EIGHTH DIVISION

 

[CA-G.R. CV No. 36764.  May 6, 1999.]

 

FLORENCIO PERNIA, MAMERTA PERNIA and IGNACIO LAURESTA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. PLACIDO RECAMARA, REMEDIOS RECAMARA and GERONIMO RECAMARA, defendants-appellants.

 

D E C I S I O N

 

BRAWNER, J p:

            The present Appeal seeks to reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Marinduque, Branch XXXVIII, Fourth Judicial Region, Boac Marinduque, in Civil Case No. 83-12 denominated as one for Damages.

            Plaintiff-appellee Florencio Pernia owns a parcel of land located somewhere in Malibago, Torrijos, Marinduque which is enclosed by a barbwire fence and partly planted to banana plants and fruit bearing coconut trees while plaintiff-appellee Mamerta Pernia owns the piece of agricultural land adjacent to that of Florencio's. Mamerta's land is allegedly planted to fruit bearing coconut trees and had a small nursery of coconut seedlings. Plaintiff-appellee Ignacio Lauresta; on the otherhand, is the hired hand of Florencio.    SaHTCE

            In their Complaint plaintiffs-appellees alleged that on 20 April 1983, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the morning, defendant-appellant Geronimo Recamara, a seven-year-old minor son of defendants-appellants Placido and Remedios Recamara and living in their company, negligently and recklessly set fire to a part of the dried underbushes and wild trees on defendants-appellants' land and because no precautionary measures were taken or done by defendants-appellants to prevent the fire from reaching adjoining properties, the fire spread until defendants-appellants and their neighbors could not subdue it anymore. As a result of the fire, the following properties of plaintiffs-appellees allegedly got totally burned to wit:

 

Of Florendo Pernia

(a)        975 meters of barbwire which is equivalent to 26 rolls valued at P6500 @ P250 a roll;

(b)        a building used in threshing palay together with 6 buri mats for drying the grain valued at P400;

(c)        40 fruit-bearing banana plants (latordan) valued at P800 @ P20 a plant;

(d)        52 fruit-bearing coconut trees which yield an income of about P259.97 per harvest, and each tree valued at P70 per tree;

(e)        Plaintiff Florencio Pernia hired six (6) laborers to help him repair the barbwire fence of his land, for which he spent P945;

or a total damage of P12,285.

 

Of Mamerta Pernia

(a)        20 fruit-bearing coconut trees which yield an income of about P35 per harvest and each tree valued at P70 per tree;

(b)        250 coconut seedlings valued at P500 @ P200 per seeding or a total of about P1900.

 

Of Ignacio Lauresta

            Because of the destruction of the barbwire fence, Florencio Pernia's cattles strayed into and fed upon the palay on, Ignacio Lauresta's ricefield; said ricefield normally yields five (5) cavanes of palay per harvest, valued at P350 @ P70 per cavan;

            or a grand total damage in the amount of Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Five (P14,535) Pesos, Philippine currency. 1

            On the otherhand, defendants-appellants contended in their Answer that only a portion of plaintiff-appellee Florencio Pernia's grazing land is fenced with and the banana plants and fruit-bearing trees were planted outside the perimeter of the fence. Defendants-appellants denied that plaintiff-appellee Mamerta Pernia's land is planted to fruit-bearing trees. They further claimed that it does not have a small nursery of coconut seedlings; that if the land has improvements at all, the same belong to Macaria Pernia, sister of Florencio. Defendants-appellants further argued that the riceland being farmed by Ignacio Lauresta could not have been ready for harvest as alleged since the palay planted thereon had been already harvested in March, 1983. Defendants-appellants admit that they made a "kaingin" by cutting underbushes which they left to burn in the sun preparatory to burning at the proper time but they denied having cut wild trees as well. More importantly, defendants-appellants claimed that they have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of plaintiffs-appellees' contention that Geronimo Recamara negligently and recklessly set fire to a part of the dried underbushes which eventually led to the burning of the latter's properties. 2 Defendants-appellants, through they testimony of Remedios Recamara, instead sought to prove that during the incident Geronimo was sleeping with his elder sister Francisca in their house while Remedios herself was out in the irrigation canal washing clothes while her husband Placido was in Torrijos securing her residence certificate. 3

            After trial, the court a quo ruled in favor of plaintiffs-appellees. The court relied on the uncorroborated testimony of Ignacio Lauresta that he actually saw defendant spouses Placido and Remedios Recamara set on fire the dried underbushes on their land. At the same time the court rejected their defense of denial and alibi and held as follows:

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            This Court therefore found the defendants negligent and at fault in failing to take precautionary measures to prevent the burning of the plaintiffs' properties before setting fire at their kaingin.

            Per Commissioner's Report, the following were found to have been burned:

1)         That there are forty (40) remnants completely burned coconut trees;

2)         There is no more remnant of banana plants that were completely burned because the land has already been plowed;

3)         That two (2) burned posts and three (3) burned "Panukuran" with a size of 2 x 6 x 16 of the burned "kamalig" are still visible on site;

4)         The barbwire-fence consisting of four (4) "Andanas" was burned. The total burned portion of each "Andana" is Nine Hundred Seventy Five (975) meters long or a total length of 3900 meters.

            WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, except Geronimo Recamara (the minor defendant).

1.      Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Florencio Pernia the sum of P12,285.00 representing:

A 1.     975 meters of barbwire or 26 rolls at P250.00/roll or P6,500.00; a wire once exposed to fire becomes brittle and easily breaks;

2.      Small building and six (6) buri mats - P400.00;

3.      25 fruit bearing banana plants at P20.00 per plant or P800.00 as admitted by Pernia;

4.      40 fruit bearing trees - P70.00/tree or P2,800.00;

5.      P945.00 paid to the laborers.

B.         To pay plaintiff Mamerta Pernia jointly and severally the sum of P1,900.00 representing:

1.      Payment for 20 coconut fruit bearing coconut trees at P79.00 per tree; and

2.      250 coconut seedlings valued at P500.00 or P2.00 per seeding.

C.        To pay plaintiff Ignacio Lauresta jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 representing the destroyed palay.

2.      Ordering plaintiffs to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 moral damages and the further sum of P500.00 exemplary damages;

3.      To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 as and for attorneys fees;

4.      To pay jointly and severally the cost of suit; and

5.      Further dismissing defendants' counterclaim.

            SO ORDERED. 4

            Unsatisfied, defendants-appellants elevated the case to Us assigning the following as errors. 5

1.         The trial court gravely erred in relying on the uncorroborated testimony of Ignacio Lauresta whose testimony is contrary to that of another witness for the plaintiff; and

2.         Granting without admitting that defendants could be held responsible for the burning of the properties of the plaintiffs, the award of damages is excessive compared to the extent of actual damage caused.

            These assignment of errors clearly raise two issues for Our determination:

1.         Whether or not the trial court erred in relying upon the uncorroborated testimony of Ignacio Lauresta which is allegedly contrary to the testimony of Remedios Apostol; and

2.         Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

            We agree with the ruling of the trial court finding defendants-appellants, Geronimo Recamara, liable for damages to plaintiffs-appellees, albeit on a different basis. Whereas the trial court found them liable based on their alleged own act of negligence in setting the underbushes on fire without taking necessary precautions, We find that it was their minor son Geronimo who started the fire but nevertheless We hold them responsible for the damage caused by their son who lives in their company.    ADTCaI

            Defendants-appellants contend that it was an error on the part of the trial court to have relied on the testimony of Ignacio Lauresta when the same is different from the allegations in the complaint and from the testimony of Remedios Apostol, another witness for plaintiffs-appellees, who testified on Exhibit "B", the affidavit which served as the basis for the allegations made in the complaint. A close perusal of the records would show that the alleged discrepancy between Exhibit "B" and the testimony thereon of Remedios Apostol, on one hand and the testimony of Ignacio Lauresta on the other hand, is more apparent than real.

            Remedios Apostol testified that she conducted an ocular inspection of the Recamaras' place immediately after the incident subject of this controversy. Her investigation led her to conclude that defendant-appellant Geronimo Recamara, the minor, was the one who started the fire. These findings were accordingly reduced into writing and was duly signed by Geronimo and his parents, herein defendants-appellants, Placido and Remedios Recamara, and was presented during the trial of the case as Exhibit "B". Specifically, Exhibit "B" provides:

            "Ang maikling salaysay ng batang si Geronimo tungkol sa naganap na sunog noong Miyerkules, ika-20 ng Abril, humigit kumulang ang oras 11:00 ng umaga. Ang bata ay nag tapung (sic) sa paligid ng kanilang bahay ng kasalukuyan hindi namalayan ng kasamahan. Sila at ang kapatid na si Francisca  na nakatulog sa pagsuso ng bagong anak.

            Ito ay pinagsikapan nilang patayin ang apoy ngunit hindi na na ampula (sic) haggang sa ito ay lumaganap sa ilang karatigan. Ang sinasabi kong sila ay ang kanyan (sic) Ina na si Remedios at ang manugang na si Tony ang sumagawa na pag aampula ng makita nila ang apoy." 6

            Ignacio Lauresta, on the otherhand, testified as follows:

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"Q:       Going back to the question where you allegedly saw Placido and Remedios Recamara set on fire their kaingin, my question to you is: how did the couple set on fire their kaingin?

"A:       At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning when I was pasturing my carabao, I saw the couple put out the fire.

"Q:       Let us clarify this. Which is true or correct: at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of April 20, 1983, you allegedly saw the couple Remedios and Placido Recamara set on fire their kaingin or they were merely putting out the fire?

"A:       They were putting out the fire, sir.

"Q:       Which portion of their kaingin was burned at the time they were putting out the fire?

"A        The big fire was spreading to the land of the Pernias and the portion that they were trying to put out the fire was leading to their house, sir." 7

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            It is evident from the foregoing that defendant-appellant Geronimo was the one who started the fire while defendants-appellants Remedios and Placido were the one who put out the fire. The fact that Exhibit "B" and the testimony of Remedios Apostol thereon point to Tony as the person who helped defendant-appellant Remedios Recamara to put out the fire would not necessarily negate the positive identification of Ignacio Lauresta that defendant-appellant Placido Recamara and his wife were the ones who tried to put out the fire. The findings of Remedios Apostol is only based after all upon her investigation of the incident while the testimony of Ignacio Lauresta is based on his own personal knowledge. Basic is the rule that the testimony of an eyewitness is accorded great probative value.

            Defendant-appellant Remedios Recamara, and Honorata Morales, testified that at the time when the fire occurred, defendant appellant Placido Recamara was in Torrijos, Marinduque securing the residence certificate of Remedios. Placido allegedly returned at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. These testimonies could not prevail against the positive identification of Ignacio Lauresta that he saw both defendants-appellants Placido and Remedios Recamara put out the fire at around 10:00 o' clock in the morning of 20 April 1983. In People vs. Lopez 8 the Supreme Court held that denial and alibi can not prevail over the positive identification by an eyewitness who has no untoward motive to falsely testify.

            To prove that Placido was indeed securing Remedios' residence certificate at the time of the incident, defendants-appellants presented the said residence certificate as Exhibit "1". 9 A close perusal of the same reveals that the residence is in the name of Remedios Magdalita and not in the name of defendant-appellant Remedios Recamara. Hence, We can not give credence to the same. Time and again the Supreme Court ruled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 10 Hence, between the self-serving testimony and the positive identification of an eyewitness, the latter deserves greater credence. 11 Besides, as pointed out by the trial court residence certificate are regularly issued to the person who is purchasing the same. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty would prevent us, therefore, from giving credit to the allegation that the public officials who are in charge with the issuance of residence certificates have issued the same to Placido Recamara and not to Remedios Recamara if Remedios Recamara is indeed the same Remedios Magdalita whose name appears thereon.

            In relying upon Exhibit "B" which pointed to Geronimo as the one responsible for starting the fire, we are not unmindful of the fact that as a rule, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay. However, this rule would not apply when the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 12 In the case at bar, Remedios Apostol testified on the contents of Exhibit "B". During her direct examination, Apostol testified as follows:

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"Q:       Do you remember having investigated a case at Brgy. Malibago in connection with your duty or duties as councilwoman of Brgy. Malibago?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       Do you remember having reduced your Investigation in writing?

"A:       Yes, sir.

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"Q:       I am showing you a document previously marked as Exhibit B . . . Will you please examine this document and tell the court if you still recognize the same?

"A:       This Is the document regarding my investigation, sir.

"Q:       At the foot of the main text of the document marked Exhibit B, I noticed the following: "Ang Bata" with the signature Geronimo marked Exhibit 1 then followed by Ina with the signature opposite which reads Remedios M. Recamara marked Exhibit B-2, followed by Ama with the signature opposite which reads Placido Recamara marked Exhibit B-3 were those among the persons you Investigated?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       I am going to read the main text: "Ang maikling salaysay ng batang si Geronimo tungkol sa naganap na sunog noong Mierkoles ika-20 ng Abril, humigit kumulang ang oras 11:00 ng umaga. Ang bata ay nagtap-ong sa paligid ng kanilang bahay ng kasalukuyang hindi namamalayan ng kasamahan. Sila at ang kapatid na si Francisca na nakakatulog sa pagpapasuso ng bagong anak." Who is this batang "si Geronimo" being referred to in the first paragraph of this investigation report?

"A:       The son of defendant Placido and Remedios, sir.

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"Q:       Where did you conduct the investigation regarding the fire?

"A:       At the house of Placido Recamara, sir.

"Q:       At sitio Masilig, Brgy. Malibago?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       After the three signatures of the defendants are the following remarks and I quote: "na kung sakali na sila ay kakailanganin ng kapitan o batas ay sila'y malugod na makikipag-ugnayan o maglalahad ng mga katuwiran o salaysay na pag-uusapan sa pangyayari". From whom did you gather the fact that they are willing to appear?

"A:       From them, sir.

"Q:       You are referring to the three defendants?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       From whom did you gather the facts embodied in Exh. B-7 that they did not deby (sic) the facts of the incident or in tagalog, sila ay hindi tatangi.

"A:       From them, sir.

"Q:       At the last portion marked Exh. B-4 is a signature which reads "Remedios R. Apostol", whose signature is that?

"A:       Mine, sir." 13

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            Remedios Apostol was also subjected to cross-examination by defendants-appellants. The main function of cross-examination is to discredit the testimony of the witness. What happened in this case is the exact opposite. Not only did the cross-examination clarify and elucidate Remedios Apostol's testimony on direct, it instead strengthened it. We are hereunder reproducing at length the testimony to prove our point.    AcSCaI

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"Q:       You testified during the last hearing that you personally prepared Exhibit B and its sub-exhibits, is that correct?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       And this was written, as it appeared on Exhibit B. On April 22, 1983, is that correct?

"A:       Yes, sir.

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"Q:       Before the defendants namely: Placido Recamara, Remedios Recamara and Geronimo Recamara (sic) affixed their signatures, did you inform them about the possible consequences just in case they will sign Exhibit B?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       What did you tell defendants Placido Recamara, Remedios Recamara, and Geronimo Recamara before they allegedly sign Exhibit B?

"A:       I told them before they sign their signature, the moment they sign it, that would mean that they do not deny.

"Q:       They do not deny what?

"A:       They do not deny to the effect that their son Geronimo who burned and that their son is still minor and it is their responsibility.

"Q:       Did you inform them before defendants allegedly sign Exhibit B that they may be charged civilly or criminally in court because of signing Exhibit B?

"A:       I told them, sir, as a matters of fact, I even put on the left part of the statement that they do not deny.

"Q:       Before the defendants sign (sic) Exhibit B, did you tell them "Pirmahan ninyo at wala namang mangyayari sa inyo" or words of similar import?

"A:       I told them also that they just sign this to prove that I even visited the place where the fire occurred because it is one of my duties.

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"Q:       And before the defendants allegedly signed or affirmed their signatures, did you read to them the contents of Exhibit B?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       How many times did you read to them the contents of Exhibit B?

"A:       Two (2 )times, sir.

"Q:       And after you read to them the contents of Exhibit B, you asked them to affix their signatures.

            Atty. Caballes:

            'The witness already testified that she asked the consequences regarding Exhibit B.

            Atty. De Luna — continuing:

"Q:       Now, you said a while ago that you explained to the defendants the possible consequences that may happen to them if they sign Exhibit B. When did you explain to them the consequences, was it before, or after signing Exhibit B?

"A:       Before they signed, sir.

"Q:       So, after reminding them of the consequences, did you asked them to sign Exhibit B?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       Who signed first among the defendants on Exhibit B?

"A:       First to sign was Geronimo, second is the mother Remedios Recamara and the third was Placido Recamara, the father, sir.

"Q:       After the defendants allegedly affixed their signatures, what happened next?

"A:       After they signed their respective signatures, I signed my name affirming the truth that I was really the one who prepared that document, sir." 14

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            Furthermore, defendant-appellant Remedios Recamara was duly confronted with the contents of Exhibit "B" as well as by the testimony of Apostol thereon during her own direct examination thus:

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"Q:       When councilwoman Remedios Apostol testified in this case, she testified among others that she went to your house immediately after April 20, 1983, is that correct?

"A:       Yes, sir.

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"Q:       And were you able to know her purpose in coming to your house?

"A:       Yes, sir. She went to our house because the coconut plantation was burned.

Q:        And whose coconut plantation was burned?

"A:       Florencio Pernia's plantation, sir.

"Q:       Aside from telling you that she will investigate the burning of the plantation, what did councilwoman Apostol tell you?

"A:       She told me that she will make a document to be signed by us, sir.

"Q:       And did you know if councilwoman Remedios Apostol make a document?

"A:       Yes, sir. she made a document.

"Q:       What was your reaction when councilwoman Remedios Apostol told you that she will make a document?

"A:       She told us that we were the suspects because we are on the lower level of the land, sir.

"Q:       What was your answer when she told you or informed you that you are one of the suspects because you are living at the lower portion of the land?

"A:       I told her that when the incident happened, we were not in our house, sir.

"Q:       I will show you a document which is now marked as Exhibit B for the plaintiff located on page 67 of the record. Will you be able to identify this document?

"A:       This is not the one, sir. The one she made on our house is short. Not like this.

"Q:       What do you mean by short?

"A:       That the document made by Remedios Apostol in our house was a short document.

"Q:       There appears at the bottom of this document now marked Exhibit B a signature. Tell us, do you recognize this signature?

"A:       The signature of my son is not like that. When he signed the document, it is not in the line because at the time, he was just a kinder.

"Q:       So, Geronimo Recamara was just a kindergarten pupil at that time?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       There appears a signature also before the word Ina. Can you recognize that signature?

"A:       I signed at the lower portion of the document as (sic) not at the upper portion of the document as shown in Exhibit B, sir.

"Q:       Again, there appears a signature before the word Ama. Can you tell whose signature is this?

"A:       I do not know whose signature is that, sir.

"Q:       Tell us, you said that councilwoman Remedios Apostol prepared this document marked Exhibit B. Who actually wrote the contents of the document she prepared?

"A:       She was the one who wrote the document, sir. But that is not the document I am referring. That is another document.

"Q:       And where is now the document which you described as a short document?

"A:       It is in the possession of Remedios Apostol, sir.

"Q:       After councilwoman Remedios Apostol finished preparing the document, what did she tell you, if any?

"A:       She asked me to sign the document, anyway, we were not in our place when the incident happened. She told us not to be afraid.

"Q:       In other words, Remedios Apostol was asking you to sign the short document which you mentioned a while ago, is that correct?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       And what else did she tell you when you were asked to sign the short document?

"A:       She forced me to sign the document and threatened me if I will not sign the same, she might request a soldier to make me sign it. She told me "Baka PC pa ang magpapapirma sa iyo".

"Q:       What was your answer, if you answered anything?

"A:       I told my husband, "pirma na, Cido at mahuhuli na tayo pagpunta sa tiangge."

"Q:       And this tiangge that you are referring to is what tiangge?

"A:       Tiangge of Tigwi, sir.

"Q:       Aside whta (sic) councilwoman Remedios Apostol told you that "Baka PC pa ang magpapirma sa inyo" what else did she tell you to persuade you to sign the document?

"A:       She said that we are not yet ready to burn our kaingin, in fact, our plants and coconuts were burned.

"Q:       While councilwoman Remedios Apostol was persuading or convincing you to sign the document, what did she do next?

"A:       I told her we will just tell the truth before the court. "Bahala na kaming magsabi ng katotohanan sa Hukuman."

"Q:       And were you able to sign the document which you described to be a short one?

"A:       Yes, sir. I signed it.

"Q:       Who signed first?

"A:       Geronimo, sir.

"Q:       And who signed next to him?

"A:       Placido, sir.

"Q:       And the last?

"A.       I was the last to sign, sir.

"Q:       After you signed the document, what did councilwoman Remedios Apostol do?

"A:       She went home with the short document we signed, sir.

"Q:       How many copies of that short document which you signed was prepared by councilwoman Remedios Apostol?

"A:       One copy only, sir.

"Q:       Do you know if before you signed the document, councilwoman Remedios Apostol read and explained the consequences of what was embodied in the document?

"A:       Yes, sir. She read it to us.

"Q:       Remedios Apostol read the document which you described as a short one?

"A:       Yes, sir." 15

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            When cross-examined, Remedios Recamara testified as follows:

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"Q:       In connection with this incident on April 20, 1983 when the landholding of Mr. Florencio Pernia and other properties adjacent thereto. Including your land were burned Remedios Apostol investigated you and your son, Geronimo?

"A:       Yes, sir.

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"Q:       And the investigation conducted by Remedios of you and Geronimo about this incident April 20, 1983 which resulted in the burning of Mr. Pernia's landholdings and other adjacent properties transpired on April 22, 1983, about two days following the said burning?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       Prior to April 22, 1983, did you and Remedios Apostol have any cause of animosity or misunderstanding or any quarrel?

"A:       None, sir.

"Q:       Prior to the same date, April 22, 1983, did councilwoman Remedios Apostol and your husband Placido Recamara have any cause for animosity or misunderstanding or quarrel anytime?

"A:       None, sir.

"Q:       You claim that Remedios Apostol testified falsely against you and your son Geronimo in connection with this document marked Exh. B and some portions marked sub-exhibits B-1 etc. Do you know of any reason why Remedios Apostol would testifies (sic) falsely against you and your son Geronimo?    HSDaTC

"A:       She told me that it was an order of the Barangay Captain to visit the burned portion and according to the Barangay Captain that is her duty?

"Q:       But you do not know of any reason why Remedios Apostol, the councilwoman who conducted the investigation upon order of the Barangay Captain, would testify falsely against you and your son Geronimo in connection with this investigation now embodied in Exh. B?

"A:       I do not know of any reason, sir.

"Q:       You and Remedios are still on speaking terms up to the present?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       So, from April 20, 1983 up to now, you and Remedios have been in good terms and you are in speaking terms?

"A.:      Yes, sir.

"Q:       Similarly, prior to April 20, 1983 you and Remedios Apostol and your husband were of the same good relation and/or terms?

"A:       Yes, sir." 16

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            We give more credence to the testimony of Remedios Apostol rather than the testimony of Remedios Recamara with respect to Exhibit "B". As We explained earlier, denial and alibi can not prevail over the positive identification of an eyewitness who has no reason to falsely testify. 17 Remedios Apostol personally investigated the incident and her investigation was accordingly reduced into writing which is affirmed by defendants-appellants themselves in her presence when the latter affixed their signatures in the written instrument. Remedios Recamara denied that Exhibit "B" was the written instrument which she and her co-defendants signed allegedly through intimidation on the part of Apostol. Yet, Recamara testified that she and her co-defendants have been and are still in good terms with Apostol. This, therefore, negates any motive on the part of Apostol to falsely testify against them. Besides, if it is indeed true that Remedios Recamara and her co-defendants were intimidated by Apostol to sign the written instrument, no presented as Exhibit "B", then the Recamaras would have refrained from maintaining their harmonious relationship with Apostol. But the Recamaras did not do so. On the otherhand, as testified by Remedios Recamara, she and Apostol remained in good terms.

            The act of affixing their signatures on Exhibit "B" constitutes an admission on the part of defendants-appellants that Geronimo Recamara is the one who started the fire on August 20, 1983. An admission is defined as a voluntary acknowledgment in express terms or by implication, by a party in interest or by another by whose statement he is legally bound, against his interest, of the existence or truth of a fact in dispute material to the issue. 18 Section 26, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides:

            Sec. 26:         Admissions of a party. — The act, omission or declaration of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

            This rule is based upon the presumption that no man could declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. A man's act, conduct or declaration, wherever made, provided they are voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. 19 Hence, by so signing Exhibit "B", defendants-appellants voluntarily admitted the participation of Geronimo in the fire which burned plaintiffs-appellees' properties. Their act is therefore admissible in evidence against them which may be duly appreciated in the absence of other credible proof to the contrary.

            Since Geronimo Recamara was the one who started the fire that burned plaintiff-appellees' properties, his parents are liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 221 of the Family Code. Article 2176 provides:

            ART. 2176:                     Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

            Article 2180, on the otherhand, states:

            ART. 2180:                     The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own act or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

            The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned proved that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

            Article 2180 of the New Civil Code is partly modified by Article 221 of the Family Code which reads:

            ART. 221:                       Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

            There foregoing legal provisions fix the vicarious, yet primary, liability of parents over the acts or omissions of their minor children who live in their company when these parents have failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising their children. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Art. 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or the omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Art. 2180 in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of their vicarious, although primary liability as in Art. 2176, is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission, The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Art. 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. 20

            In the case at bar, defendants-appellants Placido and Remedios Recamara failed to show to the Court that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising their minor son Geronimo. Therefore, they are liable for Geronimo's acts in causing damage to plaintiff-appellees.

            Is the award of damages proper?

            Except for the amount of P1400.00 representing the value of the fruit coconut trees of plaintiff-appellee Mamerta Pernia, the award for actual or compensatory damages is proper and well supported by the evidence on record.    ECHSDc

            The sum of P6,500.00 representing the cost of the 975 meters barbwire use by plaintiff-appellee Florencio Pernia to repair his fence as well as the sum of P2,800 representing the value of 40 fruit-bearing coconut plants that were burned based on the Commissioner's Report that was made as a basis for the trial court's decision. 21

            The Commissioner's Report 22 likewise made the finding that "two (2) burned posts and three (3) burned "Panukuran" with a size of 2 x 6 x 16 of the burned "kamalig" are still visible on site". This is proof that indeed plaintiff-appellee Pernia's "kamalig" was gutted by fire thereby justifying the award of P400.00 as damages in his favor. The said sum also represents the cost of six (6) buri mats which were likewise burned as testified to by Florencio Pernia himself during the trial. 23

            With respect to the sum of P800.00 representing the value of the 25 fruit bearing banana plants, the said amount is supported by the testimony of plaintiff-appellee Florencio Pernia during the trial thus:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       You testified during the direct examination that there were 40 banana plants that were destroyed and 15 banana plants that were exposed to heat were included in the 40 banana plants that you mentioned.

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       So, there were only 25 banana plants that were completely destroyed?

"A:       Yes, sir.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       In whose presence did you count the 15 banana plants that were exposed by heat?

"A:       In the presence of my men including Ignacio Lauresta, sir." 24

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            Finally, with respect to the P945 awarded to Pernia as payment for the laborers who repaired his fence, Pernia himself testified as follows:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       You employed six (6) workers. How much did you pay per worker?

"A:       P15.00 a day per worker, sir.

"Q:       And you testified that they worked for 63 days after the incident on April 20, 1983?

"A:       One worked 63 days and I am included in that and i have a payroll, sir.

"Q:       What about the other five workers, did they worked for 63 days?

            Atty. Caballes

            "All in all there were 63 days work by the laborers including himself.

            Atty. de Luna (continuing)

"Q:       Your six workers including yourself worked for 63 days continuously?

"A:       The work of sic (6) persons including myself is equivalent to 63 days including myself (sic), sir." 25

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            To support his testimony, plaintiff-appellee Florencio Pernia presented Exhibit "A" 26 showing the names of seven (7) people and the number of days each of these people worked to repair the fence 27 complete with their signatures. 28 Five (5) persons, out of the seven (7) worked for nine (9) days; one (1) worked for six (6) days; and the last one (1) worked for 12 days. The total number of working days is 63. Each worker is paid P15.00 a day thereby making a total of P945.00.

            Romulo Pernia and Ignacio Lauresta, two of the workers who were hired to repair the fence also testified. Romulo Pernia testified thus:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       How many days did you work for the refencing of the cattle ranch?

"A:       We worked for 9 days, sir.

"Q:       How much did each of you received per day?

"A:       P25.00 per day, sir.

'"Q:      How many workers were there when you worked in the cattle ranch including yourself?

"A:       We were 7 all in all who worked in the refencing of the cattle ranch, sir." 29

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            Ignacio Lauresta made the following testimony:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       Do you know the persons whom Florencio employed to repair the burned barbwire fence of his cattle ranch?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       How many were employed by Florencio?

"A:       He hired 6 persons and himself.

"Q:       How much did he pay you per day of service?

"A:       P15.00 a day." 30

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            From these testimonies, the grant of P945 to Florencio Pernia is justified. In fact, Florencio Pernia himself testified that his workers received P15.00 daily, of P25.00 as testified to by Romulo Pernia, thereby lessening the amount of damages that he may claim for the repair of his barbwire fence. This attitude lends credence to his claim. Moreover, except as to the amount paid to the workers daily, his testimony on the matter is corroborated by other witnesses. The minor discrepancy, therefore, will not affect the credibility of his claim. The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or weight of their testimony. 31 Slight variations in the testimonies of witnesses as to minor and inconsequential details or collateral matters do not affect their credibility. Said variations, in fact, are indicative of truth and slight contradictions even serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness' testimony proving that it was not rehearsed. 32

            As to the damages awarded to plaintiff-appellee Mamerta Pernia, We find that the court erred when it awarded the sum of P1400.00 for the fruit-bearing coconut trees that were allegedly burned. Our basis in saying so is the testimony of Ignacio Lauresta, to wit:    DEICTS

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       The twenty (20) fruit bearing coconut trees that were burned, were they burned completely or some are burned partially?

"A:       The twenty (20) fruit bearing coconut trees were burned but now they all recovered, sir." 33

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            It is clear, therefore that Mamerta Pernia is not entitled to damages in so far as the fruit bearing coconut trees are concerned since they were not actually damaged by the fire. With respect, however, to the coconut seedlings, We find that they were completely destroyed by the fire hence the award of P500.00 for them is proper. This is supported by the testimonies of both Florencio Pernia and Ignacio Lauresta. Florencio Pernia testified as follows:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       The two hundred fifty coconut seedlings that were allegedly burned were they completely burned or some survived?

"A:       All were totally burned, sir.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       Did you actually or personally count the destroyed two hundred fifty coconuts seedlings (sic) situated in the land of Mamerta Pernia?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       Who were present when you personally counted the destroyed coconut (sic) seedlings in the land of Mamerta Pernia?

"A:       Ignacio Lauresta was also present, sir." 34

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            While Ignacio Lauresta testified as follows:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       Who made the actual counting of the P250 burned coconut seedlings?

"A:       I was the one who counted those seedlings, sir.

"Q:       And while you are actually counting the coconut seedlings, Florencio Pernia was beside you, is that correct?

"A:       Yes, sir, and he was the one who asked me to count the coconut seedlings that were burned." 35

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            Again, notwithstanding the minor inconsistency as to who between Florencio Pernia and Ignacio Lauresta actually did the counting of the burned coconut seedlings, the fact is clear that there were 250 coconut seedlings that were burned by the fire.

            The award of P500.00 to Ignacio Lauresta for his unharvested palay that was eaten by stray cows is also proper. To this effect, Lauresta testified:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       So, for clarity, you mean to tell us that when you arrived at the place where your palay was planted, the 20 cows have already eaten your palay, is that correct?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       But the 20 caws were still there in your ricefield at the time that you arrived?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       And that is the reason why you concluded that it was the 20 cows of Florencio Pernia that consumed all your palay there?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       But you can not deny that some of the people in the vicinity in the burned place also won (sic) animals like carabaos and cows?

"A:       Only Florencio Pernia, sir.

"Q:       You mean to tell us that only Florencio Pernia own cows within that grazing land.    CIHAED

"A:       That pasture land is his, that is why, those cows belong to him." 36

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            Defendants-appellants contended that Lauresta is a mere hired hand of Florencio Pernia hence he is not entitled to the harvest of the riceland he farms. It is likewise claimed that the rice planted on the riceland in question was already harvested as early as March of 1983. However, it was established by the testimonies of Florencio Pernia and Ignacio Lauresta that while Pernia owns the riceland, Lauresta, as a tenant, has a share in the harvests thereof. And while most of the rice were already harvested, there were some still that are yet to be harvested. Pernia testified thus:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       You testified among other things during the last hearing that the harvested palay were eaten by astray cows because the fence were (sic) burned, is that correct?

"A:       Only the unharvested palay in one pitak, sir.

"Q:       And that one pitak is owned by you, is that correct?

"A:       The land was mine but the palay was the share of my tenant, sir. 37

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            Lauresta, on the otherhand made the following testimony:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"Q:       You said that the palay on the ricefield that you were guarding against mayas were your palay, although the land belongs to Florencio. Do you claim that you own the palay although the riceland belongs to Florencio?

"A:       The land is owned by Florencio but I was the one farming that land.

"Q:       What was your arrangement with Florencio?

"A:       It will be divided equally into two.

"Q:       How many pitak or rice boxes did you cultivate and plant with palay for and in behalf of Florencio?

"A:       Six pilapil, sir.

"Q:       Now, according to you, there was only one pitak of rice box still planted with ripening palay. What happened to the other 5 boxes of ricefield that you had planted with palay?

"A:       The 5 pitak were already harvested and the remaining one pitak was burned.    HTcADC

"Q:       Of the 5 rice boxes or pitak that had already been harvested of palay earlier, how many pitak has been already the share or shares of Florencio?

"A:       Florencio had no more share in that 5 pitak, those were exclusively my share.

"Q:       So your exclusive shares were the palay that you planted to those 5 rice boxes?

"A:       Yes, sir.

"Q:       Could you tell the court how much is the value of the palay that was eaten by the cattles that strayed into the ricefield because of the destruction of the barbwires as a result of the fire?

"A:       One cavan costs P100.00.

"Q:       How many cavans could have been realized from that one pitak that had not yet been harvested of palay and which you are guarding against mayas when the fire occurred in the kaingin of the defendants?

"A:       I could harvest there 5 cavans, sir." 38

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            We find that the trial court erred when it awarded moral damages to plaintiffs-appellees.

            The requisites for the award of moral damages are: (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code 39 Article 2219 Provides:

            ART. 2219:   Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1)        A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2)        Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3)        Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4)        Adultery or concubinage;

(5)        Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6)        Illegal search;

(7)        Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8)        Malicious prosecution;

(9)        Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10)      Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

            The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

            The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

            Article 2220, on the otherhand, reads:

            ART. 2220:                     Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

            In the case at bar, it is true that plaintiffs-appellees has suffered an injury but the same did not arise from any of the grounds mentioned in Articles 2219 and 2220. Therefore, they are not entitled to moral damages.

            Plaintiffs-appellees are entitled, however, to exemplary damages which is governed by Articles 2229 to 2234 of the New Civil Code. Article 2234 specifically provides:

            ART. 2234:                     While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether not exemplary damages should be awarded. . . .

            We have upheld plaintiffs-appellees right to compensatory or actual damages. We can therefore sustain their right to claim exemplary damages for defendants-appellants' negligence resulting in the loss of their income-bearing properties. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. 40 They are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. 41 Defendants-appellants' negligent application of the slash and burn method of farming if not corrected would yield to the destruction not only of farm properties but of countless trees and woodcrops as well which serve as human shelter for nature's fury.

            Finally, the trial court did not commit any error when it awarded the sum of P2,000.00 for Attorney's Fees. Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides:    CSIHDA

            ART. 2208:                     In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be awarded except:

(1)        When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2)        When the defendant's acts or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3)        In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4)        In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5)        Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6)        In actions for legal support;

(7)        In actions for the recovery of verges of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8)        In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability law;

(9)        In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from crime;

(10)      When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11)      In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

            Plaintiffs-appellees are clearly entitled to attorney's fees based on numbers 1, 2 and 5. The sum of P2000.00 awarded by the trial court is therefore sufficient to cover plaintiffs-appellees' attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation.

            Lastly, the trial court did not err in ordering defendants-appellants to pay the cost of suit. Under Section 1, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court, the cost of suit is allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course but always subject to the discretion of the court. The trial court exercised judicial discretion when it allowed the cost of suit to plaintiffs-appellees. We find no reversible error in the exercise of such discretion.

            WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with slight MODIFICATION. Defendant-appellant Remedios Recamara, as the the surviving parent of the minor Geronimo Recamara, 42 is liable for damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees in the amount adjudged by the court a quo, except that the sum of P1400.00 awarded to Mamerta Pernia for the value of the twenty (20) coconut trees in her property which remain intact and the sum of P2000.00 for moral damages are DELETED.

            SO ORDERED.

            Sandoval-Gutierrez and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

  1.       "Complaint", Original Records, pp. 1-4.

  2.       "Answer", Original Records, pp. 9-11.

  3.       TSN, 23 September 1987, pp. 5-8.

  4.       Decision", Original Records, pp. 139-159.

  5.       Rollo, p. 88.

  6.       Exhibit "B", Original Records, p. 67.

  7.       TSN, 28 August 1985, pp. 6-11.

  8.       249 SCRA 610, 621 citing People vs. Morales, 241 SCRA 267.

  9.       Original Records, p. 109.

10.       People vs. Almania, 248 SCRA 486, 493.

11.       People vs. Sotto, 275 SCRA 191, 203.

12.       People's Bank and Trust Co. vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164, 166.

13.       TSN, October 2, 1986, pp. 3-10.

14.       TSN, March 18, 1987, pp. 2-5.

15.       TSN, February 16, 1988, pp. 15-21.

16.       TSN, May 4, 1988, pp. 14-19.

17.       People vs. Lopez, supra.

18.       Encyclopedia of Evidence cited in Francisco, Evidence, Second Edition, p. 175.

19.       Truby vs. Seybert, 12 Pa. St. 101, cited in U.S. vs. Ching Po, 2 Phil. 378, 583.

20.       Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 S 160, 162-163.

21.       "Commissioner's Report", Original Records, p. 130.

22.       Ibid.

23.       TSN, 26 June 1984, p. 11.

24.       TSN, 25 October 1989, pp. 15-17.

25.       TSN, 24 January 1985, pp. 5-6.

26.       Original Records, p. 66.

27.       Exhibit "A-1", Original Records, p. 66.

28.       Exhibit "A-2", Original Records, p. 66.

29.       TSN, 18 January 1990, pp. 8-9.

30.       TSN, 8 May 1985, pp. 10-12.

31.       People vs. Flores, 243 SCRA 374, 379 citing People vs. Payumo, 187 SCRA 64.

32.       Cortez vs. CA, 245 SCRA 198, 205.

33.       TSN, 1 July 1986, pp. 16-17.

34.       TSN, 24 November 1984, p. 20.

35.       TSN, 1 July 1986, p. 17.

36.       TSN, 2 July 1986, 9-11.

37.       TSN, 24 January 1985, p. 2.

38.       TSN, 5 May 1985, pp. 13-15.

39.       Del Mundo vs. CA, 240 SCRA 348, 357.

40.       People vs. Teehankee, Jr. 249 SCRA 54, 116.

41.       Article 2229, New Civil Code.

42.       Exhibit "2", Original Records, p. 110.