TWELFTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV. No. 55281. January 31, 2002.]
TIRSO ATAJAR ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ATTY. GEMINIANO AQUINO ET AL., defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
ADEFUIN-DE LA CRUZ, B., J p:
This is an appeal from the decision dated January 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. 1762, entitled: "Tirso Atajar, et al., plaintiffs versus Atty. Geminiano Aquino, et al., defendants," for specific performance with damages, dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiffs as well as the counterclaim of the defendants.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the court a quo, are hereunder reproduced, to wit:
"Plaintiff TIRSO ATAJAR brought to this Court an action for specific performance with damages against the defendants. It appeared, however, that several cases of the same nature against the same defendants were pending in two other court branches of this Court with the following plaintiffs, namely: Inocencio Cabatian, Severino Gube, Marciano Marasigan, Simplicio Sale, Pastor Garcia, Arcadio Marasigan, Pedro Bautista, Emiliano Segunial, Simporoso Sale, Fernando Arevalo, and Zoilo Marasigan. Hence, the Court, on motion, ordered the consolidation of the cases against common defendants.
"All cases having been consolidated, plaintiffs filed a common complaint. In brief, the complaint states that plaintiffs are share tenants (on a 50-50 sharing arrangement) of the sugarland owned by defendants and located at Sagod, Calaca, Batangas. In crop year 1985-1986, the sugarcanes were harvested and milled in the name of the defendants. Defendants intentionally underpriced the local and export sugar at P225.00 and P300.00 respectively, whereas the prevailing prices are P292.00 and P400.00, respectively. Likewise, defendants deducted the cost of fertilizer to be applied in crop year 1986-1987 from the share of the plaintiffs. In that crop year (1985-1986), defendants also deducted P250.00 from each plaintiff as cost of 'home use' sugar received by each plaintiff when in fact by custom and regulation the same is given free. Defendants retained plaintiffs' share in the harvest, gave them only cash advances and refused to make proper accounting. Plaintiffs were not likewise given their share of the molasses and amelioration fund.
"Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to the following, viz: 1) refund with interest of the sum of P250.00 each for 'home use' sugar; 2) attorney's fees of P500.00 each and litigation expenses of P1,000.00 each, 3) moral damages of P20,000.00 each.
"Defendants filed an answer with counterclaim for damages and ejectment. The answer states that the plaintiffs (tenants) employ sub-tenants in cultivating the subject land in Violation of Republic Act No. 1199, Sec. 24, Subsection (Share Tenancy Act) and Presidential Decree No. 27, Sec. 27, Subsection 2 (Land Reform Code). The subtenants constructed their houses on the land thereby reducing the area planted to sugarcane. Likewise, the tenants' and subtenants' children who got married did the same thing. From crop year 1984-1985 up to the present (1987, when the action arose) the annual sugar production is way below average because the tenants plant palay, seasonal crops and fruit trees against the will of defendants.
"In crop year 1985-1986, defendants deducted an amount from plaintiffs' share which defendants could have earned were it not for the unauthorized planting of palay, crops and fruit trees by plaintiffs. Defendants correctly computed the domestic and export sugar since the price then was very low. The deduction in advance of the cost of fertilizer is a local practice and sort of protection for the defendants as the plaintiffs borrowings may far exceed the value of their shares. The shares in the molasses were not given to the tenants since it is not a local custom and because plaintiffs refused to give defendants the latters' share in the products of the land. Defendants, however, are amenable to give Amelioration Fund to the plaintiffs.
"By way of counterclaim, defendants pray for the payment of P300,000.00 to compensate the alleged lost income from the portion of land planted to palay and for the payment of moral damages and attorney's fees. Moreover, defendants seek to eject the plaintiffs from the subject land.
"During the pre-trial conference of the consolidated case, plaintiffs as well as their counsel failed to appear despite proper notice, prompting the Court, upon motion, to declare plaintiffs non-suited. Defendants were thus allowed to present their evidence ex-parte to prove their counterclaim."
(Decision, pp. 1-4; Record, pp. 681-684)
On January 22, 1996, the assailed decision was issued the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the complaint and the counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
(Record, p. 690)
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, defendants-appellants filed the present appeal interposing the following:
"ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
"(1) The trial court committed error in ruling it had no jurisdiction over ejectment of agricultural tenants;
"(2) The trial court consequently erred in not ejecting plaintiffs-appellees from the agricultural land of defendants-appellants;
"(3) The trial court erred in not awarding actual damages in favor of defendants-appellants and against plaintiffs-appellees;
"(4) The trial court erred in not awarding moral damages in favor of defendants-appellants and against plaintiffs-appellees;
"(5) The trial court erred in not awarding attorney's fee to defendants-appellants and against plaintiffs-appellees."
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 28-29)
The main issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the instant case.
Defendants-appellants contend that the Regional Trial Court (RTC for brevity) has jurisdiction of the case when the 12 individuals filed separate cases sometime in April 1986, as expressly provided for in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. They further contend that jurisdiction is retained by the trial court in this case until it disposes of the same with finality, as expressly provided in Sec. 62 of RA 6657.
We find the contention to be tenable.
It could not be denied that when the complaint for specific performance and damages was filed on January 8, 1987, the RTC has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The issuance of Executive Order No. 229 which took effect on August 29, 1987 and the enactment of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. 6657 on June 15, 1988, vesting the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR for brevity) original jurisdiction over matters on agrarian disputes, do not in any way affect the RTC's jurisdiction over the subject matter, "The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action." (National Irrigation Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 255, 266) The subsequent enactment of RA 6657 is recognizable for implementation when a case is newly filed but not when the case was already filed before the RTC in 1987 as in the instant case. Inasmuch as the present case was originally filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Balayan Batangas, reason dictates that said court has to continue exercising its original jurisdiction in trying and disposing of the instant case.
In support of our view that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the instant case, We find it necessary to quote the letter-reply of Meynardo A. Tiro, Court Administrator of the Supreme Court dated September 4, 1989 addressed to Judge Conrado R. Antona of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Batangas City as follows:
"Dear Judge,
"Pleased be informed that the paragraph in Adm. Order No. 80 dated July 18, 1989, designating Special Agrarian Courts quoted hereunder, to wit:
"'All cases cognizable by said Special Agrarian Courts which are not pending in the Regional Trial Courts shall be transferred to the said Special Agrarian Courts whether trial thereon commenced or not.'
should be interpreted as follows:
"1. All cases falling under Sections 56 and 57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 which where filed with the Regional Trial Court before the designation of the Special Agrarian Courts shall be transferred to the said Special Agrarian Courts whether trial thereon have already commenced or not;
"2. All other agrarian cases pending before the other Regional Trial Courts shall stay with said RTC.
"Please be guided accordingly." (Record, p. 355)
A perusal of the aforequoted letter-reply supports this Court's view that the instant case falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan Batangas. This is so because this case does not actually fall under Sections 56 and 57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 whereby all cases then filed shall be transferred to the Special Agrarian Courts "whether trial thereon have already commenced or not."
Upon receipt of the said letter-reply of then Court Administrator Tiro, addressed to Judge Antona, the latter issued an Order dated November 15, 1989 quoted in full hereunder:
"As it appears that the above-entitled cases does not fall under Section 57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, over which Sprecial (sic) Agrarian Courts have jurisdiction and in line with the letter of the Court Administrator dated September 4, 1989, copy enclosed, the Clerk-in-Charge of the Civil Cases is hereby directed to return the records hereof to RTC Branch XI of Balayan, Batangas, from where these cases originated for appropriate further proceedings.
SO ORDERED."
(Record, p. 354)
Incidentally, it is worth emphasizing that the instant case underwent series of transfer from Branch 9, to Branch 11, then to Branch 10 until the case was returned to Branch 9, presided by Hon. Elihu A. Ibañez who finally decided the said case on January 22, 1996.
The lower court issued its decision of January 22, 1996 dismising both the complaint (as the plaintiffs were declared non-suited) and the counterclaim as well alleging that it has no jurisdiction to rule on ejectment case which involved agricultural tenants, upon a a ground that it falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Inasmuch as it is the view of this Court that the trial court indeed has jurisdiction over the instant case, as disclosed in the preceding paragraphs, it is but proper to state that the presiding judge should have rendered his decision on the issue of ejectment.
vIt is worth noting that the lower court, in deciding the case, made the following ratiocinations to support its findings and conclusions:
"Basically, the thrust of the plaintiffs complaint boils down on the following, viz: 1) the alleged unjust deduction from them of the cost of fertilizer for the crope year 1986-1987; 2) the deduction of the cost of "home use" sugar which, allegedly, is given free to tenants by old practice and custom; 3) defendants allegedly underpriced the domestic and export sugar to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; 4) defendants allegedly did not give plaintiffs their rightful share in the molasses; 5) defendants withheld from them the so called amelioration pay.
"The foregoing claims, however, are now water under the bridge upon failure of the plaintiffs to prove their case, they having been previously declared non-suited. Hence, as it now stands the evidence of the defendants remain undisputed.
"The Court now adjudicates defendants' counterclaim for damages and ejectment. The counterclaim for ejectment, obviously, will not prosper for reason of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case which concern agricultural tenants, the same being under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB.
"Defendants, by way of counterclaim, demand payment of P300,000.00 which they could have received were it not for the alleged plaintiff's unauthorized planting of palay in certain portion of the subject land. This fact, however, has not been convincingly established by the defendants. Except for the bare testimony of defendant Geminiano Aquino about the alleged unauthorized planting of palay and other farm crops, no evidence at all exists. The testimony of witness Felix Dioquino raises some doubts. He is admittedly the driver of defendant Geminiano Aquino. The task of an overseer is thus foreign to his job as a driver. The alleged warning posted by the previous owner (Exhibit "G") does not also present anything to show that plaintiffs made alleged unauthorized planting. The low production of sugar may be attributed to some factors, e.g., variety of sugar canes, fertility of the soil, amount of fertilizer applied, etc.
"Defendants' claim for moral damages is also unfounded and lacking in factural basis. For moral damages to be awarded, it is essential that the claimant must have satisfactorily proved during the trial the existence of the factural basis of the damages and its causal connection with adverse party's act. (Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 547). Moreover, in the absence of wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16) The Court believes that plaintiff (tenants) did not act in bad faith in filing the instant action.
"Finally, attorney's fees cannot be awarded. An award of attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith (Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16, see also Art. 2208 (4), New Civil Code)." (Record pp. 687-690)
There having been findings and conclusions in the court a quo's assailed decision on the other issues except for ejectment wherein it did not determine the merits of the aforestated ejectment case, it is but logical that the said ejectment case be heard on its merit.
WHEREFORE, promises considered, the assailed decision dated January 22, 1996 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the court a quo is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing ex-parte on the counterclaim for ejectment alone, with dispatch until its final termination.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Agnir, Jr. and Guevara-Salonga, JJ ., concur.