[O.P. Case No. 4554.  April 20, 1992.]

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION UNDER P.D. NO. 27

DOMINGO DACILLO, JR., petitioner.

D E C I S I O N

          This refers to the letter dated March 25, 1991 of Floro Lorona, Clemente Estrera, Mario Ruela and Pastor Tolo, herein treated as an appeal, from the Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, dated January 22, 1991, which affirmed the order of the DAR Regional Director, Region VIII, Tacloban City, dated August 23, 1989, the decretal portion of which reads:

          "WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued allowing petitioner to retain seven (7) hectares which must be compact contiguous, and placing the rest with an appropriate area of 2.1142 hectares under Operation Land Transfer. Leasehold relation should be maintained in the retained area.

          Petitioner is advised to immediately coordinate with the MARO of Abuyog, Leyte for the segregation and delineation of the area he is going to retain, and the MARO concerned should render a report to the Operation Division of such retained area and OLT area."

          Record shows that Domingo G. Dacillo, Sr., is the owner of two parcels of land covered by OCT No. P-14704 and OCT No. P-10975, containing an area of 7.1537 hectares and 1.9605 hectares, respectively, located at Balocawehay, Abuyog, Leyte. He filed an application for retention on January 22, 1976 with the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. He died on January 24, 1981.

          After his death, Domingo Dacillo, Jr., pursued the application for retention of his father, having allegedly acquired the right to the property, partly by inheritance upon his father's death and partly by purchase from his brothers and sisters.

          In opposition to the application for retention, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Abuyog, Leyte, in a comment of June 24, 1989, pointed out that the property falls within the coverage of LOI 143 because Domingo G. Dacillo, Sr., is an absentee landowner.

          The Regional Director, Region VIII, Tacloban City, ruled in favor of appellee on the basis of the following premises, as continued in his order of August 23, 1989, which states:

          "The landholdings of the late Domingo G. Dacillo, Sr., consist only of two (2) parcels covered with OCT No. P-14704 and OCT No. P-10975 containing a total area of 9.1142 hectares located at Balocawehay, Abuyog, Leyte. He does not own other agricultural lands, nor residential, commercial or industrial lands where he derives an adequate income. Indubitably, he is entitled to retain seven hectares of his rice and/or corn lands and the rest with an approximate area of 2.1142 hectares should be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

          There is no legal impediment on the part of Domingo Dacillo, Jr. to acquire partly by virtue of inheritance and partly by purchase from his brothers and sisters with respect to the seven (7) hectares supposedly to be retained by their father. This seven hectares do not fall within the ambit of PD 27, nor under LOI 474, he being not an owner of other agricultural land, nor residential lands where he derives an adequate income."

          Feeling aggrieved with the order, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Floro Lorona, et al., with the Department of Agrarian Reform, which was denied. Hence, the instant appeal on the sole ground that Domingo Dacillo, Sr. is an absentee landowner and is therefore covered by LOI 143.

          In his Compliance/Comment dated July 2, 1991, appellee contends that the Office of the President has no jurisdiction over the instant case by force of Republic Act (RA) 6657, which states:

          "SEC. 54.      Certiorari. — Any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof."

          and that the order appealed from has become final and executory pursuant to Section 51 of the same law, which reads:

          "SEC. 51.      Finality of Determination. — Any case or controversy before it shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for resolution. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Any order, ruling or decision shall be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof."

          The issues in this case are as follows:

1.         Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction over this case;

2.         Whether or not appeal was filed on time; and

3.         Whether or not Domingo Dacillo Sr. is an absentee landowner and is therefore covered by LOI 143.

          On the first issue, this Office declares jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently reads:

          "SEC. 17.      The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

          In his book entitled "THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A Commentary", Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading authority in Constitutional law, opines:

          "The President is given control 'of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices'. His control is not just over the department head but also over all the subordinate officers of the department. . . .

          This awesome power of control has been defined 'as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter'. It is such power which has been given to the President over all executive officers from Cabinet members to the lowliest clerk. It is at the heart of the meaning of 'Chief Executive'."

          The constitutional power of control as aforequoted may not be withdrawn by the legislature as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of De Leon vs. Carpio (178 SCRA 457, 464), to wit:

          "The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature."

          On the second issue, appellee seeks victory on technical grounds. Records, however, disclose that the MARO of Abuyog, Leyte, received a copy of the appealed order on March 4, 1991, as evidenced by a registry return receipt attached to the records. But appellants alleged that they actually received a copy of the Order only on March 15, 1991 and thereafter filed their letter appeal dated March 25, 1991 with his Office or within the fifteen (15)-day period of appeal prescribed under Section 51 of RA 6657. However, even assuming that the appeal was not filed on time, this Office is not precluded from liberally construing rules of procedure to serve the ends of substantive justice as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Alfonso vs. Villamor, and reiterated in subsequent cases, to wit:

          "A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedures, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won be a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities." (16 Phil. 315, 321-322)

          The third issue was re-evaluated by the Department of Agrarian Reform and re-explained in the following manner:

          "It was established that Domingo Dacillo, Sr. went to the United Stated of America and eventually met his death thereat on January 24, 1981; that before his death he filed an Application for Retention and Affidavit dated January 18, 1976 which was subscribed and sworn to before the Philippine Consulate General of San Francisco, California, USA; that subsequently, his son Domingo Dacillo, Jr. pursued his father's application for retention until finally he became the petitioner herein and claimed that he was one of the heirs and that his brothers and sisters sold their shares of the landholdings in his favor.

          Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, could we not consider Domingo Dacillo, Sr. an absentee landowner? Certainly not. The fact that he was known and recognized as owner of the questioned landholdings and had in fact legally applied for its retention which was later followed up by his son Domingo Dacillo, Jr. can we say that LOI No. 143 is applicable in his case? This LOI imposes certain requirements such as the survey report regarding a property and the implementing guidelines. As it appeared, LOI No. 143 has no implementing guidelines at all and could not therefore be used as a basis in the evaluation of this instant case."

          In the absence of the survey report, a sine qua non requirement for the applicability of Letter of Instructions (LOI) 143, the instant case cannot be fairly adjudged to be under its coverage.

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

          SO ORDERED.

          Manila, Philippines.

By authority of the President:

(SGD.) FRANKLIN M. DRILLON

Executive Secretary