FIFTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 39913.  February 8, 1999.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIANO V. BUENAVENTURA, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as a Special Agrarian Court and FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J p:

            Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review is the decision dated November 14, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court at Cabanatuan City, Branch 23 sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, and its affirmatory order of February 13, 1996, in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF), an action for judicial determination of property valuation.    CIETDc

            The facts:

            Private respondent Feliciano F. Wycoco was the registered owner in fee simple of a vast tract of unirrigated and untenanted riceland situated at the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija with an area 94.1690 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. Wycoco acquired the property thru foreclosure sale from the Development Bank of the Philippines.

            In a letter dated January 1986 to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Wycoco, in line with the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), voluntarily offered to sell his aforementioned parcel of land to the government for a total consideration of P14.9 million (Annex "C", Petition). In the same letter, Wycoco authorized the DAR to enter, inspect and evaluate his property for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

            Sometime in November 1991, the DAR sent a notice of coverage to Wycoco conveying its intention to acquire not the whole of the latter's landholding but only 84.5690 hectares thereof. The DAR was obviously disinterested in acquiring the road, idle land and river situated in Wycoco's property comprising an area of a little less than twenty (20) hectares. In its notice, the DAR offered to acquire the property for only P1,342,667.46 by way of compensation for the land intended to be taken. Later, the monetary offer was raised to P2,594,045.39, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 11, but was subsequently reduced to P2,280,159.82 (Petition, p. 4). Finding the DAR's offer to be too low and unconscionable, Wycoco rejected the same. Notwithstanding such rejection, however, the DAR nonetheless immediately distributed the property to the farmer-beneficiaries.

            Because of the irreconcilable disagreement over the valuation of the land, the DAR issued an order on February 24, 1993, directing the holding of a summary administrative proceeding by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB, for brevity) at Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga for the purpose of fixing the just compensation for Wycoco's land. In compliance with said directive, the DAR Regional Director at Region III addressed a communication to herein petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) requiring it to open a Trust Account in the name of Wycoco and to deposit therein the value of the compensation offered to but rejected by the latter (Annex "F-3", Petition).

            In the ensuing summary administrative proceedings, docketed as DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93, the DARAB Regional Adjudicator issued an order on March 29, 1993 requiring the parties thereto (Wycoco and LBP) to submit their respective position papers supporting their valuation claims (Annex "G", Petition).    HTSaEC

            Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the said position paper. Instead, on April 13, 1993, he filed a complaint for judicial determination of land valuation with the Regional Trial Court at Cabanatuan, Branch 23, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Impleaded as party-defendants in the complaint were the DAR and the herein petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines. In his complaint (Annex "H", Petition), docketed as Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF), Wycoco prayed for the following reliefs:

"1.     Ordering the re-valuation of the price of the land in question by determining and fixing the fair, reasonable and just compensation at the rate of P135,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare;

2.      PENDENTE LITE, the defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff the quantity of 10,000 cavans of palay at 50 kilos per cavan, computed at the rate of P6.00 per kilo, it being the government support price, every agricultural year from the date of the issuance of the Administrative Orders and/or Memorandum Circular for the compulsory acquisition of agricultural lands the area of which is fifty hectares and above with the banking rate of interest at the time, there being two cropping seasons for every calendar year, until the land [has] been fully paid by the defendants to the plaintiff on the basis of just compensation;

3.      Moral and exemplary damages must be adjudged the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, for such amount as may be proven during the trial".

            On May 6, 1993, Wycoco filed a manifestation in DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93, informing the DARAB at Region III of his filing of a complaint for judicial valuation with the RTC of Cabanatuan City (Annex "I", Petition). Required to comment on the Manifestation, LBP, in a "COMMENT" dated June 17, 1993, asked the DARAB at Region III to resume the summary valuation proceedings pending before it, saying that Wycoco's action before the Special Agrarian Court was "prematurely commenced" as it was instituted "without exhausting all appropriate administrative remedies'' (Annex "J", Petition).    TaDIHc

            Nonetheless, on July 6, 1993, petitioner LBP filed its Answer to Wycoco's complaint in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF). In its answer, (Annex "K", Petition), LBP interposed the following affirmative allegations and special defenses:

"1.     That the valuation and compensation being offered for the property of the herein petitioner are all in accordance with the provision of DAR Administrative Order No. 03, Series of 1991 which is the law then subsisting at the time said property was voluntarily offered for sale to the government;

2.      Under Section 1 of EO 405 issued on June 15, 1990, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall be primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation of all private lands suitable for agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer To Sell (VOS) scheme of acquisition or the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme;

3.      That questions on the existing valuation formula or demand for its revision/amendment should be properly addressed to the DAR from which office the said Administrative Order was formulated. It is worthy to note at this point, however, that the DAR had already issued Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, containing certain revision which we believe would improve the situation;

4. That plaintiff in this case has prematurely commenced this action as she had not exhausted all the appropriate administrative remedies which are plain, adequate and immediately made available to him by law";

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

6.      Moreover, that to let administrative process take its course is not a fancy or plain formality but it has a pre-designed objective and that is to give the DAR Adjudication Board and other similar bodies an opportunity to address and resolve questions of facts and questions of policy affecting their progress implementation".

            On March 9, 1994, the Regional Adjudicator, acting on Wycoco's earlier Manifestation in DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93, issued an order dismissing said case. In part, the order reads:

            "Admittedly, this Forum is vested with the jurisdiction to conduct administrative proceeding to determine compensation, however, a thorough perusal of the petitioner's complaint showed that he did not only raise the issue on valuation but such other matters which are beyond the competence of the Board. Besides, the petitioner has the option to avail administrative remedies or bring the matter on just compensation to the Special Agrarian Court for final determination.

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby dismissed.

            SO ORDERED" (Annex "L", Petition).

            It is a matter of record that herein petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines, albeit very much a party to DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93, never appealed the dismissal order to the DARAB proper at Quezon City, thereby allowing the same to pass to the realm of finality.    IDCScA

            Subsequent events disclose that on October 3, 1994, Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) was heard on pre-trial. What transpired thereat is embodied in a pre-trial order issued by the respondent court on the same date. The pre-trial order pertinently reads:

            "The parties manifested that there is no possibility of amicable settlement, neither are they willing to admit or stipulate on facts, except those contained in the pleadings.

            The only issue left is for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation of the land owned by the plaintiff subject of this case.

            The parties then prayed to terminate the pre-trial conference.

            AS PRAYED FOR, the pre-trial conference is considered terminated, and instead of trial, the parties are allowed to submit their respective memoranda.

            WHEREFORE, the parties are given twenty (20) days from today within which to file their simultaneous memoranda, and another ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file their Reply/Rejoinder, if any, and thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for decision.

            SO ORDERED" (Annex "M", Petition).

            On November 14, 1995, after the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the respondent court, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court came out with the decision now under review (Annex "A", Petition). The decision dispositively reads:

            "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.      Ordering the defendants to pay the amount of P13,419,082.00 to plaintiff as just compensation for the property acquired;

2.      Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,663,235.00 representing the unrealized profits from the time of acquisition of the subject property and the sum of P8,475,210.00 for every calendar year, until the amount of compensation is fully paid including the legal interest which had accrued thereon.

            No pronouncement as to costs.

            SO ORDERED".

            In time, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration contending, in the main, that the respondent court was without jurisdiction to decide Wycoco's complaint for judicial valuation because "the preliminary determination of land valuation such as the instant case by the DARAB is a condition precedent prior to its filing in the Special Agrarian Court" (Annex "A-1", Petition).

            On November 29, 1995, or before the respondent court could act on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Wycoco filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, invoking in support thereof, his advanced age of 71 years and weak physical condition. To the motion, an opposition was filed by the petitioner on December 26, 1995 (Petition, pp. 8-9).    TCAHES

            On February 13, 1996, the respondent court dealt another blow to petitioner's cause when it issued another order (Annex "B", Petition), this time denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and granting Wycoco's motion for execution pending appeal, thus:

            "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 'Motion for Reconsideration' filed by defendant-movant Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby denied for lack of merit and the 'Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' is hereby granted. Consequently, let the Writ of Execution under this Special Order issue in favor of the plaintiff, upon filing of the bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00, against the defendants in the following manner, viz.:

1.      Ordering the defendants to pay the amount of P13,419,982.00 to plaintiff as just compensation for the property acquired;

2.      Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,663,235.00 representing the unrealized profits from the time of acquisition of the subject property and the sum of P8,475,210.00, for every calendar year, commencing on November 1991, until the amount of compensation is fully paid including the legal interest which had accrued thereon.

            SO ORDERED".

            On April 17, 1996, a writ of execution was issued by the respondent court commanding its deputy sheriff Salvador Navallo to enforce its decision of November 14, 1995 (Rollo, p. 139). Per petitioner's admission, the writ was served upon it on April 22, 1996 (Rollo, p. 135).

            A day earlier, however, or on April 16, 1996, petitioner came to this Court via the present recourse. To thwart the execution of the writ which was issued by the respondent court, petitioner filed with this Court on April 30, 1995, an Urgent Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Temporary Restraining Order (Rollo, 134).

            The petition raises five (5) issues, to wit:

"1.     WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTING AS A SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT ERRED IN TRYING THE CASE AND IN RENDERING A DECISION ON LAND VALUATION DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF DARAB SUMMARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE SUCH VALUATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 6 OF R.A. 6657 AND OVER THE TIMELY OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER.

2.      WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUATION DETERMINED BY THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

3.      WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO COVER UNDER THE LAND REFORM THE ENTIRE AREA, EVEN AREAS NOT SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURE.

4.      WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN AWARDING ALLEGED UNREALIZED PROFITS OF P29, 663, 235 FROM THE TIME OF ACQUISITION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THE SUM OF P8, 475,210.00 FOR EVERY CALENDAR YEAR UNTIL THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION IS FULLY PAID INCLUDING THE LEGAL INTEREST WHICH HAD ACCRUED THEREON.

5.      WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL CONSIDERING THE ABSENCE OF ANY CIRCUMSTANCE NECESSITATING ITS ISSUANCE".

            To Our mind, the issues thus raised may be condensed into the singular question of whether or not the respondent court erred in (a) assuming jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) and rendering judgment thereon in favor of private respondent; and (b) granting the latter's motion for execution pending appeal.

            The petition must fail.

            We rule and so hold that not only has the respondent court the jurisdiction to hear and decide Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) but that it decided the case correctly and in accordance with the laws. We further rule that under the circumstances prevailing, the same court did not err in ordering the execution of its decision pending appeal.    aDHCcE

            Petitioner initially contends that the respondent court is without jurisdiction to act on Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) in view of the pendency before the DARAB Regional Office of DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93, a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just compensation for private respondent's land. To petitioner's mind, private respondent may not go directly to the Special Agrarian Court without first exhausting all administrative remedies available to him because the law "placed the initial determination of the just compensation with the DAR" (Petition, p. 12). Petitioner anchors its submission on Section 16, paragraphs (d) and (f) of Republic Act No. 6657. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which respectively read:

            "SEC. 16.      Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            (d)     In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

            (f)      Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the Court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation".

            We are not persuaded.

            To begin with, when the respondent court sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, heard and decided Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF), there was no pending summary administrative proceeding before the DARAB for the simple reason that as early as March 9, 1994, or even before the respondent court could conduct the pre-trial conference in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) on October 3, 1994, DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93 had already been dismissed by the DARAB Regional Adjudicator, which dismissal, as aforesaid, passed to the realm of finality on account of petitioner's failure to take an appeal therefrom to the DARAB proper. In short, there was no more pending administrative proceedings to speak of at the time the respondent court resolved Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF).

            But even if the summary administrative proceedings in DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE' 93 were then still pending, We would nonetheless uphold the jurisdiction of the respondent court to take cognizance of and eventually decide the land valuation case — Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) — thereat commenced by the private respondent.

            Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 prescribes the procedure by which the issue of just compensation is resolved, first by the DAR, then by the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Viewed in isolation, Section 16 of the law truly lays down the ground for the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the matter of just compensation. Unfortunately, however, Section 16 cannot be taken in isolation of but must have to be viewed along side with Section 57 of the same statute, whereunder unto the Regional Trial Courts sitting as Special Agrarian Courts are conferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act on petitions for the determination of just compensation for lands brought under the coverage of the land reform program. We quote Section 57:

            "SEC. 57.      Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.

            The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision" (Emphasis supplied).

            The provision is unequivocally clear and emphatic. The grant of "original and exclusive" jurisdiction in the matter of determining just compensation negates a sharing of the same jurisdiction with any other agency or tribunal. We thus see no reason why a direct access to a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation may not be had without first availing of the administrative remedies before the DARAB. Such a condition is simply inconsistent with the clear and unmistakable language of the statute. To require a prior resort to DAR is to render inutile and meaningless the words "original" and "exclusive" found in Section 57, supra, of the law.    AHcaDC

            For sure, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Acil Corporation, 263 SCRA 758 [1996], the Supreme Court has had an occasion to reject a similar contention of the petitioner. Says the High Court in that case:

"xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            . . . In the terminology of [Sec.] 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has 'original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners'. It would subvert this 'original and exclusive' jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.

            Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Court, it is clear from [Sec.] 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to [Sec.] 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question".

            From the aforequoted pronouncement of the High Court, it appears clear to Us that resort to the DARAB, whether in its provincial, regional or central level, is merely permissive and may even be dispensed with by the landowner. Evidently, the procedure outlined in Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 is only applicable when the landowner opts to go through the entire process — administrative and judicial — of determining the just compensation for his land. But certainly, Section 16, taken, as it must be, in conjunction with Section 57, does not preclude landowner's direct resort to the Special Agrarian Court for a judicial determination of the just compensation for his property.

            This brings Us to the substantive merits of the assailed decision, namely, the correctness and propriety of the awards therein made to private respondent Feliciano Wycoco by way of just compensation and related items.

            To the mind of the petitioner, the valuation findings of the respondent court in the challenged decision are unsupported by "substantial evidence" and were arrived at in disregard of the factors to be considered in determining just compensation, as laid down in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657.

            Again, We disagree.

            Explicit it is from the assailed decision that in arriving at the amount of the just compensation therein fixed for private respondent's property, the respondent court took "judicial notice" of the "prevailing [fair] market value" of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija. Thus, expounding on the basis for its valuation, the respondent court states:

            "Taking into consideration the prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija, where it is of public knowledge that a hectare of land is sold at P135,000.00 to P150,000.00, the compensation for the subject property compulsorily acquired is hereby fixed at P142,500.00 per hectare, that is, taking the average of values submitted as consideration for transfer of tenurial rights. In the case at bar, the total proper compensation for the whole property should be P13,428,082.00 (P142,500.00 x 94.1690 has. = P13,419,082.50) bearing in mind the foregoing factors" (Emphasis supplied).

            Respondent court acted correctly in utilizing the "prevailing market value" of lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija in determining the just compensation that should be paid the private respondent. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that "just compensation" may refer to the "fair market value" of the property expropriated (J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413; Republic v. Gonzales, et al., 94 Phil. 956, to cite a few).    CcTHaD

            And certainly, no error could have been committed by the respondent court in taking "judicial notice" of the prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab. For, matters pertaining to the fair market value of real property in a particular locality are proper subjects of judicial notice, conformably with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, to wit:

            "Sec. 2.         Judicial Notice, when discretionary. — A court may take notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial function" (Emphasis supplied).

            At this point in time, when property speculation is so prevalent an activity, most people are particularly knowledgeable on the fair market value of real properties and one need not even be an expert to form a conclusion thereon. Without doubt, information regarding the subject matter is now generally considered as "public knowledge". For this reason, We feel that the respondent court is not anymore obligated to require the private respondent to adduce additional evidence to prove the current "fair market value" of his property. After all, the respondent Court is no less a Special Agrarian Court whose exposure to cases involving just compensation must have equipped it with the requisite knowledge on property valuation, at least as regards lands within its territorial jurisdiction. By the very nature of its function as a Special Agrarian Court, it is safe to assume that the respondent court knows whereof it speaks in the matter of what the "prevailing market value" is of agricultural lands within its territorial coverage.    SATDEI

            This leads Us to petitioner's other contention that the respondent court similarly erred in including in the compensable property areas thereof not suitable for agriculture. Petitioner is actually referring to the idle portion, river and the road in private respondent's property, which have a combined area of about 19.6 hectares (Petition, p. 4).

            The contention deserves scant consideration.

            To allow the DAR and/or the petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines to purchase only the riceland and not the remaining part of the land in question would be totally unjust and oppressive to the private respondent. We were to go along with the petitioner, then nothing would be left to the private respondent except the road, the river and the idle portion, all of which are practically with no further economic value to the private respondent after he had surrendered and the DAR had taken possession of the riceland portion of his landholding. We would not have any hand in such an unfair and iniquitous arrangement.

            We shall now dwell on the propriety of the award of legal interest and unrealized profits in favor of private respondent, matters which petitioner likewise assails in the petition at bench. Arguing the award of legal interest is undeserved, petitioner cites Section 16 (e) of Republic Act No. 6657, to wit:

            "(e)    Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries".

            Expounding on the above, petitioner explains:

            ". . . the cash portion of the DAR valuation that was rejected by the private respondent was deposited by the DAR with the petitioner and it has been earning interest at the highest prevailing rate from the date of booking pursuant to existing DAR administrative orders and LANDBANK policies.

            On the other hand, the bond portion has been earning market interest rate in line with 91-day treasury bill rates . . ." (Petition, pp. 19-20).

            Concededly, nowhere is there in Section 16 [e], supra, of Republic Act No. 6657 which allows the award of legal interest and unrealized income. Conversely, however, neither is there in the same provision which prohibits or proscribes the grant of legal interest or unrealized profits in favor of a landowner in land acquisition cases. Given the fact that up to this time, private respondent is yet be paid for his property which the DAR had taken possession of way back in the early 90's, elementary sense of justice and fairness dictates that legal interest on the amount due the petitioner ought to be included in the award.    ESCacI

            Upon the same consideration must We sustain the award for unrealized profits considering the factual findings of the respondent court that private respondent's landholding is capable of producing 150 cavans of palay (weighing 50 kgs. per each cavan) per hectare for every cropping season (Rollo, p. 45). To deny private respondent the earnings which he could have received had the DAR not expropriated his property would likewise be the height of injustice.

            It may be so, as the petitioner explains, that the cash portion currently on deposit with it as well as the LBP bonds issued to private respondent are already earning interest which would eventually go to the private respondent. To the petitioner, such interest earnings would suffice to compensate the private respondent for whatever loss he may suffer pending actual payment of the just compensation due him, hence the impropriety of the respondent court's award of unrealized profits and legal interest.

            On surface, the argument sounds plausible. However, what was lost sight of completely by the petitioner, and which makes its posture unacceptable, is the hard reality that the interest alluded to must necessarily be based only on the principal amount of P2,280,159.82 earlier offered by the DAR and already rejected by the private respondent for being very much way below his counter offer.

            Finally, We come to petitioner's challenge against the February 13, 1996 order of the respondent court allowing execution of its decision pending appeal and issuing the necessary writ therefor.

            Even as it concedes that "[T]he grant of a motion for execution pending appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court" (Petition, p. 24), petitioner argues that "the circumstances of the instant case do not show such urgency and manifest oppression upon the private respondent so as to justify the application of the exception to the general rule that execution should issue only when judgment has become final and executory" (Petition, p. 27).

            The rule governing execution pending appeal is found in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides:

            "SEC. 2.        Discretionary execution. —

            (a)     Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

            After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

            Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing".

            In its order of February 13, 1996, the respondent court cited the "advanced age" and "precarious state of health" of the private respondent in granting the latter's motion for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Even on this score, We have to sustain the respondent court. The "advanced age" and "weak health" of a prevailing party constitute valid and "good reasons" for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. So says the Supreme Court in Borja v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 847 [1991], where the High Court shared a party's apprehension that at age 76, "he will not be long for this world and may not enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he finally passes away". Here, petitioner Feliciano Wycoco was already 71 years old as of November 29, 1995 when he filed before the respondent court his motion for execution pending appeal (Petition, pp. 8-9). By this time, private respondent must be of approximately the same age as the party in Borja. He would definitely surpass that age should this decision be elevated by the petitioner to Supreme Court. With private respondent's present state of health, there is the grim possibility that he may not be around anymore to receive the payment for his property which the DAR had taken possession of some eight (8) years ago. To borrow the words of the High Court in Borja: "By that time, (private respondent) may be facing a different judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal".    THIASE

            WHEREFORE,  the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

            With costs against the petitioner.

            SO ORDERED.

            Vasquez, Jr. and Regino, JJ., concur.