FIFTEENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 44717. February 13, 2001.]
RACHEL ABESAMIS, plaintiff-appellee and third party defendant-appellant, vs. VIRGINIA MARQUEZ VDA. DE PASCUA, ET. AL., defendants-appellants and third party plaintiff appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DACUDAO, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-658, the decretal portion whereof reads —
"WHEREFORE, in view of the above consideration, the court hereby renders judgment for the plaintiff Rachel Abesamis and against the defendants —
"1. Declaring plaintiff Rachel Abesamis as the lawful owner of the land described in paragraph 2 of her complaint;
"2. Declaring the defendants as mere trespassers or interlopers to the 3-hectare portion of the above-mentioned land and not tenant-tillers which status they want to be conferred to them for convenience:
"3. Ordering the defendants to vacate the three-hectare portion of the same parcel of land or to surrender to the plaintiff the peaceful possession thereof as a necessary and indispensable attribute of her ownership;
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly to the plaintiff her rightful share or unrealized fruits of the land in question 810 sacks of palay at 46 kilos per sack, dry, for a period nine (9) years or their money value at current prices obtaining on each year the delivery of the landowner's share became due, duly certified by the National Food Authority;
"5. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly to the plaintiff the sum of P15,000.00 by way of reasonable attorney's fees for having acted in evident bad faith thus compelling the plaintiff to file this case in court; and
"6. To pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"Roxas, Isabela, July 15, 1993.
"(SGD.) TEODULO E. MIRASOL
"Judge"
This case was originally instituted by the plaintiff-appellee through his father natural guardian Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis. 2
The salient material facts are fairly recited in the RTC decision, to wit—
"Rachel Abesamis, a minor, represented in this suit by her father Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis, as her natural guardian, seeks to recover a portion of a parcel of land registered in her name from the defendants who not only refused to surrender their unlawful possession but also failed to give the supposed share of the landowner claiming that they are tenants and as such cannot be ejected therefrom.
"In her complaint she alleges that her father bought a parcel of land located at San Manuel (formerly Callang), Isabela from one Pedro Pascua, the deceased husband of defendant Virginia Marquez vda. de Pascua and father of the other defendants. The deed of absolute sale executed by the spouses was registered and forthwith a new title was issued to her after the same land bought by her father was donated to her by her parents.
"She further alleged that after the deed of donation was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela on August 7, 1972, and forthwith Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-618 in her name was issued, the late Pedro Pascua with the help of his children, the defendants herein, continued cultivating and planting three (3) hectares of the land in bad faith without any oral or written contract either from her or her father, Dr. Abesamis, nor were they constituted as tenants, over the protests of the plaintiff and her guardian Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis and the repeated demands made to them to vacate the same and turn over the possession to the plaintiff and her father, Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis.
"That according to the plaintiff, Dr. Abesamis sought the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform (formerly Ministry) to determine the status of the defendants in the portion allegedly occupied by them without the consent of the plaintiff and that it was the finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that there was no legal ground for the defendants to occupy the portion in question and henceforth they were advised to vacate the same but they continued their unlawful occupation until Dr. Abesamis lodged their complaint with the barangay captain of the place to no avail because he was ignored by the defendants prompting the plaintiff to institute this action.
"In their answer with a third party complaint, the defendants denied all the material allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, claiming as an affirmative defense that they were constituted as plaintiff's tenants after the sale of the land in suit to Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis; that there was no such order from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for them to vacate the portion allegedly usurped by them. They even claim further that the officials of the MAR tried to induce them to sign an acknowledgment of a supposed debt of the late Pedro Pascua to Dr. Abesamis; that what they cultivated as tenants was the entire parcel of land but reduced to only three due to scheming maneuvers employed by Dr. Abesamis and his spouse and that they have been giving the landowner's share but because of serious losses imputable to the Abesamis spouses and abetted by drought the giving of shares to the landowner become an impossibility.
"The third-party complaint filed by the defendants reverberates what have been alleged by them in their answer and in addition they now seek to recover the more than one hectare portion of the land in dispute alleging harassment, deceit, fraud, threats, intimidation and force allegedly employed by the spouses, Dr. and Mrs. Reynaldo Abesamis, resulting in their dispossession, thereby making them suffer, for which they ask that spouses be made to pay the amount of P100,000.00 to compensate (sic) their (defendants') suffering.
"Defendants also claim their third-party complaint that an additional P150,000.00 be slapped against the spouses, for acts inimical and prejudicial to the defendants, resulting in losses due to disruption and prevention of the flow of water in the irrigation ditches towards defendants' farm by the Abesamis couple."
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On March 25, 1993, the date scheduled for the continuation of the reception of defendants-appellants' evidence, the latter's counsel failed to appear, thus, the RTC issued an order, 3 considering as waived the defendants-appellants' right to present evidence, and declaring the case submitted for decision.
So it was that on July 15, 1993 that the RTC handed down the assailed decision disposing of the case in the manner above-stated.
Defendants-appellants moved for a reconsideration thereof, 4 but this was by the RTC thumbed down in its order 5 of August 6, 1993.
Hence, this appeal, with defendants-appellants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants submitting the following assignment of errors 6 —
I
"THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR (SIC) ORDERING THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO PRESENT FURTHER EVIDENCE DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THEIR COUNSEL.
II
"THAT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY (SIC) RENDERING THE DECISION WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS OR INSUFFICIENTLY GATHERED EVIDENCES."
Except for the award of attorney's fees, and for the adjudgment requiring appellants to pay plaintiff her share of the unrealized profits, we find no merit in this appeal.
First off, it is an admitted fact that counsel of herein appellants failed to appear on the scheduled date of hearing on March 25, 1993. So much so that the Court a quo had to issue this Order, to wit—
"When this case was called anew it being now 11:35 in the morning, the plaintiff appeared with his counsel, Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr. Defendant Virgilio Pascua appeared and informed the court that his counsel has (sic) not yet in, although according to him he called by long distance yesterday and he was assured by his counsel to appear (sic) today.
"This date is the proposed and available date of the counsel of the defendants for the continuation of the reception of the defendants' evidence and his unexplained absence would mean that he is submitting the case for the defendants closed and terminated (sic).
"There being no rebuttal evidence as manifested by Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr. for the plaintiff, the case is deemed submitted for decision."
In other words, it is appellants' submission that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforequoted order, inasmuch as they never intended to waive, as indeed, they never waived, their right to present further or additional evidence. Appellants' counsel also claim that the reason he failed to appear on the aforementioned date was because he suffered a sprained left knee due to a fall from the stairs the day before. 7
We are not persuaded.
The Trial Court's order categorically states that "defendant Virgilio Pascua . . . called by long distance yesterday and he was assured by his counsel to appear today." Evidently, one of the appellants was able to talk to their counsel over the phone on the very day counsel was allegedly injured. It is thus a mystery of sort that even as counsel for appellants did not tell Virgilio Pascua that he could not attend the hearing because he suffered a sprained ankle, he, at the same time, also, hastened to assure appellants that he could attend the scheduled trial. Too, it must be noted that this was not the first time that appellants' counsel was absent. For, during the September 15, 1992 hearing, 8 appellants' counsel did not also appear, despite due notice. The court a quo even asked herein appellants if they still wanted to keep their counsel, even as it warned them that counsel's continued absence would not be tolerated by the court. Already manifest, right from the outset, was the lackadaisical and indifferent attitude of appellants' counsel, for the records showed that said counsel, as early as the pre-trial stage of the case, came to the pre-trial unprepared, and without even a pre-trial brief: even so, the Court allowed him to file one, despite the vehement objection/opposition, of the other party. 9
What is more, appellants' failure to present additional or further evidence in amplification of their position, was their counsel's own making and doing. Such failing is, by extension, also their own failing, as it is an axiom of the law that the parties are bound by the errors and negligence of their lawyer. 10 Evidently, appellants' counsel had not seriously taken to heart the postulate that "a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." 11
By the same token, we cannot subscribe to appellants' thesis that they were not given their day in court, or that the decision rendered by the RTC was without factual basis, or that this decision was erected upon insufficient evidence.
To begin with, in support of their defense, appellants did present certain documentary evidence, to wit—
1. Certification by Barangay Captain Sergio S. Dayao 12
2. Certification by the Municipal Mayor 13
3. Certification by Barangay Captain Jose Salaguinto 14
In the second place, appellants were able to cross-examine the witnesses of the opposing party. As a matter of fact, appellees' last witness, the barangay captain of District No. 1 of San Manuel, Isabela, Sergio Dayao, who was able to testify in the absence of appellants' counsel, was subjected to cross-examination by appellants' counsel at the next hearing of the case on November 20, 1992. 15
Thirdly, in point of fact, on January 7, 1993, appellants did call to the witness stand one of their own, the appellant Virgilio Pascua, for the purpose of establishing their assertion that there was a tenancy relationship between/among the parties-litigants. And, if the testimony of this witness did not carry the day for appellants, in a manner of speaking, that is nowhere nearly the equivalent of saying that the lower court's judgment was devoid of factual basis, or that is was based upon insufficient evidence.
Here, there can be no question or cavil that the land in question is owned by appellee Rachel Abesamis under Tax Declaration No. 30-760-R'82 16 and TCT No. T-61968. 17 The only question that clamors for an insistent answer, is whether or not appellants are occupying the land in question as tenants of the former.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. 18
In the instant case, there is no showing that when the appellee, or her predecessor-in-interest, allowed appellants to take possession of the former's property, the parties intended to forge a landlord — tenant relationship. If anything, the evidence seems to suggest that it was merely the understanding of the parties that appellants shall work or till the land, albeit not in the character of tenants. 19 More than that, it was the understanding between or among the parties that, upon demand to recover and possess by appellee, of the land in question, appellants shall return the same. 20 Simply put, possession of the land by appellants was by mere tolerance or sufferance of the owner, thereof, no more, no less. As correctly found by the RTC, thusly —
"True, there can be no doubt that the defendants were in possession and they helped in the cultivation of the land in dispute even before it was sold to Dr. Abesamis. Absolute sale implies the concomitant delivery of possession, or at least a promise to that effect, otherwise another contract could have been drawn showing a different intention. But as Dr. Abesamis said which [was] plausible, he allowed Pedro Pascua, Sr. to continue his cultivation until he should have a need for it because he was too busy in his practice that he could not attend to it yet. And there was no agreement, verbal or written, regarding the payment of lease rentals. In other words, he (and that includes the members of his family who helped him till the land) were tenants at sufferance which does not give tenurial status to them. They are interlopers so to speak bereft of any legal right or continue their cultivation after the death of their parents, absent any clear and unequivocal arrangement to that effect either oral or in writing." 21
To repeat, appellants' stay in the premises was merely by the sufferance or tolerance of appellee and/or her father, Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis, and thus, carries with it the implied obligation to vacate the property should the need therefor arise. In Peran v Presiding Judge, Br. II, CFI of Sorsogon, 22 the Supreme Court stressed that, even though possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal to unlawful when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses to comply with or resists, such demand.
Quite interesting, too, is the fact that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), upon motion 23 by appellants to remand the records of the instant case to the DAR, Isabela, in order to determine whether or not a tenancy relationship existed between appellant and appellee, in fact remanded the records to the RTC for appropriate action and proper disposition. 24 True, appellants appealed this order to the DAR Secretary, but the latter effectively affirmed and upheld that order in his Order of September 6, 1990, 25 to wit —
"In the light of the foregoing facts, this Office believes that defendant-appellants are not bona fide tenants. The late Pedro Pascua, Sr. being the incumbent Chief of Police cannot at the same time be a tenant on this vast tract of landholding, his occupation being completely incompatible with his alleged status as a tenant. (Justina Limjuco Pelayo vs. Honorio Vinuya, et. al. CA-G.R. No. 46824, March 15, 1977). Upon the death of Pedro Pascua, Sr. the latter had not transmitted any tenancy rights to his heirs, the herein defendant-appellants, including third-party plaintiff. Pedro Pascua, Jr., whose testimony constitutes the defendant-appellants' primary evidence testified that he had been personally supervising the phases of farmwork therein. In this regard, this Office believes that for lack of personal cultivation, defendant-appellants are not bona fide tenants. (Sec. 26, par. I, R.A. 3844, as amended). Pedro Pascua, Jr. further testified that he is an incumbent policeman. (TSN of January 17, 1986, p. 12 thereof). For this reason, the doctrine that a policeman cannot at the same time be an agricultural tenant also applies to him. (Pelayo vs. Vinuya et. al., supra)
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued affirming the Certification dated July 8, 1988 issued by the DAR Regional Director of Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to the effect that the above-entitled case is Proper for Trial and defendant-appellants' appeal therefrom is hereby dismissed.
"Let the record of this case be forwarded to the DAR, Regional Director of Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, who will forthwith return only the judicial records hereof to the court of origin together with the copy of this Order for further appropriate action.
"SO ORDERED.
"Diliman, Quezon City, September 6, 1990.
"(SGD.) BENJAMIN T. LEONG
"Secretary"
In the context of these circumstances, we find no compelling reason to remand or refer the case anew to the RTC. Such a remand or referral would only entail concomitant difficulties, and unnecessary expenses implicit in another proceeding, in the course of which the litigants would have to present the same evidence all over again. And, as elsewhere indicated, the RTC had already received the evidence, and its judgment was based on the facts before it.
Nonetheless, we are unable to award to appellee her rightful share of unrealized fruits in the land in question. This is a necessary corollary of our finding that there was, in fact, no tenancy relationship between or among the parties, nor was there any written agreement or contract purporting to show such a relationship, and that appellants' possession of the contracted land was by mere sufferance or tolerance of appellee. Conformably to unrelenting case law, we are likewise constrained to eliminate the award of attorney's fees, for the reason that the Trial Court failed to set forth the factual, legal and equitable basis and justification therefor.
WHEREFORE, MODIFIED as thus indicated, the assailed decision is, in all other respects, AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr. and Guevara-Salonga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Judge Teodulo E. Mirasol, RTC — Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela.
2. Records, p 125 — Special Power of Attorney authorizing Dr. Reynaldo Abesamis to represent Rachel Abesamis to litigate.
Records, p 103 — Manifestation of Rachel Abesamis that she is already of age and that she can pursue the case.
3. Records, p 199.
4. Records, pp 210-213.
5. Records, p 219.
6. P 2 of Brief; Rollo, p 16.
7. P 2 of Brief; Rollo, p 16.
8. TSN, September 15, 1992, pp 1-2.
9. Order dated May 28, 1992; Records, p 126.
10. Vide: Ocampo v Caluag, 19 SCRA 971; Montes v Court of First Instance of Tayabas , 48 Phil. 640.
11. Canon 12, Canon of Professional Responsibility.
12. Records, p 139.
13. Records, p 137.
14. Records, p 138.
15. TSN, November 20, 1992.
16. Records, p 162.
17. Records, p 161.
18. Isidro v Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503.
19. TSN, October 20, 1992, P 8.
20. Id, at p 16; TSN, January 7, 1993, p 5 and p 18.
21. P 4 of RTC Decision.
22. 125 SCRA 78.
23. Records, pp 72-73.
24. Letter signed by DAR, BALA-Director, Ruben Joel A. Puertollano.
25. Order dated September 6, 1990, signed by Secretary Benjamin T. Leong; Records, pp 83-87.