIE
On 05 July 1996, petitioners filed two counts of theft against respondent Felipe Young with the Municipal Trial Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 1191 and 1192. The cases are still pending trial.
On 05 September 1996, respondent spouses filed a complaint with the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator of Zamboanga del Norte for "Reinstatement, Injunction and Damages" against petitioners and their eight children. In their complaint, herein respondents (petitioners below) alleged that in 1989, herein petitioners-spouses (respondents below) designated them as "tenants/caretakers and regular farm workers" of the subject land owned by petitioners and their children; that since then, they have "worked, tilled, cultivated, plowed and took care of the land", and planted corn, coconut and mango trees; that their possession, occupation and enjoyment of the land as "lawful tenants/caretakers/regular farm workers" was interrupted in June 1996 when petitioner drove them out of the land by force, threats and intimidation, and prevented them from harvesting the fruits of the coconut and mango trees they planted. Respondents-spouses prayed that: (1) they be reinstated as tenants/caretakers/farm workers; (2) petitioners be ordered to account for respondents' share of the mangoes petitioners unlawfully confiscated on 21 June 1996, and of their share of the coconuts unlawfully harvested in July and August 1996; (3) petitioners be ordered to account for the expected income from the corn crops that should have accrued to respondents since June 1996; and (4) petitioners be ordered to pay moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In their answer to the complaint, herein petitioners denied that they instituted herein respondents as their tenant and alleged, by way of special and affirmative defense, that their relationship with the respondents is not of landlord-tenant but is defined in the two Kasabutans they entered into on 26 April 1989 and 03 September 1993; that in the first Kasabutan, petitioners merely agreed to allow respondents to use a portion of their land to raise respondent Felipe Young's fighting cocks; that respondents were not given permission to harvest the fruits of the coconut trees and mango trees; that respondents were allowed to plant corn but they never shared the produce with petitioners; that the second Kasabutan modified the first in that respondents agreed to plant corn without sharing the produce with petitioners but in return, respondents were to plant coconut seedlings on the entire land without cost to petitioners; that there is no agreement allowing respondents to harvest the coconuts and mangoes planted on the land; that they repossessed the subject land pursuant to the provisions of the first Kasabutan; that aside from the two Kasabutans, there is no other agreement entered into between the parties. Petitioners prayed for dismissal of the complaint and that respondents be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
On 16 June 1997, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator for Zamboanga del Norte rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents:
1. To reinstate the complainants to their entire farmholdings;
2. To pay the complainants damages in the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (=P=1,200.00) PESOS per quarter from July, 1996 to the time they are finally reinstated.
3. To refrain from committing further acts prejudicial to the rights and interest of the complainants as tenants of the land in question.
SO ORDERED."
Not satisfied with the above decision, petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Diliman, Quezon City.
On 14 February 2000, the DARAB rendered the assailed decision affirming the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
Hence, this petition for review, petitioners raising the lone issue of: "WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS ARE THE PETITIONERS' TENANTS DE JURE WHO MAY ENJOY TENURIAL RIGHTS."
The Supreme Court has consistently held that "findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality and are binding upon this court unless there is grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record" (Brahm Industries, Inc. vs. NLRC, 280 SCRA 828, 839). A careful review of the record of the instant case persuades Us to deviate from the general rule and follow the exception. We do not agree with the findings of the lower tribunals that respondents are tenants of the petitioners.
Petitioners contend that they have no landlord-tenant relationship with the respondents and that the two Kasabutans they signed established reciprocal obligations and therefore their contract is not agrarian in nature but purely civil.
We agree with petitioners.
The indispensable requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the land-owner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee (Chico vs. CA, 284 SCRA 33, 36).
In Isidro vs. CA (288 SCRA 503, 511), the Supreme Court held that "(A)ll these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws."
And in Gonzales vs. Alvarez (182 SCRA 15, 22), the Supreme Court held that "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements which are complied and are not contrary to law, are even more important." (Emphasis Ours)
Under the first Kasabutan signed by the parties, the subject is respondents' use of a portion of petitioners' land to raise and train the former's fighting cocks. It is clearly stipulated that respondents' use of the land is rent-free, i.e., respondents would not be required to pay a monthly rental. It was also agreed that respondents "may" plant corn in which event respondents would share the produce with petitioners. In other words, respondents were not obligated to plant corn but in case they did, obviously for the consumption of their fighting cocks, petitioners would be given a share. In the context of their agreement, this share would be used to help pay realty taxes. DASEac
It is thus clear that the purpose of their agreement was not for agricultural production but principally to allow respondents to use the land to raise their fighting cocks which, incidentally, is big business. There is no sharing of harvest because there are no crops to be shared, respondents not being obligated to plant any crop on the land. There is no consent for respondents to "work" on the land for purposes of agricultural production since respondents' planting of corn was optional on their part.
The second Kasabutan modified the first Kasabutan but did not change the nature of their agreement. This time, respondents agreed to plant corn but will no longer share the produce with petitioners. Instead, they agreed to plant coconut seedlings on nine hectares of the land. In other words, respondents' use of a portion of the land for their fighting cocks was no longer rent-free; they would pay rent in the form of coconut seedlings planted on the land. This is the clear import of their agreement. The coconut seedlings would be planted for the benefit of the petitioners as rent for the use of their land and not, repeat, not for its fruits to be shared by the parties.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that five requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship are not present.
Under R.A. 3844 (Agricultural Reform Code) as amended by R.A. 6389, a tenant is "the person who personally cultivates" the land of another. In Zamoras vs. Su (184 SCRA 248), the Supreme Court defined a tenant as "a person who by himself, or with the aid available from within his immediate family, cultivates the land belonging to another."
It is not disputed that respondent Felipe Young is a businessman and belongs to a wealthy family, while his wife and co-respondent Florcepida Young is a registered nurse. Given their circumstances, there is no way to convince Us that they "personally" cultivated the land of petitioners. Thus, a sixth requisite for tenancy relationship is likewise not present. "Absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties" (Castillo vs. C.A., 205 SCRA 529). In sum, none of the requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship are present in the case at bench. There is no substantial evidence to prove that petitioners instituted respondents as their tenants on the subject land.
Respondents contend that the provision about fighting cocks being raised on the land was for "documentary purposes only" and "was merely incorporated by the petitioners as a ploy to evade the agrarian laws;" that "it was never meant to be actually implemented or realized;" that respondents "never intended to place any fighting cocks on the land;" that "they do not have the financial capacity to engage in such costly and expensive pastime;" and that "since 1989 until they were forcibly and unlawfully ejected, not a single rooster was placed inside the land." Respondents thus imply that the real purpose of petitioners was to hire them as tenants.
We are not persuaded.
The terms of the two Kasabutans are clear and unambiguous. Where the parties have reduced their contract into writing, the contents of the writing constitutes the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties (PNR vs. CFI, 83 SCRA 569, cited in Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. IV, p. 558).
Both respondents are college-educated. It is difficult to believe that they would agree to sign a contract containing a provision that was not meant to be implemented. And if in fact they did not use the land to raise fighting cocks which was the consideration for their planting of coconut seedlings, that is hardly the fault of petitioners.
Respondents also contend that the harvest from the land was in fact shared with petitioners as shown by several receipts or "pesadas" bearing various dates. However, there is no showing whether the harvests came from existing coconuts planted by petitioners or from those planted by respondents. According to the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, respondents began planting coconuts in 1992 but there is no showing that by 1996 when respondents were allegedly ousted from the land, the coconuts were already fruit-bearing. At any rate, the mere fact of sharing does not by itself establish a tenancy relationship. As held in Isidro vs. CA (supra), all the six requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship.
Likewise, there is no substantial evidence to show that respondents were ousted from the land through threats and intimidation. But even granting this to be true, respondents' remedy is to file a civil case for damages, not an agrarian case seeking to be restored as tenants.
Respondents claim that petitioners hired them to develop the land which, "prior to 1989, looked like a semi-forestal (sic) area with tall, uneven and dirty trees, grass and shrubs all around, the soil was totally uncared of (sic), hard and unplowed, the surrounding area was a pitiful and disdainful picture of a totally abandoned land", and that through their efforts, the land was cleared, the soil improved and 700 hybrid coconuts were planted and a coconut seedling nursery was established.
But even granting all these to be true, they do not establish a tenancy relationship. Under the terms of the second Kasabutan, they agreed to plant coconut trees as a consideration for their occupancy of a portion of the land for their fighting cocks. But if petitioners employed deceit in getting respondents to agree to plant coconut seedlings on nine hectares of the land, that is a cause of action for damages. Respondents can recover actual damages representing the value of improvements they introduced on the land such as the coconut trees planted and the coconut seedling nursery they established, and possibly moral and exemplary damages as well. But these must be recovered in a civil case, not on agrarian case.
Finally, under the terms of the first Kasabutan, should petitioners decide to rescind the Kasabutan, respondents would be given two months notice in order to give them time to relocate. Petitioners admit that they gave notice on 05 June 1996 and considered the Kasabutans rescinded effective 20 June 1996. It is not clearly indicated in the pleadings when petitioners resumed possession of the land. Respondents imply in their complaint before the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator that petitioners ousted them from the land on 21 June 1996. If this can be substantiated, petitioners clearly violated a provision of the Kasabutan, and that too is a cause of action for damages.
All told, the DARAB committed reversible error when it declared respondents as duly instituted tenants of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of DARAB in DARAB Case No. 6331 is REVERSED and a new one entered dismissing respondents' complaint in DARAB Case No. IX-ZN-1118. aESIHT
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Valdez, Jr. and Enriquez, Jr., JJ ., concur.