TENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 40831. February 3, 1999.]
PACIFIC OXYGEN & ACETYLENE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, JR., in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform and ANDRES C. ORTIZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Is "land classification" tantamount to "land conversion"?
The focus of issues and arguments presented before Us in the case at bench hinges on the foregoing question, the resolution of which is pivotal to the instant Petition for Review.
The factual antecedents bring Us back more than twenty (20) years ago in Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where the subject landholdings are located. These landholdings have a total area of forty-two thousand, one hundred forty-eight (42,148) square meters, more or less, formerly embraced by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-68275 and T-68287 of the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, and owned by Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Company, Inc., (or "POACO," for simplicity), a domestic corporation registered and existing under Philippine laws.
Portions of the said landholdings have remained unutilized. However, with the intention that a farming program would be productive for the benefit of its employees, POACO, through its Board Directors, entered into a contract 1 on December 2, 1977 with Andres C. Ortiz, herein private respondent, to work on the same lands for planting rice and other crops. Their contract contains, among others, the following salient features: 2
(a) the worker shall receive a monthly salary of P300.00;
(b) all costs of production including pesticides shall be shouldered by POACO;
(c) the contract shall be terminated at any time upon a 15-day written notice; and
(d) the worker shall not be considered an agricultural lessee and the parcels of land shall not be covered under any circumstances by or under the then existing Land Reform Code and similar or decreed.
More than ten (10) years after the execution of their written contract, a letter 3 dated March 15, 1988 terminating the said contract was sent to Ortiz, specifically breach of contract as the main cause for failing to "deliver harvests for the past several years" 4 and the unauthorized construction of a "4-door apartment on the subject premise." 5
A couple of years later, in 1990, POACO has sold 6 the subject properties to MMO Realty and Development Corporation (or "MMO," for simplicity), which is likewise a domestic corporation registered and existing under Philippine laws.
Ortiz, now in the middle of the real property sale between POACO and MMO, saw himself facing inevitable dispossession from the subject lands. Not budging from his position, Ortiz found himself being bulldozed away from the premises in November 1997. 7
Following the "bulldozing" incident, a criminal complaint 8 was filed against the officers of POACO and MMO; however, the same was dismissed on October 12, 1992. In the same year Ortiz filed with the Region IV DARAB a complaint docketed as PA-Case No. IV-0161-91 entitled "Andres Ortiz vs. Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co., et al." Its amended complaint 9 basically prayed that: (a) he be declared an agricultural tenant; (b) the sale between POACO and MMO be nullified; (c) the properties be declared as covered by the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 and LOI 474 and by the CARP law; (d) that the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and the Provincial Assessor of Laguna be ordered to re-classify the properties from industrial sites to ricelands, and to cancel the existing tax declarations; and (e) that he be allowed to redeem the subject properties. In its Decision 10 dated November 23, 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed Ortiz's complaint for lack of merit.
Undaunted by the uphill legal battle, Ortiz went on appeal to the DARAB headed by the herein public respondent, Hon Ernesto Garilao as Secretary of the DAR, where the decision in Reg. Case No. IV-LA-0161-91 (not "0160'91," Vide; Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 108) was reversed in its decision on May 2, 1996 in Case No. 2124. The dispositive portion of said decision is quoted hereunder: 11
"WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors in the decision dated November 23, 1993 under appeal, the same is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:
"1. Declaring Plaintiff-Appellant Andres C. Ortiz a de jure agricultural lessee on the three (3) subject irrigated landholdings situated at barrio Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-2277097, No. T-227098 and T-209221 in the name of Defendant-Appellee MMO Realty and Development Corporation and containing an aggregate area of forty two thousand one hundred forty eight (42,148) square meters, more or less, and is entitled to the right of security of tenure on said landholdings;
"2. Ordering Defendants-Appellees Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Company as represented by its President, Jovino C. Lorenzo, Jr., the MMO Realty and Development Corporation represented by Dr. Mercedes M. Oliver, Onofre S. Banasan and his forty (40) armed security guards and others concerned and persons acting on their behalves or proceeding from them to maintain Plaintiff-Appellant and his farm household in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholdings and to cease and desist from committing any act that tend to harass, molest, disturb and annoy said Plaintiff-Appellant and his farm household in their tenurial peace and cultivation inside the said landholdings, and to immediately restore the subject landholdings to their physical condition prior to the November 26, 1991 incident;
"3. Reserving to Plaintiff-Appellant the right to institute an appropriate case for redemption of the subject landholdings in question, if he so desires;
"4. Reserving to Defendant-Appellant MMO Realty and Development Corporation the right to file an application for conversion with the DAR, subject to the laws, rules and regulations on the matter, of the subject properties from agricultural to non-agricultural use; and,
"5. With costs against Defendants-Appellees.
"SO ORDERED."
On October 8, 1996, POACO filed the present petition for review and presents before Us the following assignment of errors, 12 viz:
I
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND IN GIVING MORE PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE LATTER'S SELF-SERVING ORAL ASSERTIONS IN DECLARING HIM AN AGRICULTURAL LESSEE."
II
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN HOLDING THE PROPERTIES TO BE COVERED BY THE CARP LAW."
III
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN PUTTING PREMIUM ON DECEPTION AND BAD FAITH AND IN REVERSING THE CORRECT DECISION OF THE PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL REFORM ADJUDICATOR."
After a careful scrutiny of the issues, arguments and records of the case, We find these assignment of errors devoid of merit.
First. To begin with, are the subject premises agricultural or industrial lands? The response to this query is material to a latter discussion of whether agricultural tenancy exists. To arrive at the answer to this initial question, however, the discussion of the pivotal question Is 'land reclassification' tantamount to 'land conversion'? must be dealt with. The Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 13 which was issued by the DAR ON October 29, 1997 to regulate land use conversion, by virtue of Republic Act 3844, as amended by RA 6389, Presidential Decree 27, Presidential Decree 946, Executive Order 129-A and Republic Act 6657, would be appropriate to support Our view on the matter.
In the case at bench, the problem clearly arises as "classification" is confused by petitioner with "conversion," which are not interchangeable terms. "Classification." A word taken from the phraseology of land reclassification, on the one hand, refers to the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to requirements and procedure for land use conversion. 14 The word "conversion," which is taken from land use conversion, on the other hand, refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. 15 Furthermore, "classification" is more akin to "zoning," which is the division into districts of certain areas with regulatory proscription applied to the lands or buildings, the regulations having reference to an being in interest of the public, such as the preservation of the peace, safety, morals, health, comfort, and convenience of the public generally. 16 Precisely, the 1981 zoning ordinance of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, which is the basis of the 1984 Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) certification 17 relied upon by petitioner, was enacted to identify the various land uses in its districts and to designate the allowable uses therein based on the municipality's development plan. 18
The foregoing definitions clearly show that land reclassification is a step precedent to conversion. In other words, a reclassification is not sufficient per se to consider a parcel of agricultural land "converted." Once reclassified, the landowner must take further steps so that the "conversion" of his landholding may be completed only upon allowance and approval by the DAR.
Conversion may be allowed if at the time of application, the lands are reclassified as commercial, industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the new or revised town plans promulgated by the local government unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988 in accordance with Section 20 of RA 7160, as implemented by MC No. 54 and EO No. 72, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. 19 The exercise of land reclassification, however, by the respective offices of the HLURB 20 and the SP 21 are both subject to national policies, standards and guidelines. Any reclassification is subject, therefore, to the existing national policy on agrarian reform, which is embodied in Section 4, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution as the basis of the passage of the present comprehensive agrarian reform law, otherwise known as RA 6657.
If the city or municipality does not have comprehensive development or land use plan and zoning ordinance duly approved by the HLURB or SP but the dominant use of the area surrounding the land subject of the application for conversion is no longer agricultural, or if the proposed use is similar to, or compatible with the dominant use of the surrounding areas as determined by the DAR, conversion may be granted. 22
Furthermore, to prevent circumvention of coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), conversion shall be granted only upon evidence that the project to be established therein is viable and beneficial to the community affected and that the land development phase of the area shall be completed within one (1) year after the issuance of the Order of Conversion where the area is five (5) hectares or less. 23
Tested against the foregoing rules, petitioner's contention that the subject premises have been "converted" 24 to industrial use based on a mere certification issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), 25 now HLURB, indicating an industrial zoning reclassification with the corroborative statements 26 of the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and the Provincial Tax Assessor of Laguna merely declaring the same as industrial lands "tax purposes" is simply untenable.
Although lands which have been converted into non-agricultural uses as duly approved by the HLURB and its predecessors in interest prior to June 15, 1988 are excluded from the coverage of CARP, 27 absent any showing of proof, such as but not limited to, a necessary DAR clearance 28 being issued by the Regional Director of the Place where the landholding is located, the mere reclassification of the subject premises into industrial lands did not ipso facto result in the conversion of the same.
More revealing is the truth that nowhere is there any explicit provision that empowers the municipal and provincial tax assessors' office with the authority to "reclassify" land use from agricultural to industrial pursuant to agrarian laws. Precisely, their authority to reclassify real properties subject of local taxation and fiscal matters is exercised for the purpose of tax assessment. 29 Restated otherwise, the power of the municipal and provincial tax assessors' office is primarily exercised for taxation, not agrarian, purposes. Anything that is exercised outside the gamut of such power is obviously ultra vires.
Choosing to persuade Us, in vain, with a mere certification for land reclassification and the declaration of the municipal and provincial tax assessors instead of the appropriate clearance from the DAR reflects a naked attempt by petitioner to expose the subject agricultural lands to premature conversion, 30 or the undertaking of any development activities whose results will modify or alter the physical characteristics of the agricultural lands to render them suitable for non-agricultural purposes without an approved order of conversion from the DAR.
Suffice it to say, at the risk of being repetitious, the authority to issue an order converting a parcel of land from agricultural to non-agricultural use by the DAR has explicit support and authority, such as, but not limited to, those provided in Section 12 b) No. (10), Presidential Decree 946, 31 the first 'Whereas' clause of EO 124, Section 5 (1) of EO 129, and Section 65 of RA 6657.
Second. Is Andres Ortiz and agricultural tenant or not? Petitioner emphasizes, among other things, the terms of the written contract to support the contention that Ortiz is not an agricultural lessee. Material evidence adduced by Ortiz were several receipts for rental payments spanning dates from 1981 to 1984. To settle the contradicting claims of both parties, the essential of a tenancy relationship must be relied upon. Thus, in several case, such as the recent ponencia in Sintos v. CA, 32 the Supreme Court specified the six (6) requisite elements, viz:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest.
Based on these elements, the DARAB correctly found the following: 33
"From the records, it is to be seen that the landowner is the Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Company, Inc., (POACO), a juridical person which, through its Vice-President Crispino Cortez, granted to tenant-lessee Andres Ortiz the cultivation and use of its lands for a price certain after the cropping harvest of August 1981 or beginning September 1981. The subject parcels of lands are concededly agricultural lands at the time of the institution, being irrigated ricelands and Plaintiff-Appellants' cultivation thereof, then and now, is for the purpose of agricultural production. Whether the said landholdings have become non-agricultural lands later on or not is to treated in the following paragraphs hereof. There is consideration for Plaintiff-Appellant's cultivation and use of POACO's landholdings, and this is his paying a leasehold rental consisting of the equivalent value of sixty (60) cavans of palay every cropping harvest to the said owner, thereby sharing the harvests with the owner. There was, likewise, consent given to Plaintiff-Appellant to work on the said landholdings by the true and lawful landowner, POACO, which acted, through its Vice-President. Although there was no written evidence to show such consent, the same is to be implied in its acceptance and reception of the lease rentals from tenant-lessee-Plaintiff-Appellant Ortiz, as shown by the several receipts of lease rentals from December 1981 to March 1984. Finally, there is personal cultivation by Plaintiff-Appellant of the lands in question, as he works and tills the said land personally and with the aid of labor from his immediate farm household including his sons, Alfredo, Armando, Ernesto, Andresito and Adolfo, doing all the phases of labor incumbent upon a tenant to do in the land from land preparation such as plowing, harrowing, arrangement of paddies, to irrigating and care of the growing plants and harvesting and delivery of the lease rentals to the owner as shown by the affidavits he presented in the case (Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," and "E") including his having farm animals and implements to aid in said farming activities on the lands (Annex "B" to "B-4" to the Plaintiff-Appellant's Exhibit "A")."
It cannot be overemphasized that the uncontroverted receipts of lease rental, which were ignored by the Region IV DARAB, refute the denial of petitioner that private respondent Ortiz is a validly constituted agricultural lessee on the landholdings.
Despite the contention that the initial contract supposedly ended sometime in 1981, We are inclined to believe otherwise. It seems to be uniformly accepted as a rule of law that a tenant who remains in possession of the leased premises after the expiration of his term does not thereby become a tenant from year to year unless the landlord consents to the holding over. 34 Such consent may be actual or constructive, express or implied, or nay be by words or some act recognizing or treating him as a tenant, and is often evidenced by payment and unconditional acceptance of rent, 35 which is actually clear from the records in the case at bench.
Third. May petitioner validly insist on the terms of the written contract with Ortiz oblivious of the then existing agrarian laws? The obvious answer is in the negative. It is a basic rule that services which are contrary to law or public policy may not be the objects of a contract. 36
RA No. 3844, as amended by RA No. 6389, which is the pertinent law governing the events at land, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. 37 Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." 38
The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to farm the land, as was done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. 39 On the contrary, Section 10 of RA 3844 provides:
"Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguishment by Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor." (Emphasis supplied by Us)
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in the change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in the interest. 40
Serving as illustration of the legal principles outlined above is Catorce v. CA, 41 where the person holding a mortgage over the farm land subject of an agricultural leasehold took possession thereof pursuant to the mortgage and ousted the agricultural lessee. Upon complaint for reinstatement filed by the agricultural lessee, the then Court of Agrarian Relations ordered the mortgagee to deliver possession over the land to the agricultural lessee but this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstating the Agrarian Court's decision, the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, ruled, among other related considerations, that "tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory judgment, which is not so in the case at bar." 42 By way of implication, the decision shows the recognition that the transfer of possession to the mortgagee did not terminate the agricultural leasehold nor prejudice the security of tenure of the agricultural lessee.
The tenant is entitled to security of tenure which is not extinguished by the sale of the land worked by him. 43 Thus, the sale of the subject premises to MMO did not necessarily terminate the existence of tenancy between Ortiz and POACO. If at all, its termination can take place only for causes and reasons provided in the law, 44 and not from petitioner's mere self-serving allegations that have not persuaded Us a bit.
In fine, this Court, after a painstaking examination of the entire records of the case and taking into account the applicable law, as well as the relevant jurisprudence, holds that private respondent is a de jure agricultural lessee over the land owned by petitioners. As such, private respondent's security of tenure must be represented by petitioner.
Fourth. Following Our conclusion that private respondent Ortiz is an agricultural lessee of the owner of the subject landholdings, it follows that private respondent is entitled to redeem the same. 45 Section 12 of RA No. 3844, as amended by RA No. 6389, reads as follows:
"Sec. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this section may be exercised within one hundred and eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale."
Fifth. Finally, We deem it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Teodoro v. Macaraeg, 46 where the High Tribunal, speaking through the ponencia of the former Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz Castro, has pronounced its opinion amid the prevalent practice of landowners who continue to evade and defeat the import of tenancy laws by having tenants sign contracts/agreements to disguise the real intention of their contracts, thus:
"We agree with petitioner that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly impress, however, is that once a landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry." (Emphasis supplied by Us)
In view of the foregoing, We affirm the judgment of the DARAB in Case No. 2124 (Reg. Case No. V-0161-91) in toto. The immediate execution of the decision in the said case is appropriate and in consonance with Section 1, Rule XIV 47 of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure 48 which allows the immediate execution of the decision of the DARAB pending appeal. More particularly, We uphold the favorable grant of private respondent's motion 49 to fix the redemption price by the DARAB or any of the agency of the DAR to be paid by plaintiff-appellant to defendant-appellee MMO Realty and Development Corporation, POACO's successor in interest on the subject premises of this case, pursuant to the DARAB's issuance of the Writ of Execution 50 on January 8, 1997, and the subsequent resolution dated September 9, 1996 which denied POACO's Motion for Reconsideration 51 thereof for lack of merit after finding that no new matters were adduced by POACO which would have warranted a reversal of the decision appealed from.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Case No. 2124 (Reg. Case No. V-0161-91) is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, the DARAB is hereby ordered by this Court to immediately execute the decision appealed from without further delay. With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 76-78.
2. Rollo, p. 19 (The Petition emphasizes the salient features of the contract).
3. Rollo, p. 47.
4. Rollo, p. 47.
5. ibid.
6. Rollo, pp. 68-69 (The deed of sale appears to be dated June 20, 1990).
7. Records, p. 83.
8. Rollo, pp. 48-52.
9. Rollo, pp. 62-63.
10. Rollo, pp. 108-119.
11. Rollo, pp. 163-164, referring to Annex "K," DARAB Case No. 2124, Reg. Case No. IV-LA-0160'91, pp. 43-44.
12. Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 24.
13. Otherwise known as Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1997, it consolidates all existing implementing guidelines issued by the DAR, taking into consideration other Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use conversion.
14. Letter K, Part II, Definition of Terms, DAR AO No. 07, Series of 1997, p. 4.
15. Letter F, Part III, Definition of Terms, ibid., p. 3.
16. Smith v. Colloson (Cal.) 6 P. (2d) 277, 278, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 45, West Publishing Co., p. 668.
17. Annex "A," Rollo, p. 41.
18. Section 6, Article II, 1981 Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, p. 2.
19. No. 2 (b) letter B, General Guidelines, Part VI, Policies and Guidelines, ibid., p. 7.
20. Section 1 (a), EO No. 72, Series of 1993.
21. Section 2 (b), EO No. 72, Series of 1993.
22. No. 2 (c) Letter B, General Guidelines, Part VI, Policies and Guidelines, DAR Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1997, p. 7.
23. No. 7, General Guidelines, Part VI, Policies and Guidelines, ibid., pp. 9-10.
24. Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 34.
25. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission was renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to Section 1 (c), Title I, Executive order No. 90, Series of 1996.
26. Records, pp. 211-212.
27. See DAR AO No. 1, March 22, 1990, Series of 1990, reprinted in The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, RA No. 6657 and the Recent Developments Under It, With Commentaries, by Retired Court of Appeals Justice Milagros A. German, published by the National Bookstore, 1992 ed., p. 55.
28. Ibid., p. 3.
29. Section 215, first par., Local Government Code of 1991.
30. Letter I, Definition of Terms, Part III, DAR AO No. 07, Series of 1997, p. 3.
31. Section 12, b), (10) reads as follows: "Issuance of certification for the conversion of tenanted rice and/or corn land for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes, it being understood that the authority to issue certificates for conversion of other kinds of tenanted agricultural land for the same purposes remains vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform."
32. 246 SCRA 223.
33. Rollo, p. 152-153.
34. 49 Am Jur § 1143.
35. Ibid
36. Art. 1347, New Civil Code.
37. Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended by R.A. No. 6389 (1971), provide:
"Sec. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share tenancy. — Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public and shall be abolished . . ."
"Sec. 5. Establishment of Agricultural leasehold Relation. — The Agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code, in other case, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly."
38. The latest agrarian reform law, R.A. No. 6657 (1988), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, provides for the continuation and maintenance of the right to security of tenure of agricultural lessees acquired prior to the passage of the law. Section 6, paragraph 3 of the Act provides: "In all case, the security of tenure of the farmers of farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall respected."
39. Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, provides:
Sec. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold relation. — The agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee."
40. Tanalgo v. CA, 97 SCRA 421; Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil 675.
41. 129 SCRA 210.
42. Catorce v. CA, supra.
43. Davao Steel Corp. v. Cabatuando, 10 SCRA 704.
44. Pineda v. De Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450.
45. Cuaño v. CA, 237 SCRA 122.
46. 27 SCRA 7.
47. This rule is also based on Section 50, RA 6657.
48. The revised rules were promulgated on June 6, 1994 and took effect on June 22, 1994.
49. Rollo, pp. 414-416.
50. Records, pp. 469-472.
51. Records, pp. 456-457.