Department of Agrarian Reform

"IN RE: PETITION OF FORTUNATO M. BUELA FOR DECLARATION AS SOLE OWNER-CULTIVATOR, NULLIFICATION OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, COVERAGE UNDER OPERATION LAND TRANSFER (OLT) AND/OR CARP, AND ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENT (EP) AND/OR CERTIFICATE OF LAND OWNERSHIP AWARD (CLOA) OVER THAT PARCELS OF LAND IDENTIFIED AS LOT NOS. 3272 AND 3261 WITH AN AREA OF 8,399 SQ. M. AND 14,423 SQ. M., RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 22,822 SQ. M., BOTH SITUATED AT BARRIO MALHACAN, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN".

JOSE C. JUSON, appellant, vs. FORTUNATO M. BUELA, appellee.

D E C I S I O N

This case involves an appeal from the Order of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR Secretary") dated 31 January 1996, denying appellant Jose C. Juson's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the DAR Secretary dated 16 June 1995. In turn, the Order dated 16 June 1995 denied the appeal filed by the appellant Jose C. Juson with the DAR Secretary of the 03 March 1994 Order of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo. The dispositive portion of the 03 March 1994 Order reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, an order is hereby issued:

1.      SUBJECTING the landholding (Lot No. 3272 with an area of 8,399 square meters, and Lot No. 3261 with an area of 14,423 square meters) in dispute, both situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and all other ricelands of Jose C. Juson under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to E.O. 228;

2.      DECLARING the "Pinanumpaang Salaysay" or the voluntary surrender of the late Francisca M. Buela as illegal, against public policy and therefore, null and void;

3.      DECLARING petitioner Fortunato M. Buela as the sole owner-cultivator of the said landholdings, identified as Lot Nos. 3272 and 3261 with a total area of 22,822 square meters, more or less, situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan; and

4.      GRANTING the issuance of Emancipation Patent (EP) in favor of said Fortunato M. Buela, petitioner herein.

SO ORDERED,"

The facts of the case are as follows:

1. Appellant is the former owner of Lot No. 3272, having an area of Eight Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Nine (8,399) square meters, located in Barangay Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-785 ("OCT No. 0-785")issued on 09 July 1980 by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan (Annex "2" of appellant Juson's Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

1.1 The lot covered by OCT No 0.785 was later on subdivided among Josefina M. Juson, Zenaida M. Juson, Ma. Cecilia M. Juson and Ma. Asuncion M. Juson, who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41.178 (M) by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan on 19 August 1980 (Annex "3" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

1.2 The lot covered by TCT 41.178 (M) was then consolidated with the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 25.814 (M) and TCT No. 42.031 (M), and later subdivided as follows:

a) TCT No. 47.434(M) — Ma. Asuncion M. Juson, covering an area of 1,289 square meters

b) TCT No. 47.435 (M) — Ma. Cecilia M. Juson, covering an area of 1,319 square meters

c) TCT No. 47.437(M) — Zenaida M. Juson, covering an area of 2,105 square meters

d) TCT No. 47.438 (M) — Josefina M. Juson, covering an area of 2,033 square meters.

(Annexes "4" 1994 to "7" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994)

2. Appellant is the registered owner of Lot No. 3261, having an area of Fourteen Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Three (14,423) square meters, located in Barangay Malhacan, Mecauayan Bulacan, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1343 (M) issued on 28 January 1994 by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. The above parcel of land is classified as residential per Tax Declaration No. 5554 (Annex "9" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

3. The above mentioned parcels of land were allegedly tilled by the spouses Pelagio and Francisca Buela even prior to World War II until the death of Pelagio Buela in 1955 and the voluntary surrender executed by Francisca Buela in 1979.

4. On 21 October 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known as the "Tenants Emancipation Decree" (P.D. 27), which subjected all rice and corn lands to land reform. However, until the issuance of the assailed Order of the OIC Regional Director, DAR Region III dated 03 March 1994 (Annex "10" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994), neither Lot No. 3261 not Lot No. 3272, or any other landholding of appellant Juson, was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

5. On 23 February 1979, Francisca Buela executed a voluntary surrender of the above-mentioned parcels of land in favor of the landowner, appellant Juson, in consideration of the sum of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) and One Thousand (1,000) square meters of the property. In her "Pinanumpaang Salaysay", Francisca Buela stated that she was voluntarily surrendering the land since it was no longer productive and since she intended to engage in a more stable and regular means of livelihood. The voluntary surrender was acknowledged by appellant Juson in an Affidavit dated 29 February 1979 (Annex "11" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

5.1 Although the sum of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) was duly received by Francisca Buela, appellant Juson was not immediately able to transfer the One Thousand (1,000) square meters to Francisca Buela since the title to the property had not yet been issued in his name. However, the heirs of Francisca Buela have occupied and appropriated for themselves the One Thousand (1,000) square meters portion. (In fact, the heirs even went beyond the area agreed upon). Sometime in December, 1993, the appellant and two of his daughters visited Miguelito Buela (who was occupying Lot 3261) to inform the heirs of Francisca Buela of the reason for the delay in transferring the One Thousand (1,000) square meters portion and to assure them that the same would be transferred to them as soon as the title was issued in the name of the appellant.

6. On 11 October 1979, a Certification was issued by Armando Canla, then a Department of Agrarian Reform Team Leader, stating that Lot. No. 3272 had no tenant and was not covered by Operation Land Transfer or P.D. 27 (Annex "12" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

7. From the time of execution of the voluntary surrender by Francisca Buela in 1979, and even after her death in 1989, none of Francisca Buela's heirs asserted rights to the Subject Property. The appellant did not receive any farm lease rental from Francisca Buela's heirs nor did he receive any communication from them regarding the Subject Property.

8. Further, from the time of execution of the voluntary surrender by Francisca Buela in 1979 up to the present, the appellant did not enter into a tenancy relationship with the appellee, or any of the heirs of Francisca Buela. Neither did the appellant authorize the appellee, or any of the heirs of Francisca Buela, to cultivate the land since the appellant already considered the Subject Property untenanted. To the best of appellant's knowledge, the subject lots have not been cultivated by the appellee or any of the heirs of the spouses Pelagio and Francisco Buela. On the contrary, appellee Bonifacio M. Buela, one of the heirs, constructed a four-door apartment building on Lot No. 3261, without the knowledge or consent of the appellant. Appellee Bonifacio M. Buela has also been using the Subject Property for his hollow block business.

9. On 09 December 1993, the appellee filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a Petition entitled "In Re: PETITION OF FORTUNATO M. BUELA FOR DECLARATION AS SOLE OWNER-CULTIVATOR, NULLIFICATION OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, COVERAGE UNDER OPERATION LAND TRANSFER (OLT) AND/OR CARP, AND ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENT (EP) AND/OR CERTIFICATE OF THE OWNERSHIP AWARD (CLOA) OVER THAT PARCELS OF LAND IDENTIFIED AS LOT NOS. 3272 AND 3261 WITH AN AREA OF 8,399 SQ. M. AND 14,423 SQ. M., RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 22,822 SQ. M., BOTH SITUATED AT BARRIO MALHACAN, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN" (the "Petition") [Annex "14" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994].

10. However, until the appellant received a copy of the assailed Order of the DAR Region III Office dated 03 March 1994, he had no notice that the above-entitled Petition had been filed by the appellee. He was not furnished a copy of the Petition nor did he receive an invitation to an alleged conference with Ray Dennis A. Roque, Legal Officer III of the DAR's Region III Office, contrary to the statement in page 3, paragraph 2 of the Order of 03 March 1994. Appellant was only able to obtain a copy of the Petition, through the assistance of counsel, after he received a copy of the above-mentioned Order dated 03 March 1994.

11. On 23 December 1993, Ray Dennis A. Roque, Legal Officer I of the Bulacan Provincial Agrarian Reform Office ("PARO") rendered a legal opinion on appellee's Petition and recommended that an Order be issued:

"(1) DECLARING the 'affidavit of waiver' executed by petitioner's mother, the late Francisca M. Buela, waiving her right as a leasehold tenant to the landowner Jose C. Juson null and void;

(2) Declaring petitioner Fortunato M. Buela the sole owner-cultivator of the said lands pursuant to DAR Circular No. 19, Series of 1978, otherwise known as 'Rules and Regulations in Case of Death of a Tenant-Beneficiary';

(3) Declaring the subject landholding covered by Operation Land Transfer program of the government pursuant to P.D. 27, LOI No. 227, LOI No. 474, E.O. No. 228 and the CARP;

(4) Granting the petitioner the issuance of an Emancipation Patent (PE); and

(5) Directing the DAR field personnel concerned to continue and expedite the processing of the compensation claim of the landowner.

(Annex "D" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 07 March 1996)

12. On 17 January 1994, Erlinda Pearl V. Armada, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer for the Province of Bulacan, issued a 1st Endorsement forwarding appellee's Petition to the Regional Director for DAR Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga.

13. On 27 January 1994, Dante G. Beltran, Legal Officer III of DAR Region III, issued a memorandum to Engr. Eugenio B. Bernardo, ARD for operations of DAR Region III, recommending that an Order be issued:

(1) Declaring the affidavit of waiver executed by Francisca Buela null and void;

(2) Declaring Buelas as sole owner-cultivator of the lands in question;

(3) Declaring subject lands covered by O.L.T.; and

(4) Issuing an Emancipation Patent in Buela's name.

In the same Memorandum, Beltran stated that the above-enumerated matters fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ("DARAB") and that the parties should, therefore, ventilate the case in the "proper forum" (Annex "E" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 07 March 1996).

14. Thereafter, the Petition was endorsed in a 1st Endorsement dated 01 February 1994 signed by Enrique S. Valenzuela, OIC-Assistant Regional Director for Operations of DAR Region III to the PARO, DARPO, Baliuag, Bulacan.

15. On 09 February 1994, appellee sought reconsideration of the endorsement of the Petition by DAR Region III to the PARO on the ground that the same is within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as it allegedly involves the administrative implementation of P.D. 27.

16. On 14 February 1994, a 2nd Endorsement was issued by Erlinda Pearl V. Armada, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer for the Province of Bulacan., forwarding appellee's Petition to the Regional Director of DAR Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga.

17. On 03 March 1994, the DAR Region III Office, with undue and excessive haste and without giving appellant any opportunity to present his evidence considering that the Petition was filed only on 9 December 1993, issued an Order;

1. Subjecting the landholding (Lot No. 3272 with and area of 8,399 square meters and Lot No. 3261 with an area of 14,423 square meters) in dispute, both situated at Malhacan Meycauayan, Bulacan, and all other ricelands of Jose C. Juson under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to E.O. 228;

2. Declaring the "Pinanumpaang Salaysay" or the voluntary surrender of the late Francisca M. Buela as illegal, against public policy and therefore, null and void;

3. Declaring petitioner Fortunato M. Buela as the sole owner-cultivator of the said landholdings, identified as Lot Nos. 3272 and 3261 with a total area of 22,822 square meters, more or less, situated at Malhacan, Bulacan; and

4. Granting the issuance of Emancipation Patent (EP) in favor of said Fortunato M. Buela, petitioner herein.

Appellant received a copy of the Order dated 03 March 1994 on 12 March 1994 (Annex "F" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996). This was the first time that appellant learned of the existence of the case.

18. On 26 March 1994, appellant filed his Notice of Appeal dated 25 March 1994.

19. Meanwhile, on 18 April 1994, Zenaida M. Juson and Josefina M. Juson-Ochoa, the daughters of the appellant, commissioned a geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation and subdivision survey of Lot No. 3261 for the purpose of determining the One Thousand (1,000) square meter portion to be segregated and transferred to the heirs of Francisca Buela. They were, however, prevented by Miguelito Buela from conducting the survey. Both parties reported the matter to the Meycauayan Police Station/PNP, Meycauayan Bulacan and caused the recording thereof in the station's Police Blotter (Annex "15" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

19.1 Despite the fact the geodetic engineer commissioned by the appellant's daughters was prevented from completing the survey of Lot No. 3261, he was able to ascertain that the appellee is now occupying approximately Two Thousand Nine Hundred (2,900) square meters thereof, contrary to what was agreed upon in the voluntary surrender executed by Francisca Buela.

19.2 Appellant filed a protest letter dated 02 May 1994 with the Office of the Municipal Engineer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, assailing the issuance to appellee of Building Permit No. 07-93-11-00963 for the construction of the four-door apartment building despite the fact that Bonifacio Buela is the registered owner of the land (Annex "16" of the Memorandum dated 14 June 1994).

20. On 30 May 1994, appellant received a copy of the Order dated 19 May 1994 issued by the DAR, requiring appellant to file an Appeal Memorandum.

21. On 14 June 1994, appellant Juson, filed with the DAR Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance ("DAR-BALA") his Appeal Memorandum of even date (Annex "C" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996), in which he raised the following arguments:

THE OIC-REGIONAL DIRECTOR DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION.

THE ORDER DATED 03 MARCH 1994 WAS ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

III

THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT COVERED BY OPERATION LAND TRANSFER UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND/OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657.

THE APPELLEE IS NOT A QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF AN EMANCIPATION PATENT."

22. On 26 August 1994, appellant Juson received a copy of appellee Buela's unverified Appellee's Memorandum dated 15 August 1994.

23. On 10 October 1994, appellant Juson filed his Reply Memorandum of even date with the DAR-BALA, in which he raised the following arguments:

CONTRARY TO APPELLEE'S CONTENTION, THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, AND NOT THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR CLEARLY ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE APPELLEE'S PETITION DATED 09 DECEMBER 1993.

APPELLEE DOES NOT DENY THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD DURING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, IN WILLFUL AND BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

III

THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1979 EXECUTED BY FRANCISCA BUELA IS VALID AND BINDING ON FRANCISCA BUELA, HER HEIRS AND ASSIGNS AND DIVESTS THEM OF ANY RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

APPELLEE'S CLAIM TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, FORTUNATO M. BUELA IS NOT A QUALIFIED TENANT-BENEFICIARY AND IS, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, OR ANY AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR THAT MATTER."

24. During the pendency of the appeal in A.R. Case No. 0039-94 with the DAR-BALA, appellant Juson caused the annotation on 18 January 1995 of a Notice of Lis Pendens on OCT No. 0-1343 (M) (Annex "H" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996). It was only then that appellant Juson discovered that, notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal in A.R. Case No. 0039-94 with the DAR-BALA, OCT No. 0-1343 (M) in the name of appellant Juson had been cancelled and Emancipation Patent No. 697354 which is contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-131-M dated 09 November 1994, was issued in the name of appellee.

25. On 25 July 1995, appellant Juson received a copy of the Order dated 16 June 1995 of the Secretary of the DAR denying the Appeal of appellant Juson for "utter lack of merit" and affirming the questioned Order dated 03 March 1994 issued by Regional Director Eugenio B. Bernardo of the DAR Region III Regional Office (Annex "B" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996).

26. On 11 July 1995, within the reglementary period, appellant Juson filed with the Office of the Secretary his Motion for Reconsideration of even date, wherein he raised the following grounds for the reconsideration of the Order of the Secretary dated 16 June 1995 (Annex "I" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996):

"I

          CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, THE INSTANT CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE MERE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF P.D. NO. 27.

II

          BOTH THE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR WERE RENDERED IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF APPELLANT JUSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

III

          THE HONORABLE SECRETARY'S FAILURE TO CITE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS FINDINGS IS UNFAIR AND ARBITRARY, AND AMOUNTS TO ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

IV

          THE HONORABLE SECRETARY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLEE BUELA IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO ACQUIRE AND REGISTER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN HIS NAME.

V

          THE HONORABLE SECRETARY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER EXECUTED BY APPELLEE BUELA'S MOTHER AND ALLEGED PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST IS NULL AND VOID.

VI

          THE HONORABLE SECRETARY ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF APPELLEE BUELA TO BE A BENEFICIARY, NOTWITHSTANDING A CLEAR SHOWING THAT HE IS NOT A QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY.

VII

          THE HONORABLE SECRETARY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT JUSON CANNOT RETAIN HIS RICE/CORN LANDS."

27. Appellee Buela filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 July 1995.

28. On 11 September 1995, appellant Juson filed with the Office of the Secretary his Reply (To Appellee's Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 July 1995) dated 09 September 1995, wherein he raised the following arguments (Annex "J" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996):

CONTRARY TO APPELLEE'S CLAIM, THE INSTANT CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE MERE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF P.D. 27 WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR AND THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, BUT INVOLVES JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD ('DARAB').

THE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT JUSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW RESULTED FROM THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF P.D. NO. 27.

III

CONTRARY TO APPELLEE BUELA'S CLAIM, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY'S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

CONTRARY TO APPELLEE BUELA'S SELF-SERVING CLAIM, HE IS NOT LEGALLY ENTITLED TO ACQUIRE AND REGISTER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN HIS NAME.

CONTRARY TO APPELLEE BUELA'S CLAIM, THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER EXECUTED BY APPELLEE BUELA'S MOTHER AND ALLEGED PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST WAS VALID AND PRODUCED LEGAL EFFECTS.

APPELLEE BUELA IS NOT A QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY.

VII

CONTRARY TO APPELLEE BUELA'S CLAIM, APPELLANT JUSON HAS THE RIGHT TO RETAIN HIS RICE/CORN LANDS."

29. The DAR Secretary issued an Order dated 31 January 1996, dismissing appellant Juson's Motion for Reconsideration for "lack of merit" and affirming his Order dated 16 June 1995 (Annex "A" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 06 March 1996).

Hence the instant appeal.

In his Appeal Memorandum dated 07 March 1996, appellant Juson raised the following grounds:

CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY, APPELLANT JUSON PRESENTED CLEAR, CONVINCING AND SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT THE ORDER DATED 03 MARCH 1994 OF THE OIC REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DAR REGION III IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CONCRETE EVIDENCE AND THAT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THEREIN ARE CONTRARY TO LAW.

A. THE OIC-REGIONAL DIRECTOR HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FILED BY APPELLEE BUELA.

B. THE DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY DATED 16 JUNE 1995 AND 31 JANUARY 1996, AND THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR DATED 03 MARCH 1994 WERE RENDERED IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF APPELLANT JUSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

C. THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT COVERED BY OPERATION LAND TRANSFER UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND/OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657.

II

          CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY, APPELLEE BUELA'S MOTHER AND ALLEGED PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH HER TENURIAL RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT HAVE TRANSFERRED THE SAME TO THE APPELLEE BUELA BY WAY OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION.

A.        APPELLEE BUELA IS NOT A QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY IN HIS OWN RIGHT WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO ACQUIRE AND REGISTER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN HIS NAME, NOR IS HE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF AN EMANCIPATION PATENT.

III

          CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY, THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT, AND NEVER WAS, COVERED BY OPERATION LAND TRANSFER.

IV

          CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY, THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER EXECUTED BY APPELLEE BUELA'S MOTHER IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT JUSON IS VALID, AND CONSEQUENTLY, TERMINATED ALL OF THE CLAIMS OF APPELLEE BUELA'S MOTHER, AS WELL AS THOSE OF HER HEIRS AND SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST, OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

After going over the records and arguments raised by the parties, we find the appeal to be impressed with merit.

We find that the Order of the DAR Regional Director dated 03 March 1994 and the Decisions of the Secretary dated 16 June 1995 and 31 January 1996 are not supported by substantial evidence and that the findings and conclusions therein are contrary to law for the following reasons:

A. The OIC-Regional Director Had No Jurisdiction Over The Petition Filed By Appellee Buela.

In the first place, the DAR Regional Director had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by the appellee Buela. An examination of Executive Order No. 129-A clearly shows that DAR Regional Offices have no jurisdiction over the adjudication of agrarian reform cases since jurisdiction over the same property pertains to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ("DARAB").

Based on the allegations of the Petition which is one for "(D)eclaration as Sole-Owner Cultivator; Nullification of Voluntary Surrender; Coverage Under Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government (OLT) and/or CARP and Issuance of Emancipation Patent and/or CLOA", the same squarely falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB pursuant to Rule II, Section I of the 1989 Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which were effective at the time the Petition was filed. Contrary to appellee Buela's claim, the Petition does not merely involve the administrative implementation of CARP laws but raises justiciable issues and controversies within the authority of and competence of the DARAB. In fact, in a Memorandum dated 27 January 1994, DAR Legal Officer Dante G. Beltran of DAR Region III recognized the jurisdiction of the DARAB and even recommended that the parties should ventilate the case in the "proper forum".

On this score alone, the appeal is entitled to be given due course.

B. The Decisions Of The DAR Secretary Dated 16 June 1995 And 31 January 1996, And The Order Of The Regional Director Dated 03 March 1994 Were Rendered In Blatant Violation Of Appellant Juson's Right To Due Process Of Law.

The records do not show that appellant Juson was furnished with a copy of the Petition filed by appellee Buela on 06 December 1993, and given any opportunity to refute the allegations contained therein before the Office of the Regional Director. Nowhere does it appear in the records that appellant Juson ever received an invitation to confer with Ray Dennis A. Roque, Legal Officer III of DAR Region III. Appellant Juson has consistently maintained that the first time he learned of the existence of the case was when he received a copy of the Order dated 03 March 1994 of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo. On the other hand, appellee Buela has not refuted, or even attempted to refute, the lack of service of notice of the filing of the Petition on appellant Juson. Furthermore, the records do not show that an actual hearing was held wherein the testimonies of witnesses were given and documentary evidence properly identified and authenticated. Thus, the DAR Secretary's statement in his Order dated 31 January 1996 that "(A) careful study of the records of the case shows that appellant Juson miserably failed to present substantial proof that the subject Order is not supported by concrete evidences . . ." is erroneous since any alleged failure on the part of appellant Juson is not due to his fault or negligence, but due to the failure of the DAR to give an opportunity to present his evidence.

Considering the weight of the evidence presented by appellant Juson, it would have been more prudent for the DAR Secretary to have conducted further proceedings in order to properly evaluate and appreciate said evidence. It is readily apparent from the arguments raised by appellant Juson in his pleadings that the instant case involves a justiciable controversy, and does not merely involve the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws. Thus, proceedings during which appellant Juson could have presented, marked and authenticated his evidence, as well as refuted and controverted appellee Buela's evidence, were warranted by the circumstances. Unfortunately, appellant Juson was deprived of this opportunity, and thus far, only appellee Buela's "evidence" appears to have been considered.

Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." In Villareal v. Court of Appeals [219 SCRA 293 (1993)], the Supreme Court held that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling.

In the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [69 Phil. 635 (1940)], the Supreme Court laid down the "cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings", to wit:

(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know of the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered."(Emphasis supplied)

The above-enumerated cardinal primary requirements must always be observed [Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, 190 SCRA 29 (1990)]. It is clear, however, that these cardinal primary requirements were not complied with in the instant case.

It is also noteworthy that, throughout the proceedings before the DAR, appellant Juson repeatedly requested the DAR to conduct an ocular inspection of the Subject Property to determine whether or not the same was truly agricultural, and to personally see the condition of the Subject Property, instead of merely relying on what the parties had alleged in their respective pleadings. Although appellant Juson was led to believe that an ocular inspection would be scheduled and conducted, during which inspection the parties would be present, the said ocular inspection did not take place. The ocular inspection would have been the perfect opportunity for the DAR lawyers to see for themselves that, among other things, the Subject Property is clearly no longer agricultural and that the alleged crops of appellee Buela thereon were illegally, hastily, belatedly and haphazardly planted in order to "comply" with the requirements of the law.

As a consequence of the violation of appellant Juson's right to due process of law, the questioned Order dated 03 March 1994 is clearly null and void. In the case of David v. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707, 713 (1979), the Supreme Court held:

"This petition is quite obviously invested with merit. In the light of the foregoing factual and procedural milieu and since, admittedly, respondent judge did not conduct any hearing in the case prior to issuance of the challenged decision, the ineluctable conclusion is that the challenged decision is null and void for want of due process. The following requisites, as set forth in a leading case before the 1935 Constitution took effect, must concur for procedural due process in civil cases: '(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.' Thus, it is well-settled rule that 'no one shall be personally bound until he has had a day in court', by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all determination; it is a judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly administered. (Ong Su Han vs. Gutierrez David, 76 Phil 546, etc.,; Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1957 ed., p. 476). And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, supra, p. 523; Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921. Being null and void from its inception, the decision sought to be set aside does not exist in the eyes of the law because it is 'as though it had not been done.' In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. 'By it, no rights are divested. From it, no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. . . .' It may be attacked directly or collaterally, and the action therefor may be brought even after the time for appeal or review has lapsed. The judgment is vulnerable to attack even when no appeal has been taken. Hence, such judgment does not become final in the sense of depriving a party of his right to question its validity." (Emphasis supplied) "

The records do show that the Order of the Regional Director dated 03 March 1994 was issued less than three (3) months after appellee Buela filed his Petition on 09 December 1993. Appellant Juson was allegedly invited for a conference to discuss the said Petition on 16 December 1993 where only appellee Buela and his counsel allegedly appeared. No proof of notice of such invitation was ever presented by appellee Buela to controvert appellant's repeated denial of receipt of any such notice.

C. The Subject Property Is Not Covered By Operation Land Transfer Under Presidential Decree No. 27 And/Or Republic Act No. 6657.

Aside from the jurisdictional and procedural infirmities mentioned above, the Order of the DAR Secretary dated 16 June 1995 and 31 January 1996 and the Order dated 03 March 1994 of the DAR Regional Director all erroneously found that the Subject Property was covered by Operation Land Transfer.

The DAR Secretary found that the Subject Property is allegedly covered by Operation Land Transfer by virtue of Letter of Instruction No. 474, dated 21 October 1976, which broadened the scope of land transfer by including tenanted rice and corn lands with an area of seven (7) hectares in aggregate area, or land used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families, citing DAR Administrative Order No. 04, Series of 1991.

Appellant Juson has repeatedly contested this finding of the DAR Regional Director and of the DAR Secretary in all the pleadings that he has filed. After a careful examination of the evidence presented, we find that the tabulation of appellant Juson's alleged landholdings presented by appellee Buela is inaccurate, misleading and padded, as it included lands which are no longer registered in the name of appellant Juson, to wit:

a. Annexes "L-1" and "L-6" refer to the same residential lot, which has an area of .0780 hectares;

b. Annexes "L-2" and "L-7" refer to the same road lot, with an area of .0101 hectares, which has already been donated to the people of Barangay Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan;

c. Annexes "L-3" and "L-10" refer to the same lot, with an area of .9470 hectares was sold without tenants to the Phil. Ville Development Corporation;

d. Annexes "L-13", "L-15", "L-16" and "L-17" all refer to Cadastral Lot No. 3261;

e. Annexes "L-24" and "L-17" refer to the same lot, having an area of 1.2017 hectares;

f. Annexes "L-14" and "L-22" are the same as Annexes "L-19", "L-20" and "L-21", which refer to the same riceland, having an area of 2.6211 hectares;

g. Annex "L-18" should not be included in the list since the land had been sold to City Investment Corporation on 29 October 1957;

h. Annexes "L-4","L-5", "L-8" and "L-9", with an aggregate area of 3,000 square meters, were parts of Lot No. 3963 and were given to tenants of the appellant Juson on 17 June 1979 when the former surrendered their farmholdings as the same ceased to be economically productive and were overtaken by urbanization and industrialization in the area;

i. Appellant Juson never owned property with an aggregate area of 1.4385 hectares in Barangay Camalig, contrary to what is stated in Annexes "L-23" and "L-24";

j. Appellant Juson owns only one residential lot in Barangay Saluysoy, with an area of 1,729 square meters under Lot No. 2480, inclusive of a 115 square meter road (Annex "L-27") and his private palay storage bin ("Camarin", Annex "L-29"); and

k. Urban land lots under Annexes "L-30" (525 square meters), Annex "L-32" (800 square meters), Annex "L-33" (800 square meters) and "industrial" lot under Annex L-34 (1,340 square meters) do not exist.

Thus, appellee Buela's claim that appellant Juson's landholdings allegedly exceeding seven (7) hectares cannot be relied upon.

Further, the records do not show that the Subject Property was ever placed under Operation Land Transfer. In fact, in a Certification issued on 11 October 1979, or long before this case was filed, Armando G. Canlas, DAR Team Leader 1 in Meycauayan, Bulacan, certified that Lot No. 3272 is not covered by P.D. 27 or Operation Land Transfer.

D. Appellee Buela's Mother And Alleged Predecessor-in-Interest Has Failed To Establish He Tenurial Rights Over The Subject Property And, Therefore, Could Not Have Transferred The Same To The Appellee Buela By Way Of Hereditary Succession

Notwithstanding the issuance of P.D. No. 27, the record shows that the Subject Property was never placed under Operation Land Transfer. It should be noted that Francisca Buela was never identified or recognized by the DAR as a tenant-beneficiary even after the promulgation of Executive Order No. 228 on 17 July 1987. In fact, a certification issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform itself dated 12 April 1994 states that "FORTUNATO BUELA and/or FRANCISCA BUELA are not included among those listed as tenants in the OLT documentation folder or Barangay Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan". Thus, appellant Juson clearly remained the owner of the Subject Property pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion No. 35 dated 27 February 1973 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1974, which states:

"We also understood that your Department is now implementing, throughout the country, the said decree only with respect to rice and/or corn lands with areas of 100 hectares or more. As to other lands containing less than 100 hectares, the implementation has been held in abeyance. Your Department Memorandum Circular No. 2-A, dated February 15, 1973, states that pending the promulgation of the rules and regulations — which was postponed by direction of the President — 'the leasehold system should be provisionally maintained' and the 'tenant-farmer shall continue to pay to the landowner lease rentals for the time being, which, subject to the Rules and Regulations aforementioned may later be credited as amortization payments.' The issuance of those rules and regulations has been deferred due to studies being made in pilot projects. As correctly pointed out in your letter, 'landowners and tenant-farmers are put in status quo which means that the leasehold relations between them shall be maintained pending the promulgation of the rules and regulations.'

"Such being the case, I believe that with respect to tenanted rice and/or corn lands 100 hectares or more in area, it is beyond question that the tenant-farmers are already deemed owners of lands they till and as, such owners, they ought to pay the real property taxes assessable on the said lands regardless of whether or not land transfer certificates have been issued. However, as regards lands containing less than 100 hectares, it is believed that, all things considered it would be more logical and reasonable to conclude that pending implementation of the decree as to those lands, the ownership of the lands remains with or is still retained by the present landowners. The real estate taxes should, accordingly, be paid by the present landowners. This may be implied from the preservation of the status quo pursuant to which the leasehold system shall be maintained and the tenant-farmers shall continue to pay 'lease rentals' and not 'amortization payments, 'except of course, in certain cases where land transfer certificates have already been issued by the government to the tenant-farmers."

Department Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 1974, of the Department of Agrarian Reform similarly provides:

"3. Tenant-farmers are deemed owners of the land they till as of October 21, 1972, subject to the rules and regulations to be hereafter promulgated. On lands already covered by Operation Land Transfer, the leasehold system shall be provisionally maintained and the lease rentals paid by the tenant-farmers to the landowner to be credited as amortization payments. Payment of rentals shall be stopped when the Land Bank shall have paid the cost of the land. On Lands not yet covered by Operation Land Transfer, leasehold shall continue to govern the relationship between the landowner and his tenant-farmers."

The finding of the DAR Regional Director, which was later on upheld by the DAR Secretary, that Francisca Buela was automatically "deemed owner" of the Subject Property is without basis. In Pagtalunan v. Tamayo [183 SCRA 252 (1990)], the Supreme Court held that the import of the phrase "deemed to be the owner", which is used in P.D. No. 27, must be construed within the policy framework of P.D. No. 27, and interpreted with the other stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree. Under the aforecited case, the transfer of lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 is subject to specific terms and conditions which must be complied with in order that the grantee can claim the right of absolute ownership over them. It is only after compliance with these terms and conditions that the grantee shall be entitled to the issuance of an emancipation patent, which shall be the only proof that he has the right of absolute ownership over the landholding. As held by the Supreme Court:

          "Pres. Decree No. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree") was anchored upon the fundamental objective of addressing valid and legitimate grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent conflict and social tension in the country-side. More importantly, it recognized the necessity to encourage a more productive agricultural base of the country's, economy. To achieve this end, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Landowners of agricultural lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production and exceeded the minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell, through the intercession of the government, their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions. However, a careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 27, and the certificate of land transfer issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.

          "A certificate of land transfer issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27 provides:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

          I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, declare that ________________ having manifested his desire to own the land under his cultivation and having complied with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land described as follows:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

          subject to the conditions that the cost of the portion herein transferred to the tenant farmers as fixed by the authorities concerned, including the interest rate at the rate of six percentum (6%.) per annum shall be paid by the tenant farmer in fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations, that the tenant farmer must be a farmer of a Barrio Association upon organization of such association in his locality, and that the title to the land herein shall not be transferred except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree Number 27, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

          [Annex 'B' to the Petition; Rollo, p. 26, Emphasis supplied]

          And under Pres. Decree No. 266, which specifies the procedure for the registration of title to lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27, full compliance by the grantee with the above mentioned undertakings is required for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation patent which constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee.

          Hence, the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. The certificate simply evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].

          Clearly, It is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. [See definition of "vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928); Republic of the Philippine v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possess a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding." (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, no evidence was ever presented that during her lifetime, Francisca Buela complied with all of the requisites for the issuance of a Certificate of Land Transfer and an Emancipation Patent. While a Certificate of Land Transfer ("CLT") is no longer necessary for the issuance or award of an Emancipation Patent, it is still necessary to show that an Emancipation Patent was issued to Francisca Buela in order for the latter to acquire a vested right of ownership over the Subject Property. An Emancipation Patent is the document representing absolute ownership over land transferred to the tiller who has completed payments for the same. It is only upon full compliance with the prescribed conditions that the farmer/grantee is entitled to an Emancipation Patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding. Prior to compliance with these conditions, the farmer-grantee merrily possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.

It must be emphasized that Emancipation Patent No. 697354, which is contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-131-M issued in the name of the appellee Buela, was issued only on 09 November 1994, Long after Francisca Buela .passed away in 1989, after the instant Petition was filed on 09 December 1993, and after the questioned Order of the Regional Director was rendered on 03 March 1994. Further, it must be noted that the aforementioned Emancipation Patent was issued during the pendency of the appeal filed by appellant Juson.

Since Francisca Buela did not possess an Emancipation Patent at the time she executed the voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant Juson on 23 February 1979, or ten (10) years before her death in 1989, Francisca Buela was not yet the absolute owner of the land. Therefore, she did not fall under the prohibition in P.D. No. 27, stating the tenant cannot transfer the land except to his heirs or the government. Thus, Francisca Buela could validly surrender the Subject Property to appellant Juson.

Consequently, considering that an Emancipation Patent was never issued to Francisca Buela during her lifetime, the latter's rights to the Subject Property remained contingent or expectant only as of the time of her death. As a result, Francisca Buela never became the owner of the Subject Property. Therefore, the Subject Property could not have been transferred to appellee Buela and his brothers and sisters, through hereditary succession, and the latter could not have validly executed a waiver in favor of appellee Buela.

E. Appellee Buela Is Not A Qualified Beneficiary In His Own Right Who Is Authorized By Law To Acquire And Register The Subject Property In His Name, Nor He Is Entitled To The Issuance Of An Emancipation Patent.

It is well settled that before a tenancy relationship can be created, the following requisites must be present:

(a) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(b) The subject is agricultural land;

(d) The purpose is agricultural production;

(e) There is a personal cultivation, and

(f) There is sharing of harvests.

In the instant case, the element of consent is conspicuously absent. After the execution of the voluntary surrender by Francisca Buela in 1979, appellant Juson never consented to, or authorized appellee or any of the heirs of Francisca Buela, to cultivate the Subject Property which appellant Juson already considered as untenanted. In fact, one of reasons cited by Francisca Buela in her voluntary surrender is that the land was no longer productive.

Further, appellee Buela has not met an essential requisite of Section 9, R.A. 3844, which is that the heir of the deceased agricultural lessee must be able to cultivate the landholding personally.

Appellee Buela's only proof that he has been cultivating the Subject Property consists of affidavits allegedly executed by the Barangay Captain of Malhacan, Eusebio M. Geronimo, as well as by Vicente Angeles, Alberto Santa Ana and Jesus Halasan, who claim to be farmers, tilling the lot adjacent to the Subject Property. However, in an Affidavit dated 11 April 1994, BARC Chairman Vicente Angeles retracted his earlier statement about appellee Buela's alleged personal cultivation and claimed that he was misled by appellee Buela into signing the Affidavit dated 17 November 1993 since in truth and in fact, appellee Buela never cultivated the Subject Property. What is more convincing is the fact that the Subject Property is being used for Appellee Buela's hollow block business and that a four-door apartment building has been constructed thereon, as shown in the photographs submitted as Annexes "13" to "13-H" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994, which appellee never denied.

Further, on 28 August 1995, another signatory to the 11 April 1994 Affidavit, Alberto Sta. Ana, disowned having signed the same, stating that the signature purporting to be that of "Alberto Sta. Ana" in the 11 April 1994 Affidavit is not his signature and that he never signed the said Affidavit. Not only was Alberto Sta. Ana's signature forged on the aforementioned Affidavit, the person or persons responsible for the forgery also used the Community Tax Certificate ("CTC") number of another person. The 11 April 1994 Affidavit states that Alberto Sta. Ana's CTC No. is 20024331, and was allegedly issued at Meycauayan, Bulacan on 15 November 1993. In truth, however, said CTC was issued to a certain Mr. Joel Ricamora, as evidenced by the photograph of CTC No. 20024331. In addition, Ma. Victoria A. Cruz, Municipal Accountant of Meycauayan, Bulacan, issued a Certification stating that CTC No. 20024331 was in fact issued to Mr. Joel Ricamora, and not to Alberto Sta. Ana.

It is, therefore, evident that the false, misleading and perjurious documents relied upon by appellee Buela to establish his alleged personal cultivation can not be given any credence.

The Subject Property is allegedly located in predominantly residential and industrial area so that it is no longer classified as riceland. An ocular inspection of the Subject Property would have easily settled this issue. It is noted that appellant Juson has submitted as annexes of his pleadings: (1) a Certification issued by the Office of the Zoning Administrator of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board of Meycauayan, Bulacan on 25 April 1994, which attests that Lot No. 3261, covered by OCT No. 0-1343, has been classified as RESIDENTIAL by virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 11-90 (Annex "17-A of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994); and (2) a Certification issued by the Agriculture Office of the Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan on the same date (Annex "18" of the Appeal Memorandum dated 14 June 1994), similarly stating that the land covered by OCT No. 0-1343 is located within a residential subdivision and was left idle after" 1979. These documentary evidence showing that the Subject Property is classified as residential have not been controverted by appellee Buela.

Moreover, it is not possible for appellee Buela to personally cultivate the Subject Property for the simple reason that appellee Buela is not a bona fide farmer but the full-time manager of an eatery in Tondo, Manila and does not reside in Barrio Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Although appellee Buela's address of record with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance is "Barrio Malhacan, MEYCAUAYAN, Bulacan," an Income Tax Return filed by appellee Buela in 1991 states his address as "200 B. Herbosa Street Extension, Tondo, Manila" and that appellee Buela derives his income from the aforementioned restaurant. Further, the application for the Building Permit for appellee Buela's four-door apartment on the Subject Property clearly states his address as "Padre Herrera I, Tondo, Manila". The foregoing documentary evidence have not been refuted by appellee Buela.

Furthermore, there has also been no sharing of harvests nor has appellant Juson received any farm rental from appellee Buela. This is not denied by appellee Buela.

The requirement of personal cultivation has clearly not been met by appellee Buela. On the other hand, BARC Chairman Vicente Angeles executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 25 August 1995, stating that the Subject Property has not been cultivated since the voluntary surrender by the late Francisca Buela in 1979 and that it is, at present, untenanted is surrounded by a fence constructed/installed by appellant Juson.

F. Contrary To The Ruling Of The DAR Secretary, The Voluntary Surrender Executed by appellee Buela's Mother In Favor Of Appellant Juson Is Valid, And Consequently, Terminated All Of The Claims Of Appellee Buela's Mother, As Well As Those Of Her Heirs And Successors-in-interest, Over The Subject Property.

Contrary to the DAR Secretary's findings, the voluntary surrender executed by Francisca Buela is valid and produced legal effects. We affirm that appellant Juson remained the owner of the Subject Property until the death of Francisca Buela in 1989 pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion No. 35 dated 27 February 1973 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8 Series of 1974.

Thus, after the issuance of P.D. No. 27, there was no immediate and automatic transfer of ownership of the Subject Property from appellant Juson to Francisca Buela. The leasehold system continued to govern the tenancy relationship between appellant Juson and Francisca Buela until the latter executed her voluntary surrender in 1979.

In the instant case, Francisca Buela voluntarily and unequivocally executed a "Pinanumpaang Salaysay", in consideration of the amount of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) and a portion of the property measuring One Thousand (1,000) square meters, indicating her reasons for the voluntary surrender, to wit:

"2. Na dahil sa kahinaan ng lupa at halos natatalo ako sa aking inaani at bukod pa dito ay mayroon akong binabalak na ibang palagiang hanapbuhay, ay minarapat kong bitiwan at isauli ang aking pagsasaka."

It appears that since the execution of the voluntary surrender, the heirs of Francisca Buela have recognized its validity by occupying and appropriating for themselves the One Thousand (1,000) square meter portion mentioned therein. In fact, the heirs have even gone beyond the area agreed upon.

Thus, since the voluntary surrender dated 23 February 1979 was validly executed by Francisca Buela at a time when the tenancy relationship was governed by the leasehold system, the said voluntary surrender divested her, her heirs and assigns of all rights to the Subject Property. Consequently, when Francisca Buela died in 1989, she was no longer entitled to and had no more rights over the Subject Property and could not have transferred the same to the appellee through hereditary succession

It should be noted that Francisca Buela, appellee Buela's mother and alleged predecessor-in-interest, did not exercise her so-called rights under P.D. 27 during her lifetime, until she died in 1989, despite her knowledge of the existence and effects of the law. On the other hand, she expressly and categorically waived, abandoned and forfeited her rights thereunder by executing a voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Juson. Obviously, appellee Buela, who was already of age at the time his mother and alleged predecessor-in-interest exercised the controversial waiver, also recognized the voluntary transaction and even upheld its existence and validity, until he commenced the present proceedings in 1993 in furtherance of his ulterior motive to enrich himself at the expense of appellant Juson. By this inconsistent and much delayed conduct, appellee Buela is clearly estopped from and cannot resurrect the alleged rights of his mother at this late hour and disturb the vested rights of appellant Juson over the Subject Property.

It is clear that appellee Buela is not a bona fide farmer actually cultivating the land and is obviously not a "landless tiller" who is the intended beneficiary of the government's land reform program. The grant of the Subject Property to appellee Buela must, therefore, be disallowed since this would only result in a serious miscarriage of justice. Awarding the land to an unqualified beneficiary would defeat the very objective sought to be accomplished by the government in its program of giving land to the landless. Since he does not meet the qualifications laid down by law, appellee Buela must not be allowed to benefit from the government's land reform program at the expense of the landowner who acquired the Subject Property through hard work and honest means.

While the Supreme Court has consistently declared that the findings or conclusions of administrative bodies which have gained expertise in their fields because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, supported as they are by substantial evidence, are generally respected and given great weight, this rule does not apply where there is a showing of unfairness or arbitrariness on the part of the administrative body amounting to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction [Ting v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 797 (1994)].

With regard to appellee Buela's contention that appellant Juson's Appeal Memorandum was filed out of time, the same is without merit. DAR Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 1994 ("DAR M.C. No. 10"), which is cited by appellee Buela, is inapplicable since it is ineffective and without any binding legal effect by reason of the failure of the DAR to comply the provisions of Section 3 and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which require the deposit with the University of the Philippines Law Center of certified copies of administrative rules and regulations before the same may take effect (cf. Certification of the UP Law Center dated 13 June 1996).

In the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres p. 212 SCRA 298, 305-307 (1992)], the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that, for failure to file the required copies of a circular with the University of the Philippines Law Center, said circulars are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable.

In any event, the facts in the instant case and the very nature of an agrarian dispute dictate that any decision thereon must be made in the interest of substantive justice without regard for technicalities [cf. Tiongson v. Court of Appeals [197 SCRA 197, 208 (1992)].

As so aptly stated by the Supreme Court in Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 545, 549 (1992):

"The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the. technical rules of court practice and procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings in the Department (former Ministry) of Agrarian Reform:

'. . . In the present case, DAR Secretary was not in estoppel when it reconsidered the previous ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling is plainly and directly against the law. As the order of September 7, 1988 stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under the law to a retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the office had not discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded by law to the landowners. No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court of justice, can deprive or deny the land owners of the retention of seven (7) hectares which the law has reserved for them. Otherwise, the law would be set to naught or would lose its very reason for being. Besides, there is no administrative rule or regulation, and our attention has not been called to it, which would preclude the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, to change the decision of his predecessor if the ruling is patently against the law; on the contrary, justice and equity demand, that the wrong should be righted and the error should not be made to prevail over what is correct and legal. . . .'(p. 22, Rollo.)" (Emphasis supplied)

It is noted that upon learning of the filing of appellee Buela's Petition, appellant Juson has not wavered in his attempts to present his side of the case, and has vigorously and vigilantly tried to protect his rights to the Subject Property. In so doing, appellant Juson has managed to refute the evidence relied upon by the DAR Regional Director and, subsequently, by the DAR Secretary, Thus, based on the evidence presented by both parties, and after carefully weighing the same, we find sufficient grounds to grant this appeal.

From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that appellee Buela is not a bona fide farmer actually cultivating the land and is obviously not a "landless tiller" who is the intended beneficiary of the government's land reform program. Thus, the grant of the Subject Property to appellee Buela cannot be countenanced, as this would only result in a serious miscarriage of justice. Awarding the land to an unqualified beneficiary would defeat the very objective sought to be accomplished by the government in its program of giving land to the landless.

The objective of agrarian reform is the promotion of social justice and, in view thereof, agrarian laws favor tenant-farmers and are often construed against the landowner. However, the law's bias in favor of tenant-farmers cannot, and not justify disregard for the landowner's fundamental and constitutional right to due process and fair play. Appellee Buela, since he clearly does not meet the qualifications laid down by law, must not be allowed to benefit from the government's land reform program at the expense of the landowner who acquired the Subject Property through hard work and honest means. As held in the case of Cabatan v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 323 (1980), landowners are no less entitled to social justice under our Constitution.

"Social justice as thus defined and in its true meaning is not meant to countenance, much less perpetuate, an injustice against any group — not even as against landholders. For the landholders as a component unit or element in out agro-industrial society are entitled to 'equal justice under law' which our courts are, above everything else, under mandate of the Constitution to dispense fairly, without fear nor favor." (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued: (1) granting appellant Juson's appeal; (2) setting aside and declaring null and void the Orders of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform dated 16 June 1995 and 31 January 1996; (3) reversing, setting aside and declaring null and void the Order dated 03 March 1994 of the DAR Region III Director; (4) declaring that Fortunato Buela is not a qualified beneficiary under CARP; (5) declaring that the Subject Property is not covered under Operation Land Transfer; (6) recognizing the validity of the voluntary surrender executed by Francisca Buela; and (7) dismissing the Petition dated 09 December 1993.

SO ORDERED.

By authority of the President:

(SGD.) RUBEN D. TORRES

Executive Secretary

Copy furnished:

Department of Agrarian Reform

Atty. Delfin B. Samson

Atty. Jose M. Jose

Fortunato M. Buela

Department of Agrarian Reform,
Region III

The Prov'l Agrarian Reform Officer
Baliuag, Bulacan

HELP CENTER

CONTACT INFORMATION

Department of Agrarian Reform
Elliptical Road, Diliman
Quezon City, Philippines

Copyright Information

HELP CENTER

CONTACT INFORMATION

Department of Agrarian Reform Elliptical Road, Diliman Quezon City, Philippines

Copyright Information

Department of Agrarian Reform
Elliptical Road, Diliman
Quezon City, Philippines