FIFTEENTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 48896.  January 31, 2002.]

HEIRS OF THE LATE DOMINGO DELA ROSA, NAMELY: ESPERANZA DELA ROSA-LINA, REYNALDO DELA ROSA, JUANITO DELA ROSA AND FLORENCIA DELA ROSA-SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. ZENAIDA GONZALES AND SPOUSES DOMINADOR SANTOS AND VERONICA SANTOS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AGCAOILI, J p:

          Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated April 14, 1998 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversed the decision dated June 28, 1994 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for the Province of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija (Provincial Adjudicator of Nueva Ecija). The decision under review disposed of as follows:

          "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered as follows:

1.      Declaring the 'Kasunduan ng Pagsasauli at Pagmamay-ari ng Lupang Sakahin' as valid and binding between the parties;

2.      Ordering the respondent-appellee to vacate the premises of Lot 1 embraced within TCT No. NT-20455 and deliver actual possession thereof to the petitioner-appellant; and

3.      Ordering the respondent-appellee not to disturb the petitioner-appellant in her peaceful and actual possession of the property in dispute.

SO ORDERED." 1

          The factual antecedents are as follows:

          On September 6, 1993, respondent Zenaida Gonzales (Zenaida) filed with the Provincial Adjudicator of Nueva Ecija an action for "Recovery of Possession" against Domingo Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) involving a one-hectare agricultural land with TCT No. NT-204655 situated at Bo. Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Zenaida alleged that she is the registered owner of the property in issue. Dominador Santos of Las Pinas, Metro Manila formerly owned the subject land. Zenaida further alleged that on June 29, 1993, Dela Rosa executed a document 2 by virtue of which he surrendered the possession of said land in favor of the original owner, Dominador Santos, in consideration of another one-hectare land.

          Zenaida claimed that in July 1993, Dela Rosa entered and occupied the land in dispute thru force, stealth, and strategy and without her knowledge and consent. She demanded Dela Rosa to vacate the premises but to no avail. The matter was, thus, brought to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of Mahipon, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Dela Rosa, however, continued to possess and work on the land.

          Dela Rosa retorted that he was merely deceived into signing the "Kasunduan ng Pagsasauli at Pagmamay-ari ng Lupang Sakahan," (Kasunduan) as he honestly believed that the one-hectare land would be given to him as compensation for his long years of tilling and farming the same and that the other one-hectare land would be sold to him for P60,000.00. The transfer of the one-hectare portion of the subject land in favor of Zenaida violated his right of pre-emption, hence, the title issued in Zenaida's name should be cancelled for having been unlawfully awarded. Dela Rosa claimed that, as tenant, he has a right to redeem the property. Furthermore, granting that Zenaida subsequently became the owner of the subject land, she must respect his rights as tenant. Dela Rosa, therefore, prayed for the cancellation of the title of Zenaida and that the Kasunduan be declared null and void.

          In the interim, Dela Rosa, through Esperanza Dela Rosa-Lina, filed a third-party petition against respondent spouses Dominador and Veronica Santos, alleging that the Santos spouses conspired with Zenaida in deceiving him into signing the Kasunduan.

          The Santos spouses countered that Dela Rosa's third-party petition states no cause of action, for his failure to first file the case with the BARC. Also, the essential requisites of a contract had been complied with. Thus, there is no reason for Dela Rosa to complain. The Santos spouses also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB, as it, allegedly, has no jurisdiction to annul the sale executed by them.

          The Provincial Adjudicator of Nueva Ecija decided in favor of Dela Rosa, thus:

          "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered as follows:

1.         Dismissing the ejectment aspect of the case;

2.         Declaring Annex 'B' or the 'Kasunduan sa Pagsasauli ng Saka' as null and void and without effect;

3.         Declaring respondent Domingo dela Rosa as the agricultural tenant-lessee over his original landholding of 2.0 hectares which included the 1.0 hectare subject landholding;

4.         Ordering the petitioner not to disturb the respondent in his peaceful occupation and cultivation on the subject landholding;

5.         Dismissing the prayer for redemption for lack of merit.

NO PRONOUNCEMENT ON COST.

SO ORDERED." 3

          On appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, holding that:

          ". . .. It is axiomatic that contracts may be entered into in any form, whether orally or in writing, so long as the essential requisites for their validity are present (Dolloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 217 SCRA 49) Moreover, in interpreting contracts, the general rule is that if the terms thereof are clear as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control (Intestate Estate of the late Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 372; Syquia vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 624). Its notarization converts the document into a public one (BA Finance Corporation vs. IAC, 217 SCRA 261). Obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the contracting parties and should he complied with in good faith. Its validity or compliance shall not be left to the will of one of the contracting parties, for one who assented to a contract freely and fairly bound thereby (Heirs of the late Ricardo P. Presbitero, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Alcasid vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 419; RETA vs. NLRC, 232 SCRA 613). One who alleges fraud or mistake in any transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular (Cayabyab vs. IAC, 232 SCRA 1).

          In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent-appellee entered into the transaction (Kasunduan) freely and voluntarily. In fact, the agreement was attested to by Ricardo Domingo, BARC Chairman of Mahipon, Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Annex 'F', appellant's position paper) Also, Renato dela Rosa, the brother of herein respondent-appellee, signed as a witness to the covenant (Annex 'G', appellant's position paper) and the same was duly subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Pablo D. Canlas. The genuineness and due execution of said document are therefore beyond question.

          As to the allegation that the Kasunduan does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the same is found to be inaccurate. The Kasunduan is worded in clear and unmistakable terms and is written in a language known to the parties. In sum, there is no room for ambiguity in its interpretation.

          The contention that the Kasunduan which resulted in the surrender of the property in issue stipulates no consideration is misplaced. As we see it, while there appears to be no monetary consideration, such fact would not necessarily nullify the surrender. The Supreme Court has ruled that no consideration is required for the voluntary surrender by a tenant of his agricultural holding (Dela Cruz vs. Bautista, 186 SCRA 517).

          There being no substantial proof of fraud or mistake, the 'Kasunduan ng Pagsasauli at Pagmamayari ng Lupang Sakahin' must be respected, it being the law between the parties. Its fulfillment must not be placed at the pleasure or displeasure of either of the parties.

          The Kasunduan having extinguished tenancy relation on one hectare of the landholding subject of the suit, the right of pre-emption and redemption could no longer be exercised thereon, because the said prerogative is given only to agricultural lessees or tenants (Sec. 11 and 12, R.A. 3844, as amended by Sec. 2, R.A. 6389)." 4

          Aggrieved by the DARAB decision, petitioners Esperanza Dela Rosa-Lina, Reynaldo Dela Rosa, Juanito Dela Rosa and Florencia Dela Rosa, as heirs of the late Domingo Dela Rosa, now come to this court on a petition for review with the following —

"GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

(A)

          THE DARAB QUEZON CITY (MAIN) ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THE KASUNDUAN NG PAGSASAULI AT PAGMAMAY-ARI NG LUPANG SAKAHAN AS VALID AND BINDING IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR SHOWING THAT DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION WAS ACTUALLY PAID TO THE LATE TENANT DOMINGO DELA ROSA.

(B)

          THE DARAB-QUEZON CITY (MAIN) ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE LATE DOMINGO DELA ROSA TO VACATE THE SUBJECT PREMISES OF LOT 1 EMBRACED WITHIN TCT NO. NT-20455 IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE LATE DOMINGO DELA ROSA WAS ACTUALLY REMUNERATED AND PAID HIS DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION.

(C)

          THE DARAB-QUEZON CITY (MAIN) ERRED IN NOT RESPECTING THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF THE LATE DOMINGO DELA ROSA OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND.

(D)

          THE DARAB-QUEZON CITY (MAIN) ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE PRE-EMPTIVE AND REDEMPTIVE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND WITH AN AREA OF 1.0 HECTARE." 5

          Petitioners argue that the now deceased Dela Rosa never received any disturbance compensation from the Santos spouses in executing and signing the Kasunduan. The sale between the Santos spouses and Zenaida did not extinguish the security of tenure of Dela Rosa. Thus, Dela Rosa or his heirs cannot be ordered to vacate the subject land. Furthermore, as tenant of the land subject of this dispute, Dela Rosa had pre-emptive and/or redemptive rights. Hence, in selling the land to Zenaida without first offering the subject land for sale to Dela Rosa, the Santos spouses committed a violation of the agrarian laws.

          There is nothing in the law, which imposes a consideration of whatever kind and nature, for the surrender by the tenant of his landholding. What it requires is a mere written notice in order that voluntary surrender will terminate the tenancy relation. 6

          While section 8 of RA 3844 7 does not prohibit the parties from attaching conditions to the agreement on the surrender of the landholding by the tenant, nowhere does it appear from the Kasunduan that the voluntary surrender is conditioned upon the giving of any consideration. Furthermore, the law does not require the payment of disturbance compensation before Dela Rosa may be validly ejected on the strength of the provisions of the Kasunduan. Section 36 of RA 3844, as amended, provides:

          "SECTION 36.         Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

          (1)        The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions." 8

          Thus, the Santoses cannot be held liable for the payment of disturbance compensation. The said compensation may be claimed only when the agricultural land is converted into residential, commercial or industrial land, 9 which is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar. The subject landholding in this case was surrendered voluntarily and was thereafter sold.

          Accordingly, even in the absence of any consideration or disturbance compensation, the tenancy relationship between Dela Rosa and the Santos spouses was validly terminated by the voluntary surrender of the subject landholding. Voluntary surrender of the landholding is one of the valid causes of the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. 10

          Apart from the allegation of petitioners, no other evidence was presented to prove that there was fraud in the execution of the contract. Petitioners' case cannot thrive merely on allegations. In this regard, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the DARAB, thus:

          "In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent-appellee entered into the transaction (Kasunduan) freely and voluntarily. In fact, the agreement was attended to by Ricardo Domingo, BARC Chairman of Mahipon, Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Annex 'F', appellant's position paper). Also, Renato dela Rosa, the brother of herein respondent-appellee, signed as a witness to the covenant (Annex 'G', appellant's position paper) and the same was duly subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Pablo D. Canlas. The genuineness and due execution of said document are therefore beyond question." 11

          If Dela Rosa miscalculated on the advantages and disadvantages of the voluntary surrender of his landholding for whatever purpose, petitioners must now assume the consequences of his error. They cannot, even "with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live." 12

          Consequently, when the subject landholding was sold to Zenaida, Dela Rosa had already ceased as tenant thereof and, thus, no longer possessed the right to security of tenure. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure. 13

          Neither is Dela Rosa entitled to the rights of pre-emption and redemption. As aptly ruled by the DARAB:

          "The Kasunduan having extinguished tenancy relations on one hectare of the landholding subject of the suit, the right of pre-emption and redemption could no longer be exercised thereon, because the said prerogative is given only to agricultural lessees or tenants, . . .." 13

          WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated April 14, 1998 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is AFFIRMED.

          SO ORDERED.

          Sabio, Jr. and Pestaño, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

                  1.       Rollo, 40-41

  2.       Kasunduan ng Pagsasauli at Pagmamay-ari ng Lupang Sakahan; Annex "D"

  3.       Ibid., 33

  4.       Ibid., 39-40

  5.       Ibid., 15-16

  6.       Dela Cruz v. Bautista, 186 SCRA 517 (1990)

  7.       Agrarian Land Reform Code

  8.       Emphasis supplied

  9.       Bunye v. Aquino, G.R. No. 138979, October 9, 2000

10.       Section 8 of Republic Act 3844; Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 263 (1978)

11.       Rollo, 40

12.       Dequito v. Llamas, 66 SCRA 504 (1975)

13.       Dela Cruz v. Bautista, supra; Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 168 SCRA 247 (1988)

13.       Rollo, 40